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ABSTRACT
The institution is based on the concept that a nucleus 
of ancestral property and accretions to it do not exclu­
sively belong to one person, but form the basis for the 
spiritual and economical welfare of family members normally 
within a circle of three generations* In traditional 
belief even past and future generations have an "interest” 
in the property of those who enjoy the property for the 
present* This concept was based on patriliny* Patriarchy 
existed but did not develop into the strict Roman patria 
notestas. It rather served to emphasize the rights of the 
father in the face of premature assumption of powers by 
the son. The core of the institution is the relationship 
between father and son* The son is the father reborn and 
inherits not only rights to enjoy property, but also 
responsibilities towards all family members*
The admixture of customary law in the Dharmasastras 
brought modifications and accretion of rules. Thus the 
value of ancestral land furthered the rights of the son* 
Rights of females in property competed with the view that 
women should be only maintained which includes marriage 
expenses* The customary elementary family with community 
of ownership between husband and wife occurs in sastric 
texts but recede in the face of the pivotal relationship
of father and son which constitutes a kind of "trust"•
After the death of the common ancestor the law always 
anticipated partition and formation of new smaller joint 
families unless brothers remained joint out of convenience 
or necessity*
In Anglo-Hindu law the traditional institution may 
have suffered from over-specialisation of rules, deficient 
selection of application of sastric material, and conflict­
ing decisions* But judge-made law has essentially 
supported greater individuality without destroying basic 
jointness and has in fact supported the preservation of 
the joint family* Even legislation has not abrogated the 
basic jointness between agnates and especially between 
father and son* This process represents an example of the 
adaptation of a traditional legal institution to modern 
demands•
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The existence of the joint Hindu family as a legal 
and social institution has been deplored as antiquated and 
backward. Zealous reformers had little sympathy with an 
institution which in their eyes seemed to be opposed to all 
progress of society. Already in 1901 reformers would 
criticise the institution emphatically. It was said: "The
tendency of all progressive nations is to allow the fullest 
scope for the expansion of the latent powers of the indi­
vidual and the fullest liberty for him to follow whereever
1
his powers lead him”. Especially the subordinate status 
of women and their limited rights in property were the 
target of movements for social legislation. In 193^ a write 
expressed a very widely held conviction about the disadvan­
tage of the joint family system when he says: MThe joint
family system is to be condemned. It creates idlers in the 
family and discourages the enterprising by its restrictions 
oautious distribution of funds for domestic business 
purposes. It provides a sort of 'dole' which encourages 
'unemployment'. It is this system which encourages the 
living of fifty or more members of one family in a small 
ill-ventilated, unsanitary dwelling-place with no privacy or
seclusion and with no chance for thinking, studying or
1G.Subramania Iyer, The Hindu Joint Family System, in: 
Yajneswara Chintamani (ed.), Indian Social Reform. Madras, 
1901, at p.115.
tis'
developing individuality. The only 'recreation' of the
1members consists in quarelling over their respective shares".
On the other side stood the sympathisers with the 
joint family system, the "traditionalists", who believed 
in the spiritual and material merit of joint living, subor­
dination to the eldest common ancestors , jointness of
2
property and common mutual sharing of fortune and misfortune.
It is generally believed that the recent legislation
of the year 1956, if not judicial decisions before that,
have accelerated the impending extinction of the joint
family. Individualism, urbanization, and industrialization
have contributed, it is maintained, to replace to a great
extent the joint family by the nuclear family.
This presumes that the essence of a joint family are
a conglomeration of relatives or one household, i.e.a
residential unit and that the large patrilineal household,
joint living, commensality, property held in common, and
participation in common family worship wate always the rule
3in Indian life.
—  -  ^  -
J.C.Durai, "The Hindu Law; should it be reformed?", Journ.
of Como. Legislation and Intern. Law, l6 (1934) 140-4•
2 _
See e.g. G.C.Sarkar Sastri, Hindu Law. 3rd ed., 183-6.•z
See Irawaii Karve1s definition, Kinship Organization in India. 
Poona 1953ilO. For a collection of sociological definitions 
see T.N.Madan, "The joint family: a terminological clarifi­
cation", Intern. Journ. of Comp .Sociology. 3(1962) The
author considers joint rights in property and obligations as 
the criterium for the existence of a joint family. Cp.also 
Kane's definition (HDh..Ill.590f.): "A joint family consists
of all males lineally descended from a common ancestor and 
includes their wives and unmarried daughters••. Under the 
Mitak^ara a Hindu coparcenary so-called is a much narrower 
group than the joint family. It comprises only those males
But there is no need for a joint family to live jointly
in one house and often smaller joint families, e.g. a couple
with an adult married son, or even a minor son, because, he
has an interest by birth in the father’s property, forip a
part or a branch of larger joint family the branches of
which may have separate residence though they are joint in
status with the larger joint family. Nor is it necessary
to have only one receptacle of property. The institution
of self-acquisitions as a separate entity developed in
Anglo-Hindu law supports separate living without effecting
severance of status and partitioning the ancestral property
or a nucleus of common property. In the customary law of
some castes we find arrangements where brothers or father
1
and sons are separate for some purposes.
Moreover ties of kinship are still strong and support
the tendency to jointness which is strengthened by the ideal
respect to the head of the family, the feeling of mutual
2
responsibility , ancestral rituals and cults, the sentimental
3 (Cont'd • from previous page) 
who take by birth in interest in the joint or coparcenary 
property, i.e. a person himself and his sons1 sons, and sons' 
grandsons form for the being a coparcenary.
See Derrett, "The History of the Juridicial Framework of 
the Joint Hindu Family, Contr. to Ind.Sociology. 6(1962)17-47* 
2See e.g. Richard 0* Lambert, Factories, Workers and Social 
Change in India. Princeton, 1963*56: the industrialization 
had the effect that the relatively high income of the factory 
workers draws added dependents and thus larger families.
See also e.g. Jyotirmoyee Sarma, "The Nuclearization of 
Joint Family Households in Nest Bengal", Man in India. 44 
(1964) 193-206.
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and economic value of ancestral property, and the tendency 
of families to hold together in order to preserve prestige 
and identity within the wider kinship group and caste, and 
the physical and emotional security which joint family 
life provides•
The larger household as an incident of the joint family 
may be disappearing in modern life being a feature of the 
traditional society whether in India or e.g. in Africa where 
joint families occur. But the essence of the joint Hindu 
family may be found in the concept that a man’s property 
serves family purposes and that a father and son own the 
property rather as a kind of trust for many others besides 
themselves•*
This notion which took firm root in Indian legal texts —
contrary to the development of Roman law where individual
ownership with full testamentary power, superseded the
earliest conception of ’co-ownership1. In classical Roman
law individual ownership as evident from the freedom to
make a will had superseded all inherent rights of the
descendants; the only survival of a limitation on the
father’s powers consisted of a formal requirement that in
a will any or all sui heredes whom the testator wished to
be disinherited had to be mentioned expressis verbis in an
1See J.D.M. berrett, "The Law and The Predicament of the 
Hindu Joint Family” , The Economic Weekly. February 13*1960,
305-311, 311.
appropriate clause (exheredatio). This limitation probably 
dates back to very early times when the pater familias was 
rather the administrator than the absolute owner of the 
family property and when the sui heredes were in a certain 
sense co-owners even in the lifetime of the father. At 
that time the testamentum was a recent innovation and it 
had still to be approved by the oontifices and sanctioned 
by the comitia caiata. In the earliest period of Roman law 
there was apparently no succession or transfer of dominium, 
nor a mere expectancy of the male descendants, as they were 
in a position of quasi-owners of the common property along 
with the father and at his death they succeeded to his 
spiritual and economical position and inherited his rights 
and duties, including the right of the administration of 
property which had become now 'free1 (libera adminitratio).
Indian legal texts have gone beyond this concept for 
the benefit of the family. *Ve have concentrated on the 
genesis and development of the joint Hindu family as a 
property-acquiring, -managing, and -enjoying unit centering 
around the relationship between father and son according to 
traditional law. Subsequently we have indicated with the 
help of a few typical illustrations from the mass of
1See Paulus, Digestes XXVIII,2,11 in Institutes of Gaius. 
ed. and tr. F. de Zulueta, pt.2, comm., 97* The famous 
passage of Gaius is: sed sui quidem heredes ideo appellantur, 
quia domestici heredes sunt et vivo quoque parente quodammodo 
domini existimantur• Inst.II, 157 *
decisions the adaptation of the institution to modern 
conditions at Anglo-Hindu law and modern legislation*
It remains for me to express thanks to the staff of 
the SOAS Library who were exceedingly helpful and indulgent. 
I am especially grateful to Professor J.D.M. Derrett whose 
teaching and works on Hindu law have helped me immense iy 
and whose unfailing and patient guidance was of great 
encouragement to me.
uCHAPTER I
FAMILY LIRE AS SHOWN IN PRE-LEGAL TEXTS 
AND THE DHARMASlSTRA
I* Types of Families and Membership*
(1) The Patrilineal Family according to Pre-legal Texts,
Brahmapical and Buddhist texts of the pre-legal
period, that is to say before the first Dharmasutras and
Smptis came to be composed and had found a wide acceptance
in society, generally reflect the existence of a patrilineal
family consisting of father and mother, sons and their wives,
including unmarried daughters and children of sons, and
perhaps occasionally widowed or divorced daughters, thus
forming a unit of three generations of family members. This
circle of family members is already indicated in the often-
quoted marriage hymn of the Rg-veda when in the course of
the prayer welcoming the newly-married wife at the entrance
of her husband’s house it is said:
,rbe a queen to your father-in-law,
be a queen to your mother-in-law,
be a queen to your husband’s sisters,
be a queen to your husband’s brothers.”
The descendants in the male line normally included two
1, 10, 85* 4-6; tr„ follows H.H. Wilson’s Rig~Veda-Sanhita,
IV, 1952; Poona ed,, 4-, 587J.
saprajni §va§ure bhava samrajni §va§vra& bhava/ nanandari 
saprajnl bhava samrajnx adhi devp$u//4-6//
24
i
generations, as we notice in the earlier part of the hymn*
In the Atharva-veda a passage shows the circle of family 
members a particular member could envisage or have active 
memory of:
"Self, father, son, grandson, grandfather, 
wife, the mother that bore me, those who 
are dear, them I call upon*"2
This circle of five generations differs from the later 
conceptional unity of seven generations consisting of three 
generations of deceased agnatic ancestors and four genera­
tions of living agnates based on the notion of sapipdaship* 
The great-grandfather is hardly referred to in early writings 
except in the funeral hymn of the Atharva-veda (4,35,75-80) 
where he is invited as one of the ancestors along with 
father and grandfather* Similarly the third male descendant 
is hardly referred to and there are no definite words for 
descendants in different generations except that the term 
meaning the first male descendant may be repeated to suggest
1* 10,85,4-2[586] :
ihaiva stap ma vi yaugfap vi&vamayurvyaSnutap/ krlj.antau
putrairnaptpbhir-modmanau sve gphe//42// Geldner, Harv.
Or*Ser*, XXXV, 273, translates: "Bleibet immerhier, 
trennet euch nicht, erreichet das voile Lebensalter, mit 
Sohnen und ErOceln spielend, im eigenen Hause frohlichj" 
Atharva-veda 14, 122 is similar.
Ath* -v* 9, 5,30. Translation follows Whitney1 s, Harv* Or* 
iper., VTl, 1, 716* The Hoshiarpur ed*, ii, 1186, reads:
atmanap pitaram put rap pautram pitamahap/ jay am j anitrlm
matarap ye priyastanupa hvaye//30//.
the descendants in the first and second generation. ^  The
authority of the father-in-law over the wife of the husband
is stressed in the Brahmapas and confirms the impression that
2
extended families were the rule.
The texts of the Pali-Canon likewise show that the
family unit was normally larger than the nuclear family and
to illustrate this we may refer to a passage from the
Ahguttara Nikaya where the newly-married woman is said to
feel "extreme fear and bashfulness in the presence of her
x
husband*s mother, his father, and domestic servants.1
In the Vinaya Pit aka we find the female members of 
an extended patrilineal family and other female members of 
the household classified according to their rank and posi­
tion within the family, namely, the women of the family 
(kula ittl), the daughters of the family (kula dhltayo), 
the young girls of the family (kula kumariyo), the daughters-
1. Kapadia, Hindu Kinship, 122f*, where further references 
are given"and the -berms napat (naptp) , toka and tanaya 
are discussed. Kapadia, ibid., comes to the conclusion 
that "so far as the Vedic Aryans is concerned, the 
normal family unit consisted of three generations,"
2. Aitareyabrahmaqa 3,22,7; [1,508]:
•.. tadyathaivada^L n^u§aljL svaSural-lajamane nillyamanaitye-
vameva ... Keith, Harv.OroSer., XX7, 179> translates:
"... just as in this world a daughter-in-law keeps 
hiding in modestyjbefore the father-in-lawCp. Taittirl- 
yabr. 2,4,6,12. Naitrayanx Sagihita 2,4,2. Kathakagi 6agi.
12"712• (cit. in Kane, HDili., II, 793* passages are
collected in W. Rau, Staat und Gesellschaft im alten 
Indien, 42.
3* II,' N.K. Vagle, Society at the Time of the Buddha,
Ph.D. Thesis, London, 210.
in-law of tlie family (1mla suphayo) , and the women slaves
(kula dasiyo) In the same text a household of gahapati is
described to include his wife, his son, sonfs wife, slaves
2
and domestic servants.
(2) Kula (Extended Family or "Gens") and Kulya (Kinsman, 
Relative).
The term which is frequently used in the Brahmapas 
as well as in the Pali-Ganon to describe an extended family 
or large household is kula and it may be worthwhile to trace 
the meanings and implication of the term in various contexts. 
Even in late legal texts the term occurs occasionally in the 
sense of 1 joint family1 or 'extended household'. In the 
Dlgha Nikaya it is stated that father and mother 'desire a 
son to be born in the family1 so that he may fulfil the
1. Ill, 120; Wagle, 120. kula dhltayo are most probably 
widowed or divorced daughters whomight return to their 
father's kula. Cp. Rau, 42. ArthaS. 3.3*13* In the 
DharmaSastras the wife's rights in her father1s family 
are neglected.
2. I, 240; Wagle, 211.
Katy. 874: kale vinl t a - v i dy an aA bhratppafi pitpto'pi va/
fcaurya-praptagL tu yad-vittagi vibhajya^L tad bphaspatih//
Tr. [310]: "Bphaspati declares that the wealth acquired 
by valour (in battle) by brothers who were instructed in 
the family or by the father is liable to be divided 
(among all members of the f a m i l y ) C p .  Bphaspati 10,56 
[107]: "Notice having been given to the debtor's family 
..." (ppi-kule).
manifold functions which are attached to the position of a
son.^ The male descendants of a kula were known hy the
generic name kulaputta in the Pali-Canon, whereas the head
of this patrilineal group was known as kulapati or kula- 
2
.jettha, who may have "been a senior head of a larger group 
than the extended family, namely an agnatic lineage or 'gens1 
into which the kula may grow eventually*
In the Brahmapas, kula has the meaning of a family
living in a mess community comprising besides the members
- 3of the family brahmapical guests and female slaves. That a
kula may eventually comprise too many members and become 
unwieldy is perhaps reflected in a passage from the Jaiminlya 
brahmapa: "then (in the golden age) one bowl of rice was
ZL
sufficient for a kula0M Thus after a certain time, the kula 
would split up and the members of the original kula establish 
separate households. Here the term kula may assume the 
meaning of an extended kinship group, or a patrilineal ^ l a n 1 
This accounts for the vagueness and ambiguous connotations 
with which the term is used in the legal texts. Thus in the 
Artha§astra which is one of the earliest texts reflecting
1. Ill, 189«
2. Wagle, 240,
3. PancavigiSa-brahmapa 5>6,9; Satapatha-brahmapa 2,1,4,4.
In the Buddhist scriptures monks appear as dependants on 
households (kula) for their livelihood, Samyutta Nikaya 
(II, 200) anO i n a y a  Pit aka (II, 83, 248^9).
4. 2,266: api ha smaiko vrihipatralj. pakvaljL kulayalap. bhavati.
Rau, 37i translates: "Fruher (in golden Zeitalter) war 
eine Schussel gekochten Reises genug fur ein kula#"
customary rules, we find the term represented in the compound
svafeura-kula = father-in-law's family or house' pati-
2
kula = 'the wife's husband's family or residence, and 
tinati-kula = 'family, or residence, of the kinsmen of the
wife, or the agnatic lineage to which the wife originally
x 4
belonged* Yet a kulya, a member of the kula, is not
necessarily a sapinda, that is one of the members of the
mess community who have claim to the property of a deceased
within this group and who are members of the unit of four
generations of agnates according to the ArthaSastra♦^
In an ancient text attributed to Devala, which
closely follows the ArthaSastra in this respect, four
generations of male agnates 'undivided' or 'reunited'
(actually 'living together after having been divided') are
said to participate in a partition, and it is made clear that
up to the fourth degree kulyas would be sapindas which
clearly indicates that the kulyas may comprise a much wider
circle of agnates and that the notion of sapipdaship was
1. 3s5?6 [100; tr.223]
2. 3 4 1 102; tr*236]e
3. 3.4.19, 13 [102, tr. 2373.
Arthas. 3?9?3 [109]: samanta-catvarim§at-kulye§u ...
Ltr.253]: in the presence of members of forty
neighbouring families...")
5. 3.5*5-6 [104] In 3.4.40, the kulya ranks behind the
sapipda who has a preferable claim to marry the deceased's
widow after the full brother or half-brother. 3j6,22'
[106; tr.246] .
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utilised to distinguish the rights of the members of an
undivided patrilineal joint family against the claims of
the wider agnatic kin:
"Among kulyas that are undivided or who are 
living -boge-ther after being divided, there 
may be a partition up to the fourth degree; 
so far would kulyas be sapipdas; beyond that 
there would be difference of plpda; they 
hold that the partition of properEy and the 
pipda go hand-in-hand."I
A passage in the Eaudhayana-dharmasutra shows that the con­
cept of sapip<Jaship had superseded the term kulya, sapipda 
meaning a member of the undivided family who takes a share 
or inherits the property in preference to kulyas whom 
Baudhayana calls sakulyas: "The great-grandfather, the grand­
father, the father, oneself, the uterine brothers, the son 
by a wife of the same caste, the grandson, the great-grand­
son - these undivided dayadas they call sapipdas; the
-  -  2divided dayadas they call sakulyas..." At some stage of
the development of the Smptis, the terms sakulya and sagotra,
1. Jha1 s tr., HLS, II, 356. avibhakta-vibhaktanam kulyanai 
vasatam saha/bhuyo daya-vibhaga^i syad a caturthad iti 
sthiti^// tavat-kulyah sapi^a^. syulp. pip.da-bhedas-tata^ 
parajjp. samam-icchanti pi^anam dayarthasya vibhajanam// 
Dh.K. 1203a. Cp. also Brh.Sm. 26,14- and fn.211.
ArthaSo 3*5«4— 6*
2. Baudh. dh.su. as cit. e.g. in Kptya-kal. 751, Dh»K.1465f♦
Sapipdas are the primary heirs after whom the sakulyas 
inherit"according to Manu 9, 187*
i,e, member of the patrilineal clan, must have been disting­
uished and a sagotra must have been a member of a wider 
group. According to the Devala-smyti the partition of 
property of a Brahmajjia who has only a paraSava son (from a 
Sudra wife) has to be as follows: one third to the para&ava 
son, the remainder to his sapipdas or near sakulyas; in the 
absence of these the property shall go to the father's 
acarya or pupil; if these are absent the property should be 
made over to persons belonging to the same gotra, After the 
term kulya had lost its importance for explaining the 
property relations within a family, especially in respect
of partition of daya, it retains its residual meaning as a
2
kinsman and heir after the sapipdas,
Kula is eventually mainly used while referring to
*
a well-known or noble family or 'gens1. It may even lose 
its original meaning of a patrilineal family or agnatic 
lineage and according to a passage of Sahkha, if at a 
partition between agnates or members of a gotra any doubt
1* Devala, as cit, in the Kptya-kal» 702f, (attr, to Bphas-
pati in Vi,ra0 538), The texi; attributed to Devala seems
to be related to Artha§, 3,6,22-24 [1033*
2, Manu 9, 187*
3. Manu 7t 63,77,141;_10,60, Bph,Sm, 17,8-9 [1513; Katy,
347,927; cp, kulinarya, 965° kome further uses of kula 
may be noted here; kula-dharma (Manu 8,40) is, according 
Katy, 85, that whicEHEias come down hereditarily in a 
gotra as the dharma (or custom) to be observed by the 
members of the family, Kula as a court of first instance 
is mentioned in the Taqilc Sm♦ ( 2,30)» Ifelr ada Sm, (1,7), 
a *  •Sm, (17,17), and~T£aby, 821; cp,496)« Kulani is a 
group of impartial persons: madhyastha-purugah, 
Medhatithi on Manu. second interpretat 1 on),
arises, the kula should "be witness* Here kula can apparently 
not he the agnatic lineage as the term gotra already includes 
the agnatic lineage. The commentators understand kula as 
cognates and it was probably a neutral body constituted by 
cognatic relations.***
(3) A Comparison of the Terms Kula and Kutumba.
Whereas kula means primarily the extended patrilineal
household and refers to birth and relationship, kutumba,
2
which is connected with kuti = cottage, hut, refers primar­
ily to a nuclear family, to dwelling and the household as 
an economic unit, perhaps within the wider framework of a 
kula. In the ArthaSastra a widow who desires to remarry one 
of her husband’s brothers is described as katumba-kama, 
"desirous of having a family", and is allowed to keep the 
gifts made by her late husband and her father-in-law. This 
presumably refers to a family within an extended family. In 
the Narada-smrti a brother is referred to who maintains the
1. Sankha as cit. in Dayabhaga, 229fo* etc. Jha. HLS, II,
621f• Dh.K,1375a.
gotra-bhaga-vibhagarthe sandehe samupasthite/gotrajaiS- 
caparijnate kulagi sakgitvam-arhati//Medhatithi (ubi cit.) 
likewise gives bandhu-tjana-samuhafr. as his first interpre­
tation of kulani in Naradas* text.
2• Nayrhofer, A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary, 
s.v0 The term seems of jDravldian origin and kafcumbin = 
householder appears relatively late in the literature of 
the Brahma^Las. §atapatha-br.2,3*5*6 ; Rau, op.cit., 39♦
3* 3?2,21 [99; tr.22$J . It a(my also mean 1 (emotionally) 
attached to the household *, that is the widow does not 
wish to remarry or not remarry outside her husband’s kula,
 3ji
kafvrnba of his brother while the latter is away to acquire 
learning.***
Kutumba was something which had to be established 
unlike the kula which was already in existence, but the 
continuation of which had to be secured by dayadas. Thus in 
Viscera- Pitaka we find an instance where a gahapati 
establishes the kutumba of his sister's son to the prejudice 
of his own son who describes the gifts to the sister's son 
as actually constituting his "inheritance” (pituno dayajja)0 
The term kutumbin occurs to describe a family where 
the householder and his wife have some joint interest in the 
property: kutumbinau dhanasyefeate.^  In the ArthaSastra 
kutumbinah appears with the meaning of heads of families of
li. * — —
workmen. The well-known Selarva^i inscription associates 
the term kutumbaka (kudubika) with a peasant who works his 
own fields and distinguishes this peasant from his son who 
had become a gahapati, a "squire" or a rich householder
1. kufumbagi bibhyyad-bhratur yo vidyam adhigacchata^/
[191; Dh.K.1221]. "If a brother maintains the family of 
another brother who is engaged in acquiring learning...” 
Jha, HLS, II, 42,
2. Ill, 66-67: Kufumban ca sap.$hapesi danan ca pajjhapesi. 
Quot, by Wagle, 242.
3. Spastamba-dh.su. 2,11,29,3 [296; Dh.K.1407a], SBE,II,168.
4* 2,4,24 [393 : karmanta-kgetra-va&ena kujumbinam slmanaiji
sthapayet. Tr. 81: ”He should fix boundaries for house­
holders in accordance with areas necessary for their 
workshops."
In the Smptis the term is not necessarily confined 
to the nuclear family, because just as the kula might 
become a clan, the kutumba may grow into a kula, a large
p
household which would split up eventually to form a clan.
In the chapter on debts the term is made use of and some
texts disclose the circle of family members or numbers of
generations staying in a kutumba, The Narada-smpti says:
"If a debt has been contracted for the purpose of a kutumba,
by an unseparated uncle or by an unseparated brother, or by
the mother, it shall be paid by all those who inherit the
property on the death or on the going abroad of the man who
3
contracted the d e b t M o r e  clearly a text from the Bphaspati 
smpti shows that kutumba implies an extended household:
"When a debt has been incurred for the benefit of the family 
by an uncle, brother, son, wife, slave, pupil or dependant -
Zl
it should be paid by the head of the family.,," For
1, Burgess, Cave Temples of Western India, 1881, 38; Tr, 
Kosambi JASB, . See fop the meaning of 
kutumbin and kutumbaka R #S.Sharma, Sudras in Ancient 
India, 235: cultivating householders,
2. The medieval Lekhapaddhati (p,10) distinguishes between 
udvasa-[sic] kutumbikas = cultivators who have come from 
outside and settled recently and kula-kutumbikas = 
farmers who lived for generations at tEe same place and 
who might be the original settlers,
3« Nar. 4,3 [46] : pitrvyenavibhaktena bhratra va yad-pp.ajjL
kptam/ matra/va yat-kufumbarthe dayus -tad-rikthino 1
khilam//• _ _ _
4, 11, 121 [118]: pitpvya bhratp-putra-strl-dasa-§i§yanujl-
vibhi£/yad-g£hlta$ kutumbarthe tad-grhl datum-arhati//.
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describing the liability of the family members for debts
incurred for the purpose of a family, kutumba was more apt
than kula as we can see from the use of the term kula by
Manu and the difficulties of most of the commentators to
understand this as referring to the liability of an undivided
family for debts*1
The attempt to preserve the continued existence of
the kutumba and to prevent its breaking up, with the result
that three generations would be living jointly, is visible
in a passage from the Saiikha-Likhita-dharmasutra; "On the
father becoming disabled, the eldest brother shall carry on
the business of the family (kutumba-vyavaharam) ; or with his
permission the next brother who may have knowledge of
business* There shall be no partition of property if the
father is unwilling • *, the eldest brother shall guard the
property in the same manner as the father; as the property
is the basis of the family (riktha-nulam hi kutrumbam); and
those whose father is alive are not independent* Similarly
2
while the mother is alive*"
The passage dwells on the necessity of preserving 
the property of the family during the life-time of the 
father and mother which applies presumably to families which 
were less wealthy and which were monogamous* Such families
1* Manu 8, 169; SBE, XXV, 284 and fn 
2* Jha, HLS, II,“25 [Dh.K. 114-7] .
tend to emulate the customs of the large, undivided, patri­
lineal and patriarchal household, in which especially women 
are protected "by father, husband, and sons according to the 
classic passage of Manu.^" Partition during the life-time of 
the parents was only to take place when property was plenti­
ful so that the material security of the father and the 
mother was not prejudiced# Further, a mother or wife looking 
after the affairs of the family as far as they concern the
outside world and especially the earning for maintenance of 
2the family, would be an undesirable proposition# We find 
for instance that a distinction is made in the Law on 
summons between a woman who is born in a kula (kule (jabam) 
and a woman who is herself a householder (kutrumbinl) # The 
former is not to be summoned whereas the latter can be 
summoned personally and is mentioned along with women who 
are of low status#
The two bases for the existence of a householder are
said to be a well-kept house and field: dve vasahetu kujrum-
_ _ - 4
binam; mulaig. kutumbinam. Property is the basis of the
1# See below,105f.
2# As in the case of wives of washermen, hunters, herdsmen, 
and distillers# Cp# Katy. 569-70.
3. Katy# 97 and 98; Kane, HDh, III, 287*
4. Nar. 14,42 [172]: gyha-kjetre ca dpgte dve vasa-hetu 
ku^umbinam/ tasmat te notkjiped-raja taddhi mulaip 
kujumbinam//.
family and a person who has lost daya or kutumba may be
suspected ipso facto of being a criminal I A householder
should not prejudice the basic needs of the family by
alienating his whole property: svaip. ku^umbavirodhena deyam 
2
... Except the house, the necessary clothes and food, 
being the requirements of maintaining the family, the 
property may be given away.
(4) The Establishment of Patriarchy in Legal Texts.
(a) The Situation in the Pre-legal Era.
There are several instances which indicate that the
patriarchal authority of the head of the family was based
on weak foundations * Ve learn from two passages in the
Brahmapa literature that sons, apparently without much ado,
4.
divided the property of an aged father. The earliest 
example of sons dividing the possessions of an aged father 
comes from the gg-veda.^ In the Atharva-veda we find ritual 
devices to prevent harsh treatment of parents by their 
adult sons. A prayer for the new-born son concludes "let 
him not, increasing, slay his father; let him not harm his
1« Artha|. 4,6,2 [137; tr.311].
2. Yajn.Sm. 2, 175*
3* Katy. 640: sarva-sva-gpha-varjap. tu kujrumba-bharapadhikam/ 
... deyam ...// Bphaspati 14,3 [1373: kufumba-bhakta- 
vasanad-deya^i yad at ir icy ate...
4. Jaiminlya-br. 3,156. Aitareya-br. 5,12,2ff. See below,
5* 1,70,10 [i, 462; Dh.K. 1158a].
mother that gave him h i r t h . T o  this we may add an instance
of the Pali-Canon where a rich Brahmap is driven out of his
2
home by his sons in conjunction with his daughters-in-law*
It can probably be said that the father was on account of 
his patriarchal power at liberty to divide the property as 
he desired, but that his power was subject to the possibility 
that his sons would oust him from his possessions once he 
grew too old and physically unfit to exercise the authority 
necessary in a society which was still on the way to a life 
of regular settlement.
One consequence of this state of affairs was that 
the father used to retire after dividing his property and 
became a parivrajaka or would live under the protection of
IL
his son or sons. Thus at times a kula is named after the 
son which indicates that the father has retired from worldly
5 _ _
affairs.^ In the Pali-Canon it is also considered in no way
1. 6,110,5 [8133: sa ma vadhlt pitaragi vardhamano ma mataragt
pra minljjanitrim// Tr. Whitney, i, 11; see also 6,140,
1;3 [866f.] Zimmer, Altindisches Leben, 327*
2* Sagyutta Nikaya, I, 176-177#
3. For references to tribal life and feuds, see V, Rau, 18; 
foodgathering, hunting, and fishing as important supple­
ments to diet, 22; cattle-breeding, 24; evolution of the 
meaning of the term grama from !a horde of migrating 
cattle-breeders! or *band of warriors1 to 1car-camp1 and 
1village1 „ Has the term kula a similar origin? Cp.
go-kula.
4. Cp o the fampus handing-over ceremony by the father to the 
son in the Sankaynarapy aka (4,15), quot. by W.Rau, 45#
5. Satapatha-br. 14,4, 3,32 = Bphadarapyaka-upanisad 1,5,21. 
Cp. Jaiminlya-br. 2,286; 3,3# Quot. by Rau, 37#
!3£*1 ^  -V *
unusual to retire at an advanced age from active day-to-day 
affairs and to band over tbe property, as the instance of a 
gahapati named Pofaliya illustrates The Manu-smpti con­
templates the father becoming an ascetic and living under
2
the protection of his son*
(b) Consolidation in the DharmaSastras*
By the time the Dharma- and Gyhyasutras came to be 
composed, major parts of the society in the Gangetic valley 
were inhabited in regular settlements. We hear of rich 
householders - gahapatis - and the society was supported by 
regular agriculture based on plough cultivation. As a conse­
quence of the more settled condition a father might not 
think: of dividing the property and would postpone a partition 
until after his death. The proposition that the father should 
withdraw from worldly pursuits and enter the vanaprastha 
stage became rather an ideal and not a practical solution.
The continuation of a state of affairs which would allow 
sons to divide the property of the father against his wishes 
was, therefore, strongly condemned, A series of texts make
it clear that the property should be divided only in accord-
*
ance with the will of the father or after his death• Other
1. Majjhima Nikaya II, 339* The case of the Buddha himself 
is an instance in point. He is asked by his son Rahula 
for his inheritance (dayajja = day a) . Vinaya Pitaka I, 82, 
Wagle, 82 f,
2, Manu 6, 94-95; tr. SBE, XXV, 215*
5* Baudhayana-dh, 2,3?8 ; Manu 9*104; Gautama-dh.su. 28,1;
SaAkha-Likhita-dh.su, as cit. e.g, in the Nptya-kal.649, 
DhXll48b. ----  -----
rules provide for the exclusion of sons who initiate a
partition against the father*s will from the Sraddha-
ceremonies which practically amounted to social ostracism,
a serious proposition considering that the loss of one*s
1kin involved severe social and economical consequences*
The son is said to have no property and is asvatantra during 
the lifetime of the father, a proposition which finds its 
strongest expression in the dicta of Manu and Narada: "A 
wife, a son, and a slave, these three are declared to have 
no property; the wealth which they earn is (acquired) for
p
him to whom they belong*” "Non-independent are women (wives), 
sons, and slaves together with the household. Independent 
there is the householder, to whomsoever it has come by 
descent."^ "Three persons are svatantra in this world: the 
king, and also the spiritual teacher; and in every caste,
LL
caste by caste, the master of the house in his own house."
The concept of the head of the household as a 
miniscule king transpires in this dicta and has influenced 
much of the early law of the family, and the rule of primo­
geniture probably derives from this atmosphere.^ Manu*s and
1. Manu 3, 159; Gaut.dh.su. 15* 18.
2. Manu 8, 416; 3EE7TXV7~326.
3. Narada 4, 31 1573; tr. Derrett,ZVN, 64 (1962) at p.97*
d^ ywo-vt __ _  _
4. Nar. 4,32[573 • traya£ svatantra Wkoifcomin rajacaryas
tathaiva ca/prativarnan ca sarvesaft varnanam sve grhi 
Tr. Derrett, ubi cit., 96* _ _
5* See Vyasa cited in the Vibhaga-sara 9, 1,2; Jha, HLS, II, 
83: The rule of primogeniture is found e.g. in Manu
(9,105).
Narada*s dicta are explicable in the atmosphere of the 
large, wealthy, and possibly polygamous patriarchal house­
hold, where the authority of the father had to be firmly 
established, but was also more easily attainable, because 
of his economic independence* His dependence on sons was 
essentially confined to having worthy heirs* Yet this 
approach of the law, namely, that the sons and women !belong* 
to the patriarch and ipso facto their property is really 
speaking his property is a recurring feature in legal 
writings, even after it was admitted that sons could acquire 
property of their own* The patriarchal household which may 
dissolve at the wish of the father or after his death was 
probably customary among the descendants of the Aryan tribes 
whose customs other communities tended to emulate* The
seclusion of women which began amongst K^atriyas according
*1
to & at apatha-brahmana the non-participation of women in the 
property of the agnates, the institution of strldhana as 
the separate property of the woman is in line with this* It 
must be stressed, however, that this patrilineal and patri­
archal system was modified to some extent by Smpti-authors 
who were aware of changing social conditions and customs 
of different origin*
1. Rau, opecit*, 29: Sat»br* 10,5>2,10*
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(5) Nuclear Family and the Desirability of Extended 
Families. Community of Goods between Husband and 
Wife.
The patrilineal, vertically extended family occurs 
frequently in the pre-legal literature and was a desideratum 
for various reasons, especially because a son and the con­
tinuation of one*s line was a material and spiritual neces- 
sity. Nuclear families where sons would leave the family 
at marriage would especially occur where there was little 
or no property to inherit and where sons would have to seek 
for a living and could readily build their own hut or home. 
Whereas for poor parents sons were needed for protection in 
old age, the wealthy family would require at least one son 
who would look after the estate eventually and inherit it, 
as otherwise the property might revert to one*s kin, to the
tribe or to the king. The story of Sudinna in the Vinaya 
2
Pitaka illustrates the danger for the property of a rich 
couple in case they lose their only son. Sudinna wanted to 
join the Buddhist SaAgha and his parents try to dissuade 
him as otherwise their property would revert to the Licchavis, 
The possibility of adoption seemed not to have been
1. See below, 11 ff.
2. Ill, 16ff.; see above,
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contemplated tlien and there.'*’
If there were many sons, some of them could leave 
the family at marriage taking a share of the property in 
advance. Thus the fact that the eldest son may leave the 
family after receiving a share of the property is noticed in
the Taittirlya-samhita: "They settle the eldest son with
2
wealth." The setting up of a housefire has to take place 
at the marriage or at the time of the partition of daya 
according to the Paraskara-grhyasutra and the Gautama- 
dharmasutra, which implies that for the establishment of 
their own homes sons must have been provided with property
1* The Dharmasastras place restrictions on thejright of the 
king -bo inherit, at least in the case of Brahma^as. 
Gautcdh9su« Manu 9* 188-89* Byh.Sm. 26,119[216]:
ye1 putra^ . k^atra-vif-cchudrajL patni-bhraty-vivar jita&/
te§aii dhano-haro raja sarvasyadhipatir-hi sa£//- "Should
a K§atriya, Vai§ya or §udra die without son, wife or
brother, their property shall be taken by the king as he
is the lord of all." Cp. ArthaS. 3,5*28f. [108; tr.243];
Katy. 931 etc. In the early period a brother was not 
necessarily ’separate in status* so that the question 
whether Byhaspati's text refers to a joint brother or a 
divided brother would not arise.
2. 2,5*27: ••• jesthaip. putrajji dhanena nirvasayayanti.
Monier Williams nir-ava-so, causp -sayayati = to estab­
lish, to settle, furnish; cp. Arthafe. 3*5*21[104]: 
sannivi§ta-samam-asannivi§£ebhyo naive&anikai£ dadyujj.,
kanyabhya&ca pradanikam - "To (brothers) who are not 
established (in life) they shall give some amount for 
their marriage, equal to that of those already settled, 
and to daughters an amount for bestowal in marriage." 
[242]» This is irrespective of their regular share 
according to Kangle. J.J.Meyer translates naiveSanikam 
as ’Haushaltungsgrundungssumme1, 256.
receiving some advancement. ^
Whereas normally in the Gastric system the patri­
lineal family is dominant and at least one of the sons 
remains in the paternal household, we also have to take into 
account the widespread existence of the nuclear family in 
customary law according to which normally all the sons and 
daughters left at their marriage to establish separate
p
households. In this context the institution of a community 
of goods between the spouses created by marriage would 
follow which plays a marginal role in the Dharma§astra and
(p ra b a b b f i>punouS )
is represented by the |Smpti author Datta. The passage, as 
cited in the Smpti-tattva, reads: dampatyor madhyagam
^ * Paraskara-CT .su. 2,1 [ 1 ] : avasathyadhanajp. darakale//l//
dayadya-kale eke§aii//2// - Tr. SEE, XXIX, 271* Cp. Gaut.
dh.su. SBE, II, 199# N.C. Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Anc. 
Ind.. law, 207* draws attention to the housebuilding 
ceremony in the A§ valayana-gp.su. (2,7-9) which is inter­
posed between the rituals of marriage and the daily and 
periodical rituals of a gphastha (householder). See also, 
ibid., 38, baliharana ceremony in Baudhayana.gp.su.
(2,8,1-40)• Sen-Gupta suggests that the ceremony, which 
involves offerings in one!s own house and then in the 
house of the elder brother, indicates that descendants 
of a common ancestor normally lived grouped together in 
adjacent but different houses*
2. See J.D.M.Derrett, Contr. to Ind. Boc., 6(1962) 1?££*
(at 22fo) with reference to Tesayalamai, A study in the 
literature of the Sangam Age indicates the prevalence of 
the nuclear conjugal family. See R.Shanmugam, "The Kin­
ship Terms in Cahkam Literature", Summaries of Papers 
(26th Int. Congr. of Orientalists,~lfew Delhi, 19w , $26f»).
4'4
db.an.agi - "Property is joint, or common between spouses* 
Amongst the Gastric authors of whose works we have complete 
versions, Ipastamba comes close to this concept when he 
declares that no division of property takes place between 
husband and wife, that they are joint as to religious 
ceremonies and spiritual merits and with respect to the 
acquisition of property* The wife may, therefore, spend on 
necessary occasions from the common property and she would
p
thereby not commit theft. The same author states that both 
husband and wife have power over the property.^ The influence
i
of this institution in the DharmaSastra did not amount to 
the recognition of a right of the widow to succeed to the 
common estate by survivorship in the presence of sons though
1. The text is cited anonymously in the Smyti-tattva, see 
Jha, HLS, ii, 249* and is attributed toHDa/Eta by Jagann- 
atha»"TTyada-bhang^naya, Colebrooke's tr*, ii, 5^1.
The significance of this text in customary law and the 
Sastra was first explained by J.D.M. Derrett in: ZVR,58 
(1965) 219ff.; TJniv* of Ceylon Rev*, 14(1956) 105TF7 
(at 119* fn*86) ; feSOAS, 18 (1956) 490; see especially 
discussion at ZVR* 64(1962) 62ff.-*t
2* Sp.-dh.su*2,14,16-20[ ; tr*SBE,II,138]: jaya-patyor
na vibhage vidyate//16// pa^iigrahapadhhi sahatva^. karmasu
//17// tatha pupya-phale^u//18// dravya-parigrahegu ca//
19// na hi bhartur vipravase naimittike dane steyam-
upadi&anti//20// Joint authority of husband and wife 
existed in respect to giving a son into adoption* See 
Manu 9: 168. In Milinda*, Questions we find an instance 
of a wife consenting to the sale of the son. I.B.Horner's 
tr., 95f* For further illustrations, see
3* See above,31
the latter may have separated from the father*^
The tribal past of the descendants of the Aryan
would make the wife merely an object to procure male issue,
a bhastra, i*e. a leather-bag or basket for holding children,
_ p
as she is called at one plac6 in the ArthaSastra* But 
parallel to this notion we find the concept of the identity
of husband and wife in very early texts * In the J§atapatha-
—  3brahmapa we read: T,The wife is half of the man*,r The
Va,jasaneya-brahmapa elaborates this concept: "A man is only 
half of his self* Therefore, when he does not take a wife 
he is not fully born, for he is incomplete so long* Then 
when alone he takes a wife, he is fully born, for he is 
incomplete so long and he becomes complete* Accordingly 
Br ah maps versed in the Veda declare this: fThe person known
lL
as husband is verily known as wife ’," This concept finds 
its expression in the unity of husband and wife in spiritual- 
religious matters* The husband is dependent on the wife!s 
co-operation at the domestic sacrifices*^ The identity of
1* On the rights of the woman at divorce and the rights of 
the widow at customary law, see references to Tesavalamai 
^ontro to Ind* Soc* 9 4(1962) at 26f*
2o 3) 7i"l -2l"i®JT Cp. garbha, ?g-veda 3 >31 >21. The notion of 
the wife as kgetra - field - comes with agriculture and 
could be of Tater origin*
3* 2,5)1? 10 : ardho ha esa atmano ya.j-jaya* Kane, HDh,
III, 428*
4. Cit* by Kulluka Bhat£a on Manu-smyti 9*45[372]* He adds 
dampatyor aikyam = there is identity of husband and wife*
Tr* §ankharama Sastrl, Fictions in Hindu Law, 206f©
5. Taittirlya-br* 3*7*5; Kane, HDh, II, i,556f*
husband and wife may possibly have contributed to the 
establishment of monogamy as a preferable Sastric principle 
and may well have furthered the claims of the sonless widow 
to the estate of her husband.1 The influence of the institu­
tion of community of goods may have protected the rights of 
the mother/widow against a partition of the paternal property 
by the sons before her death, as e.g. in the Manu-smpti, 
though we notice that this author makes a distinction between 
the father*s property and the motherfs property (strldhana)
which is against the notion of community of goods, and is
—  2the normal distinction in the Dharma&astras,
(6) Fraternal Polyandry. The Fraternal Joint Family
(a) Traces of Polyandry in Legal Literature.
In the large patriarchal household sons may stay 
together after the death of the father. Jointness, based on 
kinship ties, was indicated by the necessity to ward off 
enemies, or by the advantages of carrying out agriculture 
or even business Jointly. It may be necessitated by mere 
pressure of an inhospitable environment where it even may 
lead to polyandry. The early Sanskrit texts know little
1. See below,
2. Manu 9, 104- and 9,192. Cp. ArthaSastra 3* 5* 1-2, where
* sthita-pitp-matpkab1 is probably a later addition. See 
Kangle, tr <, 24-0, fn.
3. As among the Khasa; see K*M. Kapadia, Marriage and 
Family in India, 71# L.D. Joshi, The Khasa Family Law.
47
i-
ij
of polyandry, though according to the Gopatha Brahmapa a
woman could not have several husbands which may be a reproach
_  1
to such custom:. • * na haikasya bahavab patayatu The
B&illka-tribe which is referred to in the Satapatha b^rahmapa
and in the Mahabharata is considered to have been polyand-
2 —  —  rous* The ArthaSastra and the Dharma§astras turn against
the notion that marital rights belong to anybody else 
besides the individual husband, though the Ipastamba-dharma- 
sutra is aware that a girl was in the possession of the 
whole kula, because she was the consideration of the prop­
erty expended in purchasing her*^ The ArthaSastra carefully 
regulates remarriage in case the husband is absent over a 
long period, has become a monk, or is dead, by providing 
an order of preference according to which the woman is to
lL
marry a member of the family, if she so chooses* The Manu- 
smpti recorded but deprecated this custom of remarriage 
within the kula and echoes the order of preference only in
1* 2,3*20[206,9] ; quot* by W*Rau, op.cit0, 4-2. The story 
of Draupadi and the five Papjavas has been refashioned 
to suit the notions and the sentiments in the §astras *
2. Sen-Gupta, Evol* of Anc. Ind* Law, 29; Derrett™Til[T^56)
Univ* of Ceylon feev» 115« t
3» 2?,2-7 L2o9f»J: Kulajra hi strl pradlyate ityupadiSanti
//3// Brhaspati notices the custom of marrying a brother fs 
widow "in the north” and declares it de 6 a- j at i -dharma 
which is protected, though it is essentially undharmic 
and to be ranked together with the gratiloma-marriage. 
Bph*Sm*l,126f•; 130[217]: sahajata^. pragphpanti bhratp-
bharyam-abhar tpkam«
4-. 3}4-,37-4-0[103; tr.24-0].
. . . . M
connection with the custom of niyoga, according to which 
a person could he authorised to have intercourse with the 
wife in order to beget a son for the husband.'*"
(b) The Fraternal Joint Family?
Its conception as a Temporary Institution in the
DharmaSastras.
Rivalry between collaterals and their descendants 
is early evidenced in the connotations of the terms for 
brother (bhraty) and brother*s son (bhratpvya) which
p
occasionally assumes the meaning of * rival* or 1 enemy* • 
Brothers may co-operate in their relations with the outside 
world, but disputes inter se about property are not pre­
cluded* The continuation of the fraternal joint family 
becomes difficult when increased opportunities to acquire 
property for the individual member are available who 
generally prefers to favour his own immediate descendants 
rather than to enjoy property jointly with his agnatic 
collaterals. The story told in the Pali-Canon of a setthi
I* Manu 9,59; in 9>60-63 the custom of niyoga is regulated 
and 9, 64-67 rejected as being against ciharma* For 
traces of polyandry see 95 162; 182.
2* Macdonell and Keith, Vedic Index, s.v. Bhratp: Ath.-v. 
3>30,2; §at.-br* 4,1,5",3; bhratrvya: Ath.-v*2,18,1; 
8±10,35; 16,91T; Tai.-Sam,5^5?9?2 ; kath.-Sam. 10,7;
Vaj*SagL* 1?17; Ait* br*3>7» etc.; Pa£ic.-br. 12,13?2*
Cp. l!77Rau, op.cit., 97 f*
who dies without heir because in his previous birth he 
killed his brother*s only son for the sake of property,
shows the attitudes with which the DharmaSastras had to
1 — deal* Before the Dharma§astras codified the ideal behaviour
in such contexts we hear already in the period of the
Brahma^as of attempts to strengthen the position of the
eldest brother as a person of respect with whom the younger
brother should not drink together, who takes a share in the
2
inheritance before the younger brother and marries first*
The Dharma§astras inculcate the respect for the eldest 
brother with prescription of penance: "In the case of a 
younger brother who takes a wife or his portion of the 
inheritance before his elder brother, penances ordained for 
crimes causing impurity, heavier for each succeeding case, 
must be performed.”^ The Manu-smpti weakens the importance 
of sons beyond the first-born thus strengthening his position 
against his brothers and proposes that the father is to be
Zl
succeeded by the eldest son who inherits the whole estate.
1* Samyutta Nikaya 1,52; see also the story of Nabhanedistha 
in Alt.-brV 57^4,2ff. who was disinherited by his
brothers*
2. Katho-sasu 50,3(2,183,21) and Tait.-ssujL. 7,2,7,1; Kath*- 
samT 3577,(3,74,16); --sagiT~274,g7(2,39,18ff*)~an5
Eath.-sagul2,12(1774,17^e)“T?au, op.cit., 40,46.
Spastamba-dharnasutra 2,5,12,22[227]; SBE,II,128f. See 
also Manu 3, 154- and 3,172; SBE, XXV, W f M  108f.
4. Manu 9, 105-110. This elevation of the eldest brother 
is perhaps intended to ensure discipline between the 
others, who have this in common, that they all respect 
the eldest.
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On the other hand the Artha^astra had noticed a rule among 
certain communities according to which sons may live under 
a brother who displays special skills in his profession, 
and the Dharma§astras realise that economical necessity and 
the prosperity of the family would occasionally not only 
demand joint living, but also that the most capable of the 
brothers should be at the helm of the family affairs: "The 
eldest brother, or the youngest brother, shall support all 
(the brothers) like a father, if they wish it, in accordance 
with capacity; the wellbeing of the family is dependent upon 
the capacity (of its head),"^ In the §ankha-Likhita-Dharma~ 
sutra the economical aspect of jointness is referred to 
when it is said that the brothers "may, if they wish, live 
together; united they would clearly bring about prosperity", 
But jointness of brothers (however convenient for 
farming etc*) becomes a matter of mutual agreement, based on 
economic considerations as indicated by Narada and Sankha- 
Likhita, The Smptis take account of the desire to establish
1* 35 6,14-16[105; tr,2453: suta-magadha-vratya-rathakarapam- 
aisvaryato vibhagap (14) §e^-fas tan-upajlveyup/15/ 
anl £ varap/16/
2* bibhpyad-vecchatap sarvan-jegjho bhrata yatha pita/
bhrata Saktap kani^pho va Saktyapekgap kule sthitip
[v.l.&riyap]// Nar,Sn,13*5E190]; In the Coorg okka it 
was said that "the wisest is the eldest", Srinivas, 
Religion and Society among the Coorgs„„., 51•
3, kamam vaseyur eka-matap saphata vpddhim apadyeran 
[Dh,K, 11953.
separate households and to enjoy property separately from 
the agnatic collaterals and the ideal "behaviour - the older 
rule of primogeniture receding - is to establish separate 
households, to apply individually the property to purposes 
which the feastra prescribes and to gain spiritual merit 
thereby; after supporting the preferential position of the 
eldest son, the Manu-smgti expresses the advantage of separ­
ating and dividing the property: "Either let them thus live 
together, or apart, if (each) desires (to gain) spiritual 
merit; for (by their living) separate (their) merit increase 
hence separation is meritorious*"^ Thus jointness of prop­
erty between brothers is treated rather as a transitory 
condition and the rules in the DharmaSastras concentrate on 
the method of partition and connected issues (see below)* 
Before partition the younger brothers had a proprietary 
claim to the property but were not fully competent to deal
p
with the family property* The only possibility according
1* Manu 9>1H; cp. Gaut*-dh*su0 28,4; Bphaspati 26,5C196]:
eka-pakena vasatam pitp-deva-dvijarcanam/ ekazp. bhaved
vibhaktanam tad eva syad gphe gphe// Cp* Sangraha-kara:
kriyate svaip. vibhagena putrapaft paitpkap dhanap/ svatve
sati pravartate tasmad-dharmyalj. ppthak kriyalj.//
"By partition, the sons make their paternal property 
their own; it is only when their ownership has come about 
that actions proceed; therefore separation is conducive 
to spiritual merit." Jha, HLS, 11,27 = Dh*K« 1142b*
2. J.DoM. Derrett, Contr. to TnS* Soc* 6(196£) at 38f* 
Arthaju 3,5»15Ll04;tr.242J; Bph* l4,2[137]: samanyam.. *
na deyam* Daksa, cit* in Kptya-kal. Dana-kagja, 17,Dh*K*
807a; Nar. 5,4s Derrett, BSOAS 20(1957) 203ff.
for- the Smytis to facilitate the enjoyment of property with­
out danger of encroachment "by one1 s collaterals was to 
establish the rules of partition on firm foundation and 
justify the demand of a younger brother by an appeal to 
religious reasons*
II* The Ancestral Cult and Sapip^aship. The Origin of 
SapipJLaship and Its Function in the DharmaSastras.
(1) The Evolution of Ancestor Worship according to Pre- 
legal Literature*
One of the basic and original motives for ancestor- 
worship in India, as indeed anywhere else where it existed 
or exists, seems to be derived from the belief that the 
"deceased" ancestors cannot be really dead, but still part­
icipate in the family affairs* The goodwill of the manes has
to be secured by the living, and they have to be propitiated
n
and "maintained" by offerings of food etc. Eventually
1* As an illustration from the mass of literature on the 
subject a reference to Srinivas, Society and Religion 
of the Coorgs..., may suffice* The ancestors take active 
interest in the affairs of the okka (051>229)* &n& food 
is offered to the dead ancestors o£ the okka at the 
periodical ancestor propitiation (lljf*) which is called 
karapava bharani, lit. "pleasing the ancestor". There are
continued:
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these beliefs led to ceremonies performed in memory and 
honour of the deceased with symbolical offerings with which 
the feeding of Brahmapas became associated in the Gphyasutras.1 
Such offerings take place according to the Vedic ritual of 
pipda-pity~yatjha gj^  the maha-pity-yatjna which are described 
in the Srautasutras. According to the Srautasutras the 
feeding of Brahmayas has no place in these rituals, whereas
two modes of propitiation, namely the one involving 
non-vegetarian food and liquors and the "sanskritic" 
mode which consists in the offer of pip/ja, under the 
guidance of a priest (165f*). This corresponds roughly 
to a parallel development in the Gastric ritual. The 
ancestors assume the form of crows (105). Cp. Baudh.- 
dh.su. 2,8,14; Manu 5,261; Kane, HDh, IV, 355* The 
ancestor worship among the Coorgs does not seem to 
have recognized the worship of any particular ancestor 
beyond the father, and the impartibility of ancestral 
land, the non-recognition of individual rights, particu­
larly land (52 f.) is in accord with this. In the 
Dharma&astras the differentiation of ancestors is 
utilized to establish the rights of a particular person 
and his descendants, though eventually the particular 
value of ancestral immoveables and other enduring 
sources was acknowledged for purposes of inheritance 
and limitation on the power of alienation of the 
individual. See below,
1. See D.R. Shastri, Origin and Development of the Ritual 
of Ancestor Worship in India, ch. V. 1Worship of the 
Pitrs1, 102.
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for the followers of the Gphyasutras the feeding of Brahmapas 
is part of the p_ipfla-pit:p-yat1na 11 In the Gphyasutras, the 
pakaya.lnas or offerings in the household fire are dealt with 
which include the agfraka, parvapa and the funeral offerings
T 2like the ekoddigta and sapipdlkarapa .
Rather than discussing the mass of ritual details 
in the Vedic - and Dharma&astra-literature we may ask who 
the recipients of the offerings were, as this may throw 
light on the composition of the families. Literary evidence 
from the Rg-veda onwards indicates a meandering development 
from worship of communal manes to worship of specific ances­
tors of a family. In the Bg-veda a period which is still 
marked by the prevalence of tribal life and different con­
cepts of property-holding, the ancestral spirits are vaguely 
referred to and occur as the early or ancient ancestors of 
the human race that were supposed to inhabit a separate
1, D.R. Shastri, op.cit., 105* Kane, HDh* II, 1085ff.: 
Pitp-pigda-yatina. Sat.br. 2,3*2,; Tait. -br. 1,3*10; 2,6,16;
A§valayana-&rautasutra 2,6-7; Katyayana-Srautasutra 4,1,
1-30 etc. Kane, ubi cit., 1101-1103: maha-pitp-y atjna,
2. Kane, HDh, IV, 426 ff. : parvana-Sraddha. Tait.sagL.1,8,5*
1-2, Tait.-br. 1,3*10,1-10. Sat.-br.2,4,2; ASv-gphyasutra
4,7-8 etc. Kane, ubi cit., 516ff.: ekoddigfra. The parvapa-
feraddha is intended for three paternal ancestors, the 
eKddigta is meant only for a deceased person. Kane, ubi 
cit., 52^: sa^ipdakaraya, reception of a deceased person 
into the community of pitps to whom gip^-as are offered.
world by themselves. In the Atharva-veda the ancestors are
similarly referred to as fathers1; "0 Agni to eat oblations,
bring thou the Fathers one and all, the buried and the cast
2
away, those burnt with fires and those exposed.”
These passages have been interpreted to refer to
*
manes of the community, an observation with which we would 
like to concur considering that tribal conditions influenced 
the family life, land tending rather to be the territory of 
a tribe. Fixed settlements and land owned by families or 
individuals seem to be the prerequisite condition for a 
developed worship of specific ancestors. But from the 
Atharva-ve da onwards we can discern a shift from the refer­
ence to pitys in general without reference to their genera­
tions towards a group of specific ancestors, with whom 
ancestors of the same generation are associated and finally 
to three specific male ascendants alone. In Ath.-veda 18,
4,35 we read: "In Vai&vanara I offer this oblation a 
thousandfold, hundred streamed fountain; it supports our
1. Eane, HDh, IV, 304f. R.S,Sharma, Aspects of Political 
Ideas ancT Institutions in Ancient' India, 63 71-75»
points to the communal (■bribed) character of sacrifices 
and prayers in the vidatha of the gg-veda which similarly 
tends to speak against developed ancestor cults. At p.75: 
”... the domestic gphya-rites are of strictly private 
nature, but of that there is hardly any trace in the 
earliest collection of the hymns.” _ _
2. Atho-v. 18,2,34. [16883: ye nikhata ye paropta ye dagdha
ye coddhitalj/ sarvastannagna a vaha pitrn havige attave//
3. Kapadia, Hindu Kinship, 10.
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father, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, it supports 
swelling".^" In the funeral hymn of the Atharva-ve da the 
invocation is directed; "To thee great-grandfather and those 
after you be this cry of hail. To thee grandfather and those 
after you be this cry of hail. To thee father be this cry of 
hail. Svadha to Fathers on earth, in the atmosphere, in the
p _
sky". The phrase 1 and those after you1 (ye ca tvam anu) 
which occurs in the invocation of the Bharadvaja-gphyasutra 
(2,12,14) as anugaifr saha = *with those who follow theer is 
explained by Kapadia as referring to an ancestor being 
invoked with his immediate descendants, i.e. with great­
grandfather with grandfather and grandpaternal uncle. The 
fact that the phrase is also added to the invocation 
addressed to the father of the sacrificer according to the 
Bharadvana-grhyasutra is attributed by Kapadia to the fact 
that offerings are not only made to three immediate ascen­
dants, but to all (deceased) persons related to the offerer 
within four generations in ascent.
In the § at ap at ha -b rahmana, Taittirlya-samhita and 
finally in the Gyhyasutras and Srautasutras the offerings
1. VaiSvanare haviridajp. juhomi sahasra^i Satadharamutsam/ 
sa bibharti pitaraip. pitamahan prapita-mahan bibharti 
pinvamanal^// [ 1760]
2. Ath.-v. 18,4,75-80 [1880f.]
Op. 1572,49 [1694]; 18,3,46[1724]; 18,3,59 [17331.
3. Kapadia, op.cit., 12f.
to three paternal ancestors primarily is described in detail.^'
(2) The Meaning of Pip<Ja and Sapig-d&ship .
The term pipfla appears in the ggveda with the meaning 
'body of the sacrificial animal*• But in the Taittirlya- 
s amh.it a and in the § at ap a tha-br ahmapa the term appears with 
the sense fball of rice* which is offered to agnatic ances­
tors,^ The term is derived from pipfl = fto roll into a lump
Zl
or ball, put together, join, unite* etc. and the basic
meaning seems to indicate a conglomeration or mass made up
of different components.^ In the context of the Sraddha-
ceremonies it connotes a fball* constituted of various kinds
£
of food; but the meaning ’body* also occurs and is met also
7
in modern Indian languages.
The giving of pipflas to the agnatic ancestors implies 
the belief in their participation in the mess community of 
the living agnatic family members who are the givers or 
potential givers of pingLas. The living and the dead are thus
1. See e.g.,§at„-br. 2,4,2,1-24 [201-205; tr. SBE, XII,361-9]; 
but see SatT-brT 12,8,1,7 1273;_tr, SBE, XLT77 2349: 
Srautamagii sacrifice based, on Va.jasaneya-sag. 1936: "To the 
... Fathers etc.”: SSvalayana-grhyasu'tra 4,7-8. etc.
2. 1,162,19 [i,968].
3♦ Tait.-sap. 2,3*8*2. Sat.-br. 2,4,2,24; also Nirukta III,
4 and 5o
4. Monier Williams, Banskrit-English Dictionary.
5* Derrett, ZTO 64 (1962) 15 at 57.
6. Raghuvam§a ii, 57559«
7 . tun j abT, TIar a$hl.
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called sapipdas,i.e. agnates within a pattern of four genera­
tions of living saplpdas and three generations of dead 
sapipdas (participating at Sraddhas in their descendant* s 
p roperty)Jointness in food and giving pipdas in the 
ancestral cult were intimately connected. It is clear that 
the members of the agnatic kula or patrilineal joint family 
must have considered themselves as forming a unit in their 
relations, with the outside world and were so viewed by out­
siders as a unit. They felt themselves and must have appeared 
to outsiders as of fone blood1 and fbodyf.
It seems equally clear that the ancestor cult could
originally only be maintained by agnatic descendants, in
other words the ancestors would not benefit from offerings
2
by persons who were not agnates. This may be one of the 
reasons why the widow was excluded originally from inheriting. 
She was born In a different family and retained, at least in 
customarily law, residual rights in the family of her birth. 
She could offer pipda to her deceased husband but not to her 
husband's agnatic ancestors. The 'appointed1 daughter 
(putrika), and especially such a daughter's son (putrika- 
putra) could be a preferable heir possibly because they were 
born in the kula and remained members of the kula. The
1. Derrett, ubi cit.
2. The impurity of pipda (pipda-dosa), that is, the defects 
that preclude its acceptance are referred to by R.Williams, 
Jaina Yoga, 160.
daughter’s son’s duty to offer pip-da was a corollary.
Another aspect in which sapip^aship plays a role is 
marriage. The Dharmasutras and Smptis insist on extensive 
prohibited degrees of exogamy. A person is not allowed to 
marry a relative within five degrees on the mother’s side 
nor a member of the same gotra or a relative within seven 
degrees on the father’s side.’1' Ipastamba deprecates inter­
course with the uterine relations (mothers and sisters) of
p
one’s parents and their children. The extension of the term
sapipda to relations by marriage was gradual. In early texts
the term sapipda is used for agnates but not for relations 
*
by marriage. Manu, however, uses the term sapipda for 
relations on the mother’s side in the context of marriage.
1. Manu 3,5; 3,172-2; £p.-dh.su. 11,15-16; Gaut.-dh.su.4,2-5; 
Vas.-dh» su. 8,1-2; Baudh♦ -dh. su. 2,1,32-8; Yajn. 1,53;
Vispu 24-, 9-10,
2. 1,7,21,8. Kane, HDh, ii,pt.l, 458.
3. Cp. Ap.-dh.su. 2,4,15-16 [220] (on marriage): sagotraya 
duhitarap prayacchet/ matusca yoni-sambandhebhya£/-
«
Ip. 2,6,16,2#[244] (on Impurity), But see £j). 2,6,14,2
[234] (inheritance): putrabhave yah pratyasannah sapip^ah//
SBE, II, 126. Gaut. mentions matr-sapipdas in connection 
with funeral offerings (15,13 L'£52;H5bE, TT,2£2. ] but 
cognates are not heirs according to 26,21 [442; SBE, Ir] ; 
the wife’s right to inherit is introduced subject to 
niyoga (Gaut. 28,2 [442]: pip£a-gotra-ar§i-sambandha
riktham bhajeran/ strl canapatyasya/ bljap va lipseta/ 
Baudh.*uses the term only for agnates (see below,
Vasi§£ha only in the context of impurity (4,10-19) and 
for agnates on inheritance (17.81). See also ArthaS.
3,4,40 and 3,6,22 where sapinda is clearly a near agnate.
4. 3,5,
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Repeated marriage bonds especially with the mother's family 
would create an attitude to consider such relatives as part 
of the community in the dealings with outside world, espec­
ially in the case of cross-cousin marriages where the strict 
rules on exogamy were widely disregarded from ancient times 
in spite of §astric disapprovalHere the connections with 
family by marriage were so close that the idea of having 
blood in common assumed importance and the circle of rela­
tives including relatives by marriage, forming 'one body',
p
would be expressed by the term sapinda.
(3) Sapip^aship and Inheritance*
In the Manu-smpti the giving of pipda to three lineal
male ancestors is stressed (9*186) and the passage is set
in juxtaposition to the right to inherit: "Whoever is nearest
*
from among the sapip^as, to him the estate shall belong".
The ceremony of giving pipda- or water to three 
immediate male ancestors, was, it may be suggested, a useful
la Baudh, 1,1,1-3 [6ff*] notices the 'southern* custom of 
marrying one's maternal uncle's or paternal aunt's 
daughter and deprecates it as, against the tradition of 
the §istas. See also Gaut. 11,20. £p.-dh.su. 1,7*21*8. 
Byhaspati 1*128 [21] counts it amongst deSa-jati-dharma. 
Kane, HDh, II, pt.i, 458ff. Id. , Hindu Law and Custom,
83-5« ~  :
2. See VijnaneSvara, Mit. I, 53* B e l o w ,  15 7-f-
3a Kane's tr., HDh, III, 733 of Manu 9* 187: anantara^.
sapip^ad yas tasya tasya dhanap bhavet/ See Kane, ubi.cit., 
fn. 1418 for amendment of Buhler's tr*, SBE, XXV, 366f.
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instrument for delimiting the property rights of members of 
a A relative who Maintains1 or whose duty it is to
' maintain1 different ancestors than those maintained out of 
the property of a household ought not to have a claim on the 
property. Thus the eldest living male ascendant NIT* of the 
kula would 'maintain' or worship his father, grandfather, 
and great-grandfather, A grandson's grandson of the great-* 
grandfather would be much too distant a relation and is not 
offering pinfla to any of the ancestors to whom N„N, is 
offering. On the other hand N.N. would be 'dependent' after 
his death on his descendants for receiving offerings. Three 
generations of descendants may not have been the normal 
number of generations living during the lifetime of N.N*, 
though it was highly desirable for a person "to see the 
great-grandson's face" which ensured the continuation of 
one's line and ensured one's maintenance after death* At the 
same time N.N* would see that property would be left to his 
male descendants, and though their duty to offer was pre­
existing and independent of the presence of property derived 
from the father, the social position of the family and its 
continuation was secured by property. The ancient fear of 
the extinction of one's line can certainly be traced to some 
extent to the apprehension that there may be nobody to secure 
the participation in the family feeding after one's death* 
Thus three paternal ascendants are 'living* on the house­
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holder, whereas he expects to 'live* on three generations of 
male descendants who may he alive during his lifetime* The 
deceased ancestor receiving pipda and those entitled or 
eventually entitled to offer formed a mess community and were 
called sapipdas♦ The offering of pipda was a duty as well as 
a right, which as a corollary gave a claim upon the property 
of the deceased ancestors, and the authors of the DharmaSas- 
tras associate inheritance with the offering of pipdas *^
It was against this background that in the Baudhayana- 
dh,su* the basic agnatic system of inheritance was formulated 
according to which not only the rights of a narrower body of 
claimants was carved out against the wider circle of agnates, 
but also the claims of the king were postponed: nThe great­
grandfather, the grandfather, the father, oneself, the 
uterine brothers, the son by a wife of the same caste, the 
grandson and the great-grandson, these undivided dayadas, 
they call sapipdas; the divided dayadas they call sakulyas * 
When there is no offspring of the deceased, his property goes 
to the aforesaid (sapipdas); in the absence of sapipdas, the 
sakulyas, the teacher, the pupil or the priest shall inherit;
1* £pastamba-dh.su, 2,6,14,2; Vasig£ha-dh„su• 4,16-18; 
Gaut»dh0su+ 15,13; 28,21; Vigpu-dh.su* 15,40ff.
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and on the failure of these, the king”
III* The Origin of the Terms Daya and Riktha,
In search of terms which throw light on the concept 
of property within a family in the Rg-vedic period we find 
that two terms come into question which also have been em­
ployed in later legal texts: riktha and daya* The word riktha 
occurs in a passage in which it is said: na jamaye tanvo
-  a
rikthaparaikcakara garbhap sanitumidhanam* Kane translates: 
"The son of the body does not give to his sister the ances­
tral wealth, but makes her the receptacle for the son of her 
husband". Riktha, derived from ric = 'to leave1, literally 
means 'what is left1, i*e* the wealth over which the father's 
power had ceased due to his death and over which the son's
7
or sons1 power has arisen. The term riktha, however, does
1* Baudh.-dh*su* 1,5,11* 9-14 [56; Dh.K. 1467b f*]; Vi.-ra, 
602; Kytya^Eal. 751. Jha. HLS, II, 510:
prapitamahalj. pitamahalj. pita svayap sodarya bhrataraljL
savarpayap putrap pautrap prapautra etan-avibhakta-
dayadan sapippan acak^ate/ vibhakta-dayadan sakulyanaca
ksate/ asat-svangayesu tad-gami hyartho bhavati/ sapippa-
bhave sakulyas tad-abhave 1 pyacaryo ' ntevasl ptvig va
haret [var* lect* aharet]/ tad-abhave raja/
2* Rg-veda 3,31,2 [i,328]* Kane, HDh, III, 543; Geldner, 
Harv.Or.Ser., XXXV, 367, translates riktha as 'Erbe* = 
heritage. The German word 'Nachlass1 comes close to the 
connotation of riktha*
3. The passage also indicates that daughters do not share the 
paternal property. Perhaps this refutes an opposite custom 
according to which the daughter would receive a share out 
of the paternal property. On the rights of the daughter, 
see below, il^f*
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not indicate the only cause of attaining power over a 
father’s property*The passages in the gg-veda and especially 
texts of the later Brahmapas clearly reveal that it was a 
frequent occurrence that the father divided the property 
amongst his sons or handed it over to the eldest son when he 
became too old to manage the family affairs.
The term used for the property of a father which is 
divided during his lifetime is daya. The word occurs for the 
first time in a passage of the gg-veda where the meaning 
seems to he a 1 share* or 1 reward1 for exertion: ’’Some drive 
around the end of the earth, they have been harnessed to the 
yoke of the car* They distribute the reward for exertion, if
p —
Yama is kindly disposed in his house”. Though daya is here 
the 1reward1 for the priest for labour applied in sacrifice, 
the notion seems to be similar to the distribution of wealth 
by a father among his sons, as the later Brahmapa-passages
7;
show. The connotation of ’reward1 seems attractive, as it
1. See etg. the marriage-hymn in the gg-veda 10,85*4-2 [iv, 
586f*3 which apparently implies a son succeeding to the 
headship of the family.
2* Bg-veda 10,114, 10 [iv,7293* Trans1* follows Geldner’s, 
Earv*Or.Ser. X2XV, 333* The text is as follows: bhumya
antagi paryeke car anti rathasya dhur^u yuktaso asthu^/
Sramasya dayagi bhajantebhyo yada yamo bhavati harmye
hita£.//-
3* Geldner, ubi cit., 338? to. to tr. of gg-veda 10,114,10.
1 I
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would suggest that sons may receive bigger or smaller shares 
at a distribution by the father depending on their relative 
merit, but we cannot stress this aspect in spite of the 
latitude of power the father had according to texts of the 
Brahmapas and some of the Smptis.
Before we proceed to consider the passages in the 
Brahmapas, we may trace the meaning of the verbal root from 
which daya is derived* Daya could be derived from one of two 
equally suitable roots: da = to give etc* and da = to cut, 
divide, mow. G-rassman seems to be inclined to assign daya
to both roots Bohtlingk and Roth inform us that the term is
-  2 —derived from da = to divide. Monier-Williams gives da as
the root of daya; it may also be derived from do = to cut,
3
divide, reap, mow, and day = to divide, impart, allot. We
may add the opinion of W.D. Whitley who similarly assigns
- - 4 5daya to the root da = to divide, share. Mayrhofer^ likewise
relates the term with da (dati) = to cut, divide, mow*. He 
assigns the root day (inter alia) to da = to cut. Mayrhofer
1, Woerterbuch zum gg-veda, 1st ed., Leipzig, 1873: daya = 
Anteil, ErbtelT, derived from (1) geben and (2) abmaehen, 
abschneiden*
2* Petersb. Worterb., s.v.
3. Sauskrit-English Dictionary, 474 col*2, 498 col.l,
4^ 69, col®5 •
4. The Roots, Verb-forms and Primary Derivations of the
SanskriF Languag^r Leipzig, 1885 >
5c A. doncise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v.
66
also points out that the derivations of the two roots cannot 
always he clearly distinguished.^
It may he argued that both roots are equally suitable 
for deriving daya, as the term may not only imply the * cut­
ting1 and distributing1 of the property, but also the act 
of "giving1*, However instances in the Brahmana-literature 
tend to show that daya is derived from da = to cut, divide 
(or do and day).
In the Nabhanedigjha legend as told in the Taittirlya-
sagihita we read: Manufr putrebhyo dayap vyabhajat/ - "Manu
o ^
divided (his) property amongst his sons." In the PancavigLSa- 
brahmapa it is said: so 1 kamayatendre me pr a jay am pratyamuii- 
catto va indraya prajaljL §rai§$yaya tigfhanta ...//3// 
tasmad yalj. putrapam dayagi dhanatamam ivopaiti tap manyate:
’yam evedap bhavipyat!ti//4// - "He (Prajapati) wished that 
amongst his progeny Indra might be the mightiest and 
fastened his wreath upon him* Thereupon the beings yielded 
the supremacy to Indra ... Therefore, they look upon him of
the sons, who enter upon the best part of the property as 
one who will have success in the world.
1. Ubi cit0, 32, on datram.
2. 3,1,9,4-6.
3. 16,4,3-4 [ii,221]; tr. based upon Caland's, 431; daya is 
here equated to dhana = wealth, which originally means 
’precious me tails’1"^ HDooty1, and also ’prize1 in a 
contest; gg-veda, e.g. 6,45,2; 12,15; 7?32, 12 etc.
For fbootyT see 10,84,7?
Whereas we can infer from this passage that the 
father was at liberty to distribute the property according 
to his discretion, we find in another passage daya being the 
property of an aged father which is divided during his life­
time though this time not by him, but by his sons: tad u 
hovacabhipratarapo jlrnaS Say anal}./ putra hasya dayap 
vibhejire/^
Once partitions took place more frequently after 
the death of the father the term daya would be used to des­
cribe the property of a deceased man, too, and in so far 
coalesce with the meaning of riktha. There may be some scope 
for distinguishing riktha from daya at this early stage of 
the development of the law by describing daya also as the 
share in the specific possession of a person within the 
wider framework of the kula. In this context daya may con­
sist of an advancement from the father or it may be a share 
received at a partition between collaterals (including sub­
sequent accretions). As the notion of partition of daya did 
not clearly imply more then a distribution for convenience 
and did not necessarily involve (as now) a separation in
2
point of status, some residual rights of the collaterals
1. Jaiminiya-br. 3?156; cp. also the parallel version of
Nabhanedigtha legend in the Aitareya-br. 5jl4**2ff. 
where nob rtanu,"T>ut his sons divide the property.
2. See the texts which begin with vibkakta avibhakta va 
or similarly.
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and of the father continued to exist. However once the prop­
erty was allocated the share received tended to become, for 
purposes of inheritance, the property (riktha) of the des­
cendants of the brother or son and could not easily be 
claimed by the collaterals, nor by the father. The Hharma£as*> 
tras moreover tend to support the exclusive claims of the 
brother during his lifetime so that eventually, once a share 
was apportioned, separation of status (see below, ch.XV )c 
between collaterals would be the consequence, and daya was 
here congruent with riktha. But during the lifetime of the 
son, that is to say in the patriarchal family, the father 
who had allocated property (daya) to the son still tended to 
have some claim on the property of the son during the latter fs 
lifetime and vice versa (see below text of HarIta,J)i39-£ ), 
though for purposes of inheriting the property (riktha) the 
father was excluded e.g. by the son's son.’*’
The final position in the Dharmasastras as regards 
the estate of a father visualises two basic situations in 
which one can become owner, namely, according to the Gautama-
dharmasu.tra, one can become owner on account of two causes,
- 2riktha and saqivibhaga. Riktha is the cause or mode of
1. See Manu's text na bhrataro na pitaraljL. ». cit. below,l02,*7&-
2. 10,38 [166] ; svaml riktha-kraya- sa^vibhaga-parigrahac£-
higamesp .../ "An owner occurs in cases of inheritance, 
purchase, partition, garnering, and finding ..."
J.D.M. Derrett*s tr., ZVR 64 (1962) 34.
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acquisition of the fattier fs property at his death, sagivibhaga 
is the cause or mode of acquisition of the father's property 
when he divides it in his lifetime. Gautama probably does 
not mention daya as a cause, as this term comprises both 
modes of acquisition by now: a share in the estate or the 
whole estate of deceased or living man. In the Manu-snipti 
on the other hand, daya is seen as the only cause to acquire 
property from a father and it is thus implied that daya is 
a share in the estate (or the whole estate) of a deceased 
or living man.1
The fact that the Dharma§astras maintain not only 
that property should be divided only after the father's 
death, but also that the father may divide it during his 
lifetime, thus stressing either the patriarchal unity of 
the family or supporting its dissolution, may reflect the 
wish of a father to advance some of his sons giving them 
a chance to avail themselves of the plentitude of land yet 
to be cleared and colonised by private initiative. Advance­
ment by shares may also have been desirable when there was 
lack of space in the house, or if strife occurred in a 
polygamous household. Apart from this we cannot negative 
the possibility of the influence of customs according to
l o  Manu-snipti 10,115: sapta-vittagama dharmya dayo labhalj. 
krayo jaya£/ prsyogalj. karmayoga§ca sat-pratigraha eva va// 
See Derrett, ubi cit.
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which sons and daughters would leave the parental home at 
marriage to found their own individual households.
At this stage we may conclude that daya is derived 
from the root da (to cut, divide) and that it connotes the 
share in the property (or advancement parentally) of a 
deceased or living man or that it may mean ”inheritance,r *
If we were to translate daya only by ’inheritance1 (in the 
sense of the mode of acquisition of property) or, as Cole- 
brooke did, by ’heritage* (in the sense of the property 
inherited) we must keep in mind that these words carry the 
unfortunate implications of the developed Roman legal system 
of classical times which are embodied in the maxim: hereditas 
est successionis in universum ius quod defunctus habuit 
and of which nemo est heres vi vent is is a corollary. Paya9 
as we have seen, originally indicates that the father 
divides his property during the lifetime whereas later daya 
may coalesce with riktha which seems to have had originally 
much more similarity with hereditas « the ’inheritance*, 
the property left by the deceased.
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CHAPTER II 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND SON 
- AND PURTHER DESCENDANTS
I. Mutual Relationship in the Material and Spiritual Sphere,
(1) Mutual Dependency: Maintenance as a Personal 
Obligation.
Por the relatively poorer householder of the pre-
legal era i.e. the period prior to the composition of legal
texts the existence of sons as such implied wealth, prestige
and welfare, etc. Thus we read e.g. in the Yajur-veda the
following prayer: ,!May this my sacrifice bring stores of
children, with ten brave sons, full-companied, for welfare,
lifewinning, winning offspring, winning cattle, winning this
world of ours and peace and safety. May Agni make my progeny
abundant”.'1’ To have many sons - in any tribal-pastoral or
semi-agricultural society - implies assistance in work,
2
increase in wealth, protection against the enemy, and 
guarantees the continued existence of the line. A householder 
was in a dependent position once he grew older and conversely 
the sonfs status within the family increased once he was in 
a position to work and acquire more property than the father. 
There are two references from the Brahmapas which refer to
1. 19,4-8: tr. Griffith, 213*
2, ”May our enemies be destitute of offspring”, runs a 
passage in the gg-veda, cited in the Vasy-dh.su. 17,2.
 n
this state of affairs in general terms. In the Taittirlya-
sagihita it is said: "... As the father approaches the son
when he is in need ... as the son approaches the father when
he is in need ... "*** In the other reference, from the 
 ^ __
Satapatha-brahmana .we come across the term which appropriately 
describes the personal relationship between the head of the 
family and his dependents, a relationship which in a subsis­
tence economy forms the primary basis of the duty of main­
tenance, namely upa-.jlv = to *live on* somebody, to be 
dependent on: "In the first part of life the sons live upon 
(or: under) their father ... in the last part of life the 
father lives upon (or: under) their sons.*1 A certain indif­
ferent attitude in the actual behaviour of sons towards 
their parents has already been mentioned, when we saw that 
sons divide the property of the aged father against his will, 
and when it was suggested that a father may become a parivra- 
jaka. Especially when there was no daya, the maintenance of 
parents may be endangered.
In the Pali-Canon the duties of a son to maintain 
his parents, even if by begging, are repeatedly stressed
1. yatha pita putragi k§ita upadhavati ... yatha putrafc. 
pitaraiji kgita upadhavati ... Tait.-sa^ i. 6,5*10,1-2 [54-5]*
W. Rau, op.cit., 44.
2. purvavaya&e putra^i pitaram upajrvanti ... uttaravaya&e 
putran pitopajlvati. Sat,~br. 12,2,3*4- [ ]. Rau, op.cit.,
ibid.
5* Samyutta Nikaya I, 181. 5p.-dh.su. 2,10,1-2; Gaut.dh.su, 
Baudh.-dh.su. 2,5*19*
and the passages indicate that the actual “behaviour of sons
may not always have guaranteed the maintenance of parents by
sons.^ This personal obligation of maintaining parents,
besides the wife, and a minor son is enjoined in a text which
has been ascribed to Manu in the Mitakgara: "Manu declares
that one must maintain one's aged parents, a virtuous wife
2
and a minor son by doing even a hundred bad acts". Other 
Smptis, besides the ArthaSastra, prescribe punishment for 
persons neglecting the maintenance of aged parents, wife and 
children.
(2) The Identity of Father and Son.
Another feature which contributed to the mutual 
relationship between father and son is the belief in the 
psychical and physical immortality of the father by the
IL
existence of a son. The belief that the father survives in
1. Wagle, 185-186. See also the Cyavana legend referred to 
by Rau, op*cit., the sons refuse to leave their father 
behind because they are afraid to earn a bad reputation. 
The Sastras make it a duty for the sons to care for him. 
Op. the story of the wealthy Brahmapa being ousted by his 
sons, above,3^37.
2. Cit. by Kane, HDh, III, 805 and fn. 1559*
5. Kane, ubi cit.
4, Already B.W. Leist in his Altarisches Jus. Gentium 18ff., 
has pointed to this feature as one of the traits common 
to many Indo-Germanic peoples and C.W.Westrup has elabor­
ated this point in his Introduction to Early Roman Law, 
III, i, 197ff•, 219ff* The notion is, however, susceptible
§f occurrence in any patrilineal community. - See also at.-br. 12,4,5,1? cit. by W.Rau, 46; ya u vai putraTj. sa
pita, ya^ t pita sa putrat^/ - "The son is as the father, the 
father is as the son". See also_the legend of §unafr§epa as 
told in the Ait.br. 7,13,9,10. Apastamba 2,9,24,Iff and 
Baudh. 2,9,l^,7ff• perpetuate this idea.
the blood of the sons is thought to be based on the desire 
to extend life beyond death by means of a son, to see one1s 
duties performed and unfinished works completed. A passage 
from the Bphad-arapyaka-upanigad expresses this point 
vividly: "Next follows the handing over. When a man thinks 
he is going to depart, he says to his sons: ^ho u art Brahman 
[the Veda, so far as acquired by the father]; thou art the 
sacrifice [so far as performed by the father]; thou art the 
world*. The son answers: *1 am Brahman, I am the sacrifice,
I am the world *. Whatever has been learnt [by the father] 
that, taken as one, is Brahman. Whatever sacrifices there 
are, they taken as one, are the sacrifice. Whatever worlds 
there are, they taken as one, are the world. Verily here 
ends this [what has to be done by a father, e.g. study, 
sacrifice]* 'Hence [the son], being all this preserved me 
from this world', thus he thinks. Therefore, they call a son 
who is thus instructed (to all this), world-son (lokya), and 
therefore they instruct him* When a father who knows this, 
departs from this world, then he enters into his son together 
with his own spirits (with speech, mind, and breath). If 
there is anything done amiss by the father, of all that the
T
son delivers him, and therefore he is called putra, son.
1. On the derivation of putra M. Mueller says in a fn.:
"from pu (put), to fill, and tra, to deliver, a deliverer 
who filTs the holes left by the father, a stopgap. Others 
derive it from put, a hell, and tra, protect; cf. Manu,
9,158". The second derivation is apparently the later one 
and is a typical example in the Pharma^astra of the method 
of cementing legal objects with the help of religious 
concepts•
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By the help of his son the father stands firm in this world, 
Then these divine immortal spirits (speech, mind, and breath) 
enter into him,n^
The identification of father and son is the very 
reason why the son comes to be entitled and has a preferen­
tial right to 1 succeed1 to his father, before anybody else 
can succeed who does not represent the personality of the 
father. Though the PharmaSastras stress the absolute power 
of the father as regards the time of partition and to some 
extent even as regards the mode of partition, the necessity 
of having a son is, however, found in many passages of the 
Pharmasutra- and Smgti-literature, not only because of the 
immortality a son guarantees, but also as the provider for
p
the ancestors. (The original primitive idea of the survival 
of the father in the son, together with the development of 
the ancestor cult made the son the natural successor to the 
rights and duties of the father who cannot easily deprive 
them of their heritage. It is only by a son that the father
1. 1,5,17; MoMueller's tr., SBE, XV, 96Q See Roer's ed., III, 
303ff• _
2. Xp.-dh.su. 2,9,24,Iff* * tr. SBE, II, 158; Baudh.dtusu. 
2,9,16, Iff.; tr .SBE, XIV, 27TTGaut .-dh.su. 12,32 on the 
importance of the son. Vase-dh.su. I7»lff<>; tr. SBE, XIV, 
84; identical with Vigpu-dh. su. 15»4; Manu 9* 1(57;
for sons and grandsons see Vas.-dh.su., ibid., Vigpu-
dh.su. 15,46; Manu 9, 137; cp* also Sapkha-Likhita and
Harlta, cit. in Jha, HLS, II, 171«
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can ’live on1 after death, a son who will complete his works, 
perform the funeral ceremonies, and perform the prescribed
sacrifices. Thus the father’s property will not lose the
function and purpose which it had when the father was alive 
and a pious father will have to ensure that a son can event­
ually perform his duties by not squandering his property*
The idea that only the son can complete the father’s 
work and perform obsequies etc*, i*e., the duties of a son 
whose non-performance would cause the resentment of the 
deceased, may at some stage also have safeguarded the rights 
of a minor son against the members of the family like father’s 
brothers, their descendants and the widow-mother* The prece­
dence of the son over all other heirs is expressed in a 
feloka which indicates that "not brothers, nor father are to 
share the property of a deceased brother, but the son": na
bhratara£ na pitarah putra riktha-hara^L pitulj/
Gradually the corollary that only the son can 
complete the works and repair the ommisslons of a father, 
established the rule that the son has to repay all the 
material debts as well.
1. Manu, 9? 185*
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(3) The Liability for Debts of a Deceased Person.
(a) The liability of sons and grandsons.
According to the Artha§astra the sons are obliged 
to pay the debts of the father with interest after his death, 
and this obligation exists even if there is no property of 
the father in the hands of the sons; other dayadas, in the 
absence of sons, have to pay the capital with interest if 
they inherit the estate, whereas co-debtors and co-sureties 
are liable (naturally) whether the deceased had left any 
assets or not.'*" The debt of the father thus becomes the debt 
of the son, and if a grandson exists, certain ancestral 
obligations are even transferred to him, similarly as in the
case of the son, even though he may not have received any
ancestral property: r,But sons, grandsons, or heirs inheriting 
the property shall (be liable to) pay a (debt about the re-
p
payment) of which, the place and the time are not fixed".
The liability of sons and grandsons to discharge the 
fatherfs personal obligations after his death or on becoming
1* Artha^o 3,11,14 [113]; pretasya putra£ kuslda# dadyulp.,
dayada va riktha-hara^L, saha-grahipa^L, pratibhuvo va/.
2. Arthafe. 3,11,17 [tr0263; 1133 s asaipkhyata-deSa-kalaip. tu
putralj. pautra dayada va rikthsup. haramap.a dadyu^/ In the
context this obviously refers to suretyship-debts of 
which ’the preceding two sections and the subsequent 
sections speak. See fn. , below.
78
a ps^ivrajaka or after his absence for twenty years lias also 
found its place in the Dharma§astras, as e.g. in the Vi?pu- 
dharmasutra which moreover expressly declares that remoter 
descendants, i.e. the great-grandson etc* are not liable 
against their will. Bphaspati lays down that one should 
discharge one's father's proved debts as his own* that is 
with interest, the grandson should pay the principal only,
whereas the great-grandson shall not be liable for the
2
great-grandfather's debts* The order of priority according 
to which the debts are to be repaid is laid down by Bphaspati 
as follows: grandfather's, father's, one's own debts.
Sons may be liable for the debts of the father even 
during his lifetime, if he is for some reason incapacitated 
to pay the debt. The causes of his incapacity are listed 
in the Smptis and include for instance when the father is 
gone to a distant country or is afflicted with an incurable 
disease, or has become an ascetic, in other words situations
1 . 6,27-28 [31; Dh.K.678a]: dhana-grahipi prete pravrajite 
dvida§a sama£ pravasite va tat-putra-pautrair-dhanaip. 
deyap/27/ natap. param anicchubhilj/28/ See also Yajn* 2,
50 and Katy. 555 and 556.
2. Bph. 10,114 [117; tr. SBE, XXXIII, 328, §1.49] Cp. also
Yajn. 2,50. Katy. 556. A possible explanation of the 
distinction (as suggested by Dr0 J.D.M. Derrett) is that 
originally the descendant was liable only for the principal 
and that when liability for interest was recognised, the 
son, because of his identity with father became liable 
for interest.
3. 10,113 [117; Dk.K. 7071.
79
where the sons have replaced the father in the management
1
of the property*
The son is not liable if he is a minor, suffers from 
psychical or physical disease or is otherwise incapable of 
inheriting, but a son!s son not suffering from such disabil-
p
ities has to pay the principal (only) in his place*
Finally the liability of sons and grandsons does not 
exist even if ancestral property is in their hands, when the 
debt is avy avahar ika, a debt which is 1 unenforce able by 
process1, because (scilicet) of illegality or immorality* 
Instances of avyavaharika debts are debts incurred for 
drinking and gambling, idle promises made to bards, wrestlers 
etc*, debts incurred under the influence of wrath or illicit 
love (kama-danam; to pimps?), and the balance of fines or 
tolls.5
(b) Liability for Suretyship-debts.
An additional important cause of the liability of 
sons existed in connection with suretyship (prat1bhavyam) 
undertaken by the father, to which we have already referred
1. Yajn* 2,50; Mar. 4,4-; Viggu 6,27; Katy*548-50.
2. Katy* 552-5; 556-7.
3* See texts cited by Kane, HDh, III, 446f* Sulka, generally 
understood to be fines or "the balance of fines in this 
context, may also refer to bride-price according to
Haradatta on Gautama 12,38 [Dh*K.677f*3 Op* also Artha§*
3,16,19*
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ii
s h o r t l y T h r e e  kinds of suretyships are especially promin­
ent in the Smptis, though some authors know four or even 
five kinds which, however, we need not specify in this con­
text, The Ya,jfiavalkya-smrti with its usual brevity and com­
pactness, mentions (a) Suretyship for appearance, that is 
the surety undertakes to produce the debtor when required;
(b) suretyship for honesty, where the respectability etc, of 
the debtor is guaranteed; and (c) surety for payment. The 
son is not liable for the fulfilment of obligations arising 
out of suretyship for 1 appearance1 and ‘honesty1, which, 
though probably the most ancient types of suretyship, must 
have involved the surety only in a strictly personal liabil­
ity, The son was, however, after the death of the father, 
liable for debts arising from a suretyship for payment under 
taken by the father, and this liability arose without agree­
ment by the son and involved only the son, that is the 
suretyship was inherited only by the first generation of
1. See
Ve have been considerably aided in the understanding of 
the nature of suretyship in Hindu law by a forthcoming 
article entitled ‘Suretyship in India: The Classical Law 
and Its Aftermath1 [Bee,Soc,Jean Bodin] by J.D.M.Derrett 
of which the author Endly gave a typescript for perusal. 
See also L. Sternbach, Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian 
Law, no,12, 'Suretyship', Suppl, to Bharatiya Vidya 7 
(194-6) 25-60.
2, Yatjn, 2,53a [170]; darSane pratyaye dane pratibhavyam 
vidhlyate/ Bph,10,74-Clll] adds'delivering the assets of 
the debtor* which Yajn. would subsume under fdaneT.
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male descendantsPerhaps this may he ascribed to the latent
presence of the belief in the identity of father and son
which supported the legal obligation conveniently.
To the rule that sons were not liable for suretyship
debts arising from suretyship for ’appearance1 and for
’honesty1 and that only sons are held liable for suretyship
for payment, there is the exception that if the surety
received a reward, a payment for his services or if he had
received a pledge (or the equivalent) sons or heirs would be
liable in all cases of suretyships on the death or the dis-
2appearance of the father# The undertaking of suretyship for 
reward must have been most common and must have been preva­
lent especially among communities engaged in trading or
*
pursuing some craft. Here we may perhaps find the reason 
why the Gautama-dharmasutra seems to militate against the 
liability of sons for all kinds of suretyship-debts« The 
fact that Gautama mentions commercial debts immediately 
after suretyship debts, amongst those debts for which a son 
is not liable, could be ascribed to the intention of the 
author to prevent involvement of Brahma^Las and their sons in 
strictly commercial commitments and activities and to con­
fine each community to its peculiar source of income which
1. Yajn. 2^54; Vispu 6,41; Hanu 8,160; Katy.561; Vyasa, cit. 
by Apararka, 656. See texts cit. at Jha, HLS, I, 186f.
2. See Derrett, op.cit.,
Manu 8, 161-2. Katy. 534.
Derrett, ubi cit.,
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is, in the case of Brahmap.as, the acceptance of gifts
(c) The Liability of the Great-grandsons.
The question whether a great-grandson is personally 
liable to pay the debts of the great-grandfather is discussed 
by MM P.V,Kane who refutes the opinion of J.Jolly. Jolly had 
believed that the great-grandson was not liable for the 
debts contracted by the great-grandfather and conversely that 
he did not inherit the property. Kane correctly states that 
the great-grandson is liable provided he has inherited the 
(or some of the) ancestral estate. Thus it might be possible 
to conclude that the only descendants who are to a varying 
degree liable for the debts of a person are the son and the 
grandson. On the other hand there are Smpti-passages attri­
buted to Narada and Katyayana which unambiguously state that 
obligation ceases with the fourth?.^ The stress with which
1. Gaut. 12,48 [208 ; tr. SBE II, 241]. Cp.lO,lff. and 39ff.
This view would be more in consonance with the character
and purpose of the Gautama-dh.su (for which see Derrett 
ln JESHO * 1 (1957) at 68J. and in 7(1964) at 103. Stern- 
bach, however, sees in Gautama one of the earliest texts 
and the beginning of an evolution of the law of surety­
ship (Op.cit., _ ). Por the age of Gautama see now
S.C.Banerji, Dharmasutras,..., ch.3.
2. See Kane*s remarks at HDh, III, 443f. and on Katy. at 560.
3. Nar.4,4[46f.] : kr amad - a vy ah a t ap praptap putrair yannarpam-
uddhrtam/ dadyu^L paitamahap pautras tac-cat uphan-ni var tate 
//- "The grandsons shall pay the debts of their grand­
father which having been legitimately [or:unresistedly] 
inherited by the sons, has not been paid by them^ the 
obligation ceases with the fourth descendant". Katy.560.
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some Smptis negative the liability of the great-grandson and 
the discussions of these texts by later commentators suggest 
that the topic was disputed. It was attempted to base the 
liability of the great-grandson on his duty to offer pin&a 
to three deceased ancestors. A passage from the Narada-smpti 
combines the duty to free the father from debts with the 
idea that three ancestors subsist on the fourth in descent 
for the repayment of their twofold (spiritual and secular) 
debts.1
But the purpose of the ancestral cult, it should be 
remembered, was to ensure the continuity of the line and 
adherence of the property to one*s own descendants in spite 
of the claims of other relatives like a surviving widow, 
collaterals etc. When a great-grandson was born, he would 
(as a minor) not be entitled to participate in legal trans­
actions, but, attaining majority or ceremonial competence, 
he would eventually be the provider of the ancestral cult 
and the link between the past and future generations. He 
would eventually be in the possession of ancestral property, 
especially lands, and he may thus be liable to pay ancestral 
debts out of the inherited property. But it was obviously 
considered unjust to make him personally liable, if he was 
not a major at the time of the transaction and did not 
inherit any property.
1. See Narada 4,5-9; cit. by Kane, HDh, 111,416; see fn. 
676 at 417, ibid.
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(4-) Participation of Three Generations in the Legal 
Sphere 0
In the hig patriarchal household whatever property 
is acquired is acquired hy or on "behalf of the eldest male 
ascendant who is the head and manager* A passage by Harxta 
inculcates this principle in clear terms: "While the father 
is living the sons have no freedom in regard to the appro- 
priation, giving away or realising of property"* The dictum 
of Manu (see above, 39 ) that a woman, sons and slaves have
no property and whatever wealth they earn is acquired for 
him to whom they belong, is equally unambiguous* But whereas 
these rules reflect a family in which the authority of the 
father tends to be absolute so that sons etc*are merely 
dependants and eventual heirs, other rules reflect that the 
mutual ties between father and son and grandson were much 
more complex in the legal sphere.
We have already referred to the liability of a son 
and a grandson for the debts of a father* Probably it was
easier to get credit when a person had sons who formed an
2additional Security1 for the creditor. A description of
1* Cit, in the Kptya-kal*, 651: jxvati pitari putrap.am-
arthadana-visargak§epe§u na svatantryam/
2* According to custom a father even could pledge or sell 
his son when He had contracted a debt or is in need of 
livelihood* See M l i n d a 1s Questions, tr. I.B* Horner, 
vololl, 102. See above
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the relationship between the creditor and debtor and his
descendants is given by Bhavasvamin on the Jsl. of Narada
which deals with the liability of the descendantsThe
passage incidentally illustrates a distinction between
personal and real security for debt which is of great inter
est in itself,
A legitimate proven debt has to be paid by the 
sons whether they are making use of the sum 
borrowed or not. In default of the sons (i.e. 
in their absence because of death or disappear­
ance) the grandson has to pay. In this way a 
bond-anount can be exacted from three genera­
tions including the original debtor but exclu­
ding the great-grandson. In the third genera­
tion a new bond must be obtained (in default 
of payment), as otherwise the obligation would 
cease thereafter* As this renewal is not certain, 
the author points out that if a debt is secured 
by a possessory mortgage, the liability does 
not cease. This is the reason why people incur 
debts (on personal security) to redeem their 
mortgaged property, for an obligation does not 
cease in the latter case even upto the tenth
generation.2
A further instance that three generations at a time 
are contemplated in legal formalities is the text of a
1. See above, 82.
2. Naradlya-manu-sagihita 1,4 [21] : kramat praptam-pp.a^~ 
avyahatam-avisa^Lvaditam/ ,.. avisaipvaditajji tu putrair na 
datta# bhujyamanam-abhujyamana^L va tat pautro dadyat/ 
caturthat tu nivartate/ ekena patrepa tri-purugaip labhyate/ 
tptlye tu punalj. patraipL kartavyam/ akarap.e tad-do^ac- 
caturthe hlyate/bhumyadisu bhujyamanagu na hani£/ at a eva 
f^a-grahapagi kytajL-adhamara— nivpttyartham/ adhamanaiji 
tvadanad daSa-purujam api na hlyate//
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grant of land etc* “by the king to a person executed on a 
copperplate or cloth, which, includes the son and the grand­
son as the recipients, whereas the great-grandson is not
l
expressly mentioned. Unbroken adverse possession by three
p
generations confers (in effect) ownership upon the fourth* 
When e.g. the Yatjnavalkya-smpti states that the son has a 
right equal to the father in ancestral immoveables and 
nibandhas acquired by the grandfather, we find again that 
only three generations participate in practice in the legal 
sphere. The rules on debts incurred for the purposes of the 
undivided family contemplate a paternal uncle as a head of 
an undivided family which visualises jointness within a 
pattern of three generations of males. But this rule simul­
taneously anticipates the imminent break-up of the family 
and the settlement of family debts at the time of partition: 
"The debts which have been incurred by the ♦.. paternal
uncle, ... should all be paid by the coparceners at the
*
time of partition".
Further illustrations could be cited, but the fore­
going instances suffice to show that unit of three genera­
tions had a series of joint legal responsibilities and
1. Bphaspati 6,20ff.,[22; tr. SBE, XXXIII, 306]: ... putra- 
p autranvavanugam/
2. Katy. 315-8, 321-4, 326-8.
3« Katy. 846; cp. Narada 4,3> [46]•
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duties in a varying degree. We may suggest that the limita­
tion to three generations was based upon the number of 
generations of which an undivided family may have been 
normally composed and functioned in the legal sphere, The 
probability that a great-grandson is living is marginal and, 
as we have said, he would usually be a minor and so dis­
entitled to participate in legal transactions. He could not 
be made personally liable for the debt of the grandfather.
It is significant that the Smptis as well as the 
Artha§astra refer to the unity of four and the bond of 
sapi:p4 aship only in the context of inheritance, probably to 
safeguard the claim of a great-grandson to property deriving 
from the great-grandfather at the latter1 s death. The main 
importance of the great-grandson at such a stage of the 
life-cycle of the undivided family is the desire that con­
tinuance of the kula be assured, Moreover he represents a 
predeceased father and grandfather in a partition between 
agnatic collaterals,
II• The Concept of Sadharapam
(1) From the indications given in the preceding section 
it seems clear that especially the son was more than just 
an appendage of the father and that father and son were in 
fact closely dependent in the material and socio-religious 
sphere, As far as the material sphere is concerned this
nexus finds its expression already in two passages of the 
Brahmapas, The first is from the Taittirlya-sagihita: 
pitaiva tat putrepa sadharapaip kurute/ tasmad ahur ya§ 
caivaip. veda ya& ca na - katha putrasya kevalaip. katha 
sadh.arap.ajji pitur iti/-"The father creates sadharanagi with 
the son. Therefore they say - whether one thus knows or 
knows not - how does the sadharaoagi belong only to the 
father and how only to the son?"'1' The concept is similarly 
expressed in the Aitareya Sranyaka: yatra ka kva ca
putrasya tat pitur, yatra va pitus tad va putrasyety etat/ 
tad ukteujx bhavati/^ "Wherever something belongs to the 
son, it also belongs to the father, or where something 
belongs to the father, it also belongs to the son, as you 
know; that is a dictum".
It may be worthwhile to trace the etymology of the 
term sadharanagi and its application in some legal texts, 
because such investigation may assist us in understanding 
the relationship between father and son which constitutes 
one of the central aspects of the law of the joint family,
(2) The Derivation of the Term,
The term is derived from a + dhy = to hold, keep,
1, Tait,-sagu 2,6,1,6-7 C ]; this and the following 
passage are quot* by Rau, 44,
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support. The noun adhara occurs with the meaning 'support* ,
1 -  -  -
'substratum' etc. In the Narada-smpti adhara accordingly
has the meaning of 'capital' for people engaged in a joint 
business: "When several partners are jointly carrying on
business for the purpose of making profits, the supplying
2
of capital forms the basis of such business".
(3) Sadharapa (Adj.)
S. used as an adjective finds application if some­
thing is 'common', or 'commonly applicable' to the whole of 
the society, i.e. the four varpas, but may also be used if 
something is 'common' or ('peculiar' to a closed group like 
a caste, guild, family, gotra etc.. To quote illustrations, 
the sources of property which are sarva-sadharapa = 'common 
to all' are riktha ('inheritance'), kraya (purchase), 
samvibhaga (partition), and parigraha (seizure; Maskari 
glosses parigraha as strldhana in the sense of 'dowry' which 
becomes the property of the husband. Dh.K. 1122 b.) and
1. Cp. Monier-Williams. Sanskrit-English Dictionary; the 
Petersb. Worterbuch lists the meanings 'Stutze', ^Sttttz- 
punkt4, 'Unterlage *, Puckhalt', 'Behalter', and sa + 
adhara = 'eine Stutze habend'.
2. Nar. 3?2,[133; Dh.K.780]: phala-hetor upayena karma
sa^bhuya kurvatam/ adhara-bhutah praksepas tenottistheyur -
amSatah//. Sadhara literally means 'having or resting on the 
same support1.
adhigama (finding),*** but the peculiar1 substratum or source 
of acquisition to Brahmapas are * gifts', to Kgatriyas
f _ p
'conquest', 'earning1 to Vaisyas and Sudras. According to 
Narada there are three sources of property, namely that 
which is received by inheritance, as an affectionate gift, 
and that which is received with one's wife: sadharapa^. syat 
trividham.. ,//4-6// kramagatap prlti-dayap praptam ca saha 
bharya/ aviSegepa sarvegam varpanaft trividhap dhanam//4-7//^ 
Similarly e.g. there are special ordeals for each of the 
castes, though the ko§a ordeal is common to all: sadharapalp. 
samastanafr ko§a£ ..
Each group has its particular dharma in common and 
the peculiar dharma which the group of workmen and 'slaves' 
has in common is characterised by the absence of s vat antra» 
the want of independence.^ The particular effort a brother 
devotes to the common object of a family and whereby he does
wou./-«A Oil
work which ought to be done jointly by the brothers pgovi&os
1* Gaut.dh.su. 10,38 and Vijnane§vara [ ; Dh.K.1122];
the Gautama-mitakgara comments: sarva-varpa-sadharapam 
svamya-karapani = ug causes of ownership common to all 
varpas" [Dh.K. 1122b]*
2* Gaut.-dh.su. 10,40-4-2 and Mitakgara prooem. to Yajn.2,114-
3. Nar.4-,50 [62; Dh.K. 1130bf.] Bphaspati 7> 8-9 [70] •
4-. Nar., cit. e.g. in the Sm.-ca. 103; Dh.K. 4-53a.
5. Sm.-ca. on Nar. 8,4- [Dh.K.825b] *
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£ a A o r a M f t ,
another for the- tem,,
’Common Property’ = sadharapa-dravya or -dhana, is 
frequently found in medieval texts, thus e.g. in an explana­
tion of the terms bhanda and pipda by Bhavasvami on a passage
— — 2from the Naradlya-manu-samhita. The tendency to consider
the property of a father simultaneously as the son’s appears
in many medieval texts and the term used is sadharapa-dhana,
thus e.g. when Capde§vara Jhakkura says about the passage 
- — 3
by Harita:^ "Receipt means using the joint wealth independ­
ently of the father".^
(4) Sadharapaip (Noun)
S. quite frequently indicates the community of 
ownership in a natural body such as the family or in a 
corporation created by consent. Thus we get as the common
property of a joint concern (sambhuya-samutthanam) and the 
passages mostly refer to the case where a partner deals 
dishonestly with the common property: ... sadharapasya -
1. Bhavasvami on Naradadlya-manu-sa^ihita 13»35[156] * 
sadhara#a-prayojana-tat-paralj. sadhara^La-karyajjL cet kurute,.
2. 3>4[85] : Bhapda~pipda-vyayo ddhara-bhara-saranvavek£apam/ 
kuryuste vyavaharepa samaye sve vy avast hi ta£//4// 
Bhavasvami: bhapdaip. sadhiorapa-dravyepa gphltap dravyam/ 
pipd^ ]?- sarva-samudayalj./
3- See above ^ 8L/
* 461: arthadanajji pitp-nairapekgapa sadharapa- 
dhana-grahapam.
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lapi.'*’ In principle one can only deal jointly with such
2
property. If a member of a corporation damages the common 
property* he should be turned out of the community, accord­
ing to a dictum of Bphaspati which is explained in the 
Smpti-candrika by the instance of a member of the corporation
siding with a person who has been found guilty to pay a fine
3 -  -
which would go towards the joint stock. Here sadharanam 
approaches the meaning of Common interest* which exist
IL _
among the partners of a joint concern, A passage by Vyasa, 
as cited e«g, in the Smpti-candrika, tells us that there may 
be common immoveable property of a gotra which should not 
be sold or given away without the consent of the other 
members of the gotra - which presumably reflects a right of 
preemption.^ If several brothers remain undivided after the
1. Yajn. 2,237; Vi§pu Jha, HLS, I, 521f.
2. Katy. 697? sadharapap tu yat-kritap naiko dayan-naradhama^i.
nadadyan na ca gphplyad vikrlyac-ca na caiva hi - "If
a thing jointly owned (by several) were purchased, a 
single vile man cannot deliver it (to the buyer). It 
should not be received nor taken, nor should it be sold*'*
3. Bph. 17*15 [152]: yastu sadharapam hipsyat sa 
nirvasya^. purat tat a£// Sm.ca., 327? sadharapap dapdadi- 
dravyap dap^yadelj. sahayya-karapadina naSayet ity arthal)/'
4. Capeller, Sanskrit Dictionary, inter alia gives the 
meaning 1 community, common cause1.
5. 716: sthavarasya/samastasya gotra-sadharapasya ca/ naikalp.
kuryat krayap danap paraspara-matap vina// Dh.K. 1586;
Jha, HLS, II, 117f« See also Derrett, Univ. of Ceylon 
Rev. 1'9(1981) at 113-4* where two texts of VySsa actually 
referring preemption are dealt with.
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death of the father, the common property is for them
sadharapagu This is very often used by Smpti-authors and
commentators.*** For another instance see a passage from
Narada with the comment of Bhavasvamin according to which
the pitg-dhana becomes the sadharanam of the brothers and
is charged with the expenses of the sacramental rites of
2
the minor brothers, such as the upanayana and marriage*
In the sense of 'common property1 s^ appears, for instance, 
in the Katha-saritsagara where a Brahmapa priest shares the 
village donated to him, with his fellow Brahmapas.
S. is obviously used in the case of brothers for 
the property which they hold jointly after the death of the 
father* But it is only by the time of the Mitakgara that 
is explicitly used in the sense of the common property of 
father and son in a technical sense. The Mitakgara introduced, 
as w3 shall see, a new theory and establishes the right by 
birrt'a of a son in his father's and grandfather's assets. The 
Smptis, however, on the one hand tend to stress the
1. S$e e.g. Vyasa, cit. in Sm.ca., VI.va., Apar*, etc. Dh.K. 
1231b; Jha, HLS, II, 34,613.
2. Nlradiya~manu~saphitiu 13,33[1553 s bhratrnap balanadi- 
pLtra akp ta-s apskarapaA pitur-abhave... bhratpbhip 
pLtp-dhanad up ad ay a sadharapat kartavyap/
3* Ed., H. Brockhaus 18, 127: Yapsca prapa nppad gramaps 
tan sa sarvan mahasayalj./ tan-ma£ha§raybhir vipraifci samap 
sadharapap vyadhat//
94
independence of the father from the claims of the son and 
on the other hand turn against excessive use of patriarchal 
power. In practice, the situation as indicated hy the two 
texts of the BrahmapaS' which we have cited above, namely 
the subsisting of the father and his sons on property 
acquired by either of them, must have been considered normal, 
natural and decent. This was equally valid in the time of 
the Brahmapas, the Smpti-period and at the time of the 
commentatorial literature and in this connection we can 
assuredly cite the comment of Sayapa on the two Brahmapa 
passages which precisely reflects in practice the relation­
ship between father and his descendants in the material 
sphere from the time when the passages were composed.^ 
Commenting on the Taittirlya-saphita Sayapa says: "Indeed 
in practice a boy will earn property and keeping it with the 
object of preventing it from being common property and so 
having some means of livelihood for himself in future, will 
go and hide it instead of giving it to his father or 
brothers. But whatever is acquired by a father becomes the 
common property of the boy, his son, and his brothers. All
p
of them in fact live upon such property". On the Aitareya-
1. They are cit. in translation by Derrett in S.C.J. 19(1956) 
at 107; this translation is adopted here.
2. loke hi balena yad-uparjitap tad-dravyap sa putra uttara-
kale sva-jlvanartham/ asadharapatvena samgphya guptam
karoti na tu pitre prayacchati na tu bhratpbhyalj/ pitra
tu yad-uparjyate tat-pitur bala putrasya tad-bhratrpa&
ca sadharapap bhavati/ tena dravyepa sarve fpi jlvanti/ 
Tait.-sagu 2,6,1,6[Dh.K.1161a]• cont*
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braThmapa passage he elaborates: ,?In practice an object 
belonging to a son becomes in its entirety the property of 
his father wherever it may be, that is to say, in whatever 
different village it may be located; and the father will 
send for it and enjoy it* Moreover should any object con­
nected with the father cone to light in another village it 
becomes his sonfs property also, and even the son will send 
for it and enjoy it. For equity demands such reciprocal 
rights of enjoyment (or 'union consists in the mutual 
enjoyment of one another's goods')"♦ (Dh.K. 1162a).
III. Conclusions
Sadharapap implies the 'substratum* of* 'basis of 
property* which the father would create or maintain in order 
to Secure the fulfilment of the 'mutual interest’ and to 
fO§te:r the 'mutual concern' which exists between father and 
son and grandson: sadharapajgi is the property which forms 
the basis for the realisation of the mutual duties which 
existed between father and son in the economic and spiritual- 
religious spheres. The father's duty to maintain a son or 
sons during their minority was influenced by the considera­
tion that the son would eventually have to maintain the 
parents eventually. Thus the son anticipated the position 
of the father as a kind of reward for his exertion, resulting 
in a right to succeed to his father's position and property.
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The right to succeed to his father’s rights and duties also 
originated from the concept of the son "being ’identical1 
with the father; the son was, therefore obliged to repay 
the debts the father might owe at his death* This eventually 
resulted in the legal injunction which imposed on the sons 
and the grandsons the obligation to pay the proven 
vyavaharika debts of the deceased father* In many respects 
the sons and grandsons participate in the legal sphere 
which gives them some ill-defined claim on the property even 
if the father is functioning as the head of the family.
The sons also succeed to the father's important 
duty of maintaining the ancestral cult, and the male des­
cendants thus form a tie which binds past, present and 
future generations* This continuity is similarly secured by 
property which was formerly in the hands of ancestors*
Co-ownership between father and son - in the devel­
oped legal sense - did not exist and is logically precluded 
in a system which was influenced by patriarchy* The notion 
of sadharapap may have assisted, gradually, a movement 
from the son's expectation of succeeding to the father to 
ownership» even, of an interest in the grandfather's property 
(especially immovable property) in the father's hands* It 
is possible to see in legal texts traces of this movement*
If there is co-enjoyment of the father's self-acquisitions 
it is natural that a desire to prevent unilateral alienations
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of inherited property should arise a fortiori: once this is 
admitted the "birth-right is only the next step. Sadharauam* 
in psychological and economic terms would seem to he the 
key to this movement*
The son's right in ancestral land and other enduring 
sources of wealth were not the theme in the early legal 
texts, which are influenced by patriarchal notions according 
to which the father's will is decisive as regards the dis­
position of property, which was not divided into the cate­
gories of moveable and immoveable property as in later 
texts* But a check on the father's power to deal with 
ancestral property at his discretion nay have been in 
existence very early and the Smytis eventually take account 
of this, declaring the land acquired by the ancestors, and 
sources of wealth which are permanent, to be types of 
property over which father and son have sadpSa svamya or 
tulya svamitva, i.e. 'co-extensive ownership1.^
Thus the Ya jhavalkya-snpti declares the basic rule 
which has formed the centre of discussion in later commen­
taries: "The land that nay have been acquired by the grand-
2
father, as also the nibandhas and dravya , over all this
1. sadp§a means 'resembling', 'similar', 'conformable'; 
tulya means 'equal1, 'similar1, 'comparable1, and is 
derived from the root tul which means inter alia 'to 
weigh *, 'compare', 'make equal', 'counterbalance'; 
Nonier-Villiams, Sanskpit English Dictionary.
2. The term nibandha means according to P.V. Kane, HDh,III, 
575? fn.lC82, a periodic payment or allowance granted by 
a king, corporation, village, or caste to a person, 
family, a maltha,or a temple. See also Derrett, ZVR 64 
(1962)74f.. Dravya often means gold, silver, an3~’other 
moveables according to Kane, ib.
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the ownership of both the son and the father is co- 
extensive." Similarly other Smptis enjoin the equal owner­
ship of father and son in the grandfather1s property
2including moveables.
But the co-extensive right of father and son amounted 
in effect only to the right of the son to an equal share at 
partition. However, the power of the father to alienate 
ancestral property became subject to limitations in order 
to prevent the father's jeopardising the maintenance of the 
family. While treating of the topic of 'resumption of gifts'
(dattapradanikam) the Bphaspati-smpti declares that though 
the father may give away his self-acquired property, ances- 
tral property may not be given away in its entirety. Even 
if there is no ancestral property or in families where there 
was no distinction made between the grandfather's property 
and the father's self-acquired property, all property
1. Yajn. II, 122: bhurya pitamahopatta nibandho dravyam eva 
va/ tatra syat sadpSam svamyagi pitu^. putrasya cobhayot-//
2. Vi§pu-dh.su. 17,2; Bph. 26,10 [197; Dh.K.1180b] cit.also 
as Vyasa's dictum: kramagate gpha-ksetra pita-putralp. 
samsuji§ina£i/ paitpke na vibhagarha£ sutalj. pitur-anicchatah// 
- Bph. 26,14 [197; Dh.K. 1179b]: Dravye pitamahopatte 
sthavare jahgame tat ha [v.l.: 'pi va]/ samamajjLsitvam 
akhyatagL pituTj. putrasya cobhayo^.. [v.l.: caiva hi]//- 
similarly Katy. 839•
3* 14,5 [158; Dh.K. 803]: sveccha deyam svayaqi prapta^L.../
... kramayate sarva-danaip. na vidyate//
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being styled as the father's, the father is not free from
the duty to maintain dependants which is incorporated by
Smptis in the rule that the whole property should not be
1
object to a gift.
The patriarchal head of the family can be prevented 
from squandering property, at least if we follow Harlta, who 
shows that the eldest son may exercise in certain circum­
stances a prerogative of management: ’’While the father is 
living, the sons have no freedom in regard to appropriating 
giving away or realising property. But if he uses property 
yielding to desires or whims, if he is absent or afflicted
2with disease, the eldest son should care for the property".
But an actual positive right of the son to realise 
his claim to an equal share of the ancestral property or to 
control the powers of alienation of the father in respect 
of ancestral property is not unambiguously stated in those 
Smptis of which a coherent version has been handed down by 
commentators.
1. Yajn. 2, 175 [238 ; Dh.K.796]; Jha, ELS,I,266. Katy. 638,
but fil. 639 permits sale in time of distress or emergency
conditions (apatkale); Nar.7*4-5C137; Dh.K.798b and 799]
forbid the gift of the entire property when there is 
offspring even in 'times of distress'.
2. Cit. in the Kptya-kalpataru, VyaK*, 651 sincL Vivada- 
ratnakara, 461,' which reads kamadane and adds kamadane 
kama-matradevartha-datari/- "Giving away wealth according 
to whims".
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On the other hand, besides the existence of 
families which followed the law developed according to the 
patriarchal pattern, the existence of families where the 
ancestral property, especially lands, was simultaneously 
an asset property for future generations, with a correspond­
ing weakening erf the authority of the father in respect to 
such property, was noticed in passages of Smptis of which 
we have only fragments preserved by commentators, perhaps 
because these Smptis had committed themselves in too detailed 
a manner to customary practices* These Smptj.-passages tended 
to modify the patriarchal power in the interest of descen­
dants and future generations. Thus a passage of Vyasa says 
that immoveable property etc* is not freely alienable by 
the father; "Immoveable property and slaves, even though 
self-acquired, cannot be given away or sold without the 
consent of all one’s sons. There can be no sale or gift of 
such property as would be the means of livelihood for sons 
already born and those yet to be b o m " ^  A text of
1. Jha, HLS,1,276; Dh*K, 1587ab: sthavarajji dvipadajp. yadyapi
svayam-arjitam/ asajpbhuya sutan sarvan na danagi na ca
vikrayalj// ye jata yefpy ajataS ca ye garbhe vyavavefthitaTp//
vpttiip ca te ’bhikanksanti na dana]ji na ca vikrayafr// Sen-
Gupta, 204,fn. 72, 209? fn*78, prefers the reading
vptti-lopah vigarhitah, which means that the dissipation
of maintenance is ’morally1 wrong. But the first reading 
might have been literally applicable amongst communities 
where the father’s alienation without concurrence of the 
sons was invalid by custom, whereas the second reading 
would apply to patriarchal families, where the father’s 
legal rights persisted untrammelled by any claims of the 
sons apart from rights to maintenance and moral con­
siderations *
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Byhaspati postulates the consent of the jnati as a necessary
1 __requirement for the gift of ancestral property, Jnati is 
an ambiguous term which normally refers to the agnatic kin. 
It may include the sons, the wife, perhaps even the daughter 
whose dowry was in danger, and agnatic collaterals,
IV* Affiliation and Proprietary Rights of Substitute Sons.
The necessity of having a son was, as we have seen, 
an essential condition for one's social, economic and ritual 
status. The belief that the father survives in the blood of 
the son would exclude ’sons* who were not !begotten by one­
self1, and an auras a son, 'a son of one's body by lawful 
p
marriage 1, would have a primary claim upon the property of 
a father. He consequently ranks first throughout the 
DharmaSastras * But in case the father had no auras a son, 
there was a variety of methods to procure for oneself 
1 secondary1 sons who may happen to live in the household or 
whom one could attach to the family and who would serve most 
of the secular purposes, if not spiritual purposes*
Most of the Smptis deal with twelve kinds of sons 
establishing an order of preference according to which the 
sons were successively entitled to inherit the father's
1. Bph.14-,6C138; Dh,K.803b] : ... kramayatagi ... yad-bhavet 
... jnati ... anujnatajji [v.l*] -matajp. dattajp siddhiip 
avapnuyat//
2* See texts cited at Jha, HLS, II, 178.
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property or to represent a deceased father if the ancestor
allocated the property,^ There is little evidence on the
exact rights of the Secondary1 sons vis-a-vis his father’s
brothers and father’s father. The secondary son’s position
might have been disputed by the agnatic relations of the
father, but apparently the substitute’s son’s right to
inherit the father's property, especially when the latter
had lived separately from his agnates, was admitted. The
dictum of Manu na bhrataro na pitarah putra rikthaharah
pituh must have been equally applicable to the case of the
2
substitute putra.
In the Manu-smpti the dattaka son attains prominence 
being placed third in the order of substitute sons.^ It may 
be that the dattaka son had a better chance to become a son 
for all purposes in respect to the kinsmen of the father, 
when social respectability as formulated in the Sastra in 
terms of ritual ceremonies gained wider influence on the 
behaviour of the people. Most of the secondary sons could 
hardly be considered substitutes adequate to represent the 
family in the material end spiritual sphere. The kgetraja
1, See e,g, Manu 9» 158-60; the first six sons are said to
be ’heirs and kinsmen’ and the other six are said to be
’kinsmen and not heirs’,
2, Manu 9> 185: Commentators take this section to refer to
a substitute son as well as to an aurasa,
3® For the development of the institution of adoption and 
the methods employed thereby see Derrett "Adoption in 
Hindu Law", ZVR, 60(1957) 34ff,, 41-46,
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son (i.e. a son who is the offspring of the wife by a kins­
man or person duly appointed to raise up issue to the hus­
band) , highly placed in the order by many texts, is depre­
cated by Manu who describes this method of obtaining a son 
as fa practice usual in breeding one*s cattle1 (pafeu-dharmao 
Manu 9?66.), *but not suitable for people who follow the 
Aryan way of life as understood by this law-giver#
The institution of adoption, however, was the most 
suitable method of procuring a son unobjectionable from the 
Gastric point of view, provided with a ceremony which would 
underline the value of the adopted son for spiritual 
purposes, e.g. at the §raddha-ceremonies
The dattaka might have been objected to in early 
Smptis because he may come from a different gotra and the 
kinsmen of the adoptive father would claim some residual 
right on his property even after partition, a right which
p
Manu intends to repress.
A further step in undermining the position of the 
various secondary sons in the sastra was taken by Smpti- 
texts which declare some or all secondary sons as obsolete, 
i.e. declaring them as pertaining to law (dharma) which
1. Vasi§£ha 15,1-9[44]* Kane, HDh, III, 663f« The notifica­
tion to the king is presumably a remnant of his residuary 
right in the propertye Cp. the case of Sudinna, above, 
ifl-f. In later times the king charged a fee for 
permitting this to happen.
2* Manu 9? 14-1.
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1
should not be followed in the Kali-yuga, though as a 
matter of fact many of the sastric texts continued to refer 
to other secondary sons, probably reflecting local customs.
1. Saunaka or Aditya-pura&a, cit. e 9g. in Apararka, 739 
C 1371a, 1383T.lV ; ~
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CHAPTER III
RIGHTS OP WOMEN TO PROPERTY IN THE DHARMA§ISTRA£
I. The Rights of a Woman as Wife, Widow and Mother.
(1) Introduction.
In the patriarchal kula where father and married 
sons live jointly, women tend to he under the protection of 
the males who are alone qualified to represent the family 
in the material and spiritual sphere. Women have to look 
after the internal household affairs and in a monogamous 
household the wife had in practice an extensive power in 
safeguarding the husband's peoperty.^ But women were 
excluded from participating in a partition on an equal 
basis with men. The tribal background of the Aryan settlers 
during the period of the Brahmapas would do nothing in 
establishing the rights of women in property. Passages 
which refer to lack of fitness of women in participating in 
(non-domestic) sacrifices dealing with Indra and other 
Vedic gods upon an equal footing with men provided the 
Sastric motivation for declaring women to be adayadas, i.e. 
non-sharers. A passage with has been utilized for this
!• Digha Nikaya III, 190; Anguttara Hikaya III, 36-38.
WagTe, "205, for the husband-wife relationship• See also 
Indra, The Status of Women in Ancient India, e.g. Ch.II.
A.S. Altekar, The Position of Women in Hindu Civilisation, 
with valuable inf ormation. Indra * s contributionmusi be 
read in the light of modern attempts to emancipate the 
Hindu woman.
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purpose is from the Taittirlya-saiphita: "Women are devoid
indriya and are not entitled to a s h a r e T h e  Baudhayana- 
dharmasutra perpetuates the passage of the Tait.-sagu which 
is taken to mean the exclusion from a share at a partition 
of day a, and not merely from a share in the soma-juice 
which must have been the original meaning* The reason for 
the exclusion is mentioned by the commentator of Baudhayana, 
Govindasvamin, and conveys the basic objection at all 
periods by most of the sastric authors, especially by those 
believing in the strict patriarchal and patrilineal pattern 
of the family, Govindasvamin apprehends that if a woman is
allowed to take a share in the day a, she would become
2
independent. The classical passage of Manu that a woman is 
protected by father, husband or sons read together with the 
dictum that women cannot hold property (adhanah) forms
1, 6,5?8a 2 striyo nirindriya adayadlr.../ Sat.Br. 4,4,2,15, 
and Maitrayana-sam# 4,6,4, are to the same effect.
Cp* Rau, 42. TEa7 HLS, II, 470. See Derrett, ZVR, 64 
(1962) 15, at 50 for an account of the disputes whether 
women can have a proprietary right as such. In denials 
of proprietary right to women the argument that women 
themselves were a kind of property was never completely 
forgotten in practice and in judicial theory. Derrett, 
ubi cit., and p .99 for further details,
2. On Baudh. 2,2,5,45 [15515 cit, by RegeA 51* Baudhfs text 
is as follows (2,2,5,45-7): na strl svatantryajp vindate
//4-5/A . .pita rak§ati kaumare bharta rakgati yauvane/
putras-tu sthavire bhave na strl svatantryam arhatlti//
46// nirindriya hyadayasca striya mat a iti srut i^ .//47//
§1.46 is identical with the often-quoted §1*9,3 of Manu: 
See also Kane, HDh, III, 605f, on the topic of the shares 
of women at partition, and below,
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1
the high-water mark of the law of the patriarchal family.
In the Dharmasastras the denial that a woman could own 
property was early modified by the admission of the institu­
tion of strldhana, which was in fact originally confined to 
personal assets of the wife kept separately from the
property of the agnates ,and maintenance. The right to
2
inherit and to a share was, however, of slow growth, and 
once it was admitted the question was not whether a woman 
could own property, but whether she had a$ratantrya, an 
unrestricted power of disposition.
The institution of strldhana existed much earlier 
than Manu. In fact we learn that as early as the time of 
the Vinaya Pifraka women could hold substantial wealth, 
though the property was apparently separate from the property 
of the agnatic members of the family. In the story of 
Sudinna whose parents attempt to dissuade him from joining 
the Buddhist Sangha, Sudinna, the only son and lheir*, is 
tempted to stay in the family with the prospect that he will
1. Manu 9?5; 8,416. Por a Modern1 Indian interpretation 
of the motives and purpose of the Manu-smpti in respect 
to the rights and social position of women, see R.M.Das, 
Women in Manu and his Seven Commentators, esp. ch.III.
2. Sen-Gupta, 183ff.} l9£ff«> for the rights of the sonless 
widow and the daughter. See_below, iiofj*., 123|J. ♦ Por the 
relationship of the Dharmasastra with the Law of the 
Kandyans, see Derrett, Univ. of Oeylon Rev., 14(1956) 
105 at 127ff.
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inherit a substantial amount of property* The wealth, 
consisting of gold and coins, is displayed before Sudinna 
in three heaps which represent the wife!s property or dowry 
(mattumattikam itthikaya ittidhanam) and the paternal and 
grandpaternal property (annaip. pettikaip annajp. pitamaham) *■*“ 
But a woman could not inherit the property descended in the 
male line at the death of her husband, as the story of 
Sudinna shows*
( 2 ) Maint enanc e
In the patrilineal and patriarchal family the 
corrollary of exclusion from a share or the whole of the 
deceased husband's estate was the right to maintenance and 
this right takes concrete shape in the ArthaSastra, being 
conceived as an endowment which forms together with 
ornaments the womanfs property: "Maintenance (yptti) and 
ornaments (abhandyam) constitute a womanfs property 
(strldhana), Maintenance is an endowment (sthapya) of a 
maximum of two thousand [papas] ; as to ornaments there is
1. Ill, 16f* Apart from the fact that women could hold
property we find one of the earliest distinctions between 
grandpaternal and paternal property, which as we know, 
was to play an important role in the Yajnavalkya-smpti 
(2,121) and elsewhere.
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no l i m i t " T h i s  endowment obviously stems from the property
2
of the husband's agnates and is designed to allow a widow 
to enjoy it living separately from those agnates. This 
right, however, did not amount to a right to a share. 
Katyayana's passage on the subject is ambiguous in so far 
as we do not know whether a woman receives up to 2,000 
papas in excess of immoveable property or whether immoveable 
property is excluded. Perhaps both interpretations proved 
useful xn practice. Bphaspati had conceded the widow a
lL
share of land instead of money. In another Smpti-text, 
attributed to Vyasa, we find that the endowment which is 
given to the widow is characterised as day a : MBut the daya 
of a dead man to be given to a woman is limited to 2,000 
(or [v,l.]: 2,000 papas); and whatever property was given
1. 3?2,14-15 [§8 ; tr.228]. For the history of this rule in 
the Dharma&astras see J.D.M. Derrett, "A Strange Buie of 
Smpti, and a Suggested Solution", JRAS, (1958) 17-25#
The standard phrase for 1maintenance* in feastric texts in 
gr a s a cchadana*, though it means 'food and clothing* or 
*bare subsistence' It nay in fact allow a woman to save 
substantial property of her own.
2. We are not discussing here the effects of remarriage, 
divorce, and polygamy contemplated in the Artha&astra.
3# Katy. 902: pitp-matp-pati-bhratp-jnatibhiljL strxdhanap
striyai/ yatha-saktya dvi-sahasrad datavyam sthavarad
rte// Kane translates sthavarad pte as "except immoveable
property"; see 61. 902. But "over and above the landed 
property" is more logical. See J.D.M. Derrett, JRAS, 
(1958) at 21. _ _ _
4. 26,28 [200]: dadyad dhanam ca paryaptap k§etrap6ap va
yad-icchati//.
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to her by her husband she may retain at her pleasure".'*’
Kane remarks 011 this passage that Vyasa seems to
represent a middle stage in the evolution of the right of
2
the widow to succeed to her deceased husband. But the 
question remains whether Vyasa referred to an undivided 
family or whether the widow succeeds to the divided 
husband’s share up to the extent of 2,000 papas and is 
allowed to retain the gift from her husband* Perhaps the 
passage may apply to a state of affairs where the son had 
been allocated a share and the widow is allowed to remain 
in the possession of her husband’s property to the extent 
necessary for her maintenance and was thus permitted to 
reside separately from her father-in-law and brother-in-law 
etc. In this connection we may refer to a provision in the
Artha&astra according to which the widow is allowed to
-  3enjoy the pati-daya provided ’she leads a pious life’.
Here pati-daya can hardly mean ’gifts from the husband* 
which the widow forfeits on her remarriage, as this amounts 
to a tautology, because svaSura- and pati-dattam, gifts
1* Vyasa, cit. e.g. in Kptya-kala, 684-; Dk.K. 14-60a: dvi- 
sahasra-pap.o daya^L striyai deyo mrtasya tu/ yac-ca 
bhartra dhana$ dattay sa yatha-kamam apnuyat// Ir. by
Derrett, JPAS, (1958) at 21.
2. HDh, I, 257.
3. 3,2,26 [99; tr* 229]: pati-dayaiji vindamana jIyeta/26/ 
dharam-kama bhuhjita/27/
i n
from her father-in-law and husband, had just been mentioned
as property to be forfeited in the case of remarriage.^ It
is implicit in the Arthasastra that during the lifetime of
the father, the sons may found their own households, though
2
separation of status may not take place. Ihe widow could 
presumably stay in possession of her husband1 s estate or 
assets subject to a life-estate.
Thus we find that a widow is provided with mainten­
ance up to two thousand papas from the daya of the agnates, 
or that she may utilise for her maintenance the daya of her 
husband which may well mean the share that had been an 
advancement to the deceased husband. In the Mahabharata 
this suggestion seems to be visualised. First the text of 
Vyasa occurs providing that a widow should get daya up to 
2,000: it is followed by the following injunction: "For 
women their husband fs daya is Remembered1 to be only
enjoyed. Women shall in no case spend their husband*s 
*
property".
In the Katyayana-smp ti the term bhartp-daya is used 
which is understood by some of the commentators as referring
1. 5,2,23 C99; tr,229] : SvaSura-pratilomyene va nivis^a 
§va§ura-pati-datta]p. jIyeta/23/.
2. Cp. 3,5,15 and 21.
3* Na.Bh.13,^-7,23-22; Dh.K.1429b]: strlnaft tu pati-dayadyan- 
upabhoga-phalaip. smptam/ napaharaip. strxyalj. kuryu^L pati- 
daya t kathaneana//.
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to a gift of a husband.^- However, the passage is often 
quoted in connection with another Sloka and may thus he 
understood differently. The text is as follows: bhartp- 
dayagi mpte patyau vinyaset strl yathej^atalp/ vidyamane tu 
saiprakget kgapayet tat-kule' nyatha// aputra Sayanaip. bhartu^L
palayantl gurau sthita/ bhuiijlta-marapat k§anta dayada
— 2urdhvam-apnuyujj// An approximate translation would be:
"On the death of her husband the widow should use the 
property of her husband at her pleasure, but during his 
lifetime she should protect it. Or she should spend it on 
the (husband's) family [or: she may pass her days in her 
husband's family). The sonless (widow), faithful to her 
husband's bed, and living with the senior elder (of the 
family, i.e. the father-in-law), shall patiently enjoy (the 
husband's daya) till her death; after her the heirs 
(dayadas) shall receive it".
According to Katyayana when the husband dies 
undivided the widow is entitled to food and raiment or she 
may get a share in property (dhansuftSam) which she may retain 
till her death. But Katyayana also puts some limitation on 
the right of enjoyment by stressing that the widow has to 
serve her elders, otherwise she would be confined to food 
and raiment (922-3)*
1. See Kane's tr. of Si. 907 and fn.
2. Dh.K. 1456a.
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(3) Strldhana
In early texts strldhana consisted only of ornaments 
and personal utensils of the woman, though Ipastamba notices 
the view of other authors, who had recognised jnati-dhanam 
as an additional category of strldhana with which the wife 
was presumably provided among some communities hy her blood 
relations in the family of her marriage.^ Manu enumerates 
six kinds of strldhana which he calls the ’sixfold strldhana * 
(gaj-vidhagi stridhanam)* It consists of: (a) property given 
before the marriage fire (adhyagni); (b) what is given at 
the time of the bride’s departure on the bridal procession 
(adhyavahanikam); (c) what is given out of affection
(prlti-*dattam); (d) what is given by her brother, mother or
_ _ _ p
father (bhraty-matr-pity-praptagi) • To this Manu adds in 
the next Sloka ’gifts which are made subsequent to marriage* 
(anvadheya) and ’gifts made by the affectionate husband1 
(yad-dattam patyau prltena)
1. 2*14,9 [242; Dh.K, 1415b]: alankaro bharyaya gnati-dhanagi
cetyeke//9// Baudhayana 2,2,3*44 [134; Dh.K, 1427a] 
speaks of ornaments of the mother given at the time of 
the marriage which after the wife’s death go to the 
daughters, Vasis^ha 17*46 [51* Dh.K, 14271)] speaks of 
marriage presents [or: ’utensils’, ^paraphernalia’], 
which_the daughters shall divide: matuli paripeyam [v.l. 
paripayyap] striyo vibhajeran/ Already the Taittiriya-sagi, 
(6,2^1 ,1) states that_in respect of parinahya the wiTe 
is master: patni hi parinahyasye&e / Nearly identical 
with Maitrayapl-sagu (3*7*9) and Kajh0~sanc
2. 9* 194.
3. 9, 195.
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Many of the commentators argue or assume that the 
expression gatj-vidhag. strldhanagi in Manu!s text only pur­
ports to give an illustration* i«e* that there could not be 
a smaller number of types of strldhana and that the text 
does not preclude a larger numberI But it seems difficult 
to agree that the use of the phrase gajl-vidhagi stridhanagt 
was not deliberate. Strldhana, according to the actual 
intention of the author* may have been exclusively the 
property over which a woman could freely dispose whereas in 
respect of the categories of property added by Manu in 9>195 
or any other acquisitions her power was restricted* Perhaps 
the commentator Sarvajnanarayapa preserves the true intention 
of the author when he says that matpka riktha refers to 
property other than strldhana and when he further explains 
that "the difference between what is strldhana and what is 
not strldhana, is that in regard to the former she is free
to give it away or otherwise dispose of it, while in regard
2
to the latter she is not to do all this"* Nandana declares
1. On Manu 9>192; SBE, XXV, 370 fn*192* The Kptya-kal* seems 
to make a distinction between matpka riktEa and 
strldhana and_subsumes the categories mentioned in Manu 
9,195 under matpka riktha for purposes of succession, 
i*e. it was not to go to the daughters preferentially, 
but equally to uterine sons and daughters* Kgtya-kal*,
688. Rangaswamirs Introduction to the Vyavaheh?ak5gfla of 
Kptya-kal., 98*
2* Manvartha-vivptti [Mandlik's ed* 1215; Dh.K. 1439a]:
vi&esag tu stridhanastridhanayo^ stridhane danadi-svamyap
striya na tvanyetreti/*
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that anything obtained besides these six categories of 
strldhana is not strldhana, but becomes only the husband fs 
property*1
There is no conclusive evidence on the question what 
Manu means by matpka riktha and how far it can be distin­
guished from the 1 sixfold strldhana* * We may conjecture that 
the matpka riktha refers to some kind of property which is 
due to the wives of a polygamous husband* In respect of 
matpka riktha, if it is a gift which is made subsequent to 
marriage (anvadheya) or a gift made by the husband (yad- 
dattam patyau prltena) the power of disposition of the wife 
is probably limited, and it goes to her children after her 
death* If what is given consists of a provision of mainten­
ance from the husband*s daya, or from the daya of the 
agnates, she has no right to dispose of it freely and it 
will be divided by uterine sons and daughters after 
husband and wife are deceased*
It appears from the text of other Smptis that many 
categories of property which a woman could call her own, 
could not be subsumed under the sixfold pattern of strldhana 
suggested in the Manu-snipti, and that by the term strldhana 
all kinds of property of a woman were generally understood,
1* Rege, 62, 63fn.l. On 9jl9^ [Mandlikfs ed., 12151: §a<3-“ 
vidhat strldhanad anyat-striya yal-labdhaip bhartp-dhanam 
eva na tu strldhanam ity-abhipraya^.//
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though a woman may not have the right freely to dispose of 
1
them.
The text of Yajnavalkya on the topic enumerates 
first four kinds of strldhana and in the following Sloka 
three other categories are mentioned. To the first four 
kinds he adds 1 adyam1 (fet cetera1), according to the most 
popular reading, whereas another version reads 1eva1 Oonly1) 
—  a discrepancy which exactly represents the two contrary 
views of Sastric medieval writers, one side tending to 
increase the number of categories of strldhana, and the
p
other tending to limit them. The majority of medieval 
writers, mainly from the South, tend to utilise the first 
reading of Yajnavalkya1s text, whereas the commentators on 
the Manu-sm.pti would restrict the number of types of 
strldhana in any case* The authors from Bengal led by
1. That 1 stridhana* was not necessarily identical with free 
power of disposition is already implicit in the 
Arthafeastra.
2. Yajn. 2,143-144 [25 of.; Dh.K. 1443a]: pity-maty-pati-
bhratp-dattam adhyagny-upagatam/ adhivedanikadyeop. [v*l.
-vedanikajp caiva] ca strldhanam pariklrtitam //143//
bandhu-datta^i tatha Sulkam-anvadheyakam e v a / . . . / / 144/ / -
,,What is given by the father, mother, husband and brother, 
what is given before the nuptial fire, what is given on 
account of supersession etc. is [or: is only] declared 
to be strldhana, also what has been given by relatives, 
Sulka (bride-price) and gifts received after marriage".
See also Vi§p.u 17,18.
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-r -  -  1Jimutavahana follow the second restrictive reading. This 
may he due to the fact that in the North and Bengal the 
patrilineal-patriarchal family continued to dominate the 
law and women were accordingly always confined to maintenance 
whereas the categories of property which she could dispose 
of freely - strldhana strictly speaking - remained limited.
Katyayana gives the most comprehensive list of 
strldhana and with the aim to dispel doubts as to which
categories a woman could freely dispose of, includes a cross-
-  - 2division of all categories into saudayika and non-saudayika.
Saudayika is defined as that property which is obtained by
a married woman or by a maiden in her husband^ or father*s
house from her brother or from her parents-^ and women are 
held to have (or desired to have) svatantryam in respect to
Zl
it, even if it consists of immoveables.
(4-) Rights of a Mother or Widowed Mother.
The rights of the mother were protected according to 
some texts in so far as the property is not to be divided by
1. Rege, 65* The Kytya-kal. had apparently no use for the 
passage and omitted it.
2* Katy. 894— 914-; Rege, 71 •
5. 61. 901: udhaya kanyaya vapi bhartuh pitp-gphe !pi va/ 
bhratu^. [v.l. Kptya-kal., 684-; Dayabhaga, 76: bhartu^.] 
saka6at-pitror va labdhajji saudayika^i smrtam//
4-. 61. 905.
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the sons until her death. Thus SanMia-Likhita tells us that
the property should not be divided, if the father is alive
and unwilling, the sons being asvatantra. It is added that
this postponement of partition applies similarly to the
mother if she is alive. ^ A similar provision is made in the
Manu-smpti and it seems that during her lifetime the mother
could remain in control of the possessions of her late 
2
husband , which is natural when there exist nuclear families 
in which the widow would manage, the sons still being 
minors, the power of managing possibly passing to the 
eldest brother when the widow*s years advanced and she
ZL
became unable to manage the household affairs. After the 
death of the father, however, an adult son would preferably 
be the manager of the property and when there were only 
minor sons the father’s brother would be the next preferable 
manager in patrilineal families in case the brothers had 
not separated. But if there was no father’s brother or when 
the father had separated from his collaterals and had 
founded his own household, there was nothing in the 
Dharma&astras which would expressly prevent the mother’s
1. See above, 34* Dh.K. 114-7# aya s thi t ay am may also mean 
’if the mother stays with themf or 1is righteous in 
conduct *.
2. 9,104-.
3* Cp. Jataka 4-,l.
4-. Whicti_was likely to^happen in the case of an aged father. 
See J at aka 5,326; Jataka 1,226; 237; 3,56; 300. Sahkha- 
LikhiEa, ubi cit.
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being the manager of her minor*s sons* joint estate. 
Especially amongst communities where the nuclear family 
prevailed, the mother must have been allowed to manage and 
protect the estate if there were only minor sons, in spite 
of the normal Gastric attitude which favoured the protection 
of the widow by agnatic elders and made it possible for the 
husband to reunite with his agnates shortly before his 
death* Katyayana mentions brother, paternal uncle, and 
mother as able to incur debts for the purpose of the kufrumba 
which will be binding on the separating * heirs* (rikthibhib)« 
The sequence brother, paternal uncle, and mother seems to 
represent an order of preference according to which a person 
could become manager."^
(5) Mother’s Right to a Share
According to the Yajnavalkya-smyti sons could, if
they wished, divide the property, provided they gave the
2 -
mother a share equal to that of a son* Vyasa extends this
1* JlL* 846_. Narada 4,3[46], cited above, According
to Apararka, who wrote in the 12th c0, the sons are not 
free (asvatantra) as long as the mother *is able to main­
tain the household1, but this does not apparently prevent 
adult sons from leaving at the time_of the marriage,719; 
for the text see below,XU* Cp. Yajn. I, 63 where the 
following order of the guardians in marriage is given: 
father, father’s father, brother, sakulya, mother.
2» Yajn, 2,123b; Narada 13, 12b[192];~cp. vi§5pu 18, 34 where 
mothers are said to receive a share on par with sons*
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rule to sonless step-mothers, and grand-mothers.^ Whether
this share of a mother amounts only to a provision for
maintenance forms the subject of a protracted struggle in
2
the commentatorial literature *
(6) The Right of the Sonless Widow to Inherit her Husbandfs 
Estate,
We have already discussed the rights of a widow as 
a member of a family living jointly or as a widow of a 
member of a family but having been advanced and living 
separately. An extant text of Byhaspati has a very involved 
rule on the subject. This Sm^ti-author argues strongly in 
favour of the right of the sonless widow to succeed to her 
husband fs moveable and immoveable property invoking the 
theory that with the widow half of her husband survives . 
Bfhaspati seems to reflect the individual enjoyment of 
property by a couple with the ensuing right of the sonless 
widow to enjoy the husband1s property, moveable as well as 
immoveable. He combats the view that if the husband's 
kinsmen (kulya, sakulya), besides his father, his mother and 
uterine brothers are alive, the widow should not receive 
her husband's property* (26, 94), The family Byhaspati
1* Dh.K, 1414a, See Kane, HDh, III, 605-6, See also Devala, 
Dh.K. 1414b, and Katy, H5X.
2. Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962) at 59•
3. 26,92-95 TSTl]; 26,97 [212].
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contemplates is probably a patrilineal kula which, has close 
ties with the mother!s family# The reference to the mother 
and the uterine brothers and the direction that the widow 
should spend the money on her husband1 s sister^ son (which 
could in South Indian and some other customs be her brother fs 
son)* seems to suggest this#'** Any claims of both families, 
agnates as well as cognates, in the property are repelled
p
with threat of punishment by the king, which similarly 
indicates that there was a close association in the property- 
sphere between the two families unlike in the large patri­
archal and patrilineal, exogamous family.
These passages do not disclose whether a husband 
dying divided from his agnates is meant, though in another 
passage a divided husband is spoken of, whose property the 
widow (jaya) inherits, with exception of the immoveables.^
In another &loka the widow of a divided person is likewise 
excluded though she may opt for food (pinfla) or a portion
IL
of arable land.
The whole subject was obviously heavily disputed 
and subject to custom which varied among different families, 
communities and from locality to locality. Yajnavalkya in
1. 26, 98C212).
2. 26,104[2133. See also 26,87C210]: also ascribed to Katy. 
927.
3. 26,98C212].
4. 26,100a [2133; 103.
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liis order of heirs typically restrains himself from offering 
involved rules on the topic of the succession by the widow 
to a sonless husband. According to him the widow ranks 
first before daughters, parents, brothers, their sons, 
sagotra, bandhu, disciple, fellow-students. But the questions 
whether the widow succeeds to an undivided or only to a 
divided husband, whether she takes his immoveable property 
or only moveable property, whether she takes it subject to 
restrictions, and whether she has to fulfil certain con­
ditions (chastity or niyoga) is left open to local custom. 
This rule could be declared by Yajnavalkya as applicable to 
all castes (...sarva-varpe^v ayap vidhi^./, because the 
customs among patriarchal families would tend to jointness 
of agnates (effected sometimes by reunion) which would 
consequently amount to the exclusion of widows and their 
confining to maintenance. Katyayana tackles the problem 
in the case of families where the brothers were thought to
±z</ZTa.Uy
hold the property in a kind of until partition. The 
widow is admitted to the share in the undivided property, 
but it is subject to restriction on the power of disposition 
and the property would lapse to the heirs of the husband
p
after her death.
1. 2j135-136. Visnu 17, 4-3.
2. Katy. §1. 921-925.
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lie The Position of the Daughter.
In the patrilineal family "based on pure agnatic 
kinship ties, the daughter had hardly any rights in the 
property of her agnates apart from maintenance and the 
marriage expenses including the dowry1 which amounted 
according to some authors to 1/4 of the share of the son.
The girl would normally go to her husband!s house and become 
for all purposes a member of her husband’s patrilineal 
family and gotra*
The earliest mention of the daughter as an heir 
occurs in the Spastamba-dharmasutra and in the ArthaSastra. ^ 
In the Artha§astra the daughters ’born in lawful marriages’ 
are apparently mentioned as alternative heirs in the absence 
of sons,^ The ArthaSastra seems to make a distinction between 
duhity and kanya, the former already married at the time of 
the death of her father or having reached the marriageable 
age, and the latter still to be married by their brothers 
who have to pay the dowry pradanikam out of the parental 
estate.^ The distinction is not maintained in the later
1* Arthas. 3?5*21 [104]:.., kanyabhya§ca pradanikam/
Spastamba 2,14,9 (jnati-dhanaip. cetyeke). See above,
2* The divergent views are discussed by Kane, HDh, III,
619f« For the sister’s share see below,
3® For the stages of the evolution of the daughter’s right 
see also Sen-Gupta, 191ff.
4. 3 9 5*10 [104]: rikthajji putravata]j. putra duhitaro va
dharmi§£he§>u vivahegu jataTj./ Note that 3*6,8[105] makes
the sisters adayadas.
5® 3?5?21[104]:... kanyabhyaSca pradanikam/.
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Smptis; Devala seems to give a paraphrase on this situation
in the Artha&astra when he says: "To the daughters should
he given that much of the father* s (estate) as would he
required for their dowry* If a man dies sonless, his
property shall he taken hy his legitimate daughters of the
same caste as himself in the same way as a son’1.'*' Spastamha
contemplates the daughter as an optional heir in the
2
absence of sapipflas , or perhaps with sapipflas * It seems 
doubtful whether in communities where the patrilineal and 
patriarchal family prevailed the daughter was more than a 
medium to prolong the line and ultimately to present her 
father with a daughter !s son and whether the text of 
Ipastamba and the Arthasastra would make the daughter a 
full owner of the inherited estate. The Arthasastra e.g. 
mentions the putrika-putra, the daughter*s son as a substi- 
tute son after the aurasa.^ The daughter was probably first 
admitted as an heir in the Sastric system through the 
institution of the 1 son-in-law in the house1 which would 
especially occur where a person has established his own 
household detached from his agnates and which was especially 
admissible among communities where the son was not of such
1. Cit. in the Kptya-kal., 670: KanyabhyaSca pitp-dravyagi 
deya^i vaivahikagi vasu/ aputrakasya kanya sva [svagO
dharma-ja putra-vaddharet//.
2. 2,6,14,4 [241]. Kane, HDh, III, 714.
3. 3j7?4-^; the daughter as such is not mentioned, though 
putrika-putra could mean a daughter treated as a son.
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spiritual and material importance as in the pure patrilineal 
system* Here a son may be preferred though a daughter was 
not unwelcome, and in the absence of a son a marriage (to 
adopt is a well-known phrase of Sinhalese origin) in binna 
would take place. The Manu-smpti invokes the identity of 
the father with the son and the identity of the son with
the daughter in order to advocate the daughter's right to
o _
the father's estate, though the daughter (putrika) had to
be 'appointed' and the daughter's son was to take eventually
the estate of the maternal grandfather. The statement that
between son's son and the son of an appointed daughter no
difference exists in respect to secular matters and religious
duties shows that the institution was mainly viewed as a
4
device to continue the family by male progeny. But the 
following passage shows that a daughter could be appointed 
even if there was a chance of a son's being borne to the 
father and that a son born after appointment would share 
equally with the appointed daughter.
A son of an appointed daughter could take the estate 
of his own father, offering funeral cakes to his maternal 
grandfather as well as to his own father. These passages
1. On the relation between Gastric and customary law* see 
Derrett, Univ* of GeyIon Rev*, 14(1956) at lllf* Also 
in Contr^to tndVSoCo, 6(1962) at 24f.
2. Manu 9,13'0; Bph. 26,126[127]•
3* Manu 9, 127; 132*
4. Mairu 9* 133; see also 9, 139: there is no difference 
between a son's son and daughter's son.
5. 9,132*
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indicate that a daughterfs son or son’s son and the contin­
uation of the line were not always the only object, but 
that the daughter’s marriage might have been valuable as it 
created a relationship with the daughter’s husband# The 
husband, who, if he was contemplated as having property of 
his own, could not have been always the indigent ’ ghar- 
jamai1 of inferior status he is normally taken to be today, 
had a definite claim on the property of the wife which 
derived from the father, in case the daughter died sonless.^
A step towards the heirship of the daughter was 
that mere intention sufficed to make a daughter a son 
(putrika), though most of the texts nevertheless mention 
only the putrika-putra, the daughter’s son as a substitute 
son.^
9? 135# Among communities where the agnatic kinship ties 
were not so strong and uxorilocal marriages were not 
unusual, the position of the son-in-law was higher* The 
so-called illatom- ”adoption" in Andhra is related to 
the features referred to by Manu* A son-in-law does not 
lose his right in his own family, and he is excluded by 
an auras a son born after marriage. The son-in-law is 
treated and acts as a son. He can perform sraddha, if a 
special ceremony is undergone by him, which does not 
confer on him the right to succeed, though if there is 
no son of the father-in-law, nor a son of the marriage, 
he succeeds. After the ceremony the illatom loses his 
rights in his natural family. See Sorg, Avis du Comit§ 
consultatif de jurisprudence indienne, 233-4-0• Serrett, 
Univ. of Ceyl. Rev#, 14 (1956) 105 at 112f.
2 —
# putrika-putra may, as we have said, mean ’daughter 
treated as a son’ and the ambivalence of the term may 
have proved useful.
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The daughter as such is recognised as an heir after 
the widow according to Yajnavalkya, ^  though he does not 
mention whether she had to he appointed or not, or whether 
she was to he unmarried or not* The daughter1 s son or son 
of the appointed daughter does not appear in the list of 
heirs, hut he is listed second amongst the secondary sons 
and the right of the daughter as an heir after the widow 
can he understood subject to the eventual right of inheri­
tance of the putrika-putra * We may suggest that the 
Yajnavalkya-smpti purposely leaves the question open and 
leaves the question whether the daughter as such could 
inherit and if so subject to what qualifications to he 
resolved by customs prevalent amongst different communities 
and families* In the patrilineal family which tends to 
perpetuate itself exclusively by male descendants, the 
daughter had to he unmarried, that is, she should not have 
passed into a different family* Here a son-in-law in the 
house was a secondary device to bridge the gap created by 
the absence of a son* The daughter would be a guardian for 
her sons and be allowed to retain the property for them.
In other communities which did not adhere so rigidly to a 
patrilineal family pattern and where daughters and sons 
might leave the family at marriage to form individual
1. 2, 136; Vispu-dhoSu. 17* 4-6.
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households, even the married daughter, who might even he 
married to the father!s sister’s son in some communities, 
might he considered as a possible heir,
Katyayana says that a daughter had to he unmarried
to he an heir; this indicates that he thinks of the
patrilineal family, where a married daughter would rarely
1he contemplated as a medium to continue the line.
1. 61* 926.
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CHAPTER IV
RULES ON PARTITION AND REUKIOH 
CUSTOMARY LAW ARP ITS REFLECTION IN THE DHAEMA^iSTRAS
I. Partition between Father and Sons,
(1) Time of Partition,
We may first give a brief summary of the main 
provisions in the DharmaSastras relating to the time and 
the circumstances in which the property (daya or riktha) of 
a person could be divided.
In the early Dharma§astras covering a period when 
it was still common to retire to the forest in old age, it 
may have been advisable for the aged father to divide the 
property before his death or retirement and to divide the 
property equally, as this would reduce the possibilities of 
quarrels amongst the brothers. This seems to be intended by 
the rule given by JLpastamba, which translated literally, is 
as follows: “[Still] living the father shall divide the 
daya equally among his sons, excluding the impotent, the 
insane and the outcast"Besides this rule a considerable 
number of passages inculcate the father1s authority as 
regards the time of partition strengthening thereby his 
authority in the patriarchal family. Sons who question the
1. 2,6,14,1 [233; Bh.K. 1164a]: jlvan putrebhyo dayaijL 
vibhajet samaiji kllbam-unmatha^i patitaip. ca parihapya//
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father's independence in this respect faced, as we have 
seen (above, 18|. ) social ostracism* The father's permission 
was an essential prerequisite for a partition initiated by 
the sons.**" In the patriarchal household the property was
2
normally to be divided only after the death of the father* 
Here the paternal property and the maternal property tend 
to be separate and this is reflected in the text of Narada 
which came to be normally quoted by medieval authors: "After 
the death of the father the sons shall divide their father's 
property; and the daughters shall divide the mother's 
property; if the daughters are not alive, then their off- 
spring"* The absolute authority of the father as regards 
the time of partition is emphasized by the principle that 
sons can have no ownership as long as the father is alive 
or that they are in any case not independent (asvatantrah) *^
1* Baudh.-dh*su* 2,3*8[128; Dh*K. 1146b] : pitur anumatya
daya-vibhaga sati pitari/ Cp. Sankha-Likhita-dh* su»
[Dh*K*1148b]: jlvati pitare riktha-vibhago 'numatalj.-
"If the father is alive, there is partition with his 
consent"
2* Gaut. 28,1 [436; Dh*K. 1144b] : urdhvap pitulj. putra
rikthaip. vibhajeran/ Devala, cit* e,g_* in the Da«bha, [13; 
28; Dh*K.1156a] : pitary-uparate putra vibhajeyur dhanajji
pitulj/ asvamyap hi bhaved egait nirdose pitari sthite//*
3. Nar* 16,2[186; Dh*K* 1152; 1449a] : pitary-urdhvap gate
putra vibhajeyur dhanap pitu^. [v*l* vibhajeram dhanap
kramat]/ matur duhitaro'bhave duhitrpam tad anvayaTp.//
4* Manu 8, 146; See Devala cit* above, fn. Sahkha-
Likhita, cit* above, asvatantraljL pitp-manta£i/
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To the strict rule that the property should he divided after
the death of the father or with his consent there are
exceptions in certain texts which consider a partition
possible when there, is no obvious need to reside jointly
because the mother has passed the child-bearing age, the
daughters are given in marriage and the father has lost the
interest in worldly affairs.'1' Exceptional circumstances
allow partition of the fatherls property irrespective of
his permission, namely when he has become an outcaste, has
turned a mendicant, suffers from disease etc*, according to 
2Narada, or on account of other faults of the father which
x
Devala leaves apparently to be determined by local usage. 
Another series of passages embodies the view that the 
property of the father should not be partitioned during the 
lifetime of the mother and we have referred before to the 
text of the Manu-smpti where it is said that after the death 
of the father and mother the property should be divided.
This may refer to cases where the sons had been advanced 
with property and have founded individual households. The 
mother would be in possession of her husband1s property
1. Nar. 16,3 [189; Dh.K. 1152b]: matur-vivptte rajasi 
prattasu bhaginl^u ca/ nivptte va*pi ramape pitary- 
uparate1spphe daya-vibhaga syat. Cp. Bph, 26,9C196; 
Dh*K.1155a].
2. Cit. previous fn., v 0l.: vina$Je vapy-a&arape.
3* Cit. above, 130 fn,% * nirdose.
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until after her death, when the property would he equally 
divided amongst the brothers.1
(2) Method of Distribution of Property.
(i) Discretionary Power of Father.
Passages of the Brahmapa-texts show that the father
had in principle the power to consider the individual needs
2
of any of the sons, the obedience shown by a son or 
services rendered, but that he may also think: of providing 
the sons with property according to seniority, equally, or
IL
by giving the youngest a larger share. The same latitude
1, Manu 9? 104; cit, above,
See also Yajn. 2,117C222; Dh.K, 1141b]: vibhajeran-
sutah pitror-urdhvap rikthap-ppap samam.
2. Jaiminlya-br. 2,183 : yas tvava putrapai kppapatamo
(’poorest*) bhavati, sa pitur hpdayam apyeti/. Cit by 
Rau, 46, fn.l.
3. §uSru§u^L putrapaii hpdyatamap/ Taittirlya-br. 2,3>11*4 
[ ]; Rau, ubi cit.
4, Kathaka-sagL. 1,8,4. Rau, ubi cit. Tensions between the
eldest son and the father have always been experienced 
in India as well and for the aging father the youngest 
son might be the main supportQ The eldest son would 
often leave at marriage. Cp. the Parable of the Prodigal 
Son,
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in the power of distribution of property is supported in 
S^ti-pas sages, as by Narada who says: "If the sons have 
been divided by the father himself either equally or un­
equally, that division shall be legal for them; as the 
father is indeed the prabhu ("master", "boss", "all-power- 
ful") in respect of everything",
But the father fs power was subject to the injunction 
not to debar any of the sons from a share without reason, 
which would arise e.g. when the son was excommunicated
p
or suffered from certain physical or mental diseases.
Even in the family which adhered to strict patriarchal 
notions as far as the father!s power of alienating and 
dividing the property was concerned, the father was not 
"all-powerful" if he suffered from certain personal faults 
which would endanger the just distribution of the property. 
Thus Narada tells us: "If the father is deceased, or 
angered, or with his mind addicted to sense objects, or 
prone to act unlawfully, he cannot be the sole authority in
1« 16,15 Cl93; Dh.K. 1172a]: pitraiva tu vibhakfa ye sama-
nyunadhikair-dhanaiTj./ te^am sa eva dharmalp. syat sar-
vasya hi pita prabhulj// Cp. the passage from the Bph.-
smpti (26,15C1973) which is to the same effect with the 
aclda/fion that the sons, if they act adversely to the 
father^s disposition, are threatened with punishment 
(vineyas te syur anyatha) ; this according to a different 
reading (patitalj. syur anyatha; Dayabhaga, 53) means that 
they are liable to excommunication.
2. Artha&. 5,5,16-17; and 20 [104-; tr.242]. Katy. 84-3 
essentially reproduces Arthafe. On exclusion from the 
right to take a share, see below,
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the matter of partition"•
(ii) Preferential Share of the Eldest Son.
In respect to the eldest son the patriarchal power 
of the father at a partition was most likely to he curtailed. 
The dependency of the father on the eldest son probably 
accounts for the preferential share due to such a son and 
its assignment might have been originally motivated by the 
desire to assure the eldest son!s loyal support to the 
father and to reward his efforts in managing the property
as the de-facto head of the family, when the father was
2
incapacitated due to old age. Another aspect of the 
preferential share of the eldest son was that the eldest 
son was after the father!s death and before partition took 
place between the brothers, and even after partition, the 
representative of the family in the socio-religious sphere. 
The share provided the reason for the performance of 
religious duties of the first-born son. Kaufilya refers to 
the method of partition which is recommended by a certain 
author U§anas* This author, according to him, gives as the 
reason for the preferential share the eldest son’s duty to
1. Ear. 16,16 [194]: 'vyadhitalj. kupitaS caiva vi^ayasakta- 
manasalj/ anyathaSastra-kari ca na vibhage pita prabhujp.// 
Jha’s tr. HLS, II, 168.
2. Bee Sankha-Likhita, cited a b o v e , 2 > V
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make offerings to tlie ancestors.^" Another passage, attributed 
to USanas and cited e.g. in the Apararka, may have some 
relation to the view attributed by Kaufalya to U§anas, and 
provides that even if the heirs of a deceased person are 
divided in wealth, certain Sraddhas including the sixteen
_ _  o
feraddhas must be performed by one alone. This would nor­
mally be the eldest brother* According to Harxta the
ancestral home and the image of the deity of the family is
inter alia allotted to the eldest at a partition, whereas 
the other sons have to build separate houses or huts.
Alternatively the sons may stay in the house the best part
of it being assigned to the eldest.^ The position of the 
eldest son is not only charged with socio-religious 
privileges and duties but may also involve - according 
to Narada - the payment of the father's debts, though the 
other sons may have received portions of the estate. Thus
1. ArthaS. 3>6,3-5 [105]• catus-padabhave ratna-varjana& 
da&anam bhagap dravyapam ekap dye^-fo haret/3/ pratimukta- 
avadha-pa&o hi bhavati/4/ ity-auSanaso-vibhagalj/5/.
2. Cit. by Kane, HDh, IV, 521 and fn. 1167. For the various 
types of Sraddhas see ibid., ch.X.
3. Harxta quot. in Vi.-ra. [473; Hh.K. 1183b]: vibhajifyamape 
gavam samuhe vpsabham eka-dhanap vari§j£hap va je§*£haya 
dadyur devata-gphap ca, itare nigkramya kuryulp. ekasminneva 
daksinap jye^'fhayanupurvyam itare gam/
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the reason for preferential share may also sometimes he
attributed to the duty of the eldest son to pay the father!s
debts Seniority alone does not always justify preferential
treatment and other qualifications may “be additionally
necessary according to Byhaspati. He says: ,fQne who is
senior on account of birth* learning and other qualifications
should receive two shares out of the daya; the others
should be equal sharers; the former is like a father to 
o
these”. The suggestion that the assignment of the preferen­
tial share is dependent on special qualifications and 
virtues is interpreted by some medieval commentators to mean 
that a brother can be assigned the preferential share and
be regarded as 1 senior1 if he distinguishes himself by
*
special qualities.
Nav. t  /
1. 4-, 2* [46]; pitary-uparate putra dadyur yatha^Lsata^L/
vibhakta va ’ vibhakta va ye va tarn udvahed dhuram/-
"On the death of the father, the sons whether divided or 
undivided, shall pay his debt in proportion to their 
shares; or it may be paid by that son who bears the 
burden (or who bears the place of honour amongst the 
brothers)". The payment by all sons in proportion to 
their shares was, however, the normal method.
2. Byh. 26,21 [198]: janma-vidya-gunair-jye^fho dvya^SajjL 
dayad avapnuyat/sama^L^a-bhaginas tvanye tegam pitr-samas 
tu sa£//
3. See Jha, HLS, II, 375 for comments by medieval authors 
on the passage of Byhaspati. Laksmldhara, an early 
medieval writer, on Manu 9,112-114 notes: gunavaj
jyes£hadi-vi$aya£cayam uddhara£/(Kptyakal. , 656f.)
This indicates the decay of the custom of preferential 
shares.
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(iii) Advancement of Sons by Shares*
The possibility that sons leave their parental home 
at marriage, receiving a share of the property in advance, 
is visualized in the early Dharmasutras and we find that 
for this purpose specific items or proportions are laid 
down. Often, as we have seen, the eldest son would leave 
the family at marriage. Ipastamba refers to a custom accord­
ing to which certain items of the property are to be handed 
over to the eldest son whereas other items are to be taken 
by the father, the mother being allowed to retain her 
property, consisting of ornaments and gifts from her 
relations. Other sons besides the eldest are not mentioned, 
which could mean that the younger son or sons would stay at 
home receiving on the death of the father the property which 
was still in the possession of the father.1 Ipastamba dis­
approves of this method of partition, but admits - by 
referring to the text of the Taittirlya-sam. - that an
eldest son could be dismissed by setting him up in life 
o
with wealth. The scheme contemplated by Ipastamba is
1. Ip. 2,14, 7-11 [241; Dh.K. 1165b, 1166a; 1415b]: de§a- 
viSege suvarp-a^ L kpgpa gava£ kpsnaip. bhaumajjL jye§-fhasya/7/ 
rathalj. pitu£ paribhap^ajji ca gphe/8/ alankaro bharyayalj. 
jnati-dhana^L cetyeke/9/ tac-chastrair-vipratisiddham/10/.
2. 2,14,12 [242; Dh.K. 1166a]; athapi tasmaj jyesthaip. 
putra^L dhanena niravasayantlty-eka-vac-ch^ruyate//.
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probably the following: The father could settle the eldest
son in life, staying perhaps with younger sons, but normally
the father (2,14,1) should divide the property equally when
he is old, assigning a share to the eldest as a sort of
gratification (2,13? 12; see below, 141 fn.I) and recognition of
*■ ,
his support and his position as the eldest, Sankha-Likhita 
would add to the share of the eldest a bull and expressly 
assigns the house to the youngest with special reservation 
for the fatherfs residence, in case, as we may add, he had 
not left the house to become a wandering mendicant or forest 
hermit, but has joined the vyddhaSrama that is, he spends 
the rest of his days under the protection of his son.**' 
Vasig-fha only knows of partition between brothers (atha 
bhratrpaih. daya-vibhagafj.). Vasisfha probably implies that 
the father is already deceased or has retired from worldly 
affairs. Again the youngest son is assigned the house inter 
alia, whereas presumably the other sons are deemed to 
have left earlier having taken some share in the property 
in advance to establish their own household, which may be in 
the neighbourhood of the house of the father, and are now 
joining together to divide the bulk of the property of the 
father: "Then follows the partition of daya among brothers;
1. Cit. in Kptya-kal. [654; Dh.K. 1166b]: vp^abho jye§£haya/ 
gphaip. yaviyase/ anyatra pitur-avasthanat//
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if there are any childless women they shall receive a share 
till they get a son; the eldest shall take two shares and 
of cows and horses, one tenth; goats and other animals and 
the house shall go to the youngest; and articles of iron 
and household requisites go to the middle-most"
A very illuminating text by Harlta indicates the 
choice of possibilities which a father had when his sons 
were grown up* The father may, it is suggested by Harlta, 
betake himself to the forest or join the vyddhaferama, that 
is, live under his son* The third alternative - corresponding 
more aptly to the postpastoral settled condition reflected 
by the Dharmasutras - is that the father could advance the 
sons with minor portions of the property and live with the 
rest of the property in his own house* We also come to know 
that the property advanced as well as the property retained 
by the father continued to form the means of subsistence 
for father and sons; "Or, while still living, the father 
shall divide the sons, and betake himself to the forest, or 
he may enter the final stage; or dividing a small portion,
. j -I o i*Vip wife of a deceased
a son who might he born. If a daughter 
-born the share reverts to xne 
collaterals. Other conmentators' 
the postponement of partition, 
are signs of pregnancy.See Jha.HK, H i
— as women who are pregnant
at the time of partition.
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if there are any childless women they shall receive a share
till they get a son; the eldest shall take two shares and
of cows and horses, one tenth; goats and other animals and
the house shall go to the youngest; and articles of iron
1and household requisites go to the middle-mo s t,f •
A very illuminating text by Harlta indicates the 
choice of possibilities which a father had when his sons 
were grown up* The father may, it is suggested by Harlta, 
betake himself to the forest or join the vyddhaSrama, that 
is, live under his son* The third alternative - corresponding 
more aptly to the postpastoral settled condition reflected 
by the Dharmasutras - is that the father could advance the 
sons with minor portions of the property and live with the 
rest of the property in his own house* We also come to know 
that the property advanced as well as the property retained 
by the father continued to form the means of subsistence 
for father and sons; "Or, while still living, the father 
shall divide the sons, and betake himself to the forest, or 
he may enter the final stage; or dividing a small portion,
1* Vas. 17, 40-45 L50; Dh*K* 1184a, 140?a: atha bhratrpam
daya-vibhaga£//40// yaScanpatyas tasam a putra-labhat//
41// dvyajjL&agi. jyeg-fho haret//42// gavaSvasya canuda^amaip.
/43// ajavayo gphsup. ca kani§-fhasya//44// kar^payasaip.
guhopakarapani ca madhyamasya//45// "Childless women”
is explained by commentators as women who are pregnant 
at the time of partition*
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lie may recover tlie property from them (the sons). He may 
[or:must] give a portion to the indigent son’1.^
Whereas this indicates that mutual adjustments in 
respect of property "between father and son were still con­
templated at this early stage, it must have been desirable 
for a wealthy father to be free from further claims by sons 
who had left their father's house at marriage and had set 
up their own house-fire. The advancement to the son became 
a definitive portion of the estate which was worked out 
between father and sons. This would especially happen when 
further issue might be expected, who were then entitled to
receive the share of the father including accretions, after
2
the father's death.
The Smptis tend to simplify the rules by not 
referring to specific items of the estate, as the Dharma- 
sutras did, and they speak only of preferential, unequal 
and equal shares, which are, once they are assigned, in the 
exclusive possession of the sharer* Some Smptis enjoin^
1. Tr. follows Jha’s tr. HLS, II, 142. Cit. in Kptya-kal., 
653, [Dh.K. 1163a]: jlvan-neva va putran pravibhajya 
vanam-a Grayed vpddhaSramaiji va gacchet/ svalpena va 
sa^ivibhajya [or: vibhajya] bhnyi^'fam adaya vaset/ yady- 
upadaSyet punas tebhyo gphpiyat/ks3p.a5i6ca vibhajet/.
2. See below,
3* Nar. 16,12 [162; Dh.K. 1171a;]: Bph. 26,16 [198; Dh.K. 
1172a]o
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that the father should take two shares at a partition, 
which refers obviously to a situation where sons have been 
definitively allocated portions from the estate and where 
father and sons enjoy their shares separately from each 
other, and at least as far as sons are concerned further 
mutual claims are excluded during the lifetime of the father 
and after his death, if a son wasjborn after partition,
(iv) Equality of Shares,
(a) Preferential Share of the Eldest Son versus 
Equality of Shares,
The preference of the eldest son at a partition or 
as the sole heir is already questioned by Spastamba who 
advocated equal partition by the father. The preferential 
share for the eldest son, consisting of an article of value, 
serves in his view merely as kind of compensation: "Having 
satisfied the eldest son by the gift of a valuable article, 
the father during his lifetime, shall divide the daya 
equally. . . Spastamba refers to the view of other authors 
who advocated primogeniture (jye^-fho dayada ityeke) and to 
the custom practised 'in certain countries1 where unequal 
division was practised (see above, 13! ) and repudiates
1. 2,13*12; 2,14,1 [232f; DhoK, 1164]: eka-dhanena jye^hajji 
tosayitva//12// jlvan putrebhyo daya^L vibhajet samanu .. 
//I// to§ayitva (from root tus, caus, togayati) means 
'having satisfied, pleased, gratified1.
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these possibilities with a §ruti-text which according to 
him suggests that all sons participate equally at a partition 
of day a . In a passage of Manu we find that equality of
shares is based on equality of skill of the sons in their 
occupation by which especially Vedic learning is meant* If 
this is the case, the special share of the eldest is con­
fined to a small part of the property which serves as an
2
expression of respect towards the eldest brother* One 
function of the property inherited from the father is to 
serve the prestige and the tradition of the kula and 
normally the eldest son inherits the personality and the 
religious duties of the father* This, as we have seen is 
one of the reasons for the preferential share* However, if 
the property is earned by the common labour of the brothers 
while pursuing agricultural or commercial occupations there 
would be no basis for the preferential share and the property 
so acquired is divided equally* Equality of shares would 
thus occur especially in agricultural and commercial
lo 2,14, 1 of. [242f*]: tac-chastrair-viprati§iddham//10// 
Manu£ putrebhyo dayap vyabhajad-ity-avi§esepa Sruyate//
11// Bee above,
2. Manu 9» 115*
3. Manu 9> 205 [402]: avidyanam tu sarve^an-ihatas ced-
dhanap bhavet/ samas-tatra vibhagalp. syad apitrya iti
dharapa// Buhler (SEE, XXV, 374) translates: "But if all
of them being unlearned, acquired property by their 
labour, the division of that shall be equal, (as it is) 
not property acquired by the father".
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communities where the common efforts of the brothers would 
not entitle the individual brother to have a special claim 
on the property on account of Vedic learning. Amongst 
Sudras who were engaged in agriculture and commercial 
activities it was not customary to have preferential shares.*^ "
(b) Distinction between Ancestral (grandpaternal) property 
and property of the father*
In the early Dharmasutras, in the ArthaSastra, and 
in some of the Smptis the father is contemplated as the sole 
owner of all property whether acquired by inheritance or 
acquired by him personally. The Narada-smpti for instance,
which was composed according to MM^ r P.V.Kane nearly at the
_ o
same time as the Ya jnavalkya-smpti or later did not differ­
entiate between the 1 self-acquired* property of the father 
and property deriving from the grandfather. The rules in
1. Manu 9> 157.
2. HDh, I, 202f.
3 * &ut see the text attributed to Narada, but_not found in 
the edn. publ. by Jolly: mapi-mukta-pravala^ai sarvar-
yaiva pita prabhulj/ sthavarasya tu sarvasya na pita na
pitamahaTj// pitp-prasadad bhujyante vastrapyabharapani
ca/ sthavarap. tu na bhujyeta prasade sati paitpke//~
r?The father is the prabhu of all such articles as jewels, 
pearls and corals, but of all immoveable property neither 
the father nor the grandfather. Clothes and ornaments 
are enjoyed as loving gifts from the father; but immove­
able property cannot be enjoyed as_a gift from the 
father", Dh*K. 1219b Yajhavalkya,Katy., and Vifpu to 
whom the text is also attributed*
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hayabhaga chapter of Narada visualise a patriarchal 
family which is held together by subjection to the will of 
the f a t h e r O t h e r  features of patriarchal, patrilineal 
family in the Narada-smpti are also the exclusion of the 
widow from inheritance, and the absence of cognates (band- 
hus) as heirs who in the Yajnavalkya-smpti rank after the 
gotrajas (2,136). In the Yatjnavalbya- smp t i we find an 
ambivalent position. The father is first given the liberty 
of dividing the property according to his wish, by giving
a preferential share to the eldest, or by dividing the
2
property equally. An unequal division would be just,
provided, as we may add, the father did not act arbitrarily,
•3
e.g. exclude one son completely without justifying reason. 
This rule can obviously refer to the latitude of the power 
of a father in strict patriarchal families where daya was 
not subdivided into nself-acquiredTI and "ancestral and 
grandpaternal" property for purposes of partition and 
alienation.
1. Sons should divide the property only after the death
of the father (according to one reading with preferential 
shares: kramat, i.e. according to order. See preface to 
Jolly *s ecTT, 13.
2. Yajn. 2, 114.
3. Yajn. 2,116b [221; Dh.K. 1169b]: ny^adhika-vibhaktanam 
dharmya^L pity-krtaTp. smptah//.
14b
This rule seems to be contradicted to some extent
by the subsequent §1. 121 where sons are said to have a
coextensive right with the father in ancestral land,
1 - ~nibandhas and dravya. The Ya.jnavalkya-smrti does not tell
us explicitly that the ancestral property has to be divided
equally amongst sons. The Vi^pu -smpti, a late work, asserts
that the father should divide the ancestral property
equally, whereas he may divide the self-acquired property
2
at his discretion. Already in the Manu-smyti we are 
incidentally informed of reservations for sons in respect 
to ancestral property, when it is said that the father need 
not divide the ancestral property recovered by him; this 
implies that the father had to divide ancestral property as 
such. In a patriarchal family the father might not choose 
to divide the property at all, and the sons' rights in any 
property would accrue to them only after the father!s death. 
The only consequence of the rule of Yajnavalkya would be 
then that if the father choose to divide he was in conson­
ance with Dharma&astra if he divided the ancestral property
1. On the meaning of these terms see above,31
2. 17, 1-2 [46; Dh.K. 1175al• pita cet putran vibhajet 
tasya sveccha svayam-uparjite*rthe//l// paitamaha tvarthe 
pitp-putrasyos-tulyaip. svamitvam/2/.
3* Manu 9, 209 [403; 1213b]: paitpkaip. tu pita dravyam- 
anvaptajji yad apnuyat/ na tat putrair bhajet sardham 
akamal^ s vayam-ar j it am//.
146
equally. There would have been nothing wrong if the father
had even alienated his whole property beyond what was
necessary for the maintenance of the family.^ The right
to take an equal share of the ancestral property at a
partition has been attributed to the growing importance of
2land as a fund for maintenance of the descendants. But a 
number of texts suggest that a different concept of the 
family made itself felt in the Dharma&astras, The passages 
of Manu and Vif^LU can be interpreted to refer to a family 
where the father tends to be rather the manager than a 
patriarch, A passage by Bfhaspati strengthens this impres­
sion that the coextensive ownership of father and son 
amounted in effect to a restriction on the father*s power 
of alienation in respect of ancestral property whereas in 
respect to self-acquired property there was no such restric­
tion, In the recovered ancestral property besides his self­
acquisitions on account of learning or valour, the father 
is said to have ownership and free power of disposition.
This property the sons are to receive in equal shares only 
on his death.^ This would suggest that as regards ancestral
1. See Yajn. 2, 175, cit.above,99.
2. Sen-Gupta,
5. Bph, 26,58 C205; 1221b]: paitamahaip. hptsuji pitra sva- 
Saktya yad-upar jitam/ vidya-sauryadina praptagi tatra 
svamya pitu£ smrtam// pradanajp. svecchaya kuryad bhoga^L 
caiva tato dhanat/ tad-abhave tanayaljL samaipSalj. pariklrti- 
tafc//.
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property there were restrictions on the father!s power of 
alienation, and we have seen that another passage by 
Bphaspati refers to the consent of e1natis as necessary for 
the alienation of ancestral property*^ It seems doubtful 
whether we can follow N.C* Sen-Gupta and assume a right of 
the sons to ask for a partition of the ancestral property 
from the following text of Bphaspati; "In ancestral house 
and land, the father and sons (v*l*: sons and grandsons) 
have equal shares* In the father*s property the sons are 
not entitled to a share, if the father is unwilling (to 
give)"* The text seems to imply merely that if the father 
divides the property, he should divide the property deriving 
from ancestors equally among sons and grandsons, whereas as 
regards his own property he could retain it completely and 
it would be divisible at his death in equal shares* One 
might be inclined to see a right of partition in a variant 
reading of the passage of the Vignu-smpti referred to above, 
which however, is cited only by Aparaditya: "If the father 
divides his sons, he may do what he likes in regard to his 
self-acquired property; in regard to the property acquired 
by the father’s father the sons also sometimes effect a
1* See above, 101. _
2* Sen-Gupta, 205, 210* Bph. 26, 10 [1973: kramagate gpha-
ksetre pita putra^ sama^iSina^./ paitpke na vibhagarha^.
suta^L pitur-anicchaya// See Yyavahara-mayukha, 95,
below,
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partition"*^ One hesitates to assume a right to partition 
for the Smpti-period on the basis of such slender evidence, 
beyond the instances which are listed in the Smytis, accord­
ing to which a partition against the will of the father is
2
not contemplated except for special, limited reasons.
The realisation of the share in the ancestral 
property during the lifetime of the father may not be 
expected to be based so much on the DharmaSastra where the 
patriarchal family prevailed as the guiding principle, but 
may be found in customary law* Ve have already referred to 
the family where the father was rather a manager than an 
absolute head and owner of all property. Here at marriage 
all or some of the sons would leave the house of their 
parents taking a share of the ancestral land which they 
owned then separately from their father. This differs from 
the background implied by the texts of the Dharmasutras, 
because the Dharmasutras (as we have seen) contemplated 
only advancements in respect of moveables. The necessity 
for providing sons with a share in the ancestral property 
was also a matter of prestige and some communities who 
normally followed the patriarchal pattern may have relented
1. Apararka, 718: pita cet-putran vibhajet tasya sveccha 
svayam-uparjite*rthe pitrar-jite!pi dhane kadacit-putra 
eva vibhaga-kartaro bhavanti/.
2. See above ,131
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to the extent of allowing sons to receive equal shares from 
the ancestral property at their respective marriages. This 
conjecture enables us to account both for the two distinct 
strands of tradition preserved in more or less co-eval 
texts, and for the customs and "schools of law11 of which we 
have adequate evidence later.
II. Partition between Collaterals.
(1) Mode of Partition.
(a) Preferential Share.
The preferential position of the eldest son or
brother has been noted above. The preferential shares for
sons born of different mothers are determined by Manu
according to priority of birth in cases where the mothers
sire of equal caste."*" But it is also stated that in case
the younger son is born of the senior wife and the elder
one of the junior wife, both sons take preferential shares,
the child of the senior marriage taking the better of these:
whereas the eldest son, born of the senior wife, having both
qualifications, is entitled to a larger preferential share
p
than was suggested in the other situation. These conflicting
1. Manu 9? 125; Bphaspati 26,11 [197; Dh.K. 1237b]. Accord­
ing to the ArthaSastra priority of birth is decisive 
only in the absence of a son born of a wife of a marriage 
performed with ceremonies and a son of a mother wh6tffi was 
married while a virgin. ArthaS. 356,13.
2. Manu 9* 122-4.
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views have been differently explained by commentators, 
Lakgmldhara e,g. taking the view that the son horn of the 
senior wife is senior and entitled to a preferential share 
The view that seniority is based on the seniority of the 
mother may presumably be based on the fact that the first 
wife was normally the one who would assist the husband in 
religious ceremonies and was the wife who was married in an 
’approved1 form so that her son seemed to be more qualified 
to inherit a preferential share. The view that seniority 
depends on the time of birth would be based on practical 
considerations ^prevalent in customary law) of the first­
born son being the most suitable to represent the family in
p
secular matters as well as religious matters, A text of 
Devala would even suggest that the requirement of equal 
caste of the mothers as a condition for the seniority of 
the son could be discarded*^ In a monogamous household the
1. Kptykal,, 658; interpr, according to Capje&vara, cit, 
ibid, See Kptyakal,, Introd,, 92f*
2, Cp, S arva jnanarayapa and Nandana on Manu 9, 126,
25SBE 551 fn. 125♦
3* Cit, in Vi.ci,, 199 (Dh.K, 1194-a): bahir-varpegu caritryad-
yamayoljL purva- janmanalp/ yasya jatasya yamayolp. pagyanti
prathamagi mukha^i/ santanaTp. pitaraS-caiva tasmin jaig^byagi
prati§£hitam// The Vi,ci. remarks that if a son of a wife
belonging to the same caste as the husband is born subse­
quently, then this son is senior though born later.
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preferential sliare was normally received by the first-born 
b r o t h e r T h e r e  are, however, many texts which show that
2after the death of the father equal partition took place,
(b) Joint Acquisitions.
If brothers acquired property jointly during the 
lifetime of the father, the property so acquired belonged 
to the father, if the sons were not yet divided by him. But 
the father was enjoined to distribute such property equally 
amongst them. Any acquisitions after the death of the
ZL
father would be equally divided.
(2) Females1 Rights at Partition.
Charges on the Estate*
Before we discuss the charges on the estate we 
should be reminded of the females1 rights at partition to 
which we referred in the preceding chapter. At a partition 
the brothers have to pay off the debts of the father, and 
likewise debts incurred by a brother, paternal uncle, or
1. Manu 9, 112-5* See above, TbU.
2, Yajn. 2,118. Manu 9, 104; See texts cit, by Jha, HLS,
II* 339* On the question of uddharas see below,
3. Manu 9, 215*
4, Yajn. 2,120a [226; Dh.K. 1192a]: Bph. 26, 18L198;
Dh.K. 1222a].
5* TlHf-
6. Arthas, 3,5)22 [104; tr. 243], cp. Manu 9, 218;
Katy. 850. Kane, HDh, III, 621.
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1
mother for purposes of the family. The paternal estate is 
also encumbered with costs of the performance of the 
sacramental rites of brothers and sisters (sagiskaras - 
marriage being the most important sagLskara for sisters and
the upananayana, if not the marriage, for the unmarried
2brothers.
Generally speaking the members of the family who 
were not entitled to a share had a right to maintenance• 
Thus there was the duty to provide maintenance for the son- 
less widows of brothers according to authors who have not 
conceded the right of the brother!s widow to inherit her 
husband*s estate.^ The concubine (avaruddha stri) and her
1* Manu 8, 166; Katy, 846.
2. Yajn, 2, 124; sisters receive 1/4 of a share of a son 
for the performance of their marriage. See Manu 9? 18 
(cp. 9, 130; 139); Vi^nu 18, 35; Bfhaspati 26,23 L199; 
Dh.K, 1421b: Katyayana] ; Katy. 858; Vyasa [Dh.K.1422a]; 
Devala [Dh.K., ibid.] The marriage of the younger 
unmarried brothers is included for this purpose according 
to the Arthaji. 3,5,21 [104] Above,H2 Narada*s text 
16, 33-4- H9&f] and also Yajn. refer to sagLskaras of 
brothers and it is not clear whether the marriage expenses 
of brothers are also to be defrayed out of the common 
estate. Commentators are divided on the question, the 
possibility that a brother might ask for marriage expenses 
and subsequently not think of marriage perhaps playing a 
role. See Kane, HDh, III? 619-21. _
3* Narada, cit* in SmVoa. [292; Dk.K. 1401b]: ya^ L patnyo
vidhavalj. sadhvyo jye^thena 6vaSurep.a va/ gotrajenapi
dhanyena bhartavya£-chadana§anailj//- "Those widows who
are chaste should be maintained with food and clothing 
by the eldest brother-in-law or the father-in-law or by 
any other sagotra". Tr* Jha, HLS, II, 475*
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issue were entitled to maintenance out of tlie property with, 
the exception of the special rights of the dasiputra (son 
of a female slave) of Sudras who had a right to a share at 
the choice of the father; and after the father's death the 
brothers had to give him half of a share due to a legitimate 
son (aurasa) An important category of dependants are the 
persons disqualified from a share on account of psychical
p
or physical disability* Finally we have to mention two 
more charges on the paternal estate, namely a gift for 
religious purposes which was promised by the father before 
the death, and gifts promised by the father as a token of
lL
affection*
III* Partition of Property* Severance of Status and Reunion*
(1) Partition between Father and Son(s) and Severance of 
Status.
In the parlance of Anglo-Hindu law and Modern Hindu 
law severance of status means that jointness has ceased and 
the shares have come into existence notionally and once 
actual shares are given in satisfaction of the right to a
1* On dasiputras see &ane, HDh* III* SOOff* Derrett, JAOS*
81 Cl961) 251-61 at p*25!?* On concubines see Kane, ibid*, 
811ff* _
2* Manu 9* 201-3. Yajn. 2* 140-2; Gaut* 28, 43-5; Baudh*2, 
38-41; Vi§^.u 15, 32-5; etc* Sons of disqualified persons, 
if free from such defects, are entitled to a share*
Kane, HDh., Ill, 617f.
3* Katy* 3S5.
4* Katy. 848*
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share and in working out the1 severance of status, a partition
by metes and bounds has taken place. The ancient text of
Harlta (above, 139 ) has shown us that the sons may be
Advanced* which is not followed by a severance of status
between father and son, so that the property advanced to
the son and the property retained by the father were still
subject to the respective needs of father and son. Though
the ideal time for partition is when further sons are
unlikely to be procreated, the Smytis also provide that the
father could partition the property amongst the sons and
separate them in status from himself in a situation where
further issue could be expected to be born. Such issue
would then exclude the divided sons from inheriting the
father’s share: "If a son is born after partition, he shall
receive the property of the father alone; or, if any other
sons had been reunited, he shall share it with them".'*' That
the son was separate after partition may also be inferred
2
from the rule of reunion which is given by Byhaspati.
Such a partition would exclude further mutual claims and 
loan transactions would be possible between father and
1. Manu 9* 216 [Dh.K. 1563a] : urdhvaip. vibhagaj-jatas-tu 
pitryam eva hared dhanam/ sa^ Lsyg-Jas tena va ye syur 
vibhajeta sa tai£. saha// Tr. Jha, HIS, II, 34-7* 
Narada 13, 4-3 [201] is identical.
2. 26, 113 [295].
1
separated son; in short, it would amount to partition as
understood in Anglo-Hindu law. This is an advance from the
position in the ArthaSastra where debts mutually contracted
pby father and son are|irrecoverabie Gu other hand the 
concept embedded in the Manu-smyti that he who engages in 
disputes with the father is not to be invited at the Sraddha- 
ceremonies (3*159) and. the idea expressed by Rphaspati that 
there could be no valid vyavahara between father and son, 
constituted a rule of socio-legal propriety which would cut 
at times across the concept of independent ownership of the 
son.
We may also raise the question whether a son would 
not be liable for any debts contracted by the father after 
separation, as presumably the duty to pay debts after the 
death of the father still exists in such an extreme case 
where the father dies separated from all sons, without 
leaving property. Putratva- the state of being a son -
makes it incumbent on the son to settle the debts as a
il _ _
personal obligation. A text of Katyayana places the burden
1. Yajn* 2,52.
2. 3,11,21 [113; tr. 263].
3. Byh. 1,124 [21]: guroTj sigye pitu£.-putre dampatyo svaml- 
bhptyayolj. virodhe!pi mithas-te^aft. vyavaharo na siddhyati//
See Sen-Gupta, 231*
4. The Smytis need not expressly deal with this question; 
the Eyhaspati-smyti says (above,78 ) that a son should
pay 7irst his TatEerfs debts and then his own, from 
which follows that the pious obligation operates even 
after partition.it\o o{-ik^ j
ov u cfii/i ^  ^0 ^ •
to pay the father’s debts on that son, who actually takes 
the wealth, i.e. the son who takes on default of an undivided 
son,"** and if we follow the Vlr amitrodaya, this text implies 
that the separated son (which includes the separated grand­
son) has to pay the post-partition debts out of his own
2
wealth even if he inherits no property from the father.
The special relationship between father and son may 
also have been the reason that the extant passages of the 
DharmaSutras and most of the Smytis with exception of the 
Bphaspati-smpti (see beloxtf, 1^1 ) do not deal with the 
question of reunion between father and son, but with re­
union between collaterals. There are also no rules on 
evidence of partition between father and son as in the case 
of brothers (see below, 151 ).
The rule of Manu sakpd-ajjL&o nipatati... sakpt-sakpt 
does stress that a father should normally not rescind a 
partition, though presumably the father would still have 
claims on the property of the son when the father!s property
1. 61. 559; Jha, HLS, I, 206.
2. 256; Dh.K. 710a; see also Para.ma. Ill, 264. But see 
Sm.ca., 595; where it is said in effect that the divided 
sons do not pay when the father dies joint with some 
sons, since by partition the sons have lost their right 
to succeed. See below,
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had become exhausted.
Against the notion that a father has any right 
beyond maintenance in the property of a son after partition, 
we may refer again to the rule of reunion between father 
and son given by Bfhaspati ( b e l o w ,1^1 ), which shows that
the father could transfer the ownership of a portion of the
estate, the size of the portion being laid down in the
2
Smytis. The provision which enjoins that a father has to 
divide the ancestral (grandpaternal) property equally, 
whereas in respect to his self-acquired property the father 
is free in the method of partition, is indicative of separate 
ownership between father and son. We may make note of the 
careful provision in the Bphaspati-smrti which says that as 
regards ancestral property recovered by the father and 
certain items self-acquired by him *the father*s ownership
1. Manu 9, 47 C372; Dh.K. 1072b]. "Once a share has fallen 
to a person [or: descended to a person]... this happens 
only once". The text may also purport to admonish, as 
other smrtis do, collaterals not to question the partition 
done by tKe~father. The fact that none of the commentators 
would commit himself by referring to a separation of 
status between father and son in this connection, could
be interpreted as showing that partition between father 
and son was sui generis and would not necessarily involve 
finality. Bpti.26, 140 and 149 [220f.; Dh.K.1584; 1585a] 
are also usually taken by commentators to relate to a 
partition between collaterals.
2. See also Gautama cited above, p.&8_ , who says that one 
can be owner on account of samvibhaga.
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has been declared1*^ This rule would be pointless if, after 
partition has taken place in accordance with it, the father 
was still intended to have svamya in the son*s share*
In addition we have the special rule of Manu and . 
Yajiiavalkya which envisages a brother receiving at a 
partition a small portion of the estate if on account of 
ability in his profession he does not desire his regular 
share in the property of the father* He thus renounces his 
rights in the property* This indicates that the receipt of 
even this symbolic share brings further mutual claims to an 
end*^ The text of YajnavaLkya on the same topic does not 
tell us that this refers only to a partition between 
brothers after the death of the father and it is justifiable 
to understand it to apply to a partition between father and 
son where mutual claims between father and sons and their 
descendants cease* The use of the term pythag - 'separate1 
in the rule points to complete separation.
To be added to p.158:
Thus we find that for practical purposes partition 
and separation of status between father and son are 
is envisaged in the ^astra* But the special relationship 
between father and son makes such partition dissimilar 
from that between collaterals in sb far as mutual 
adjustments may take place after the property is 
divided and as even a divided son may remain under 
an obligation to pay the debts of the father after 
thef* latter's de^th irrespective of inherited property* 
Moreover a separated son inherits in preference of Kis' 
the widowed mother.
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has been declared1 This rule would be pointless if, after 
partition has taken place in accordance with it, the father 
was still intended to have svamya in the sonfs share .
In addition we have the special rule of Manu and 
Yajnavalkya which envisages a brother receiving at a 
partition a small portion of the estate if on account of 
ability in his profession he does not desire his regular 
share in the property of the father. He thus renounces his 
rights in the property# This indicates that the receipt of
even this symbolic share brings further mutual claims to an
2 -  -  end. The text of Yajnavalkya on the same topic does not
tell us that this refers only to a partition between
brothers after the death of the father and it is justifiable
to understand it to apply to a partition between father and
son where mutual claims between father and sons and their
descendants cease. The use of the term ppthag = Separate*
in the rule points to complete separation.
Bphaspati 26,58-9 [205; Dh.K. 1221b, 1222a]: paitamahagi 
Ir^ tajjL pitra sva&aktya yad-upar jitam/ vidya-§auryadina 
prapta^L tatra svamya^i pitu^L smytam// pradana^i svecchaya 
kuryad bhogajji caiva tato dhanat/ tad abhave tu tanayaljL 
sama]ji§aTj. pariklrtita^.//
2* Manu 9> 207 bhratrpaft yas tu neheta dhana^L
SaktaTj. sva-karmapa/ sa nirbhajya^ svakad agL&at kincid 
dattvopa jlvanajp//.
5. Yajn. 2, 116a [221; 1169a]: Saktasyanlhamanasya kincid 
dattva ppthak kriya/.
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(2) Partition "between Collaterals and Severance of Status.
Most of the disputes over property would arise 
between brothers and other agnatic collaterals and the rules 
in the Dharma&astras purport to establish the finality of 
partition and to prevent recurring claims of the agnatic 
collaterals. Unlike in the case of father and son where 
partition involving separation of status was not expressly 
envisaged because of the special relationship of father and 
son* there was a distinct tendency towards partition of 
property as well as separation of status. The Narada-smyti 
and the Brhaspati-smpti have comprehensive rules on the 
evidence of partition and separation of brothers which could 
be inferred if e.g. their giving and receiving loans, 
property, cooking, religious acts, income and expenditure 
were separate, and mutual commercial transactions between 
the brothers took place* Only as regards the observation of 
rules on impurity due to death and birth and the offering 
of water libations they are still concerned with each other, 
according to Bphaspati.1 The evolution of the rights of the 
individual against the strong proprietary claims of agnatic 
collaterals is not only evident from the elaborate rules on
1* Narada 16, 38-40 [200; Dh.K* 1580a]; Bph. 26,147 [221;
Dh.K. 1581b]: ppthag-avyaya-dhana^. [v.l*: vyayadhanaiji =
mortgages] kusidarji ca parasparam/ vapik-patheuyi ca ye
kuryur-vibhaktas-te na saiji§aya£//= The rule on impurity
and water libations is usually cited in connection with 
the rule on the son born after partition. 26,56 [204; 
1568a].
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partition, evidence of partition, and reunion, but appears 
also from the persistence of rules which gave to the collat­
erals rights of control over land even after partition* The 
fact that these rules have been preserved by medieval 
authors shows their continued relevance, and the commentators 
had to find arguments to discredit the prima facie meaning 
of these texts* A most frequently cited text runs: "Divided 
or undivided, all sapindas are equal in respect to immove­
able property* No individual among them has power to give
away, or mortgage or sell it"* In practice the rule amounted
2
mainly to a right of preemption for relatives.
In the pre-legal era and in the early period of the 
DharmaSastras we find that reunion between brothers tended 
to be simply a question of living again together with one1 s 
brothers or agnates of the hula. Unless one was outcaste, 
which involved disinherison, there was an implicit right to 
rejoin the agnates which must have been felt at some stage 
as a handicap for the individual enjoyment of property,
1* vibhakta avibhakta [avibhakta vibhakta] va dayadalj. [v.l* 
sapipjah] sthavare samalj/ eko hyanlsah sarvatra danadham- 
ana-vikraye//, Katy* 854- [Apararka,7573; Manu [Mit•, 
Setlur's ed„, 612] and Bphaspati 14-,8 [Kptyakal,, 376],
2* On the rules of preemption in the dharmasastra see 
J.D*M. Derrett, Adyar Libr* Bull*, 25(1961) 13-27;
Univ, of Ceyl* Rev*, l9(l%l) 105-116*
3* Cp, ArthaS* 3*5>9> [108; tr*24-l] : ... bhratara^L saha- 
jivino*.. Devala: avibhakta-vibhaktanam kulyanam vasatam 
saha/ See above,23-
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especially if the rejoining agnate would claim a share at a 
second partition* It is in this context that the proposition 
of Bphaspati must be read, namely that once daya is divided, 
a reunion between dayadas is possible only as a matter of 
affection, that is to say, reunion became contractual: "If 
one, who has been divided, lives again through affection 
with his father or brother or with his uncle, he is said 
to be r e u n i t e d " T h e  parties participating at a reunion 
are according to Bphaspati limited to a pattern of three 
generations who may normally be alive at a time and who 
lived in a joint household before it broke up* Partition 
would e.g. take place between father and sons and reunion 
between father and one or some of the sons, or reunion 
between some of the sons, or there may be a partition 
between father, sons and a son of a predeceased son and 
there may be a reunion between uncle and nephew.
In the patriarchal family, based on agnatic kinship 
ties and the offering of pip^as to three deceased ancestors, 
it often occurred that the brothers would divide only after 
the father's death, so that before partition has taken
1. Bph. 26,115 [215; Dh.K. 1556a]: vibhakto ya£ puna^L 
pitra-bhratra caikatra sapsthita^/ pitpvyepathava 
prltya tat-sapspffa^L sa ucyate// Reunion between 
brothers: Bph. 26,103 [214], Medieval authors stress 
that there should be agreement.
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place a great-grandson of tb.e original owner might he 
living. Here within a patter of four generations counted 
from the original owner, the agnates had a right to redis­
tribute the property after they had resumed joint living
(3) Matp-bhaga or Patnx-bhaga.
(Partition according to Mothers or Wives) and Reunion, 
The Right of a Widow of a Reunited Brother,
Many of the rules on reunion reflect a preceding
p
partition according to mothers. Whereas this method of
1. Devala, as cit, e.g, in Krtya-kal., 663: Avibhakta-
vibhaktanaft kulyanam vasatam saha/ bhuyo daya-vibhagalj.
syad-a-caturthad iti sthiti^//- See above, £9. for tr.
The text does not suggest that agreement was essential 
for reunion and seems to refer - historically - to a 
situation where one (or some) of the agnates within 
four generations has left the kula taking possibly a 
share in advance and rejoins his agnates for joint living.
2. Derrett, Univ, of Ceyl. Rev. 14(1956) 105ff«* 151
fns. 163% 165-5, Kane, HtftiV III, 607* Partition according 
to mothers is noted by BpE. 26,24,25a [199; Dh.K,1237b] 
who wants to apply the rule when each mother is of 
equal caste and has an equal number of sons and says 
that when the number of sons varies a partition according 
to males_has been recommended; Vyasa Dh.K. 1238a, and 
Vpddha-Harlta Dh.K. 1988a. Gaut. would assign to the 
eldest uterine brother of each group a_preferential share. 
28j_17 [441; Dh.K. 1234a]± prati-matp va sva-sva-varge 
bhaga-vi&efaTp/ Patnx-bhaga occurred in South India in 
modern t ime s _ and must Eavebeen a widespread custom _ 
though the Gastric system_eventually prefers putra-bhaga. 
The Sa.vic says that patnx-bhaga is practised amongst 
Vaisyas and Sudras. Poulke1s ed„, para,79* The custom 
occurred in Negapatam. J. Mossel, Heathen Laws among the 
Wellales and Chittys on the Coast of Coromandel 1.0. r 
Macli. Coll. Ch.XIV, 10(f), [original_at Mack.Pr.22.11, ^
[pp.471-5H)] &t fol. 90b. Cp.ViSvarupa a Southerner 
(Derrett, 1965 Ker.L.T. 36), who refers to partition
continued:
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partition may have been of convenience in a polygamous 
family and may have merely prevented discord in such 
families, another object of the rules on reunion was to 
prevent the share of a reunited brother from reverting
after his death to the reunited non-uterine (half) brother.**"
2
The share was to go to a uterine brother though unreunited» 
We may venture the conjecture that the function of the 
rules on reunion are partly to assure the maintenance of 
the mother which would be rather incumbent on her own sons 
than on her stepsons. The rules may also reflect a residual
according to mothers preceding reunion. On Yajn.2,138 
[Dh.K. 154-6a,b; 1547&] In Punjab customary law the 
institution is known as chundavand and exists side by 
side with the putra-bhaga rule, called pagvand (fper 
turban1). R&ttigan, A Digest..., 13th ea., 24Off.
1. Uterine sons might live close to their mother, perhaps 
in the same compound. The mother might have received 
land from her relations. If one of the uterine brothers 
had a joint concern with a non-uterine (half) brother, 
was reunited, and subsequently died, the unreunited 
uterine brother(s) would succeed to the land and house, 
whereas moveable property which was elusive and could be 
concealed went to the reunited non-uterine brother.
Prajapati Dh.K. 1561ab: antar-dhanajjL ca yad-dravyaqi
sa^syg-fanaii ca tad-bhavet/ bhumiip. gphaiji tv-asajjLspffalj.
pragphpryur-yatha^Sata^/
2. Manu 9> 211-2.
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interest in the property of the mother*s relatives hy birth 
who are interested to see that their daughter or sister who 
has married into another family and her descendants may 
prosper rather than the children of another wife who is 
connected by birth with another family* A text of Bphaspati 
seems to confine the share of a reunited member to relatives 
who are more closely related to the owner than non-uterine 
brothers * The text seems to suggest that his share should 
go to reunited (uterine) members (by survivorship), then to 
the widow, then to parents, and then to the sister (un­
married or married).'1' This text may be contrasted with the 
text from the Narada-smpti dealing with the same question, 
though in an atmosphere of a strict patrilineal family. The 
passage is normally cited by commentators in connection 
with a reunited brother who dies sonless, though we may 
note that the text may have been applicable even to a 
divided and unreunited brother, partition of property not 
involving separation of status for purposes of the sonless 
widow*s right to inherit her husband*s estate: "If among 
brothers [commonly understood as 1reunited brothers*], any­
one without issue should die, or become a wandering mendicant,
1. Bph.26,107-108 [214; Dh.K. 1558al: kadacid-va pramlyeta 
pravrajed-va kathancana/ na lupyate tasya bhagalj. sodarasya 
vidhxyate// ya tasya bhaginx sa tu tato * gLSajji labdhum 
arhati/ anapatyasya dharmo * yam-abhary apitpkasya ca//
16 £>
the others shall divide his property, exempting the 
stridhana. They shall make provision (bharapam) for his 
wives till their death provided they remain faithful to the 
bed of her husband; should the wives be otherwise, they 
shall withdraw the provision. If he has left a daughter, 
her father*s share would be meant for her maintenance; till 
her marriage she shall retain that share; after marriage 
her husband shall maintain her".'*'
IV. Partible and Impartible Property.
Self acquisitions and Their Exemption at Partition.
In the patriarchal household acquisitions belonged
2in principle to the head, though acquisition and enjoyment 
of property with the indulgence of the father, especially 
when the son had been advanced and founded his own household
1. Nar.16,25-7 [169; Dh.K.1553b, 1554a]. Tr. follows Jha's, 
HLS, II, 430.
2. Manu 8,416. Cp. also SaAkha-Likhita-dh.su., cit.e.g.
ln Kptya-kal., 651 [Dh.K. 1148b]: ... na jlvati pitari
putra rikthaip. vibhajeran/ yady-api syat paScad adhigatajp.
tairanarha eva putralp/ artha-dharmayor asvatantryat/-
f,While the father is alive, the sons shall not divide 
the property, - even that which may have been acquired 
by them subsequently (subsequently = after they married?)
Harlta [Dh.K. 1146a] : jivati pitari putrapam-arthad ana-
visargak^epesv-asvatantryaip/- "While the father is living 
the sons have no independence in respect_to the appropria­
tion, gift or realisation of property", akgepa has been 
interpreted as referring to the disciplinary power over 
slaves etc. or the realising of debts. See Dh.K,, ubi cit.
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must always have been possible* Yet the acquisitions of the 
sons, that is in respect of property which was acquired 
without recourse to the paternal property, were originally 
part of the paternal property. When it became recognised 
that certain items of property acquired by the son, namely 
vidya-dhana (gains of learning), Saurft-dhana (acquisition 
by prowess) and saudayika (gift by the father), could not 
be easily claimed from with without disrupting the unity 
of the family, it became admitted that the acquisition was 
not compulsorily partible at a partition between father 
and sons or between brothers after the death or retirement 
of the father That early authors only know of the 
exemption of self-acquisitions at a partition between 
brothers may be ascribed to the fact that even if sons left 
the house of the father receiving a share in advance, all 
property was still - even if in practice only nominally - 
in principle the property of the father# The institution
1* Gaut.dh.su. 28,31 [445; 1205a] ; Vyasa, Dh.K. 1231a:
vidya-praptam saurya-dhanajp. yac-ca saudayika^ bhavet/
vibhaga-kale tat-tasya naaves£avy-am sva-rikthibhilp.//-
MWhat is obtained by learning, by military prowess and 
gifts (by the father), these shall not be sought by one's 
coheirs at the time of partition"♦ Tr* Sen-Gupta, 216f. 
Va§si§i£ha knows of self-acquis it ions only in the context 
of partition between brothers (17,40;51 C50f•; Dh.K. 
1205a]), i.e. when a brother acquired property during 
jointness after the death of the father, he would 
receive a double share.
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of the right to exempt self-acquisitions at a partition 
was probably admitted in the face of the tensions which 
may exist between the father and sons and between brothers. 
It could well have been a device to prevent disunity and 
premature disruption of the family, and to support the 
postponement 6f partition until the father*s death* It was 
a kind of reward or concession for members living jointly 
and co-operating.
But if the father - in a patriarchal family - 
decided to separate sons, the exemption of the sons’ self­
acquisitions would tend to be restricted, because there ■was 
no point in rewarding the son, while on the other hand the 
property acquired by the son was strictly speaking an 
accretion to the father’s property* Ve hardly find rules 
on this question, apart from the rule mentioned by Katyayana 
which shows that a father could claim two shares or a half 
share of the acquisitions of the son,'1' There is no ground
for supposing that this text applied only to the son living
2 -
jointly as has been supposed in modern decisions. Vidya- 
dhana , Saurya-dhana and saudayika are categories of self­
acquisitions which are typical for patriarchal families
1. Si, 851a: dvy-a^Sa-haro*rdha-haro va putra-vittarjanat 
pita/ Git, in Dayabhaga, 4-9, See fn. to Kane’s tr, of 
61, 851 for different explanations,
2. Derrett, 69 C.W.N, XmTI-XXXIX.
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pursuing brahmapical or military occupations, whereas gifts 
“by the father illustrate the patriarchal power of the 
father* While the pre-occupation of some of the Smptis with 
these categories led to specified subdivisions, there were 
steady accretions of other kinds of self-acquisitions to 
constitute ultimately a long and detailed list in the
- - 1 VKatyayana-smpti * If we compare the history of stndhana,
which has culminated in a similar detailed list in the
Katyayana-smyti, we find that there was a strong tendency
to keep strldhana separate from the property of the agnates
2
from the time of acquisition. The concept of self­
acquisitions, however, always related to a partition and 
the property was not separate - e*g# for purposes of 
succession - until it was exempted at a partition*
A different method besides the mere enumeration of 
types of self-acquisitions is contemplated in the Manu- 
smyti* Though in 61* 906 of ch* 9 vidyadhanam, besides 
gifts, wedding gifts and madhuparkika-^ are enumerated, in
1* 61* 867-884*
2* 6l0 894-916; but see on the wife*s dowry, and
tKe right of the husband to utilise strrdhana in excep­
tional circumstances,
3* For the meaning of madhuparkika see SBE, XXV, 374* fn.206. 
Commentators understand it as rthe fee given for the 
performance of a sacrifice* or *any present received in 
•token of respect, with the honey-mixture1 * For the 
persons worthy of receiving the honey-mixture, see Manu 
3, 119-20*
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§1 . 208 it is said that property which, has been acquired 
by one1s exertion without detriment to the fatherfs property 
is not partible amongst brothers.
Until now we have only spoken of self-acquisitions 
made by the sons which occurred in the patriarchal family, 
all property belonging to the father. In other texts we 
find that the claims of sons had crystallized in respect of 
the ancestral (grandpaternal) estate which they would take 
in equal proportions together with the fathere If the latter 
wanted to prevent further claims of the sons, he would give 
at his choice a portion of his self-acquired property, 
especially when the birth of another son could be expected 
who would then (together with a reunited son, if any) 
inherit the father's share in the ancestral property and 
the rest of the self-acquired property acquired before
2
partition and the property self-acquired after partition.
1. 403; Dh.K. 1212b, 1213ab: anupaghnan pit^-dravyajjL §ramep.a
yad-upar jitan/svayam-Ihita-labdhajp. tan-nakamo datum-
arhati// Vi§pu 18, 42 is identical. The ArthaS, already
declares property which is acquired by a person and 
which 'is not brought into being out of the father's 
property' as impartible. 3?5?3 [104; tr.241]: svayam-
arjita^i avibhajyam, any-atra pitp-dravyad-utthitebhyalp/
2. B^h.26,54-6 [204; Dh.K. 1567; 1508a*. pitra saha vibhakta 
ye sapatna va sahodaraTji jaghanya§-caiva ye tegsaift pity- 
bhaga-haras-tu te// anlsali purva-ja^. pitrye bhratp-bhage 
vibhakta-j a^ .// putrai£ saha vibhaktena pitra yat-svayam- 
arjitam/ vibhakta-jasya t at - s arvam-anl £ a]j. purva-ja^. 
smptafc//
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A father could also completely retain his self­
acquisition and his share in the ancestral property and on 
his death or on his widow's death, the property would he 
divided by all the sons equally. Katyayana stresses that 
the sons have equal ownership in the property of the grand­
father, but that the son is not entitled to ownership over 
what is acquired by the father himself."*" Manu, as we have 
seen above (145), refers incidentally to the ancestral 
property recovered by the father and declares it to be the
self-acquired property of the father which he need not
2
divide amongst his sons. Bphaspati subsumes under self­
acquisitions of the father ancestral property recovered by 
him with his own power as well as the fatherTs gains through 
learning, valour, "etc.". It is added that the father has 
the power to make gifts at his will and that he can make an 
unequal distribution.^ Katyayana has a Jil. which refers to 
ancestral property taken away from the family by force or
lost and recovered by the father which he need not give up
zl „
to the sons at a partition. Yajnavalkya does not explicitly
Caw G-ffec} )
refer to self-acquisitions of the father and contracting the 
three Slokas by Manu into one, states: "Without detriment
1. Katy. 839; cp. Bph., cit. above, f^ '2-
2. Manu 9? 209; Vi^pu 18, 43.
3. See above, 151 f.
4. Katy* 866.
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to the paternal estate whatever else is acquired by a man 
himself, or a [ors as a] present from a friend, or a [or: 
as also] nuptial present, shall not belong to the dayadas.
If anyone recovers ancestral property which had been lost, 
he may not give it to his dayadas nor also what was gained 
by learning" Yajnavalkya does not clearly answer the 
question whether sons and father are contemplated in his 
view as t simultaneously dayadas - an anathema in the strict 
patrilineal and patriarchal family - in respect of ancestral 
recovered property deriving from the father1 s father etc., 
so that at a partition either the father or one of the sons 
can exempt ancestral recovered property, or whether a situa­
tion is referred to where the sons (dayadas) are partitioning 
the father!s property which may consist of inherited property 
and self-acquired property of the father.
V. References to Customary Law and Its Reflection in the 
Dharma§astras.
(1) Classification of Property in DharmaSastras and In 
Customary Law.
In the following we intend to trace some of the
1. Yajn. 2,118-9 [224; Dh.K. 1215a]: pitp-dravyavirodhena 
yad anyat svayam-ar jita^L/ maitram-audvahikajji caiva 
dayadanafii na tad bhavet// kramad-abhyagataiji dravyajp. hytam- 
apy uddharet-tu yalp/ dayadayebbyo na tad-dadyad vidyaya 
labdham eva ca//
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questions discussed in the context of customary law* We have 
seen from the preceding discussion that (1) some Smptis sub­
divide property into the category of self-acquisitions of 
the father and property inherited from his father, (2) that 
there is a coextensive interest of father and son in respect 
of ancestral (grandpaternal) property, especially landed 
property, and (3) the peculiar value of such property from 
the point of view of the father’s male descendants which is 
further illustrated by the rule that ancestral property 
recovered by the father was declared impartible by special 
provisions*^ Finally we should be reminded that Smptis make 
distinctions between immoveable and moveable property for
p
purposes of alienation and partition* We have singled out 
some incidents which find their reflection in Tesavalamai-',
lL
in Kandyan law and in customs prevalent in South India*
1. A text attributed to Saiikha^goes even further and express­
ly admits the claims of dayadas to land which had once 
been possessed by the family by assigning to the recoverer 
only a fourth part of the recovered land_. Cit* in Sm*ca*, 
642 [Dh*K* 1207a] : pur va -na § £ am tu yo bhumim eka£
cabhyuddharet-kramat/ yatha-bhagaip labhante’nye dattvagi&agi
tu turlyakam//
2. 9/f[. tl5S
3. Cp. Ch. 1(5) above. The following references are to the 
text of the Tes* as printed in the appendix of H.W. 
Tambiah’s Law and Customs of the Tamils of Jaffna.
4. On the relationship between Kandyan law and the 
DharmaSastras see Derrett, "The Origins of the Laws of 
the Kandyans", Univ. of Ceyl* Rev*, 14 (1956) 105-150, 
cited as 1 Kandyans^ in the following.
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That the DharmaSastras assimilated such incidents may he 
suggested on the basis that (1) early Dharma§astras (Manu, 
Gautama, Apastamba, Baudhayana, Narada etc.) and the 
ArthaSastra do not refer to these features or accept them 
only with modifications, that (2) especially medieval authors 
from the North have limited use for them, and that (3) they 
functioned largely in South Indian texts.
(2) The Classification of Property in Customary Law*
(a) Ancestral (Grandpaternal) Property*
The Tesavalamai = "Customs of the Country" (sci. 
as opposed to book law or conflicting usages of immigrants 
of various provenances) divides property into hereditary 
property of the father which is called mutusom (lit. !cold 
property1 or 1 ancient property’; from mutu = old, som
svam)^ j dowry (sldanam), and property acquired during cover-
' __ __ o
ture, which is called teftiyated&am (lit. ’acquired property1).
The mutusom was mainly reserved for the male
descendants, but at the same time formed the basis on which
the whole family subsisted. Kandyan law laid much stress
1. Tamil Lexikon, Univ. of Madras.
2. SSS" on these categories Tes. I, 1; Tambiah, The Laws and 
Customs of the Tamils of Ceylon, 36; tediyateddam is the 
Tamil term for self-acquisitions to tSas day. ,
3 * Cp* the notion of riktha mulagi hi kutunbam in Sankha- 
Likhita’s dictum. Cit above, Jh,
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on the distinctions between moveables and immoveables, and 
between inherited and acquired property
(b) Dowry•
The sldanam differs from the dowry which was given 
to a bride in the strict patrilineal family of the Dharma- 
Sastras where the bulk of the property was confined to the 
agnates and where a bride of a male member of the family 
would have brought merely her dowry, consisting of ornaments 
whereas the husband merely provided a place in the ancestral 
home* The dowry according to the Tesavalamai and Kandyan law 
was an essential part of the property belonging to a couple 
and would include immoveables unlike in the patrilineal, 
exogamous family of the Dharmasastras. The duty to provide
for the dowry was binding not only on the parents, but also
2
on the brothers. With the receipt of the dowry the 
daughter!s claim to the parental estate was satisfied, if 
there were other children entitled to succeed. On her 
death the daughter1s dowry devolved on her sisters and their 
issue in the absence of her own issue, and in the absence 
of her sister and her issue, to her brothers and their issue
lL
and in their absence to the parents. It is stressed that
1. F.W.Hayley, A treatise on the Laws and Customs of the 
Sinhalese, 219* Derrett, Kandyans, 119 fn. 55.
2. Tes. 1, l0;ll; Tambiah, op#cit*, 38; 96f. Hayley, op.cit.
333, 335.
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the mother has no claim to the deceased1s daughter's dowry,
though a widow in distressed circumstances may receive the
same as a matter of grace subject to a life estateParents
2
in affluent circumstances could increase the dowry. It 
might always have occurred - not only during the reign of 
the Portuguese as the Tesavalamai states - that the dowry 
was taken indiscriminately from either sldanam, mutusom, 
or the te$iyate$4 am, because the necessity to provide a 
dowry was overriding any preference. It seems that the 
sldanam became part of the common property until divorce or
death of the husband. This type of property is recognisable
-  —  Ll
in a few surviving sastric texts according to which the
1. Tes. I, 6.
2. Qjes. I, 5*
5. Tes. II, 2. In Eandyan law there is no such preference 
discernible. _ _ _
4. See Katy. 879-80; yal-labdhajjL dana-kale tu svajatya
kanyaya saha/ kanya-qatagu..// vaivahikaqi tu tad-vidyad-
bharyaya yat-sahapatam/...// vaivahikaip. is the audvahikam
or bharya-dhana which is normally mentioned in the Smptis
(Manu 9* 206; Yajn. 2,118; Nar. 16,6; Bph. 26,46.)• The 
former kind (kanya-gatam) may be identical with the 
so-called stridhana which a man acquires as the dowry 
of the wife and which becomes part of the common estate 
of husband and wife or part of the estate of the agnates, 
but exempt at partition, See_MaskarI ref* to above,
Also Prajapati who lists audvahikam and stridhana 
amongst the items of property which can be exempted at 
a partition between brothers, Dh.K. 1232b.
dowry does not become part of the wife's stridhana, i*e. 
the wife's separate paraphernalia, but becomes part of the 
property of the unseparated agnatic collaterals but 
(naturally) exemptible at partition* In a nuclear family it 
constituted together with the mutusom, the nucleus for a 
community of acquisition*
(c) Community of Acquisition between Husband and Wife*
The subdivision of property into self-acquisitions 
of the father and property stemming from his father finds 
its parallel in the Tesavalamai with the difference that 
instead of the self-acquisitions of the father we have a 
community of acquisition between husband and wife created 
by marriage. This concept is represented, as we have seen 
(above, L!3{f. ), in the DharmaSastras by passages of Spastamba, 
by the concept of dampatyor aikyam, and the text dampatyor 
dhanajp. madhyagam, but plays a secondary role in the patri­
lineal and patriarchal joint family as contemplated in the 
Smptis, where property was acquired solely by the head of 
the family or jointly acquired by collaterals* The acquisi­
tions there became part of the property of the agnates and 
acquisitions made by the wife would become the husband's 
property, if they are not stridhana and consequently 
separate from the property of the husband or the agnates 
ab initio *
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In customary law the wife's dowry and her husband!s
mutusom were joint for purposes of acquisition of property,
the husband having a prerogative of management of the joint
e s t a t e E v e n  in the Sastric texts, though the rule dampatyor
dhanam madhyagam had not literal legal application, we find
many traces of Ma nexus of dependence and mutual responsi-
p
bility which expresses itself in the property sphere 
Whereas the Dharma§astras stress the obligation of the male 
issue to pay their father's debt after his death this obli­
gation was incumbent in the Tesvalamai on sons and widow
“ “  i i i ■
whether they had consented to the contraction of the debt
3 -  -or not. Amongst the Smpti-authors it is Katyayana who tells
us that the wife has to pay her husband's debts after his
death out of her stridhana, namely when on his impending
death he had expressly directed her to pay and this even if
zj*
she had not consented to the contraction of the debt*
1. Tes. IV, 1.
2. Serrett, ZVR 64(1962) 64 with reference^to the fact that 
a spouse could not act as a surety (Yajh.2,52) on grounds 
of their community of property and the wife's adhikara 
in her husband's property in respect of maintenance, 
expenditure for family purposes, and the husband's right 
to utilise her stridhana in certain cases without incur­
ring debts (Yajn.S, 148; Katy.914).
3* Tes. IX, 3* Tambiah, op»cit., 107*
4, Katy.547 [Dh.K. 714a: martu-kamena ya bhartra prokta 
deyam-pnam tvaya/ aprannapi sa dapya dhanajji yadyaSritagL 
striya// The Para.ma. 270, reads: dhanagi dadyat-suto 
yatha and seems to be in accord with the customary law
referred to*
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(3) The Mutual Interests of Family Members in the Family 
Property.
(a) Interests of the Daughter.
The right to a share which the son had in respect 
to the property of the parents competed with the interest 
of the daughter in so far as she had a right to maintenance 
and especially with her interest in the dowry which was of 
considerable importance and in the interest of the whole 
family because it was a matter of prestige and status that 
the daughter was properly married and provided with property, 
especially where marriage took place between cross-cousins 
or in any case with the small kinship group. The Tesavala- 
mai shows, by first dealing with interests of the daughters 
in their dowry, that their claims had to be satisfied before 
the sons could claim anything. But if there was sufficient 
property there was presumably no reason why sons might not 
be advanced at marriage, even if there were unmarried 
daughters. According to Kandyan law the daughter who married 
in binna - that is, she did not become a member of her 
husband's household, but retains full connections with her 
parents' or parent's household - shared the property with 
her sons and other unmarried daughters after the death of 
the parents. A diga married daughter - i.e. who goes to her
1. Tambiah, op.cit., 96 f.
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husband's house, adopts that house name, and becomes for all 
purposes a member of her husband's patrilineal family though 
the couple might not reside with the husband's father - 
could return during the lifetime of the father and be 
allowed to settle in binna.^
(b) Interests of Sons.
It is implicit in many provisions of the Tesavalamai
that the nuclear household is envisaged as common and normal,
that is, sons and daughters left the family at marriage,
the daughters receiving the dowry in satisfaction of a share
and the sons receiving a share of the ancestral property,
mutusom, though they could not demand it as a matter of 
2
right. If the father could not be induced to advance the 
sons, which would presumably depend on whether the parents 
could spare a slice of the ancestral property, the son would 
'inherit' the mutusom only on the death of both parents. In 
the property acquired by the parents the sons and daughters 
had an equal right on the death of both parents according 
to the Tesavalamai and it seems that on the death of either 
spouse the survivor held an interest in a hypothetical share,
1. Hayley, 389f® On the institution of marriage and its 
function in Kandyan law, see especially Derrett,
Kandyans, at 109-116.
2. Tes. I, 1; IV, 4: "... If husband and wife have two or 
three or more sons, and have given and delivered to them 
a piece of ground or garden, and if, after having 
possessed it for several years, the father and mother 
die, which causes a division of the estate..."
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namely half of the acquired, property which would he worked
out on remarriage.1 In old age the parents might distribute
the property acquired by them amongst their sons on the
condition that the sons would maintain them. But there
existed the right to recall the property if the sons
2
neglected their duties. It can be said that a separation 
of status and partition of property by metes and bounds as 
known to modern law would not take place until after the 
death of the parents. This enables Tambiah to state with 
reference to the Tesavalamai Mthat the joint family, consist- 
ing of the parents and children and their descendants was
7
both undivided and indivisible". But this ignores the 
possibility of the advancement of sons and their quasi- 
separation or residual jointness with parents and sisters. 
Before the sons had set up separate homes their acquisitions 
remained part of the 1 common estate1 except gifts by
4
relations and friends. The Tesavalamai indicates that even 
after marriage and establishing separate homes, the sons 
have to leave their acquisitions acquired before they
1. Tes. I, 1; 10; 11.
2. Tes. I, 8.
3. 6p. cit., 123.
h. Tes. I, 7; IV, 5.
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1married (and were advanced) in the common estate. This may
indicate that partition and separation in status in the
modern sense was not known at least until the death of the
parents and that the property assigned to sons was nominally
or perhaps in some circumstances effectively still part of
2
the common estate.
In other words the mutual interests1 in the property 
would endure even after the advancements of the sons, though 
this competes with the principle that once the couple had 
founded their own household a community of acquisition was 
created and the issue of the couple would have a primary 
interest in the property. We may add here that the sons had 
a customary right of protest against improper alienations 
of immoveable property in the interest of future generations.
1. In 1,7 we read: "So long as the parents live the sons may 
not claim anything whatsoever; on the contrary, they are 
bound to bring into the common estate (and there to let 
remain) all that they have gained or earned during the 
whole of their bachelorship excepting ... [ref. to 
ornaments presented by parents or self-acquired] and that 
until the parents die, even if the sons have married and 
quitted the paternal roof". In IV, 5 it is stated: "... 
all the property acquired by the son or sons while they 
are bachelors must be left by them to the common estate 
when they marry; but this is by no means understood to 
include the presents that have been made...".
2. Cp. Kandyan law where property is said to be obtainable 
from parents and from children or grandchildren by 
virtue of paternity and by virtue of maternity. Hayley, 
op.cit., 219* It may imply that once a son had acquired 
a family he would be allocated property by his father.
3. See above, 100, the text of Vyasa; Derrett, Contr. Ind. 
Soc. 6(1962) at 26f.
On the question of the liabilities of sons we notice 
the rule in the Tesavalamai which says that f,sons are hound 
to pay the debts contracted by the parents; and although 
the sons have not at the time the means of paying such 
debts, they nevertheless remain at all times accountable 
for the same"**1' We may infer that the sons were also liable 
for the personal debts of the mother incurred after the 
death of the father.
(c) Interests of the (Widowed) Mother or Widow (without 
Issue).
On the death of the father, the mother could remain 
in full possession of all the property till she remarried.
She had a right to administer the whole property for the
2
benefit of the children. This would happen especially when
*
the children were still minors. On majority the sons could 
not demand any share as a matter of right, though sons 
presumably received advancements or even inherited* the
4
mutusom subject to the rights of the widow.
1* Tes. 1,7.
2. Tes. 1,9. Hayley, 351f«
3. tes. 1,9.
4. In Tes. 1,1 it is said that sons should inherit the 
mutusom on the death of the father, whereas in 1,7 we 
read that only when both parents (the widow not having 
remarried) are deceased, the sons inherit the mutusom. 
This indicates that position might have been flexible 
in favour of the widow.
183
If the widow remarried she would forfeit her rights
in the mutusom which belongs to her sons, besides half of
1the self-acquired property of her first marriage. She would
receive her dowry subject to the rights of unmarried
2daughters. If there were not sufficient dowry-property or 
self-acquisitions left over, the mutusom served for her 
maintenance until remarriage or death. The concurrent 
interests of sons and daughters and the widow which extended 
over the whole property were to some degree checked by the 
principle that the ancestral mutusom or the praveni of 
Kandyan law was preferably reserved for those "who bear the 
name of the family", so that the widow1 s claim was weak in 
respect to this kind of property. On the other hand there 
was the principle of the right of a widow to maintenance 
which would entitle her to a right in all property belonging
lL
to the family. Primarily the self-acquisitions of the
1. Tes. I, 10.
2 . Tes. I, 10.
3* Cp# Kandyan law, Hayley, 355f*
4. The wife is entitled to maintenance even after divorce 
in certain circumstances; see Hayley, 287* Derrett, 
Kandyans, 118. On the Sastric provisions, see Manu 9»
191 which presupposes successive marriages of mothers 
and in connection with this §1 . 192 which speaks of 
equal partition of the mother1^  property (mabp&a. riktha) 
between uterine brothers and sisters. On remarriage and 
its effect in the property sphere see Artha&. 3*2,19ff* 
Remarriage of widows and divorce were deprecated in the 
Dharma&astras (see Manu 5> 161-4; 3?65*69-70; 176;
3,160; 9 *101) and their effect in the property sphere 
neglected.
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couple must have been the category of property in which the 
widow was interested* Similarly we may assume that the 
institution of self-acquired property of the father in Smpti 
texts (see above, 157-f ) was not only intended to be impart­
ible (i.e. the father could not be forced to part with it) 
in the father’s own interest, but also in the interest of 
the widow,"*" even if the institution was not contemplated as 
a community of acquisition*
On the other hand, we find that in Kandyan law the 
subdivision of property into moveables and immoveables and 
the paramount value of land would even reduce the widow’s 
interest in the immoveable property self-acquired by the 
father during the subsistence of the marriage*
The widow might in rare cases inherit the whole 
immoveable property according to Kandyan law, that is, when 
the husband had no descendants (including adopted children), 
parents, grandfather or grandmother, brothers etc. the 
property might finally be left to the widow absolutely. On 
the other hand, even though there are children, grand­
children etc., their right might be postponed in certain 
circumstances, whereas other circumstances might justify
1. Derrett, Kandyans, 130. The evidence cited by Hayley 
indicates tliat the right to praveni for maintenance is 
subject to the amount of self-acquired property, but 
not subject to the amount of dowry received, however 
large. Hayley, 355•
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the widow*s "being left in possession of only a portion of 
the land for her maintenance.'*'
If the husband was joint with his collaterals and 
parents, the widow, according to Kandyan law, could pre­
sumably opt for a share in immoveable property for her
maintenance whereas in moveable property she would receive
2
a share equal to that of a child.
(4) Conclusions* The Effect of Marriage and Kinship in 
the Property Sphere according to Customary Law*
A circle of relatives having an ill-defined mutual 
and varying interest in the estate which consists of property
1. Hayley, 34-9* Cp. Byhaspati, cit* above, 121, See also 
Tambiah, op*cit.,*il2f*, citing an account by Sir 
Alexander Johnstone on the customs of the Colombo Chetties 
of Ceylon, according to which the widow has a claim to 
her dowry and is given a part of the other property as 
may be stipulated for her by the Headman and the relations 
according to her age and situation in life in order that 
she may be enabled to reside with her parents or relatives 
without entering a second marriage. The eldest son would 
otherwise manage the estate and maintain the widow and 
the other children and if all children were under age 
the husband’s relations and the Headman would take over
the estate and maintain the widow and children* On the
sons1 marriage the estate and the widow must be given to 
the most experienced son in order that he maintain them.
On the death of the remarried wife, the eldest son of 
the first bed, if he is a fit person, would enter upon
the estate and maintain the widow and children. If he
neglects his duties the Headman and the relatives must 
give the share appertaining to her from the estate and 
the remaining property was divided equally among the sons 
of the first and second bed.- 
2* Derrett, Contr. to Ind* Soc., 6(1962), 20 fn.28. Id., 
Kandyans, Iffif. Hayley, 331 * 452f. For a particular 
method of working out the sonless widow1s right in the 
joint estate of her brothers-in-law, see Sayap.a on
fgveda 1,124,7 as explained by Derrett at ZTO, 64(1962)9 fn.82.
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derived from the father’s ancestors and the mother’s dowry- 
plus acquisitions of the couple, distinguishes the customary- 
family referred to from the patrilineal and patriarchal 
family of the DharmaSastras, In the DharmaSastras the claims 
of the widow-mother were normally postponed to the sons * 
and further male descendants1 rights, who would have the 
duty to provide for their mother* In the customary family 
the wife’s or widow’s interest, the daughter’s right to a 
dowry consisting of immoveables, the sons' interest in the 
parents’ property, especially in the ancestral paternal 
property competed with each other and were subject to events 
like divorce, and the mutual claims of the family members*
The father was a manager of the property because 
the existence of his wife and children hampered the full 
exercise of power in respect to alienations without corres­
ponding benefit of the family,"*’
The size of the dowry was left undefined in the 
customary system and it may not only consist of immoveables 
but may perhaps amount to a larger share that a son would 
get. The DharmaSastras specify the daughter’s interest as
1, Tes, IV, Is the husband may give ’some1 part of the dowry; 
of the ancestral property brought by him into the family, 
he may make a gift of one tenth without the consent of 
the wife and children, Gp, the text of Bphaspati 14,6 
[138; Dh,K, 803 t] which speaks of the consent of the 
jnati as necessary for a gift of the ancestral property 
Ikramagatam dhanam), Above, 101 There are also restric­
tions"oBrTJhe power of the father if he wants to make a 
gift to nieces or nephews which would require the consent 
of the respective spouses’ relations, because they had 
more than a spes successions, Tes,IV,2 and Tes,I,15*
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being 1/4- of a share of a son, perhaps in view of the 
variableness of the daughter Ss share in customary law.
The mother ls interest according to the Dharma§astras 
consists of a share equal to that of a son at a partition 
between sons (see above,llSj1* ) which again seems to be an 
attempt to specify and fix the mother*s interest, though we 
notice that one Smpti, less favourable than the customary 
law, makes the share subject to the amount of stridhana in 
her possession which would occasionally consist of property, 
derived from the husband or his father. The general policy 
of the Smptis is to delineate the rights of women and 
restrict the amount of property available for them, subject­
ing their total rights to a limited estate.
One of the essential features which accounts for 
differences between the Sastric pattern of the patrilineal 
and exogamous family and the customary system may be found 
in the institution of cross-cousin marriages or marriages 
within the small kinship group.
We have seen before that the circle of prohibited 
degrees for marriage was very large and that Gastric authors 
were averse to the custom of cross-cousin marriages. In
1# *Smptyantara1, cit, e.g, in Sm,ca,, 624: jananya- 
svadhana putrair-vibhagejjiSag. samarg. haret/*
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customary law the circle of prohibited degrees was very 
small.1 In contrast to the Smptis the customary law, 
especially in the South of India favoured endogamy within 
the kingroup, whereby kinship is traced in all lines through 
all links. ^
In Kandyan law marriages with the maternal uncle*s
daughter, or a paternal auntfs daughter was desirable and
7
even obligatory. In some customs the person refusing to 
marry the cousin forfeited his or her right to the share or 
the dowry in favour of the party who was prepared to marry. 
One of the purposes of such marriages was to keep the landed 
property within small kinship groups. For an illustration 
we may assume the simple situation of three families 
representing a kinship group and being connected by endoga- 
mous marriages, each family consisting of father, mother,
1, Derrett, Kandyans, 111; Hayley, 178-4.
2. Hur Yalman^ * Caste Principles in a Kandyan Community1, 
in: E. Leach (ed.), Aspects of Caste in South India.♦»,
89 ff• On p. 89 the author states: "There are variations 
in Kandyan kinship. The pattern of inheritance, the 
pattern of marriage, the closeness of kingroup endogamy 
and the position of women all vary as between different 
economic classes and as between different castes. But 
among all groups, rich and poor, high caste and low, 
kinship is recognized in all lines through all links.
The sister*s husband*s brother may be just important
a relative as the father’s brother".
3, Hayley, 155* Derrett, Kandyans, 110.
4. Tambiah, Laws and Customs of the Tamils of Ceylon, 93»96.
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son and daughter. SI of the first family (FI) would marry 
his mother1 s brother1 s daughter who would bring dowry from 
her family (F2). SI would contribute his share of the 
ancestral property# S2 of F2 would marry D3 who would bring 
dowry from F3> S2 contributing his share in the ancestral 
property# S3 would marry D1 of FI. The consequence would be 
that the property of a family would potentially belong to 
all descendants of all the families of the kinship group 
and would in fact be circulating within the kinship group. 
Even where cross-cousin marriages were not followed or where 
such marriages were not advisable, e.g# because the family 
of the partner to be married had become impoverished or 
because there was no marriageable partner, marriages would 
take place with affinal relations who were of equal status 
so that kinsmen by marriage and descent became often the 
same.'*" Marriages were thus concluded with the aim to retain
kinship ties between people of comparable wealth and ritual
2
status.
1. Yalman, op#cit#, 92. The author points to the fact that 
the SinhaieseT"do not use separate terms for these kinsmen 
by marriage and descent and continues that "this reflects 
the fact that most marriages are between persons already 
related by descent; relations are thus constantly turned 
into relations by marriage"# According to Yalman the 
kinship group is recognized by outsiders as ’one people1 
(eka munissu) or fone family * (eka pavula), and is consid­
ered to have fone blood1# Compare the similar concept of 
sapipdaship in the Mitaksara, below, 151 The two 
components of the unity of the pavala were thus according 
to Yalman equal ritual status, a concept implying descent 
from a common ancestor, and co-operation which stems from 
the obligation inherent in marriage alliances.
2. Yalman, op#cit., 93*
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In a settled society based on agriculture and 
observing the custom of endogamous marriages, the possession 
of land was considered especially valuable. The land which 
was received by a couple as a dowry and as an advancement 
to the son would be eventually form the property with the 
help of which the couple would set up their own descendants. 
The ancestral property was a kind of guarantee that the 
marriage bonds would be continued and the families connected 
by marriage must have had some residual interest, because 
the property of the couple might also in part become their 
descendants1 property. In default of descendants of the 
couple , the property might even revert to relations by 
marriage in the absence of near agnates of the husband 
The requirement of consent by relations by marriage for an
alienation is evidenced in Sinhalese and Tamil customs and
2
numerous South Indian inscriptions. The effect of cross 
cousin marriages, or in any case of the continuous inter-
1, See Derrett, Kandyans, 130, for the succession scheme,
2, See Derrett, Kandyans, For the_right of preemption for 
relations ( jnati, sapi^as, and bandhavas}, neighbours 
and creditors see the texts of Vyasa, Bharadvaja,Bph,, 
Katyayana and other cit, in the Vyavaha.ra-nirg.aya, 355ff» 
See on the topic Derrett, Adyar LibrV Bull,, 2 3  (1961) 
13-27 and Univ, of Ceyl, Rev,,' 19(1961) 105-116 where 
the texts are cited in transl. The kinship group could 
thus prevent landed property from being transferred to 
outsiders•
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marriage within the kinship group would effect that property 
which went out by marriage would return by marriages and 
would be held by the agnates or was in any case under their 
control* New acquisitions by a couple or an individual 
might also be utilised in the setting up of descendants, but 
it might also be inherited by relations by marriage. The 
result was that because relationship was traced through all 
lines and all links a concentric circle of relations had an 
illdefined mutual and varying interest in the estate which 
consists of property derived from the father’s paternal 
ancestors and the mother’s dowry plus acquisitions.
This is, essentially, a very different picture from 
the semi-nomadic concept of the family which we attribute 
to the ancient Aryans,
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Chapter V
The Family as Reflected in Early Medieval Legal Texts 
I • Preliminary Remarks *
In the present chapter we intend to trace the main 
currents of the exposition and interpretation of the Smrtis 
in early medieval commentaries and digests, especially with 
reference to the meaning of and acquisition and enjoyment 
of dava within differing patterns of families; the interests 
of non-sharers in the family property; the concept of 
sapindaship etc* This discussion will lead us in the subse-
IT. Types of Families;
Elementary and Extended (Patrilineal) Family*
The elementary family is frequently contemplated in 
early medieval legal texts and is also reflected in inscrip­
tions* In the North, though agnatic kinship prevailed, the 
elementary family, at least amongst brahmanical communities, 
appears to be perpetuated in the traditional tendency that 
after the completion of Vedic studies one should marry and
quent chapters to the diverging views on the concept of dava
with their implications and to the diverging doctrines
advanced by Jimutavahana and his followers in Bengal and by
\
r j .  /
the authors led by Vijnanesvara*
install one's own house-fire. Medhatithi, who wrote approxi-
between 825 and 900 A.D* , enjoins a father to equip a son,
Kane, HDh. X, 275.
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who has duly observed his duties and has acquired the know­
ledge of the Veda, with a share of the paternal property in 
order to facilitate him to enter the householder's stage*
Medhatithi stresses that a father should go begging for
property in order to get his son married, if there is no 
1
property* Such rules, as can be presumed, envisage a
traditional, orthodox, brahmanical elementary family of
which we find traces in Dharmasutras, Grhyasutras, and some 
2
Smrtis , rather than merchant or agricultural families* 
Amongst merchants the preservation and joint exploitation 
of common assets, including ancestral property, and amongst 
agricultural landowning families the value of land, espec­
ially the inherited land, would be characteristic features* 
Here we would also find that women have limited "Wights and 
are confined to maintenance* In Brahmanical families, 
especially among poorer families}little property could be 
expected to pass out of the family and there was consequently 
no harm of women being heirs•
That the completion of Vedic studies and the capacity 
of performing the sacrifices of a householder are considered
as an entitlement for partition is also evident from several
1 • £ —On Manu 5»3» Jha1s ed., 2, 205 5 •••grhita-vedah pitra _
k|'ta-vibhago garhasthyaip pratipadyate, nirdhanasyanadhikarat/
yadi tu pita nirdhanas-tada aantanikataya dhanam arjayitva
vivahayet/ Tr. Jha, II, i ,l6 •
^ See above, HI ^
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1
passages in Apararka. Haradatta, a southern author of
. 2
ca. 1100 A • D • would make the capacity and desire for per­
forming sacrifices separately another * time of partition*
-  3
besides the usual grounds stated e.g. by Narada.
The sastric condition of the permission for the son to 
establish a separate household, namely the completion of 
Vedic studies, does not imply that amongst communities where 
Vedic studies were not common, a partition during the life­
time of the parents would not occur. As we have indicated 
in the preceding chapter, the elementary family prevailed 
in South Indian custom, that is, on marriage the sons would 
establish their separate households.
From inscriptional material it appears that in many
kcases father and sons were holding property separately.
On Yajn. 2, 11^(719)* J£esthasya yad-anujailj sahavibhakta-
dhanatvaip ucyate, tat-te§aifi madhye kai^cid-adhyetavye vede 
sati dra§£avyam/adhita-vede§v-adhigata-vedarthe§u cagnihotrady- 
anusthana/^-samarthe§u ca vibhago eva ^reyan/ "When undivided­
ness of the younger brothers is mentioned, it is meant that 
some of them have yet to study the Veda. If they have 
completed their study of the Vedas and have comprehended 
their meaning and if they are capable of performing sacrifices, 
like the acnihotra. then partition is preferable”. The point 
is repeated in the comment on Yajn.2,117(722): agrrhita- 
vedatvamjkpi hy-avibhage karanam/.
2 Kane, HDh. 1,351.
3 — —Nar.13,3; cit. above, Haradatta in Divata on Ap.2l4,l
C233; Dh .K• 1 l64]J : • • • yada putraijaifi prthak prthak dharmanu|^hane 
^akti-^raddhe bhavatah so'pi kalah/ *'lf the sons have faith 
and capacity to perform religious rites, this is also a time 
of partition". The text of course does not in itself author­
ize sons to demand partition at such a time.
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In a grant recorded in the Torkhede inscription of* Govinda 
III. (A.D. 813) shares in lands were assigned to individual 
family members living in an aerahara village,thus to a 
father, his sons, to brothers and to a person who is stated 
to have given the share assigned to him to his daughter*s 
son. Cit. in A.B. Altekar, The Rash^raku^as and Their Time. 
339; £.1. Ill, 54. Cp. also I •A .. VII, 303. In the 
Bendeg£rfL grant of Krishna dated 12^9 A.D. eight cases of 
brothers and two of sons occur who are assigned shares 
separately. I •A. XIV,69• The Paithan plate of Ramacandra 
dated 1271 A.D. in l.A. XIV, 315: a father living separately 
from his six sons and four cases of brothers living 
separately.
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The well-known inscription from Managoli in the Bijapur
District (dated II78 A.D.) codified, in a grant to all
members of the village irrespective of caste, the order of
succession to a person dying without sons in the following
manner: his wife, daughter, divided parents, divided elder
and younger brothers, their children, ... and any kinsmen
and relatives of the same gotra who might survive, should
take the possession of all his property, such as bipeds,
quadrupeds, coins, house and field •••(assignment to temple).
Nevertheless these references should not create the
impression that the elementary family as a property-holding
unit was in existence exclusively. Amongst commercial
communities the dictum in the Smrtis that by separation one
would gain spiritual merit was hardly an incentive to
separate. Reliance on and joint exploitation of assets
would be characteristic of such families and the jointness
in status of the males would avoid the control of the property
by females and postpone their rights as heiresses or sharers
2
of the property. In the North the patrilineal joint
1 £■!»< V, 26 ; Cl•3021••.Manigavalliyal=aputrikaru sattar= 
appa<J=avara dvipa - Ci.31 :3 di chatuhppadi £chatushpadi3 _- 
dhana-dhanya-gri(gri) lia-kshetrav»emb=initumam=atana stri- 
mukhyar-agi Mragusu makkalu Cl .32:1 vibhakiar=ada tayi-tamde 
annatammatiidir=avara makkalum a...gilu jnati gotra. • •
CpI Yajff. 2,135-6.
2 See J.D.M. Derrett, "Hindu Law in Goa: A contact between 
Natural, Roman, and Hindu Law". ZVR. 67 (1965) 203-236, at 
207 f.
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family held together by the agnatic bond of sapindaship was 
contemplated in pure vyavahara context as distinct from the 
grhastha rules which would make a separate housefire and 
thus separate property necessary; the father, except in 
special cases, had the sole authority as regards the ques­
tion whether there should be any partition or not. Thus 
Laksmidhara cites e.g. Katyayana: "A father is independent,
but (the son) whose father is living, the brother (whose 
elder brother is living), the brother*s son, a younger member
who is unseparated, a slave and menial (are dependent)11 • *
2
The * coextensive ownership* between father and son resulted,
if we understand LaksmTdhara correctly, in the father*s being
3
prohibited from dividing the property in unequal shares•
There is no evidence in the Krtva-kalnataru to show that a 
son could divide the property over the head of the father, 
except in circumstances contemplated in the Smrtis.
 ^ S ’1.466 (Krtvakal.. 275); cp • Narada 4,31 and 32; 33-7
(Krtvakal.,2^47} 
o *
See supra,T?[^
Krtvakal.. 632; according to a gloss by Candesvara in 
the Vivada-ratnakara the result was the prevention of gifts 
by the father according to his choice. P.463*
H • Sapindaship: Marriage. Inheritance.
(l) Marriage and Sapindaship.
This subject is closely discussed by all medieval authors
who are generally disinclined to acknowledge the validity of
marriages within the prohibited degrees of relationship laid
down in the Smrtis• Yet the custom of cross—cousin marriages
was so inveterate that some sastric writers concede it as a
de^acara. a custom applicable only in the areas where the
practice was established. Northern authors refuse to accept
the validity of the custom or would not permit as applicable
in the North, though it occurred there in practice as well.
Medhatithi held the custom to be unauthoritative because it
1 -was asrainst the Smrti. Laksmidhara would allow such a
Z *
marriage only as a desacara. but holds that the prohibition
2
would apply elsewhere. Haradatta appears to support cross­
cousin marriages - its justification, as he says, being
based on one's predilection rather than on the necessity of 
3 _
a Vedic text. In the Anararka the possibility of marriages
On Manu 2 , 18; see Jha's tr., I, i, 232-3 * where Medh. 
also gives one(dubious)reason how the custom could arise.
2
Krtva-kal.. 21. Ibid., Grhastha-kanda. Introd., 22.
_  • * • O
On Ap.-dh.su. 1,4,12,11 (71)s yatra tu piity-upalabdhitah 
pravrittir na tatra sastram asti Haradatta: yatra tu pitrso 
asjfesuta-matula-suta parinayanadau/prity-upalabdhitah 
pravrttir na tatrotsannapajhara sastram-anumiyate, priter 
eva pravrtti-hetoh sambhavat // 11 //.
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within the prohibited degrees or within the same gotra is
1
refuted, though after a lengthy discussion.
(2 ) Inheritance.
In the North, where agnatic kinship was especially 
strong, sapindaship was mainly associated with offering of 
pindas to agnatic ancestors. The agnatic bond of sapinda-
*  O * 9
ship comprised three generations in ascent and three genera-
2
tions in descent from a particular person. The differing 
attitudes in these sastric texts are probably related to 
the fact that kinship system of the dominant groups and 
castes in the contemplation of authors from the South differed 
from those which northern authors had in mind. This induced 
some of the southern writers to accommodate southern customs, 
whereas the *orthodox-sastric* authors could better afford 
to follow Smrtis which adhered to the strict agnatic exo- 
gamous kinship system. We have seen that the custom of 
cross-cousin marriages or repeated endogamous marriage bonds 
existed in the South. Here the relations by marriage had 
pervasive 'interests1 in one's property. We have also indi­
cated that this system differed from the agnatic patrilineal 
exogamous family system which we attribute to the Smrtis.
The references which we have given above indicate that the 
establishment of the northern sastric patrilineal family 
was not ubiquitous and uniform.
1 on Yajn. 1, 53 (82-4).
2
Medh. on 5*60 is the basic passage.
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III. Acquisition and Enjoyment of Dava.
(l) Acquisition of ancestral (grandpaternal) Property.
Northern authors followed the concept that Property,
its acquisition and enjoyment was solely deducible from the
sastra (sastraikadhigamva)• The best-known exponent of this
view was the author of the Smrti-sam.graha who is commonly*
identified with King Bhoja, known as Dharesvara (Lord of
—  —  1 —Dhara)• But the question arose whether dava would include
any asset acquired by popularljr recognized means or whether
the acquisition of dava had to be gathered from the /astra.
2
whereby in view of Gautama’s text , ownership could arise 
only as riktha, i.e. after the death of the father and 
equivalent causes of extinction of right or on account of
_ 3
samvibhaga, i.e. when the father, or even the eldest son 
after the death of the father would choose to divide. We 
have seen in the preceding chapter that in customary law 
a circle of family members and especially the descendants 
had a claim on the property on account of their relationship 
Ownership arose not merely on death or on partition in the 
case of sons, but their right in the property preceded the 
death of the father and existed independently from partition 
especially in the case of ancestral immoveable property.
1 Kane, H Ph. X, 275ff.
See above •
3 See Manu, above
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In accordance with these sastrically undocumented notions
there arose a theory advocated by Mimamsaka philosophers
that ownership is not only deducible from the sastra but
that acquisition as a legal concept was laukika. 1 secular*,
or loka-siddha. 1 secularly established, established by the
1
lay public in actual usage *. Thus it was possible to account
for the fact that as soon as a son was born, he was felt to
have some claim on the ancestral (grandpaternal) property
or even in the father's self-acquired property• The Northern
'orthodox* authors felt the difficulty in the interpretation
of those sastric texts which speak of the 'coextensive
ownership' of the father and son in grandpaternal immoveable
2
property. Manu, as we have seen , apparently refers at one 
place to recovered ancestral property as not partible by the 
father, implying that normally ancestral property has to be 
divided among sons. Medhatithi discusses this passage 
closely. Partition, he says, is preceded by existing pro­
prietary right (svtatua) but nevertheless the father can 
dispose of paternal property in mortgage, sale etc. for
3
religious purposes or support of the family. We see that
1 / —  —On the disquisitions about Property being a as traikadhieamva
or laukika. see J.D.M. Derrett, ,fThe Right to Earn in Ancient 
India", JESHO, 1 (1957) 66-97.
^ Above
7 _ _ _
On Manu 9»209 (Oh.K.1213b): svatva-purvakatyad-vibhagasya/ 
bandha-krayadi-kriyasu pitr-dhanary jata-putre^a na niyoktavyam/ 
yoga-kutumba-bharanadau tu viniyogo dar^italj/ •
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Medhatithi was aware of the popular notion that the son's
birth tends to restrict the father's power in so far as he
was not supposed to use the property for purely personal
purposes. He admits that sons may in practice or according
to custom divide the ancestral property by force and concedes
that if the son does enforce a partition against the father's
will, ownership (stfamva) exists, yet if property is acquired
1
m  this way, it would be impure. Therefore if there is 
some other expedient, the father is not to be asked to
divide, as the son would be acting against dharma. Thus it
appears that Medhatithi sees the solution of the problem 
from two angles: a father acting within dharma and not
prejudicing the maintenance of the family has to set up in 
life a son(who is qualified)for which purpose he might even 
have to go begging. On the other hand a son acting within 
dharma would not ask for partition. This also appears from 
his remarks which follow his discussion referred to above:
1 — __ _ _ _ - — .
On Manu 9^209 LDh.K.1213b, 12l4aj: acare casyam-avasthayara
putranam svamye pitra ca'kamena vibhaktan iti nindadar^anad- 
balad-vibhajayantalj. papa ity-anumiyate/ ^atha'sateratigrahepa 
bhavati svamyaig, do§as tu purusasya, tenanvayagatam itidrsam- 
a^uddham eva/.
2 —  —  —  —Ibid.: atah sambhavaty-upayantare na pita arthaniyah/
adharmo hi tatha syat/ - There could be righteous and 
unrighteous properties (dharmadharma-svatvani) according to
Laksmidhejra, Krtyahal., firhastha-kanda, 259*
« ~  6 —     •   —
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"Even self-acquired property is to be divided when the father
1
knows that the sons are qualified”. The special reference 
to self-acquisitions of the father seems to suggest that 
Medhatithi does not want to view the question of the son’s 
right in ancestral property separately from the son's right 
in the father's self-acquisitions, and that he views all 
property, grandpaternal as well as self-acquisitions of the 
father as all belonging to the father. In other words the 
distinction between the two categories is not of such impor­
tance to him. A right to ask partition was not recognized 
and the rights of the son amounted in effect to an equal 
share in the ancestral grandpaternal property at a partition. 
This is also the opinion expressed by Dharesvara, as cited 
by Jimutavahana•^ The endeavours of Medhatithi to check the 
customary belief in the rights of the son arising by birth 
does not hinder his utilising the concept in contexts where 
the reference would not directly endanger the father's right. 
Medhatithi even cites incidentally an anonymous text which
declares that 'the son becomes the owner of the property
A
as soon as he is born*. The purpose of the citation of the
1 I I
Ibid.: sva^am-arjitam api dhanam adhikara-praptan-gunavathh 
putran jnatva vibhaktavyam eva/,
2 Ibid.
^ Davabha.ga. 51» Colebrooke's tr. , II, 15 •
^ On Manu 9i212 C Dh.K.15^^b]: yat uktam 'samutpanne vacyalj 
svami'ti/«
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text by Medhatithi was to oppugn the argument that on the
death of a reunited brother his share could not accrue to a
unreunited uterine brother, because the death of a brother
is not shown to be the time of the acquisition of the
property deriving from the father, Medhatithi holds that
property is 'by birth* insofar as it would entitle the sons
to the property - in the light ofsastra which constitutes a
kind of superimposed corrective - as soon as the father is
dead so that a uterine brother would have a claim to the
reunited brother's share in preference to a non-uterine
1
half-brother. But though the son's ownership is by birth
according to Medhatithi, the sons are a^nija during the
2father's and mother's lifetime.
Elsewhere Medhatithi also presupposes that ownership
3
arises on partition, i.e. the receiving of a share. His 
discussion on this point reveals that he holds that the 
Gastric provisions on the modes of partition of the father's 
property, if transgressed by one of the brothers, do not 
prevent his ownership in the property taken in excess. 
Similarly, he says, as theft creates ownership. But obviously 
Medh. would consider such property as impure, whereas pure 
property can only be acquired with reference to the sastric 
modes of partition.
 ^ On Manu 9,212*
2 Ibid.
3 Manu 5,110 ( ; tr. 3,i,136f.)
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According to Visvarupa, a Southerner, who wrote ca. 
800-825 A.D. ownership in ancestral grandpaternal property 
arises not from partition, but precedes partition* This in 
fact anticipates Vijnanesvara's proposition that ownership 
of the son in respect of ancestral grandpaternal property 
is by birth* But Visvarupa does not establish this expressly 
and it does not seem that he believes that the son has 
ownership by birth in respect of the father's self-acquired 
property. He refutes the three objections which were 
levelled at his proposition: These were: when property is
held in common between father and the son, the Vedic injunc­
tion to perform sacrifices with one's own wealth would not 
be possible to obey as soon as a son is born. Moreover the te
—  A /
text of Yajnavalkya which leaves the mode of partition open
3
to the discretion of the father would be superfluous. And 
lastly, one cannot say that a sacrifice could be performed 
with the permission of the son, as one just born cannot give
permission. But Visvarupa takes Yajnavalkya's text 'bhurya
_ _ __ / — o
pitamahopatta•••/•• • sadrsam svamyam pituh putrasya cobhay$toh(
as proof that svamva exists before partition. The text 
which provides for the discretionary power of the father at 
partition relates in his eyes to self-acquired property of
* Kane, HDh. I, 263*
2 _ ^
Proemium to Yajn. 2,122=2,124 according to the Trivandrum
Skt. Ser. ed., 244.
^ 2,115=2,118 acc. to Visvarupa.
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the father which is his property and facilitates the sacri­
fice with one's own property. Alternatively a partition
would procure the necessary separate property needed at the 
1
sacrifice•
Aparaditya does not hold that ownership in ancestral
property arises on partition. The result would be, he says,
2that ownership could be established by force. In fact
according to this author grandpaternal property is sadharanam
•  *  "
dhanam for father and son as soon as the son is born. But 
what about the Vedic injunction that Vedic sacrifices have 
to be performed with one's own wealth? Three alternatives 
are suggested: the father can perform with the consent of 
the son, or he may separate the son, or lastly, he may
3
acquire property for this purpose.
(2) Separation of Status between Father and Son.
The Concept of Paratantrva.
The references to Visvarupa and Aparaditya also clearly
disclose that a father could separate the son from himself
* P^245:«** tat svayam-arjitenapi tat-siddherna kincit/ 
tadanim eva va vibhajyanusthanam astu/ ya tvicchaya vibhaga— 
smrtih sa svayam-upatta-dravya-vato drastavya// atah svatve 
sati vibhaga iti siddham//l24//.
2 —  / * *  mm mm —
On_Yajnf. 2,121 C7291 s yadi ca vibhagah svamitve hetus- tada 
hathadina kriyamano'pi taj-janayet/.
3 -*Ibid.: na hi jata-putrasya dhane svamyam-apaiti, yena
svadhana-sadhyartha^ s'rutayo virudhyeran/yady-api tad-dhanaip 
svasya putrasya ca sadharanam tatha'pi putranumatya putra- 
vibhaga-prthak-karanena dravyantararjanena va j^akyata 
eyagnihotradi kartum/.
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and terminate the son's further claims in the property of
the father. Medhatithi shows that until partition or until
the son has established his own household the son's position
is characterised by paratantrva« 'non-independence' with
reference to all assets. After partition the son is inde-
1
pendent in respect to his self-acquired property. Whether 
a son will be completely free in respect to the property 
assigned by the father is, however, another question.
Haradatte e.g. would give the parents a right to recall 
property to secure their maintenance.^
(3) The Right in Self-acquisitions of the Father.
Visvarupa and Aparaditya tend to consider the self­
acquisitions of the father as a category distinct from the 
grandpaternal property and serving the father's own direct 
individual purposes; the father is not compelled to make
partition or any arrangement as regards the mode of division
■5
of that property. The co-extensive right of the father and
^On Manu 8,163 (vol.2, 154): putrasyapi yat-pitari paratantryam
tad-pjpthak-kytasya tad-grhe nivasatah/ yada tu pit^-vibhakto
dhanaip svayam-ar j it avails-tada "Grdhvaip tu soda^ad-varsat-
putram mitravadacaret11 iti svatantryam eva/.
2 -  —  —  —On Ap. -dh.su. 2,6,14,1 ( ): vibhagat-urdhvaip pitror-
jlvanabhave putra-bhagebhyo grahyam ity-uktam bhavati/
C p. the provision of the Tesavalamai. above,
« »  _  ^  * *  _
Visvarupa on Yajn. 2,114 (=118) ( ): ne putraih pita
vibha^am visesa-niyamam va Korayitavya ity-e.i?thah/
I*
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son in grandpaternal property confines the father’s exclu­
sive ownership to the property acquired by himself. Medhati­
thi, as we have seen, views grandpaternal property and the 
father’s self-acquisitions as primarily the father's estate. 
The distinction between the father's self-acquisitions and 
grandpaternal property suggests that sons were contemplated 
as leaving the father's house taking a share of the grand­
paternal property whereas the father retains his own 
property, which is in fact exemptible at partition. The 
concept of the family differs from that contemplated by 
Medhatithi where the question of self-acquisitions of the 
father would not arise in so many words, as in fact the 
whole property tends to belong to the father exclusively.
In the Apararka and Balakrida the equal ownership of 
the father may be described as converging on the grand­
paternal property which constitutes a common fund. The 
method of treating self-acquisitions of the father separately 
from the ancestral grandpaternal property may be explained
in terms of customary law as referred to in the preceding 
1
chapter. The text of Brhaspati which says that the father
need not divide his self-acquisitions is understandable in
2
the same light. The concept is an elementary family, the
father rather a manager than a patriarch. The sons leave at 
1
See above, W
2 —  —  -
See above , 170,]57f. Cited as Katyayana's in the Apararka ,*71° •
marriage and the father or rather the parents remain con­
fined to the father*s self-acquisitions* The rules on 
exemptions, applicable in the patriarchal family only among 
sons, apply in this family to the father as well. Aparaditya 
says in a passage which deals with the exemption of self­
acquisitions at partition: 11 Among those undivided in estate 
property in excess of another acquired by one member without 
the detriment to the paternal estate and without living on 
it, by oneself, whatever is received from friends, what is 
received from the father—in—law and the like at marriage,
mm mm 4
with that the dayadas have no connection”. In another
passage Aparaditya shows what constitute self-acquisitions
of the father: property acquired by the father without living
on the property of the grandfather.2
(3) Joint Acquisitions: Apararka.
In the Smrtis acquisitions made by the brothers became
either the property of the father who, however, was under
the obligation to distribute the property equally^ or, in
1 —  ^ —— — —— ———— ——————— — — —— —
Yajh* 2,119 =_2,118 (723)2 avibhakta-dhananam madhye 
yena pitr-dhanasyavirodhenanupaghatenanupajIvanena svayam- 
ekakinaiva yad-anyad adhikatp dhanam—arjitam, yac—ca maitrarp 
mitradavaptam, yac-codvahikam-udvahe ^va/uradibhyo labdhara, 
n — tad-dayada—sambandhi bhavet/ na tad-vibhajaniyam/kim 
tuparjakasyaiva tad-ityarthah/.
2 —  *
Yajn^ 2,121 C7283: etat-pitamaha-dhananupajivanena
pitary-uparjite drastavyam/.
3 * *Manu 9»215; see above,151 •
<r ' 
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any case, such property became common property between the
_  _  i
davadas and was to be divided equally. A son not actively 
participating in the acquisition of property and its preser­
vation or acting fraudulently, could be separated by the 
father with a symbolic portion of the new acquisitions.
This is to prevent future disputes with that son and his 
children. This would, however, not prejudice the son’s 
right to an equal share of the nucleus consisting of the
father's property including other, e.g. the grandfather’s
2property. The disadvantage for the sons was that the
title to property was acquired by the father who could divide
3it unequally. But Aparaditya further contemplates the 
possibility that brothers remain united and acquire property 
jointly, which would occur mainly amongst commercial communi­
ties. He remarks: "If some property has been acquired by
all (the davadas who are undivided) having regard to each 
other [or: intending mutual benefit, with the intention of
1 — vYajh. 2,120; see above,151.
2 —  —  )On Yajn. 2,115a (719)s*** £0 va dhanarjana-samartho pi
sathaya dhanasyarjana-faksananukufam ce^ta& na Kurute,
tasmai kirpcid-asaram-alpakaig dhanarp datttfa pit^a psrthak-
kriya karya/anyatha tena tat-santatya va vivadah flyat/
putrailj sambhuyarjite dhane^etat/ pitradi-ahane tu samam -
amsam labhat^eva/.
^ See comment on Yajn. 2,ll6b (720).
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promoting each others* welfare, having each others' welfare 
in mincQ , it should be divided equally among them".* In a 
subsequent passage Aparaditya indicates that without separat­
ing from their father, brothers may acquire property of 
their own, e.g. carrying on independent business without 
detriment to the father's assets, and are then entitled to 
hold property so acquired within the framework of the larger 
family of undivided davadas. If a partition takes place the 
brothers would be exclusively entitled to their joint 
acquisitions. The context in which this question is dealt 
with is the right of the widow, whose right to the property
held jointly by her husband and brothers is expressly exclu- 
2
ded. That the widow has no claim to the joint acquisitions
of brothers is reiterated in the interpretation of Isankha-
Likhita's text which had assigned the property of a sonless
person to brothers, the parents, and then to the eldest
3widow of the propositus. Aparaditya's treatment of reunion
1 Al
On Yajn. 2,120 (726f.): ••.sarvesam paraspara-sapeksanam
artharjane sati samo vibhagah karyah/.
2 Yajn, 2,135f.(73&): tatripi cai^a vyavastha yadi tad- 
bhratrbhih sva-pitr-dhanupaghatena sarabhuya/saniutthanena 
dhanam-arjitam, tada pitrolj sad-bhave'pi bhratara eva dhana- 
grahiijah/ yada tu pitr-pitamahady-uparjitam dhanam, tada na 
bhratrna& dhana-bhagitvaiy kintu pitror^iti/ "Here the following 
conclusion seems reasonable; if brothers have acquired pro­
perty with joint efforts (almost:in partnership) without 
detriment to their father's property, then, even during the 
existence of the parents, the brothers alone obtain title to 
those assets. But if the property was acquired by the father 
or grandfather, then the brothers are not entitled to distri­
bute it, but the parents".
P.744:... tat-pitr-dhananupaghatenarjitaCa^Jvibhakta- 
dhanesu bhrat|'gu drastavyam/ atadrsa-bhratr-bhave ca pitarau 
jyestha va patjai/
ZZ
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is also influenced by commercial considerations of a kind
of partnership between the brothers, because each of the
reuniting brothers acquires an interest in the acquisitions
proportionate to the property brought into the common fund
1
at the time of reunion. By jointness through reunion the 
deceased person’s right would accrue to uterine brothers 
(reunited or unreunited), sister, widow, daughters, parents, 
Aparaditya considers the rules on reunion as a qualification 
to the rules which would allow the wife, daughter and
3
parents to succeed to the property of a person dying sonless.
(4) The Right to Partition,
A corollary of the attitude to consider the father as a 
manager is the right of the son to ask for partition in 
respect to ancestral property. Whereas Visvarupa does not 
mention this right explicitly, Aparaditya states it unambig­
uously: "In the grandpaternal property, the grandson has
coextensive ownership. Therefore, even against his own wish, 
the father must divide his fatherfs property at the son's 
desire. There should be equal division; there cannot be
li
unequal division as in the case of self-acquired property."
On Yajn* 2,138-9t7^73* vibhaktasya dhanasya vibhaktenaiva 
dhanantarena misranarp samsr^tam tadvan-samsrsti , . • • / £7^*8] : 
...tena samsarga-samaye tadiyam yavad-dhanam samsrstam 
vibhaga-samaye tad-anusarenaiva bhagam labhate/,
O
P.7^8* Cp. the text of Brhaspati, above,
3 p.747.
A « ^ «gp
On Yajn. 2,121 L7283: pitamaha-dhane pautrasya svapitra 
tulyaip svamyam, tena vibhagam-anicchannapi pita sva-pitr-
dhanaip putra-vibhagecchaya vibhajet/ samasca vibhago na 
svSr j ita-dhanavad vis amah kairyah/ .
 ^e> y
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IV. DEFINITION OF OSYA.
The definitions of dava given by early commentators 
reflect the different opinions on the manner in which pro­
perty was owned by the family* One of the characteristic 
features of the family in the North was, as we have seen, 
the agnatic bond of sapindaship. The agnatic members of a 
family which were undivided were called sanindas and simul-
4 C
taneously davadas * The property was to be managed by the 
eldest living male ascendant, that is, he had to employ the 
property, especially the ancestral property, for the spiritual 
and material benefit of all members of the family and had to 
provide for the 'maintenance1 of the deceased ancestors.
He had to preserve the property, especially the ancestral 
property, to facilitate the enjoyment of it for future gener­
ations. The ’ownership 1 or ‘management* of the property was 
adjusted to patriarchal principles, and the next eldest male 
descendant became on account of his birth ipso facto the next 
owner of the property. A father and head of the family 
could, if he wished, separate one or some of his sons and 
these would be eventually in the position of co-owners with 
their sons, the apportioned property being ancestral grand­
paternal property. Ancestral property and self-acquisitions 
of the father were viewed as ’paternal* property which 
included accretions like self-acquisitions of the sons, and 
property acquired with the help of the paternal property.
i’U
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The brothers could set aside self-acquisitions at a parti­
tion. An early definition shows that dava is the ‘paternal* 
estate: pitryam jnati-dhanam va/- "Father's property, or the 
property of a relation (Magnate). The implications of the 
concept of sadharanam which are reflected in a right to 
share the ancestral grandpaternal property and in the idea 
of sapindaship being congruent to dayadaship, made the son
2
in practice a ‘quasi-owner* of the property of the father.
Authors like Medhatithi refuse to recognise the implications
of this notion and rely on the text of Gautama giving the
traditional times of partition. Medhatithi says that dava
stands for property obtained by descent which implies that
all property has to be first the father*s before it can
3become the son's property. Dava according to this author 
is also property 'which is given' by the father to the son 
after the latter has acquired the knowledge of the Vedas, 
that is dava does not belong to the son a priori and is a
*Bharuci on Manu 10,115; cit. by J.D.M. Derrett in ZVR. 64 
(1962) 15f f . at 54.
2
E.g. Medh* says on Manu 8,27 which deals with guardianship 
by the king over a minor: dayada^ svamyatrocyate. Dh.K.1951 
b. C p • also Halayudha in Abhidhana-ratnamala: davada means 
'son'. Cit. by J.D.M. Derrett, J »Ind.Hist. 30(1952) 36ff. at 
42 fn.21. The terms davada. svaml. putraT and saninda tended 
to coalesce in their connotations.
On Manu 10 ,115LDh»K. 1126bJ: daya ' nvayagatam dhanam/.
1
kind of allotment, advancement, or gift* According to the
description of dava in the Smrti-sanggaha dava includes0
2
property which has come from the father and the mother*
To describe property derived from the mother as dava would 
not create difficulty in the strict patrilineal family where 
such property would be stridhana and separate from the 
property of the agnates*
In the South the position was much more complex because 
of the simultaneous coextensive interests of the family 
members in the common property. Thus the property of the 
father was simultaneously the son's on account of his birth, 
and the wife's on account of her marriage. The wife's dowry 
was in fact part of the estate* The daughter's birthright, 
well established in customary law, as we have seen, is
-  3
recognized in principle even in the Apararka * One early
*0n Manu 3i3 ( 5 tr.H, i,l6 ): dava is divata« i*e*,
'it is given', in the sense of property given to the wife*
This explanation of dava also occurs in the Apararka where
dava is equated to bhartr-dattam. a gift from the husband*
See below, * *
2 _ _
Cit. in Sm.ca. etc. (Dh.K.ll42 a, 1142b): pitr-dvaragataiji
dravyara matp-dvaragataip ca yat/ kathitam daya-sabdena/tad-
vibhago'dhunocyate/
*T ^
On Yajn. 2,136C746J: duhitrnam putravaj-janmanaiva pitr- 
dhane svami-bhava-siddhir iti veditavyam/ But the share 
which unmarried sister receives from her brothers according 
to Yajn. 2,124 (see above, ) is expressly said not to be 
dava. This may be directed against customary notions.
writer, whom the Mitaksara followed in this respect, defined 
dava in the following manner: "That is signified by the
word dava which becomes the property of another solely by 
reason of relation to the owner.11* But such approach was 
bound to be considered as incomplete because nothing would 
be expressed by this definition about the pervasiveness and 
extent of dayadaship of sons, daughters, wives, and collaterals
- some holding that women are not davadas at all and that
-  —  2 stridhana could not be denoted by the word dava. In the
- 3Apararka dava is equated to riktha in one place , and else­
where riktha is explained as pitr-dhanam which includes, it 
is said, the property of a .inati ♦ This may refer to property 
deriving from the great-grandfather or perhaps to the pro­
perty of the mother as well whose property would be part of 
the common estate. The customary tendency to consider the 
property of the mother as part of the common estate is 
reflected in the description of dava as pitror-dhanam in
4another context in the Apararka.
*Asahaya, cit. in the Sarasvati-vilasa. Foulkes's ed., para.^ 
19 
2
See discussion in the Sar.-vil. paras. 21, 333 •
3 On Yajn. 1,51 C ? 7 l •
On Yajn. 3,227 Cl046l.
2 f 7
V. The Definition of Partition.
Whereas sastrie-orthodox authors would not feel the
necessity of defining the partition between father and son$
because sons were held not to have any right before partition,
authors who contemplated the son's ownership as pre-existent
to partition and coextensive with the father in respect to
ancestral grandpaternal property would have to offer a new
definition of partition. Aparaditya holds that partition
between father and sons or between brothers establishes
individual ownership of each of the owners of the sadharanam• »
dhanam in the share assigned to each of them, but does not
create ownership. Gautama's text refers to the fact of
1
the production of ownership in a particular share.
VI. The Rights and Position of Women within the Framework 
of the Family.
(1) Medhatithi.
The position of the wife is characterised by the
concept that 'husband and wife differ only in their bodies
2and in all functions they are entirely united*. In connec­
tion with ch.3>£ 1 *202 Medhatithi discusses the question how 
a person proceeding on a pilgrimage and travelling without
* 752: sayvibhage hi sadharaija-dhananam svaminam-ekaikatra 
bhage svamena ekaikasya svamyam vyavasthapayati, napurvam- 
utpadayati/
2
See comment on Manu 3*32.
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his wife could perform religious rites, i.e. sraddhas at
tirthas out of the sadharanam dravvam. since the wife's
association and acquiescence would not be available. The
answer is that the husband has to ask the wife's permission.
for the performance of sraddhas before he sets out for the
pilgrimage in the following words: fTI shall be spending our
2
belongings on religious performances11 •
Common property between husband and wife is the basic
3
assumption according to Medhatithi, but, as in the case of 
an elder brother being head of the undivided family, when 
the younger brothers would not be independent in the dispo­
sition, women possess as a principle uaratantrva. 'non-
1
The Indian method of stipulation follows a regular scheme. 
The proposer proposes and the opposite party assents thus: 
evam(iti).
2 —Vol. 1, 267f • : atha kevala g£hasthalj pravaset-tada bhaved
agny-abhava^i/ kintu madhyakatvad-etasya sahadhikarac ca,
bharyayani-samnihitayam, tad-icchaya abhavat katham
sadhara^asya iraddhe viniyoga^/ sadharaye hi dravye
anyataran-icchayam tyaga eva na sarpvartate/. • • pravasan
bharyam-anujnapayati "dharmaya viniyogam dravyasya karisyami"
iti/ tat-praptanujno1dhikarisyate/ Elsewhere Medh. says
that as the parents have joint authority over "everything"
(sarvatra sahadhikara) the father is entitled to give the
daughter in marriage only with the consent of her mother
(on Manu 5,150).
7 _  __
On Manu 8,163 (vol.2, 132): yatah sadharanam dhanam/
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independence * . Though women have no right to enter into 
legal transactions independently in respect of the common 
property as a general principle, they have a right to spend 
out of their own property after seeking the advice of their 
male protectors and apparently out of the common property 
for purposes known to law. The wife, the student and the 
slave possess each their own peculiar degree of non­
independence as an owner. Because property is common 
between husband and wife, the wife is also never entitled to
spend property for sacrifices etc. without the husband^s 
2 —permission. Medhatithi reconciles the Smrti-texts which
speak on the one hand that the mother lives under the protec-
3
tion of the sons after the death of the husband and on the
other hand that sons are non-independent as long as the
a.rc a b i/e ,
parents,i.e. including the mother } by referring them to 
different contexts. That is, when the son is a minor he is : 
not independent and imoliciter the mother - in the absence of
1 I
Ibid.,153 I tatha*kule jyestha*ity-upakramya 'tat-krtam tat- 
-karya-jatam nasvatantra-kfta1 m iti ca/ dhana-sadhara^ye hi 
purujgo'pi strivad-asvatantrah/ yac-chabde svamyam paratantryam 
ceti tad-viruddham-iva svamitvasyety-eta^ca vyavastheti 
yojyaqi bhavati/ paratantryaip parividheyata tad-icchanuvartitvaa 
/^adi ca paratantrah pareccham-antare^a viniyoktaip na labhete 
kidj'samasya svamyam/ atha danadhana-vikraye yatra prakrtvad- 
anisah/ sva^arire paribhogadau yavad-iccham sva-dhanain 
viniyojyate, paratantra-mahadhananai kastra-nigbhitatmanam 
dvijanam natmopabhogo bhavet/ balasyas svamya-paratantre 
upapanne/yada prapta-vyavaharas-tada Tsi^yate/evam putradav- 
api striyas-tu na kadacid-aparatantryam/-
2 —  —    f
Ibid.,153J tesu svamina ity-etad-apeksya bharya-sisya- 
dasTnatn yathasvam paratanryam/ dhana-sadhiaranat tu na bhartur- 
anujnam vina bharyaya yagadau kvacid-adhikara iti sthitara/
3
See above, •
^See above, .
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the father - would manage the property, whereas the subjec­
tion of the mother to the ?on refers to the duty of the adult
1
son to protect her property against thieves etc*
It is interesting to note that Medhatithi ultimately
envisages the wife as manageress if the husband is incapable
2
to transact business because of senility. This would, of 
course, also apply in situations, where the husband is 
otherwise incapable of acting as manager and in the absence 
or minority of male family members* Similarly Aparaditya 
envisages the mother as a ’manageress* in certain circum-
3
stances *
(2 ) Visvarupa
At a partition between father and son$, the wife of the 
father as well as widows of predeceased sons and grandsons 
are entitled to the share of their respective husbands if 
they have not received strldhana from the husband or the 
father-in-law. If they have not received stridhana they
1Xbid., 154.
2 —  —  —Ibid*,15^:••.yasya tu bhartuh stri janana karya-prabandhena
vartate taya1anujnatam-etad-bhavati/
'Z
See below,1 XX . For the quasi-managership of the widow/wife 
see Nar. Dh.K.696 and 698; Katy.5 k 5 ,578• Dh.K•713, then 8 ,167. 
See also Haradatta, referred to below,22*? * On the question 
of the wife-mother-widow as manageress in modern Hindu law, 
see below,
3/
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should receive a share equal to what the stridhana would
have been and this amount should not exceed 2,000 panas.
♦
according to the text of Vyasa which is mentioned without
name* This provision applies even when the property is very
large• When the property was small the wives would obtain
equal shares*1 Visvarupa does not allow the right of the
sonless widow to inherit from her husband. The text of
Yajnavalkya, he says, concerns a pregnant widow, the widow
thus being contemplated as a kind of trustee for the son who
2
might be born* On the death of the son who dies without
son, widow or daughter, the property goes to the mother or 
3
grandmother rather than to the parents jointly*
(3) Aparaditya
Community of ownership is evidenced in the comment on
_  ^ 4 _
Yajn. 2,32 where Aparaditya stresses that the text of
Yajnavalkya does not apply to husband and wife, as there is
1 fOn Yajfi. 2,113(2,119 according to Triv. ed.) ( )s samamsa- 
dana-pak§e pramlta-bhartrkah putra-pautra-patnyah sva- * _  
patnyasca bhartr-bhagarhah karyah yasam bhartra svasurena va 
svayam va strTdhanaip nadattam yad-va yasam strldhanam 
nadattam y©d*va=yex*ftm=at£ridhe»am tah s trldhana-samam^ika\i 
karyah/ 1dvisahasrah parodaya striya’ iti smrty-antarat-tavan- 
matram prabhuta-dhanatve*pi deyam/ svalpe'pi samamsatvenaiva/
2
Cp. Vasistha 17»4l; cited above, 135 •
•^ On Yajn. 2,135-6 (139“^0) ( ): mata ca pita ca pitarau/
sahadhikarat-tu dvandva-karanam-ekaika-praptya-artham/ 
dvandva-nirde^epi matur-eva-prathamyam/
no division between them, the wife being the owner of her
husband's property simply by virtue of her being his wife
and that hence property is common between husband and wife
and cannot be divided** The specific property of the husband
or father is, as we have seen, his self-acquisitions rather
than the ancestral property which are common to father and
sons* Consequently the sons having received a share in the
ancestral property on majority, would not be entitled in
principle to partition the property on the father's death*
(See also the comment on Yajn*2 ,I l k(719)* the sons are not
independent as long as the mother is alive)* Only on the
death of the father and mother would the sons receive the
property ('their') in equal shares* Especially when the
sons are minors the widowed mother could act as a manager
of the estate according to Aparaditya, a fact which shows
that he has a nuclear family in mind and that jointness of
the sons of the deceased with a paternal uncle is not
3
primarily visualised*
P. 654: na hi tayor-dhana-vibhago*sti, pati-dhane hi jaya
s vain ini' j ayatvad-eva/ ato dampatyoh sadharanam dhanam
aiakyam vibhaktum/ See also comment on 2,136, cited below,XLi> •
2 _ _
On Yajn. 2,117(720)1 mata-pitror-maranad-urdhvam tayor-eva
riktham-rnam ca putrah samam yavanto bhrataras-tavato
_    * « * c J  ___
bhaganpraty-ekam-anyunadhikan-rnasya dhanasya ca krtva 
bhajeran/ tata/ca yo yavantam dhanasya vibhagam/
^On Yajn** 2,114 (7*9) he quotes S^ankha (see above, 31/ ) and
adds: matuh kutumba-bharana-samarthye saty-etad/*..to
2 2 3
Consequently as soon as the sons have studied the Vedas 
and possess ceremonial competence a partition would take
__ ^  r-> 1
place and Aparaditya stresses that Yajn. 2,117 should not
be understood to lay down that partition takes place only
after both the father and mother are dead, which, we may
say, amounts to saying that the sons may partition the
property provided they secure the claim of the mother in the
2
property by giving her a share equal to that of a son.
Whereas the right of the widowed mother in the family 
property seems thus well accounted for, Aparaditya has to 
argue strenuously in favour of the sonless widow's right 
against her husband's collaterals and father-in-law. Follow­
ing Apastamba he holds that ownership of the widow arose at
marriage and cannot be obstructed by the father's and
3
brothers' ownership. The whole discussion is designed 
to contradict the views of authors who had held that the 
widow should only be allowed to take the estate of her 
husband if she submitted to nivoga. Dharesvara's opinion
^See above , i2>2. jV.l .
On Yajn. 2,117[722j: na ca pitror-urdhvam vibhajeran- 
neveti vyakhyeyam/- On the mother's (and co-widow's) shares 
see comment on Yajn. 2,123C730l.
7
On Yajn. 2,135-61746J: "p ani-grahanaddhi sahatvam" ity-
adina''pastamba-vakyena bhartr-dhane strTriam svamitvam pani- 
grahanam eva sadhayatTti vidhiyate/ duhitrnam putravaj- 
janmanaiva pitr-dhane svahii-bhave siddhir-iti veditavyam/ 
tatasca patnyatfi duhitari satyam tayoh svamitvam badhitva 
pitradi-svamitva-avidhiranena vakyena na karyah/...
e.g. was that Yajnavalkya1s text on the right of the sonless
widow applied to the widow of a separated brother who must
1
submit to nivoga in order to be entitled to the estate*
We have to keep in mind that Aparaditya presupposes separation
as the normal state of the family when he discusses the
right of the widow* He holds that according to Yajnavalkya1s
text the widow is entitled to the whole estate of her husband
which must include not only his self-acquired property but
2
also his share of the ancestral property. That a separated 
brother's sonless widow could inherit was not established
3
universally in practice, as we know from inscriptions*
The Aoararka does not expressly speak of a separated brother 
having received a share of the ancestral property to which 
the widow succeeds as well as to her husbandfs self-acqui­
sitions. This may be because he takes into account the 
possibility that the husband had acquired property while 
living separately from his agnatic relatives but dying 
undivided in respect to the ancestral property* Here the 
widow would succeed in any case to the property self-acquired 
by the husband*
Cit. in M i t . on Yajn•2,135-6(239;I »i »8 )• Bharuci had also 
recommended nivoga * See Kane, HDh. I, 266*
^On Yajn. 2 , 135-6 (7^2f . p a t n T  pitr-bhratr-sadbhave* pi 
svayam eva pati-dhanaip samagram grhnaii, patyu^ca ^raddhadi 
karoti•••tatha ya pitr-dhananupaghatena svayam-arjayitur- 
bhartulj paricaryam yathavat-krtava€T samyatendriya ca sa 
bhartuh sakalanjfeva dhanaip devere§u vidyamanesv-api g^hnati/ 
ya tu tarunyadina sarabh'avita-vyabhicara tasyaifi vidyaraanayam 
api mrtaksya bhartur-bhratr-gaiiiy-eva vittam, na tu patni-gami/
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Ep.Carn, III, Tirumakudal-narslpur 21(1222); M.A.R. 1920 
para. 77(1297); Ep.Carn., IX, Nelamangala 12 (c.1330), 
Kakanhalli 8 l (1306), Channapatna 13 (1318)* Ann.Rep. Ep. 
(Madras), no. 238 of 1926: gift by widow of some lands which 
had become hers on account of the death of her husband and 
his brothers. See Derrett, JIH. 30(1932) 35f*f* at 47 fn*39-
Property which had been acquired jointly by the
deceased with his brothers would accrue to the brothers by
survivorship, and would be divisible between the brothers
at a partition whereas ancestral property would still be
1
subject to the right of the parents to divide it.
Aparaditya also controverts the objection advanced by those
authors who held that property was destined for religious
purposes, such as the Vedic sacrifice, and that the widow,
because of her incompetence at the performance of such
sacrifices would not be entitled to the estate of her husband.
Property, he says, serves human purposes; besides sraddha-
ceremonies women are entitled to purta. i.e. meritorious
2religious acts, and they are entitled to employ the property
3
for this purpose.
It seems that a brother who was not yet separate from
his younger brother, because the latter might be still
studying the Vedas or might be a minor in any case, could
1 _  —
Ibid., 743; tatrapi caisa vyavastha - yadi tad-bhratrbhih
sva-pitr-dhananupaghatena sambhuya samutthanena dhanam-
arjita^i, tadei pitrofc sadbhave'pi bhratara eva dhana-
gr*ahinah/ yada tu pitr-pitamahadya-uparjitam dhanam, tada
na bhratrnam dhana-bhSgitvam kintu pitror iti/
2 —On the meaning of nurta see P.N. Sarasvati, The Hindu Law
of Endowments, 25ff»
^Yajn. 2 ,135-6 (742f•) See also Visvarupa on Yajn.2,144 
(Mit.= 2,140): because of the "human-purposeness11 of 
property (purusarthatvSd-dravyasya) it does not exist only 
for those who have ceremonial competence. Dh.K.1398h, 1399a.
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make gifts to his wife, or after his death his widow could
receive an annual allotment up to the value of 2,000
_ — 1 
karsa-panas according to the text of Vyasa. We are left • #
to surmise that this gift or allotment was made out of the
undivided property though perhaps only if there are no
self-acquisitions of the husband. It is said that the
woman may utilize this in an 1 irreproachable manner* but
(otherwise) according to her pleasure. If the amount taken
by the widow is to be exceeded, the consent of the husband,
of the husband*s younger brother and others with whom the
2
husband died undivided, was necessary.
(4) Haradatta
Haradatta, commenting on Apastamba, perpetuates many 
features of the traditional elementary brahmanical family 
of the early Dharmasutras• There is no reference to 
ancestral grandpaternal property and sons leave when they 
have the capacity to perform sacrifices separately. There
^See above, 1^ 3^ . •
2 ^On Yajn. 2,143 (752): praty-abdam karsa-pana-sahasra- 
dvaya-parimito dhanasyaika-deialj. paro day all striyai deyah/ 
para)? paramah/ diyata iti dayal?/ tam-imam dayam bhartr- 
dattaip va * nisiddhena margena y a t ha - lfara am devarirder- 
anuuiatim-antarenapy-apnuyat/ ato*dhike tu devaradya- 
anumatir apeksa+nTyety-arthaH-gamyate/
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1
is a community of acquisitions between husband and wife.
But though there is community of ownership there is inequality 
between husband and wife. Whereas the husband is 'inde­
pendent' and has thus free power to spend the ’self-acquired1 
property (or rather the property jointly acquired by 
husband and wife) without the permission of the wife, the 
wife has only a right to spend property for household 
purposes and may make occasional gifts in the absence of
3
her husband from home whereby she does not commit theft.
As religious works can only be performed jointly by 
husband and wife there is no need of separate property in 
the shape of a share for the wife at a partition between 
the father and sons. In fact if the sons are already 
married at partition each son and his respective wife, the 
father and mother receive each one share, though the father’s
1
On Ap.-dh.sii. 2 , 6 , 14, 16-17 ( » Dh.K.l4o6): dravya-
parigrahegu dravyarjanesv api tatha sahatvam/
2P. (Dh.K.l4o6a): etad-eva dravya-sadharanyepi dampatyor- 
vaisamyairi yat-patir-yathestam viniyunkte jaya to-etavat- 
eveti/
3  ^ ^
P. (Dh.K. ibid.): yasmad-bhartuli pravasesati
naimittike dane chindat-pani dadyad-ityadikq!dane krte bharyaya
na steyam-upadi/anti dharma-jSiah/ yadi bhartrur-eva dravyam
syat syad eva steyam/
22Sf
share may be larger. At a partition after the father’s
death the mother may receive a share equal to that of a son
according to Yajnavalkya (2,123; see above,119 •)•
Haradatta adds that the sons should control the mother in
2the spirit of the dictum of Manu which disallowed indepen-
3
dence to women.
The right of the sonless widow to inherit is also not
fully recognized by Haradatta, He states that the nearest
saninda of the deceased takes the dava. adding that the widow 
• *
should be maintained by the saninda who takes the wealth,c *
The text of Vyasa assigning to a widow 2,000 nanas as an
annual maximum is referred to and held to apply in case of
abundant wealth. The texts admitting the right of the widow
to the property of her husband (like YajSi,2 ,135) serve
according to Haradatta merely for an argument a fortiori in
securing the wife’s maintenance. He asserts that the wife
takes along with sanindas an equal share as in the case of
• «
4
a partition between sons after the death of the father,
*P, (Dh,K.ibid,): *jlvan-putrebhyah* ity anena bharyaya
bhago na dar^italj/ tatra kai^am-aha/ jayaT-patyor iti/ spastam/ 
kasmat/panityadi// k arm art ham dravyaip j'ayaya^ca na prthak 
karma-svadhikarah/ kiip tarhi sana-bhHvena’yastvaya dharmasca 
kartavyalj so’nayS saha’iti’ vacanat/ tatra kinj prthag- f
dravyeijeti/ On Ap ,-dh.su. 2,6,l4,l( ): bharyaya apyamao
na dar^itaji/ atraana evamsas tasya apiti manyate/ vaksyati 
jayapatyor-na vibhago vidyata iti/ See above, ISO , for the 
rights of the parents to recall part of the divided property 
for their maintenance,
2
,9*3; see above , fn-Z.
230
3 — — ,   _  j
P. : pitur-urdhvarg vibhajatam matapyamsam samam hared
iti/ atra coktam/ putrair eva saha vrtih syad iti/
4 —  — —On Ap.dh.su. 2,6,14,2 ( ): etad-prabhute dhane
jnatayasca na rakseyur -iti ^ankayara/ patni duhitrascaivetyadi 
(Yajn. 2,135)/ yani patnyah daya-prapti-parani tanyapi 
evam-eva drastyani//••• atra striya saha sapinda bhajeran/ 
tada strT saha tair-ekam-amsara grhniyat/
Chapter VI 
Jlmutavahana. Raghunandana. and
1• Preliminary Remarks
The persistent doctrine of the son's co-extensive
ownership over the grandfather's property prior to partition
which resulted in the doctrine that right in property arose
by mere relationship, that is in the son's case by birth,
tended to limit the father's power over the property and
xrame under attack by Jlmutavahana. He criticises openly
his predecessors who - in following their acarvas - 'did
not full comprehend the precepts of Manu and the rest’
The artful balance which e.g. Medhatithi maintained between
recognizing on the one hand the customary birthright of the 
2
son and the right of the son in the grandfather's property 
prior to partition, and on the other hand by holding that 
ownership arises on partition, was completely dismissed by 
Jlmutavahana. He favoured Smrti-texts which unambiguously 
reflect the sole ownership of the father and suggest that 
the father was uncontrolled by the son,
Colebrooke's tr. I, 1; cp. XV, if. It could not have been 
Vijnanesvara whom Jlmutavahana criticised, because the 
Davabhaga was composed before the Mitaksara* See J.D.M. 
Derrett, flThe Relative Antiquity of the *Mitakshara and the 
Dayabhaga", Mad.L.J* (1952) Iff.
2See
The concept of the family which emerges is entirely 
patriarchal, and though Jlmutavahana may have overstated 
his case, the legal framework which he worked out remained 
the basic pattern for his successors. Jlmutavahana perpetu­
ated the patriarchal notions represented in early Smrtis 
and some of the later Smrtis in which there was no question 
of the son having any legal right in the father's property 
prior to the death of the father or to partition at the 
father's desire. On the contrary Jlmutavahana does not 
only negative such rights but maintains the right of the 
father in the person and the property of the son as a 
principle•*
II. Jlmutavahana' s Davabhiaga and Raghunandana * s Davatattva.
(l) The Concept of Dava.
(a) Definition and Etymology.
— 2In the beginning of the first chapter of the Davabhaga 
Jlmutavahana defines the term dava: tataica purva-svami- 
sambandhadhlnam tat-svamy-uparame yatra dravye svatvam 
tatra nirudho daya-sabdah/- r,The word dava has become estab­
lished in current usage to signify the wealth, in which 
property dependent on relation to the former owner, arises
‘xi, i, 29.
The references are to Jivananda Vidyasafgara' s 2nd ed. and/ 
or Colebrooke's tr.
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on the demise of that owner (or: on the extinction of his
ownership )♦11 * Jlmutavahana derives the term dava from the
2
root di[ = to give and tells us that the use is metaphorical, 
as only the same (similar) consequence of a gift (dTvata = 
"what is given”) is produced by cessation of the former 
owner's right through demise or other causes of extinction, 
but not through actual abdication (tvaga). We have seen 
that dava was originally derived from the root d& = to cut, 
divide etc., reflecting the notion that the father divides 
his property during his life-time. But by the time 
Jlmutavahana composed his work, the term had long come to 
be used as the property of a living or deceased person and, 
in so far as it related to the estate of a deceased person, 
it was synonymous with riktha, a term which originally 
exclusively meant the property of a deceased person. Later 
in the 17th cent, the derivation of the term by Jlmutavahana 
was accused by Mitra Misra of artificiality and as incom­
patible with the simultaneous assumption of a technical 
3meaning•
1 P.5; tr.1 ,5 .
2 ■ —Cp. the similar explanation by Medhatithi and Apararka,
above . This explanation goes against the assumption
of a birthright of the son who would own already the
property and need not be given property.
^ Viramitrodava. kXX f.
(b) Acquisition of Dava»
Though the term signifies the property of any rela
who is next in order - this being worked out on the hei
having capacity to confer or offer spiritual benefit to! 
1 „  _
deceased - Jlmutavahana spends nevertheless much space 
____
the dayadaship of the sons indicating thereby that also;
according to him the sons occupy a central position in
continuation and preservation of the family, though thi
did not amount to actual right in the father*s property;
Jlmutavahana cites three main theories according to whi<
the sons were said to obtain rights in their father's
3 kproperty: birth , partition, and the extinction of the : 
of the father by death or other causes, or as he says, 
right may be also due to the survival of the son* Part; 
cannot be a cause, as ownership may then also arise on 
partition of the goods of a stranger and as right vests 
the death of the father without partition in the case o; 
an only son* In 1,11 he examines the possibility of ; 
‘ownership by birth' which he rejects with reference to
1 Ch. XI.
2 On the importance of descendants in the male line, so
grandson, and great-grandson, see XI, i, 31-36.
3 r* f 9*Predecessors of Vi jnanesvara, see above ,200,205^ 2/6.
^ Dharesvara, see above'J '%-b .
5 1 , 11,12.
f £ Z
11'Z
235
Manu’s text 'urdhwam pitusca natusca...1 (9,104) and Devala's
text which had laid down that there should be partition
after the father’s death and that as long as the faultless
<«- 1father is alive, the sons have no svamva. He obviates the 
idea that the son merely lacks independence, asvatantrva. 
an idea adopted by other authors who thus evaded the diffi­
culties posed by those Smrti-texts which laid down unmis­
takably the exclusive ownership of the father. The possi­
bility of svamva in case of the son is only admitted by
Jiniutavahana in respect of the self-acquired property of
2 -*■ — —the son. Jlmutavahana sees as another argument against
the theory of ’ownership by birth’ the consequence of
admitting the correctness of such a theory, namely that the
son would have to be allowed the right to demand partition
3 —against the will of the father. Medhatithi had evaded 
this logical consequence of the pre-existing right of the 
son in the grandpaternal property by holding the property 
which was acquired by forcing a partition upon the father 
as impure and the act of the son as directed as against
4dharma. But the view that svamva was created nevertheless
*See above, f30t|Mfn3
ry
1,16,17. Whereas Vi^varupa and Aparaditya had argued that 
the father may use the self-acquired property for religious 
rites, Jim. argues from the opposite point, namely the son 
must have a right in his self-acquisitions for performing 
religious rites.
^This could not have been directed against the author of the 
Mitaksara who had admitted the son’s right to partition 
against the father’s will. See Derrett, ubi cit.
4
See above, <2.^ 2, •
2#6
was not tolerated by Jlmutavahana and might have stimulated 
him to negative the son's right completely*
Then he points out that birth is not listed as a mode 
of acquisition in the literature and asserts that there is
no sastric proof that property is vested by birth alone:
  _ _  1
janmanaiva svamity-atra pramanabhavacca/
It seems here that Jlmutavahana recognizes birth as 
one of the constituent factors leading to the ownership of 
the son. It may be suggested that he also recognizes the 
strong tie between father and son, though this does not 
amount to ownership of the son according to him* The son 
is rather only the first heir in the order of succession* 
Whereas it seems from the definition of dava that he accepts 
two causes of the son's right, i.e. the birth of the son 
which he- creates the relationship between the father and 
the son + demise of the father or other causes of extinction
t
of the father's right, he shows in the following that this is
not necessarily so, perhaps because he does not want to
create the slightest impression that birth could be after
all a cause of property and perhaps because according to
2nvava the son's ownership could not have two causes.
But as birth of the son cannot be the cause of the 
son's right, can the right arise by the act of another, i.e.
1 1,19.
2 1,20.
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by the demise of the father?* Jlmutavahana refets us to
the analogy of the relation between donor and donee. Here
acceptance does not, in his view, cause ownership, but the
act of the donor, the relinquishment of his right in favour
of a sentient being causes the ownership of the donee whose
2acceptance is only a manifestation of his right. V/e may 
add, therefore, that dava was acquired at the death, by a 
person who would be ascertained with reference to the order 
of davadas. Raghunandana, writing in the l6th cent, 
elaborates on the definition offered by Jlmutavahana and
tackles Gautama's dictum which implied that 1 ownership is
5 „__ __
by birth' and which Jlmutavahana did not know of had ignored. 
Raghunandana says that it is through relationship of mere 
birth which is the cause of sonship (nutratva) which is 
stronger than any other relationship, that the son's right 
accrues at the time of the father's right and which is 
superior to the right of any other r e l a t i v e H e  stresses 
that sons have no ownership on account of G^nitama's dictum: 
"...after the extinction of the father's right, the son's 
right is effected through birth; consequently, by reason
1P.13; 1,21.
2I, 21-24.
3 -Cp. Raghunandana, Dayatattva, 3» t** I* 15-17*
L
See Kane, HDh, I, 4l8f.
5See below,
6Dayatattva, 12; Setlur's tr., 1,7*
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of ownership, the son takes the property of his father,
not, however, immediately after his birth while the father*s
1
right subsists”.
(2 ) Times and Mode of Partition,
(a) Self^acquired Property.
ilimutavahana admits only two periods of partition in 
respect of self-acquired property: the extinction of the
ownership of the father, i.e. when his ownership ceases 
due to patitva (excommunication) or nisprhatva (absence of 
worldly desires which occurs e.g. in the case of vanaprasthva)
or death, and when the property is divided with the will of
2 TT
the father. He denies that the absence of worldly regards
of the father together with the absence of the mother’s
capacity to bear children constitutes another reason for
the partition of the self-acquired property, because this
category must be partible only at the extinction of the
3
father1s right. If the absence of worldly interests were 
taken as a separate period, this would lead to the assump­
tion of four periods of partition: the demise of the father, 
his degradation, his disregard for secular objects, and his
,  .  4own choice.
^Tr. I, 14; t., p.3*
2 1 , kk.
3 x, 39. 
k _
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The text of Har’ita and Sankha-Likhita* which enjoin 
impartibility as long as the father labours under physical 
and mental disability, likewise do not justify a partition 
by the sons. Jlmutavahana notes an ferroneous* reading 
which says that if the father is incapable of business, 
partition takes place. (1 , 42,43*)
The father is also free in the method of distributing
his self-acquired property and he may distribute this in
2
unequal shares , but he may take into account good qualities
3
of a son, his numerous family etc.
(b) Ancestral Property.
The Smrti passage which makes it a pre-requisite for 
partition that the mother should be past childbearing refers
4to ancestral property according to Jlmutavahana. There
are thus two periods of partition: the death of both parents
or the will of the father + the mother being past child- 
3
bearing. The mention of the mother’s death does not refer
to the partition of the mother’s goods.^
The text of the Ya.inavalkva-smrti * bhurya-pitamahopatta
nibandho••* 1 (2 £12 acc. to Colebrooke’s tr. of the Mit.)
*Cit. above ,3^
2II? 16,17; cp.55- 
3H ,  74.
4I, 45.
5H ,  1-5,7- 
6II, 6.
refers in Jirautavahana's explanation to the case where A is
the father of B and C. The latter is survived by a son D.
Here B is not the sole owner after the death of A, as D
confers the same spiritual benefit on the grandfather in
the funeral ceremonies as B, and thus B and D share the
1
estate of A equally* The argument that property has to be
divided per capita amongst brothers and their sons if the
sons have equal ownership during the life-time of the father
is refuted in the Mitaksara with the explanation that the©
allotment takes place according to fathers; sons of a
predeceased brother take the share the brother would have got
The explanation of Yajnavalkya*s text by Dharesvara,
who had plausibly suggested that the father has to divide
the ancestral grandpaternal property in equal shares, amounts
in Jlmutavahana*s opinion to a restriction for the father
not to make an unequal distribution of the ancestral property
but does not imply * equal ownership1, as the father may
retain two shares, and there is no right to ask for parti-
3
tion on the part of the son. But we should mark here that
Jlmutavahana accepts Dharesvarq's interpretation in so far
as the father has to divide the ancestral immoveable
property, apart from the double share which he may retain,
*11, 9 ; for the rights of sons' sons see XX, 10.
^11, 11; Hit., Colebrooke's tr., I,v,l-2.
3H ,  15-19; 73.
1
equally* But in the absence of any controlling rights of 
the sons and their absence of ownership, such injunctions 
amount in effect to moral injunctions directed against the 
father* Ancestral recovered property need not be divided 
by the father, but this does not imply that the father has 
to divide the ancestral property as such; it merely means
2that he may treat it the same way as self-acquired property*
To the rule that the father has to divide ancestral
property equally amongst his sons, an exception is mentioned
on the basis of the text of Yajnavalkya ’mani-mukta- 
_ _ 3pravalanam** . ' , which indicates that the father owns and
has the power to distribute ancestral gems, pearls, and
4corals as he can in respect of his self-acquired property*
(c) Acquisitions by the Son:
Sections 65 to 73 of ch*II of the Davabhaga establish, 
by following the text of Katyayana , that if the son acquires 
property with help of the paternal property the father 
receives half of the acquisition, the son receives two 
shares and each brother one share* If the son acquires 
property without the help of the father's property, tfrsn
1  ^  •r-II, 76 and 8 3 » subject to 7^* See the comment of Srikrsna 
on 7^ •
2n ,  21.
3
See above , f •
4
I, 22 *
5 *Si*851; see above , Ikl *
2 4 2
then the father receives two shares and the brothers receive
no share•* But if the father is possessed of learning etc.
2he receives half a share* We note that unlike in the
- - — 3Anararka or Mitaksara the father’s right is not dependent
on jointness of paternal or grandpaternal property between
father and son and that a son may live separately having
received a share of the paternal or grandpaternal property»
(3) Power of Disposition of the Father*
(a) Self-acquired Property*
There is no legal restriction on the power of the father 
in respect of gifts or other alienations whether it concerns 
moveable or immoveable, or ancestral recovered property*
(b) Ancestral Grandpaternal Property.
The text of Yajnavalkya 'mani-mukta-pr^valanam 
sarvasyaiva pita prabhuh/ sthavarasya tu sarvasya na pita 
na pitamahah//^ is taken to mean that the father may alienate 
all moveable property, but not the whole of the immoveable 
property (sthavarasva sarvasva), because this forms the
5
basis of the support of the family. But the possibility 
of a transfer of a part of the immoveable property et£. is
h i ,  71.
2II, 72.
3
See previous chapter, , and below, •
4See above,
5II, 22-3.
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1
implied in the prescription not to transfer the ‘whole*.
But the father has authority to alienate even the whole
immoveable and other property if the support of the family
2
necessitates this. In the following the author deals with t^ e. 
obvious question how far these precepts based on Smrtis
9
would affect his theory that sons have no right in their 
fatherfs property before death of the father etc. or 
partition•
(c) The So-called ‘Factum Valet* Doctrine in the Davabha.ga.
The Smrtis enjoined certain rules which, as we have
seen, prohibit the alienation of all one’s own assets if
3
there was male issue , or the alienation of property which
4
is necessary for the maintenance of the family, or the
alienation of ancestral property without the consent of the
5sons, except for specific reasons where consent could be 
dispensed with. Similarly the alienation of common property 
(sadharanam or samanvam)by one of several brothers staying
jointly is prohibited without the consent of the other co-
— 7 8  0owners according to a text of Narada, Daksa, and Brhaspati.
1 •CM•*
HH 2 II , 25•
3 Yajn. 2,175; Narada 5»4.
4 Katy. 640.
5 Brhaspati, 14,5 6 See below,270 .
1
♦
Ubi cit. 8 Cit. bv Laksmidhara. Krtvakal.
9 14,2 (137; Dh.K.802a).
Danakanda.17 (Dh.K.807a). £ *
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On the exact Implications of these prohibitions the Smrtis<8
contain ambiguous references and three main schools of
1
thought emerged on the effect of these prohibitions. The 
first school consider the transaction as valid, but the 
transgressor sins and is perhaps liable to punishment, 
depending on the case. The second school hold the trans­
action voidable and the transgressor does not sin. The 
third school are of the opinion that the transaction is 
voidable and the transgressor does sin and is liable to 
punishment in an appropriate case. The views are discussed 
in Sa&karabhatta1s discussion on the topic of dattanradanikamc c*
(concerning non-delivery of gifts) in his t£harma-H Dvaita- 
nirnava.^ J^ankarabhatta holds the third opinion, whereas 
the first opinion - which represents the opinion of the 
authors from Bengal - is refuted by £>ankarabhatta.
Jimutavahana illustrates the doctrine that the infringe­
ment of the prohibitions does not invalidate the transaction, 
though the alienor sins, at the treatment of the problem 
of the alienation of common property by one of the co-owners 
who holds an undivided share in the common property which 
can occur naturally only when brothers continue to remain
See J.D.M. Derrett, "Prohibition and Nullity: Indian 
Struggles with a Jurisprudential Lacuna", BSOAS, 20 (1957) 
213ff.
2
The work was written ca. 1580-1600. See Derrett, ubi cit., 
208f .,where the relevant passage will be also found in 
translation. Ed. Gharpure, Bombay, 19^3? 123-^•
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joint after the death of the father. Here a text of Vyasa
had prescribed as follows: MA single parcener may not,
without the consent of the rest, make a sale or gift of the
whole immoveable estate, nor of what is common to the
family." Separated kinsmen, as those who are unseparated
are equal in respect of immoveables: for one has not power
1
over the whole, to give, mortgage or sell it."
This prohibition entails (it is said) only a moral
— — 2offence when infringed by one of the undivided davadas. 
Similarly other texts as e.g. one which prohibits the gift 
or sale of self-acquired immoveable property without the 
consent of the sons does not invalidate the transaction.
And Jlmutavahana concludes: "Therefore, since it is denied, 
that a gift or sale should be made, the precept is infringed
by making one. But the gift or transfer is null: for a
‘2
fact (vastu) cannot be altered by a hundred texts."
This discussion is inserted after the treatment of the 
question of the father*s right to alienate the whole of the
ancestral property for the support of the family or where
1 “ ~ ~
11,27: na ca sthavarasya samastasya gotra-sadharanasya ca/
naikah kuryyat krayam danam paraspara-matam vina// vibhakfa>
vibhakta va sapindah sthavare samSh/ eko hyanisah sarvatra
danadhamana-vikraye//
2n ,  28.
•Z _
^11, 29-30; t.,p.35: tena d^Lna-vikraya-karttavyata-nisedhat
tat-karanat vidhy-atikramo bhavati na tu danady-anispattih 
vacanasatenapi vastuno *nyatha-karana^-sakteh//
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the existence of* the father is threatened unless he resorts
1
to the alienation of ancestral immoveable property. It has 
been consequently assumed that Jlmutavahana admits the power 
of the father to dispose of ancestral immoveable property 
absolutely without consideration of these texts which permit 
alienation of immoveable property only for specific purposes 
or with the consent of the sons. But we should keep in 
mind the object to which Jlmutavahana devoted the first 
chapter of the Dayabhaga, namely to refute the opinion of 
predecessors or contemporaries who either tried to limit the 
right of the father in favour of his son or proceded to 
acknowledge the son's right by birth. This is evident from 
his definition of dava* his attempt to explain the text of 
Yajnavalkya1s 1bhurya pitamahopatta’ and many other instances. 
He dispels the impression that the father is limited as 
regards ancestral immoveable property and moveable property 
and that he is not allowed to transfer the whole of it for 
the maintenance of the family in the absence of consent by 
the sons. Thus he establishes the full power of disposition 
from the point of ownership. He believes that the father 
should have full authority, but also full responsibility for 
the family. The son’s claim is consequently not based on a
11,26; t.,335 yadi punah sarvasthavaradi-vikrayam-antarena 
ku^umba-varttanam eva na bhavati tada sarvasyapi vikray^na- 
dikam arthat siddhyati/ sarvatjfa evatnianam gopayiteti vacanat//
2'4 V
right in property, but on a right against the father as a 
person, a kind of ius in personam. We may remember that 
the original conception in the Brahmanas was rather that 
sons were contemplated as ’living on the father*, whereas 
the aged father used to ’live on the son’; until the 
patriarchal power became established in the Dharraasastras 
and limited the possibilities of the son to take over rights 
and responsibilities during the lifetime of the father* We 
believe that the implications of sadharanam as the spiritual, 
socio-religious and material tie between father and son 
continued to be efficacious even in Bengal, though his 
actual legal right in property was suppressed in legal texts. 
It is significant that Jlmutavahana in his Vvavahara-matrka 
provides for an action against the father who alienated the 
whole ancestral estate which modifies his attitude taken in 
the Davabhaea. having in mind those who too readily trans­
gressed the duties of a householder.^
(4) Enjoyment of Dava by Brothers and Other Co^heirs.
(a) Definition of Partition.
Before Jimutavahana enters into the definition of the 
term dava-vibhaga he discusses the question to what the 
rights of undivided davadas amount: has one of them a right 
to the whole property or does the right extend only to a
Sir Asutosh Kookerji’s ed., 285; the reference is cited by 
J.D.M. Derrett, ZVR. 64(1962) 151 fn.l45*
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part of the property? He comes to the conclusion !lthat 
relation, opposed by the co-existent claim of another rela­
tive, produces a right, determinable by partition, to portions
1
only of the estate*1’ The right of a co-heir does not
extend over the whole estate as one has to infer a divesting
and vesting of rights to the whole estate which would
involve (logical) cumbersomeness (gauravatva). Moreover
the power of alienating would be missing which in Jimutavahanak
2
belief is an incident of ownership. Here again we see that 
Jlrautavahana is intent to show that an owner has the power 
of alienating at pleasure, and if a davada who owns daya 
jointly with other dayadas * alienates his portion without 
their consent (which smrti required), he merely sins, but 
the transaction is valid.
Partition is defined in the following way: “Partition
3
consists in manifesting by casting of lots or otherwise, a 
property which had arisen on lands or chattel, but which 
extended only to a portion of them, and which was previously 
unascertained, being unfit for exclusive appropriation 
because no evidence of any ground of discrimination existed.
X _
1 ,7 ; p.7 t sambandhy-antara-sadbhava-pratipaksasya
sambandhasyavayaves\/eva vibhaga vyafigya-svatvapadakatva’t • • ./ 
Ibid.: yathesJa-viniyoga-phalabhavenanupayogat//
3 vMonier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dict.,vyanj, caus• - - 
anjayati = to cause to appear, make clearly visible or manifest.
^1 ,8 ; t.,p.J: eka-de^opattasyaiva bhu‘-hiranyadav-utpannasya
svatvasya vinigamanapramanabhavena vai/esikavya vaharanarhataya 
avyavasthitasya gutikapatadina vyanj ana|w*»etm vibhagah//
3 y
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"Or partition is a special ascertainment of property, or
1
making of it known”.
Raghunandana in his Davatattva does not follow
Jimutavahana’s definition: "partition is the adjustment by
lot or otherwise into a right over a specific portion of
that right which did, by reason of the same relation of the
co-heirs, accrue to the whole property, upon the extinction
of the right of the previous owner", that is, a co-heir
2could not alienate his share until partition.
Raghunandana points to Smrti-texts which deal with legal 
relations between davadas or co-heirs, i.e. relatives who 
have through the sameness of relationship equal claims to 
the property of the propositus. He cites a text of Katyayana 
from which we learn that a davada is not liable for the use 
of any article, which belongs to all the undivided relations, 
and consequently an undivided davada cannot commit theft as 
regards an article which belongs to all the undivided persons. 
Only separated brothers may reciprocally be witnesses, 
sureties, bestow gifts and accept presents according to
4Narada. Moreover all acts performed with the use of joint
property - whether spiritual or temporal - entitle the
*1 ,9 - ^rikrsna adds: purusa-vis^esa-nirTipitamsa-visesa-
nisthatvenetyarthah: by reference of a particular share to
a particular person, t.,p«9«
2 • — — XJ21; Setlur1s tr., 472; see Colebrooke1s note on Dayabhaga
1,8.
7
Raghunandana, D'ayatattya, 1,24 and VIII,
13,39.
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brothers to its use jointly** A text of Vyasa is cited
which similarly shows that the rights of the davadas accrued
2
to the whole of the estate: In 1,28 Raghunandana sums up
his discussion: "Therefore, when there are two persons
equally related to the deceased, each of them considers the 
property left by the deceased to belong to himself as well 
as to the other co-heir. Gift and the like by the one for 
his own purpose is prohibited, should the other’s consent 
be wanting11.
(b) Alienation before Partition.
We have seen above that Jimutavahana had apparently
conceded to the individual davada the faculty to alienate
his undivided share though he may infringe a moral precept
thereby. It is clear, however, from the description of
_  3
ownership as vathesta-viniyogarhatva , his description of
fc <i
the fraction as ekadesa, and the citation of the text of
rNarada that Jimutavahana does not contemplate the possi­
bility of alienation of property beyond the interest one 
has in the common estate. We should note that the Smrtis
do not contemplate the alienation of the undivided interest
1 _.
Raghunandana 1,26; see Narada 13t 37•
2
1 ,2 7s "Let no one without the consent of the others, make 
a gift of the whole immoveable estate nor of what is common 
to the family.11
3n , 27 •
4
’11,31; Narada 13, 42-3.
by a brother and whenever they speak of shares, bha.ga or
amsa. it is used in connection with partition. Common
property could only be alienated by an individual without
consent and before partition, if certain specified reasons,
like an emergency condition, family purposes or (a recognised)
religious purpose justified the alienation.*
It is noteworthy that Jimutavahana adduces only one
Smrti text to support his proposition of the alienability of
the undivided share and this text by Narada, one would think,
was designed to establish the fact of partition rather than
laying down the alienability of the undivided interest: MIf
there are several descendants of one man, who are separate
in matters of performance of religious acts, in business
transactions and in the implements of work, and who are not
carrying on any business-dealings jointly, if they would
give away or sell off their own respective shares, they
should be free to do all this; as they are masters of their
2
own property.” All non-Bengal; authors at least took this
- — 3text as referring to separated davadas• Raghunandana in 
his Davatattva dissents from Jimutavahana. Citing him he 
seems to associate the text of Vyasa with separated co-heirs
Raghunandana H I ,  31-2.
2
Nar. 13 ,4:2-3 (^h.K.1583a): yady-ekajata bahava^ prthag- 
dharmah pythak-kriyah/ prthak-karma-gunopeta na cet karyesu 
sammatah// svabhagan yadi dadyus te vikriniyur-athapi va/ 
kuryur-yathestam tat-sarvam-iaas te svadhansya vai//
Davabhaga. I *31; t.p.34.
■where the consent may be optional; consequently the presence
of consent of undivided coparceners is essential to validate
the alienation. The consent can only be dispensed with in
the well-known situations. Raghunandana makes an allowance
in the case where undivided co-heir does not openly object
to the alienations: "Consent, however, may be inferred from
the absence of prevention. This follows from a text of
Katyayana cited in the Prava^citta-viveka: *When the master
does not prevent the gift of his own property by a co-sharer
or even a stranger, then the gift is in effect, made by
1
himself. This is ordained by Bhrigu*." Thus we may con- 
elude that Raghunandana does not admit the alienability of 
property which is held jointly before partition for one *s 
own purposes (l,28.) Due to his theory that the right of 
each of the co-heirs accrues in respect of the whole property, 
and that only on partition do the heirs become owners of 
their share, only consent could validate an alienation and 
the theory of Jimutavahana that fa fact cannot be altered 
by a hundred texts* would have no scope. In this respect 
Raghunandana is in line with the authors who followed the 
Mitaksara whom we shall consider in the following chapters•
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IV. S^rikrsna Tarkalankara’s Dava-krama-sangraha.
(1) Alienation of* Ancestral Immoveable Property by the Father. 
Srikrsna who wrote in the middle of the l8th cent#
generally followed and elaborated the views of Jimutavahana, 
but the perusal of his work does not create the impression 
that the father was authorized to alienate the ancestral 
immoveable property completely with the aid of the 'factum 
valet* doctrine. In his discussion on the partition of 
ancestral and self-acquired property, Srikrsna does not
e to u
refer to the maxim. The text 'raani-mukta-pnvalanam•.•*
admits according to him the gift of immoveable property not
1
incompatible with the due support of the family.
(2) Alienation of the Undivided Interest.
/ _
Here on the other hand, Sjpikrsna strongly supports
Jimutavahana*s conception of partial rights and the alien-
2
ability of the undivided share. There is no general pro­
perty of the co-heirs in the whole estate and it is falla­
cious to assume that a plurality of owners constitutes 
community. Community merely means the state of not being
*Setlur*s tr. VI, 19ff. L.N. Serma's ed., f.: atra
mani-mukta-pravalanam-ity-upadaya punaty sarvasyety-upadanam 
bhumyaditritaya-bhinna yavat sa/vargadi-dravya- 
samgrahanartham dvitiyarddhe sarvasyety upadanat sarvasya 
ku^umba-varthanavirodhena sthavarader na danadi-nisedhah 
iti dayabhagah/
2P.56f.; ch.XX.
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divided* The text of Brhaspati which provides for certain 
prohibitions not to alienate what is sadharanam« is merely
2
a moral prohibition and does not invalidate the actual sale* 
We may add that the discussion of alienability of the 
undivided share appears in a different chapter from that in 
which he treats the partition from that in which E^rXkrsna
»  »  4
treats the partition of self-acquired and ancestral property 
by a father and in which he had precisely explains the 
power of the father in respect of alienations may be taken 
as a hint not to interpret the absolute power of the father 
too extensively*
V. The Right of the Widow without Male Issue to the Estate 
of her Husband*
Three generations of male descendants are entitled as
heirs in preference of the widow, or daughter, or daughter*s
son* Baudhayana*s text which reflects a primarily agnatic
g
kinship system, is the basic rule for succession. Within
this framework the widow of a collateral without male issue
within three degrees was entitled to her husband's estate
4
subject to limitation on her power of disposition* After 
her death the estate would revert to the da^adas of her 
husband in accordance with Katyayana*s text*^
x x ,7.
2p.58j XI, 1,8,9.
7_______________________ _
See above ,61 f.* Dab ha *, tr* XI, i, 31-36*
4Daftha T tr.XI,i ,43-6 5 • On the "limited estate" see ibid*,
56-65.
^Dabha. tr. XI,i,36f. Katy*921* See above,112.
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Jimutavahana1s concept of fractional ownership of the
individual co-heir would permit a widow to succeed to the
share of her husband consisting of moveable property or
1
immoveable property, even if he died joint in status.
Raghunandana1s view that the heirs became owners of their
shares at partition would exclude the widow from inheriting
her husband's property unless there had been a partition.
There is no evidence in the Davatattva that a widow could
succeed when the collaterals of the deceased were still joint.
The mother is protected by the rule that the father's
property should be divided only after her death, or with 
2
her consent. But if a partition took place during her
lifetime an equal share must be given to her subject to the
— 3
stridhana she had received.
*Dabha.tr. XI,i,7,l4.
^Da.bha.. tr. Ill, i,l-l4.
^Da.bha.« tr.Ill,ii,29-32. Stridhana in the Da.bha. is the 
property of which a woman can freely dispose independently 
of her husband's control. IV,itiff.,18. Repe, The Law of 
Stridhana.... 109»217-9*
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Chapter VII
Vijnanesvara's Mitaksara: Development and Synthesis.
#
I* The General Social Background. Vijnanesvara’s Defini­
tion of Saninda and Dava.* <
Vijnanesvara(who is still the basic authority for joint 
family law in all territory administering the same) published 
his commentary on the Yainavalkva-smrti « the Riu-Mitaksara.
G e m
1 (V f
between 1121 and 1125* The popularity of Vijnanesvara*s 
commentary among subsequent authors - whether they refute 
or follow Vijnanesvara in details - may be attributed to the 
fact that he more successfully than other authors reconciled 
divergent points of views and achieved to a certain extent a 
synthesis between the customs of different types of families. 
The basic pattern of the law in Vijnanesvara1s exposition is 
set by the sastric patrilineal, patriarchal family but 
within this framework other customs, prevalent in the terri­
tory where the author lived, could be accommodated to some 
extent•
We have indicated previously that in the South relations
by marriage were highly valued due to repeated marriage
bonds within the endogamous kinship group, established often
1 _  _
K.V. Rangaswami Aiyangar*s introd. to Krtvakal.. Danakanda.
34-35. Cp.Kane, H Dh. I,287ff. See Derrett, JIH. 30 (1952J'
35,36f. on Vijn. and his time. See also for the historical
background to Vijn.'s work, id., "taw anu the Social Order
before the Muhammadan Conquests", JESHO« 7(1964) 73-120.
2 —See Derrett, nA New Light on the Mitaksara as a Legal
Authority,t! Jill, 30 (1952) 35-55*
2 5 7
by the practice of cross-cousin marriages. Prior to
-V— /Vijnanesvara legal writers had explained the concept of 
sapindaship with reference to the offerings of funeral 
oblations to agnatic ancestors and the agnatic bond of 
sapinda-relationship which "ceases at the seventh generation" 
This suited the patrilineal, patriarchal family, but was 
not expressive of the customs of families who rated rela­
tions by marriage higher than distant agnatic heirs. Onefs 
own immediate family, comprising up to two or three genera­
tions and the families related by endogamous marriages would 
consider themselves united by kinship ties and would appear 
so to outsiders.^ Vijn. meets these customs and attitudes
halfway in his definition of saninda: "One ought to know
• *
that wherever the word saninda is used, there exists (between
the persons to whom it is applied) a connection with one
3
body either immediately or by descent".
^ _
Manu 5 ,60; see above , 57-f{, J .R.Gharpure , Sanindva.
2A systematic search of inscriptional material would probably 
show various instances where a family and relations by 
marriage are viewed by outsiders as a unit and are affected 
as such as a whole by outside interference apart from acting 
as unit in many spheres. See e. S* 2 - 1 *. XXI, No.27 (A.D.988) 
at 169-70: confiscation by king includes the property of 
two brothers (the culprits), their elder brother, younger 
brother and sons, of their wives, of the elder brothers of 
their father and their children, of their father-in-law, 
maternal uncles, sons-in-law. C p .Derrett, JESHO„ 7 (1964) 73, 
at 113 and fn.2 . See also Annual Ren, of Epigraphy (Madras). 
No. 112 of 1911* The close connection of a person with his 
son-in-law is evidenced frequently and actions directed 
against the father-in-law would affect him as well. See e.g. 
Ep.Carn.. VI, Kd. , 147* See also above for the illatom son, 
who was one of the customary sons-in-law often spoken of as 
an "adopted son".
3 _ ^
On Yajn. 1,52; tr. Gharpure, Sapindya, ?2.
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But his definition did not prevent Vijnanesvara1s disallow-
m g  marriages within the prohibited degrees of relationship.
In the property sphere this concept of sapindaship is
matched with the definition of dava> Introducing the
dayabhaga section Vijnanesvara gives the famous definition:
tatra daya-sabdena yad-dhanam svami-sambandhad eva nimittad
anyasya svam bhavati tad ucyate/- "Here the term hexitage
(daya) signifies that wealth which becomes the property of
2
another, solely by reason of relation to the owner." The
mental picture emerging from this definition was of con­
centric circles of relations from the son to the king, having
^ 3
adhikaras in respect of any person’s dhana. By definition 
all relations have a right (adhikara) in the property of a 
relation whether by blood or marriage whether males or 
females and - after perpetuating somewhat inconsistently 
the rule that agnates range before cognates (Y'ajn. 2 ,136) - 
the ultimate davadas. were the spiritual teacher, fellow- 
student, fellow-Brahmanas and in case of the non-Brahmanas.r 4 » 1
the king. Vijnanesvara uses a metaphor drawn from the law
—  ^
See comment on Yajn. 1,52-3*
2
216; Colebrooke's tr., I,i,2 .
■^Derrett in ZVR. 64 (1962) 15 * at 55*
4
On Yajn.2 ,135-6 (238-46; II, i-viii.) For the background of 
Vijn.’s definition see I.S. Pawate, Dgva-Vibhgga: or the 
Individualization of Communal Property and the Communaliza- 
tion of Individual Property in the Mitakshara Law.
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of mortgages to classify and distinguish the varying grades 
of the relation's ownership in one's own property.* In the 
inner circle of relatives sons and grandsons have ownership 
in their father's and grandfather's property as annatibandha 
davadas or owners whose ownership is 'not accompanied by an 
obstruction' or 'permanently operative until satisfaction
2 rJ fby partition'. Vijnanesvara ingeniously combined the 
notion of nutratva« which made in the traditional patrilineal 
family the son and son's son the primary heir and most impor­
tant family member with more than an expectancy to the 
father's property, with the customary right of control in 
respect of alienations by the father. The outer circle of 
relations are sapratibandha davaTdas. that is, they are owners
whose ownership is 'dormant rather than contingent... and,
3
while dormant not unreal, but merely ineffectual'. Their 
ownership is 'accompanied with obstruction', the obstruction 
being the existence of an owner who has full control over 
his property or whose control is only subject to the rights
I.S. Pawate, op.cit., ch.3«
2   _  ___
The Subodhini. a commentary on the Mitaksara includes the
great-grandson. See Gharpure's ed., 43*
3
Derrett, op.cit., ibid.
26(/3
of the apratibandha davadas« Thus an undivided family may 
consist of twp types of davadas and ownership may be limited 
in two ways, e.g. A may have a son B whose full ownership 
is limited but who would gain a higher degree of control 
over the property on A's, his father*s death, in preference 
to A*s undivided brother C. C*s ownership to the full estate 
was under two obstructions (sapratibandha dava) namely the 
existence of A and B; at the death of A one of the obstruc­
tions ceased, though C did not gail full control thereby, as 
B stood in nearer relationship to A on account of his being 
an apratibandha davada* Vr/hen there are two persons who 
stand in the same degree of relationship to a person whose 
rights cease by death etc. , they simultaneously share the 
control over the common property, the full enjoyment of the 
property being obstructed by their mutual existence. A par-
z . 2
tition (vibhaga) may make them exclusive owners of their share.
I
"It (dava) is of two sorts: apratibandha or existing with 
no obstruction and sapratibandha existing along with one or 
more obstructions. The wealth of the father or of the paternal 
grandfather, becomes the property of his sons or of his 
grandsons; and that is a heritage existing with no obstruc­
tion. But it becomes the property of parents (v.l.: uncles) 
brothers and the rest, in the non-existence of the owner and
the owner’s son: and thus the existence of the owner’s son
and of the owner himself is an obstruction to the heritage 
and on their ceasing, it becomes the property (of a parent 
or an uncle or brother) by reason of his being a parent (v.l.: 
or uncle) or brother. It is therefore heritage existing with 
one or more obstructions. Similarly it should be understood 
in respect of their sons and the rest”. Tr.follows Pawate's,
91.Cp.also Colebrooke’s tr.I,i,2 . The text is as follows(216): 
sa ca dvi-vidhah - apratibandhalj, sapratibandha^ca/ tatra 
putranam pautranam ca putratvena pautratvena ca pitr-dhanam 
pitamaha-dhanam ca svaqi bhavatity-pratibandho dayah/ pitrawa- 
bhratadlnam tu putrUbhave suimy-abhave ca svaip bhavatiti 
putra sadbhavah svaini-sadbhavasca pratibandhal^/ tad-abhave ^ 
pitr(v y )tvena bhratrtvena ca svara bhavatiti sapratibandho dayah
2 See below, •
v m /V _ _ /
We notice that Vijnanesvara not only makes the sons 
apratibandha davadas. but selects as illustrations of sanrati 
bandha davadas not the widow or daughter, but near agnates 
like the brother and paternal uncle* In other words joint­
ness of three generations of males would exclude the female's 
rights of inheritance* If a husband died joint with his 
collaterals the widow would have no right to the property 
of the husband including self-acquisitions, if any, because 
they are part of the common estate unless exempted at 
partition* This differs from the Anararka in which, as we 
have suspected, the self-acquisitions of a brother go to
his wife, though the brother may have died joint in respect
1
of ancestral property* Jointness between father and son 
and agnatic collaterals would also exclude the daughter, 
daughter's son or such near relatives as the son-in-law or
the sister's son, and the maternal uncle, though they are in
-  -  2 theory davadas and rank high in customary law* In customary
law, as we have seen, concurrent interests of parents, sons 
and daughters converged on the aggregate of property con­
sisting of ancestral property, self-acquisitions and the
1 —
See above, 12,4 •
2 — Lu -r — / \See e.g. Ep ♦ Carn * . iii « Tirumakudal Narsipur, 21(?1157)i the 
property of those who die without sons, shall go to the elder 
brother, son-in-law, father-in-law, father's younger brother, 
father's elder brother, or their children. Ep.Carn* * ix, 
Nelamangala 12, the son's property is taken possession of 
by elder and younger brother, his son-in-law and daughters.
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stridhanam (sldanam) of the wife during jointness. Their
right in dava or samudava. i.e. the aggregate consisting of
property from various sources, was in fact simultaneously
operative whether the property was self-acquired or ancestral,
moveable or immoveable* The property was common property of
all until the interests were satisfied by advancement in the
case of sons and daughters and by partition after the father*s
death between the brothers and sisters and the mother.
Vijnanesvara does not negative in his definition of dava that
the wife becomes owner of her husband's property at marriage
1
and the daughter by birth, as Aparaditya expressly held.
But Vijnanesvara selected only the male descendants as 
apratibandha davadas. i.e. co-owners whose rights in their 
father's property and paternal grandfather's estate were 
operative, and he vested rights cts well as responsibilities 
solely in the father and male descendants. By this process 
the right of the wife and the daughter were automatically 
placed under an obstruction} a»d the satisfaction of their wain ~
4c -Jlie. >e s*f c-n s i b 11 i -/"v Hhe, mates
interests in property was thrush upon father and his
/ V  >w t L \i 
SfHML.
II. Acquisition of Dava* The Relationship between Father,
Son and Grandson.
(1) Ownership by birth.
In order to realize his concept of apratibandha davada-
^See above ,^ 22,2t&*
73
263
ship of the sons, Vijnanesvara supports the theory that
ownership arises on birth# Vijnanesvara refers to a text
of Gautama which was sometimes to be believed spurious but
which may in fact have been part of a less authoritative
edition of Gautama : "Let ownership be taken by birth; as
2
the venerable teachers direct11. He holds the dictum of
3
Gautama on the modes of acquisition as illustrative and not 
exhausive. Riktha is interpreted as apratibandha dava and
ksamvibhaga as referring to sapratibandha dava. Property
in the case of the son does not occur on partition or on the
death of the owner nor is it an institution which is 'solely
cognizable from the ^astra1 (s5straikadhigamva), as
Dhare^vara and his followers held. Acquisition of property
is a matter of popular recognition according to the doctrine
of the Mimamsakas and consequently there can be no objection *
5
to birth as a mode of acquisition. If it is said that
1
See Jolly, History of the Hindu Law of Partition, Inheri­
tance and Adoption, TLL, 1883iHO; contra Kane, HDh. H I . 557f. 
Cp.Derrett, BSC? AS . 21(1958) 6 lff,at 69f.
2 _
I,±,23 ; p.218: uttpatyaivartha-svamitvam labhetety-acaryah. . J
Cp.Medh., above XOS , who knew a similar text.
3
riktha-krava-samvibhaga*.. See above,tS .
4217; I,i,l3.
5217f.;I,i,8-l6 . See Derrett, JESHO, 1(1957) 66ff., on the 
foundation of Vijnanesvara1s doctrine and for text and 
transl. of the relevant passages of the philosophical dis­
quisition •
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theft is a mode of acquisition, which Medhatithi probably 
suggested to illustrate the necessity of the recognition of 
the sastra.* the ahswer is that proprietary right in such a
2case is not recognized in popular usage and legal procedure.
(2) Joint Ownership between Father and Son. Objections 
Refuted.
The criticism of Northern ’orthodox-sastrie' authors
contained in the Mitaksara concerned the limitation of the
• ■ ■—  «  -
patriarchal powers of the father which negative any legal 
rights of the son in the father's property before partition
 . f
or death of the father. Vijnanesvara considers the objec­
tion that, if property is created by birth in the case of 
the sons, a father could not use his own wealth for sacri­
ficial rites according to Vedic requirements and would thus 
be incompetent to sacrifice (anadhikara), because the estate 
would be common to father and son.^ Visvarupa and Aparaditya
had, as we have seen, referred the father inter alia to the
^  /
possibility to acquire property of his own. Vijnanesvara, 
however, is actually intent to establish the objection raised 
^See above , 10*L •
217; 1 ,1 ,11.
3 _ _
218; I,i,17f*i idanim-idaip sandihyate kim vibhagat-svatvam-
uta svasya sato vibhaga iti/ tatra vibhagat-svam iti tavad-
yuktam; jata-putrasyadhana vidhanat/yadi janmanaiva svatvam
syat-tadotpannasya putrasyapi tat-svam sadharanam iti-dravya-
sadhyesv-adhana^disu pitur-anadhikarah syat/
by the opponents as a fact, namely the estate is indeed 
common to father and son. The son acquires by birth not 
only a right in ancestral grandpaternal property, but also 
in the father’s self-acquired property whether moveable or 
immoveable. Vijnanesvara skilfully combines two points of 
view. On the one hand he utilizes the northern tendency 
of styling all property in the hands of the father as the 
"father fs property11. Here the son’s right amounted at the 
most to an equal share at partition. But the father might 
not divide the property at all. If he chose to divide he 
might also assign a share of his self-acquired property to 
make the partition complete. On the other hand Vijnanesvara 
incorporates the customary interest of the son in respect of 
ancestral grandpaternal property, especially immoveable 
property, by giving that interest legal recognition.
The characteristic feature of the customary family was 
that sons would normally leave at marriage. Here the self­
acquisitions of the father would be retained by him. His 
acquisitions in fact tended to be the common property of 
husband and wife and they might not be divisible by the sons 
until the mother’s death or her remarriage. But according 
to Vijnanesvara the self-acquisitions of the father are part 
of the common estate of father and son. This is a step in 
direction of further emphasis on a strict patrilineal family
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with the result that the institution of community of owner­
ship between the spouses recedes considerably in Vijnanesvara1s 
conception of the law. It is significant that he nowhere 
expressly mentions that property is common between husband 
and wife, a proposition taken seriously by Visvarupa, 
Medhatithi and Aparaditya. Vijnanesvara could not admit 
common ownership between husband and wife in so many words, 
because this would be inconsistent with his theory of the 
son being an apratibandha davada in respect of all his 
father’s property.
Before we continue to state Vijnanesvara’s view we have 
to refer to two texts which are dealt with in this connec­
tion by medieval authors before Vijnanesvara. One of the 
texts was that of Apastamba which had expressly suggested
that there can be no partition between husband and wife
—  —  _  1 
(jaya-patyor na vibhago vidyate). The other text is that
■— .
of Yajnavalkya 12,115) which said that at a partition the
wives to whom no stridhana had been given by the husband or
/ . f\j
father, should be made equal sharers. Visvarupa on Yajn,
22,52 simply held that there can be no partition between 
husband and wife and that Yajnavalkya’s ^loka emphasizes the
fact that before partition there can be no mutual trans-
3
actions between father and sons, and brothers.
*See above, W  .
See above, . _
3 — > 2^2° f _ _ —
P0n Yajnf2,52fci,rs)/; Dh.K.72 fj: dampati-vacanam catra vibhaga-
sambhavad-anyesam api riktha-bhaj^am-avibhaktanam saksyady- 
abhava-pradari anar tham/
As long as the elementary family was favoured in the eyes
of the law on equal basis with the patrilineal joint family
there was no inconsistency between the institution of common
ownership between husband and wife and sloka 2 , 115 of
Yajnavalkya, which refers obviously to a partition in a
polygamous or a patrilineal joint family. In the polygamous
or patrilineal joint family there would be no community of
ownership between husband and wife, and the father and his
male descendants tend to acquire property jointly. At a
partition the wives and widows of sons and predeceased sons
would receive a share to substitute stridhana which they did
1
not receive from their husband and father-in-law.
On Yajn. 2,52 Aparaditya holds that 1avibhakta1 refers
to brothers or father and sons, but does not include husband
and wife. The wife is owner of her husband's property simply
on account of her being his wife. Thus "property which is
2
common between husband and wife cannot be divided". The 
only property, we may say, which can be common to husband
and wife, are the self-acquisitions of the father which he
3 -can exempt at partition , and his wife’s dowry (sidanam).
^See Visvarupa on 2,115(i*e. 2,119) L Tqz ; Dh.K.l4o8b; 1^09a).
2 —  —65^! atravibhakta-grahanam bhratr-visayam/ pita-putra-
vi§ayam va/ na jSya-pati-vi§ayam/ na hi tayor-dhana-vibhago1
sti, pati-dhane hi jaya svaminT jayatvad eva/ ato dampatyol^
sadharanam dhanam-asakyam^vibhaktum/ ata eva*1 pastambah.••
See above, 170 •
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If the sons remained joint with the father, the ancestral 
property belonged to father and son jointly; here his self­
acquisitions could also not be styled ’common property between 
husband and wife’. Aparaditya also held that Yajn. 2,115 
refers to a polygamous household and we can say that in his 
eyes this text has nothing to do with common ownership of 
husband and spouses*^
^ /
To return to Vi jnanesvara1 s view that the son owns all 
property of the father* According to Visvarupa and 
Aparaditya the self-acquisitions of the father tended to 
serve solely his purposes and were the means for the perfor­
mance of Vedic sacrifices which have to be performed with 
one’s own property. In this respect there was rather common 
ownership between husband and wife than common ownership 
between father and son. But Vijnanes^vara holds that the 
self-acquisitions of the father belong simultaneously to 
father and sons•
Answering the objection that, because property is common 
between father and son, the father cannot use his own pro­
perty for his religious duties prescribed by the Vedas and
1the Smrtis, Vijnanesvara says that by the cogency of the
precept the father is invested with sufficient power to uti-
2
lize property for such purposes I The northern authors whose
1 719.
2 rI,i,26; t.219: yad-apy-artha sadhyesu vaidikesu karma sva- 
anadhikara iti, tatra tad-vidhana-balad-evadhikaro gamyate/
~7 /
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opinions Vijnanesvara records, would object that, if the
whole estate were common to father and son, this would also
be inconsistent with Smrti-texts which allow a father to*■
make gifts of affection from the moveable property to his 
wife or daughters, sisters and sons, in whose hands it would
1 <v i
be exeraptible at a partition# Vijnanesvara holds in answer
that in accordance with the special provisions of the Smrtis,
moveable property whether self-acquired or acquired by the
grandfather, are under the especial control of the father,
though this does not alter the fact that the son acquires
property by birth in all his fatherfs and grandfather1s 
2property.
(3) The Son‘s Rights to Control and the Concept of Faratantrva 
The relationship between father and son is based on the 
concept that though the son is svami. his svamva is not 
necessarily accompanied by svatantrva. that is, the son is 
dependent on the management of the family property by the 
father. The father is not controlled by the sons as regards 
moveable property but he has to obtain their consent for the 
alienation of grandpaternal immoveable property and self­
acquired immoveable property. Thus there is naratantrva on 
the side of the father as well - a fact not expressed by 
VijnanesVara in so many words, because northern authors would
I,i, 19-22. 
2I,i, 23-4, 27
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have difficulty in conceding it. Apprehension of northern 
Gastric authors must have been allayed to some extent by the
I'V' /provision of a Smrti-text and the comment by Vijnanesvara 
which gave wide managerial powers to the father and the 
eldest brother during jointness: "An exception to it follows:
*bven a single individual may conclude a donation, mortgage, 
or sale of immoveable property, during a season of distress, 
for the sake of the family, and especially for pious purposes' 
[Vijn• comments J The meaning of that text is: while the sons 
and grandsons are minors, and incapable of giving their 
consent to a gift and the like; or while brothers are so and 
continue unseparated; even one person, who is capable, may 
conclude a gift, hypothecation, or sale of immoveable 
property, if a calamity affecting the whole family require 
it, or the support of the family render it necessary, or
I,i,27; 219 5 tasmat-paitpke paitamahe ca dravye janmanaiva 
svatvam, tathapi pitur-ava^yakesu dharma-kj'tyesu vacanikesu 
prasada-dana-ku^umba-bharanapad-viraoksadi§u ca sthavara- 
vyatirikta-dravya-viniyoge svatantryam iti sthitam/ sthavare 
tu svarjite pitradi-prapte ca putradi-paratantryam eva; 
the text of Vyasa follows 'sthavaram dvipadaiji caiva. . 1 which 
is cit. in full above, Colebrooke translates "Therefore
it is a settled point, that property in the paternal or 
ancestral (grandpaternal) estate is by birth, CBalambhatta; 
althoughj the father have independent power in the disposal 
of effects other than immoveables, for indispensable acts 
of duty and for purposes prescribed by texts of law, as 
gifts through affection, support of the family, relief from 
distress, and so forth: but he is subject to the control of 
his sons and the rest, in regard to the immoveable estate, 
whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or 
other predecessor; since it is ordained, "Though immove­
ables or bipeds..."
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indispensable duties, such as the obsequies of the father
1
or the like , make it unavoidable •tf
(4) The Periods of Partition, Mode of Partition, and the 
Son's Right to Demand Partition of Ancestral Assets* 
Commenting on sJL.2,114 of the Ya.inavalkva-smrti 
Vijnanesvara specifies the periods of partition which are 
more or less in accordance with 1orthodox-sastrie1 tradition. 
The periods are held to apply to self-acquired property of 
the father. Property is divided (a) by the father, with 
his will, (b) against his will when he is indifferent to 
wealth, is disinclined to pleasure and the mother is past 
child-bearing, (c) if the father is addicted to vice or 
afflicted with a lasting disease, even if the mother is not
/ s 2past child-bearing, and (d) after the death of the father.
The father could divide his self-acquired property amongst
his sons equally or unequally according to the preferential
— 3shares (uddharas#) prescribed by Manu and others. But the
ancestral wealth had to be divided equally and the father
4had no double share. After the death of the father, the
1 —  _  _ _
I,i,28f.; 219i asyapavadah- 1eko'pi sthavare kuryad-
danadhamana-vikrayam/ apat-kale kutumbarthe dharmarthe ca
visesatah/ / 1 iti/ asyarthah - aprapta-vyavaharesu putresu
pautre§u v a *nujfiadanadav-asamarthesu bhratrsu va tatha-
vidhesv-avibhaktesv-api sakala-kutumba-vyapinyam-apadi tat-
posane v a fvas^ yaiji kartavyesu ca pitr-^raddhisu sthavarasya
danadhamana-vikrayara ekofpi samarthah kuryad iti/
X,ii.7; 220.
3Iiii ,131 5 iii,3-4.
4
I ,i i ,6 ; iv,§•
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brothers had to divide the property equally. The method of
dividing the property with preferential shares had largely
fallen into disuse and, as the Mitaksara says, "must not be*
practised, because it is abhorred by the world" (Joka- 
_ 1
vidvistatvannanustevah)• The decay of the law of preferen­
tial shares may be attributed to the fact that the rules 
had become archaic and not applicable to a wide range of 
people amongst whom there was no reason to prefer any of the 
sons to such an extent as to let him have a special share in
the hereditary property of the family unless the brothers
2
consented to one of them having a larger share. Especially 
among communities where ancestral property was highly valued 
and formed the natural provision of the descendants * marri­
ages each brother would expect to be treated equally at a 
partition. A father, especially in communities where he was 
not the strong patriarch but rather a manager, could show 
his preference at the most by making gifts or unequal divi­
sions of his self-acquired property. But any preference 
shown to a son by an unequal division of ancestral hereditary
I,iii,4,7; 222f. Cp.Smrti-samgraha. which also disowns the 
custom of uddhara; ...tathoddhara-vibhago1pi naiva samprati
vartate// Dh.K.119^b. On smrti rules rendered obsolete by 
relegation to a 'previous Age1 of the Universe (kalivarjya) 
see Kane, H Dh,III, ch.3^* Id., Hindu Customs and Modern Law, 
v. * kalivarjya * • Batuknath Bhattatharya , The ^alivar.ivas 1 
or Prohibitions in the 'Kali1 Age. Calcutta, 19^3*
^Cp. Visvarupa on Yajn. 2,118 (=2,117); atam bhratrnam 
evecchaya vibhaga-vaisamyam/
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property would cause endless jealousies and disputes. Not 
the least because the feeling that a relative’s property 
was in a way also one’s own, only equality observed at parti­
tion would mitigate mutual quarrels. Especially in respect 
of the ancestral property to which sentimental value and 
prestige value was attached, or in connection with a throne, 
quarrels would occur and the term davada significantly often 
assumes the meaning of ’rival claimant1.* In the North the 
law of preferential shares was retained by Medhatithi who 
had - in connection with Manu*s text on the preferential 
shares of brothers (9 i112-3 ) - denied the view of authors 
that the rules do not find application. Their very presence 
in the Krtva-kalnataru shows that they must have been rele- 
vant alongside the simpler rules of equal shares. The 
arrangement of the texts by Laksmidhara conveys the impression 
that the preferential treatment of a brother at a partition 
is based upon his special qualities and service to the
father or family rather than on preferential shares predeter- 
/ __ 2
mined in sastric texts. That a son had not only to be the
3
eldest but also qualified to receive a preferential share
*G. Yazdani (ed.), The Earlv History of the Deccan. 480f. 
Indian Culture. IX,4lO. See references cit. by Derrett at 
JIH. 30(1952) 35 at k2 f 11,22• Cp. above,
2Krtvakal.. 655-6 5.
^See above, 136 .
in
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1is evidence of the decay of these low on preferential shares.
(3) The Patrilineal Joint Family and the Customary Elemen­
tary Family according to the Juridicial Framework of 
the Mitaksara.
In the proemium to the davavibhaga part Vijnanesvara 
expresses the legal recognition of joint ownership of father 
and son in respect of all property in the hands of the
father. The self-acquisitions of the father are part of the
v  _  /
common estate. Vijnanesvara contemplates a patrilineal joint 
family though curtailing the patriarchal powers of the father 
considerably. One effect of this approach is the modifica­
tion of the rights of the wife-mother-widow as occurring in 
the customary family, because even after partition between 
father and son, the son would remain owner of the father’s
property including acquisitions acquired subsequent to 
2partition. Self-acquisitions did not tend to be the joint
acquisitions of husband and wife and were not a» such exemp-
tible at partition by the father; self-acquisitions of the
*The ivesthamsa did not completely disappear in practice.
See e.g.Hyderabad Arch. Ser. No. 5 , Munirabad Stone Insit. 
of the 13th year of Tribhuvanamaila (Vikramaditya VI), ^A.D. 
1088; ^ine 29i the land donated included .wes thams a ( *sa) 
da bhumi.
2
Subject to the rights of a son born subsequent to partition 
who would have the sole right to the father’s property 
acquired subsequent to partition and the share of the 
ancestral property. See comment on Yan/j.2,122a (228; I,i±, 
1-6).
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father were not property which should be divided only after
  1
the death of father and mother as in the Apararka ; with 
the establishment of joint ownership between father and son 
in respect of all the fatherfs property, the marriage portion 
would be excluded and become the separate estate of the wife 
ab initio. The controlling powers of the son in respect of 
self-acquired immoveables of the father reflect the inten­
tion that if the son is desired to remain joint with the 
father and cooperate in the preservation and acquisition of
property, he should have a right of control of the manage-
2
ment of the father. We thus also find a modification of 
the patriarchal sastrie-orthodox family foreshadowed in some 
of the Smrtis, though we have to take into account that with
4
the provision that the father is free to spend the property
^  _  /
for religious purposes, Vijnanesvara is in accord with 
northern authors. Similarly the ’periods of partition1 can 
be interpreted as applying to the circumstances of a patri­
archal joint family with the reservation that the father, if
he divided the property, had to divide the ancestral property 
3 ^equally. Vijnanesvara also incidentally speaks of the
See above,22-2- •
n
See above, #
^Cn Yajn. 2,11^ (220; I,ii, 1-6.)
•paternal estate* implying that all property is in principle 
the father’s including the grandpaternal property.
Besides the legal incidents of the patrilineal joint 
family we find incidents of the customary family in which 
the sons would normally, though not invariably, leave the 
family at marriage the ancestral property constituting the 
fund from which the marriages of the sons and the daughters
JV - f
were provided. Vijnanesvara does not say that sons are
normally advanced at marriage receiving a share of the
ancestral property., but he holds that the son has a right
to partition, so that he apparently suggests that jointness
between father and sons or at least one of sons ought to be
the basic legal and social pattern. The son’s right to
partition might have been a safeguard for the son to be
2
utilised if the father mismanages the property. V7hile dis-
10n Yanfj .2, 118 (224; I , iv, 6-10 ,12 , 29 ) .
o
On Yanjj . 2 , 121 (227 ; I,v,3-H*) In spite of the excellent 
(dissenting) judgment of Telang,!*, in Ana.ii v. Ramchandra 
(1892) 16 Bom.29 (F.B.) we are not convinced that Vijn. wanted
in fact to deal with the question of the right of the son to 
ask for partition of the grandfather’s property in a case 
where the father is joint with his brothers or his father.
The proeraium to Y‘ajn.2 ,121(227; I , v, 3 ) may equally plausibly 
be interpreted that if the father is separate from the grand­
father and from his brothers the son has a right to ask for 
partition under certain circumstances. The solution may have 
depended, historically speaking, on the particular family 
system one had in mind. In the patrilineal joint family the 
son would obtain title through his father and if the brothers 
e.g. decided to remain joint it seems unlikely that a brother', 
son could disturb this arrangement. It would be different 
if one has the elementary family in mind where, however, one 
or more sons may remain joint at times. Here the son has a 
right to partition, especially when the father mismanages the 
property. This does not mean that once the son's right to 
partition had been admitted in Anglo-Hind law as absolute, 
his right to partition, if his father was joint with his 
brothers, would not follow. See below, .
*?'2277
cussing the son's right in ancestral grandpaternal property
lV _ f
Vijnanesvara does not restate the right to interdict the 
alienation of immoveable property self-acquired by the 
father, but on the contrary expressly says that the son has 
no right of interdiction and must acquiesce in a donation 
or sale, because the father is independent having a predomi­
nant interest in his own acquisitions. Perhaps this echoes 
the attitude found in the Apararka and elsewhere to consider 
the fatherfs self-acquisitions as primarily reserved for the 
father and his wife whose marriage portion would be a part 
of the common estate; this would leave the son in practice,
if he remained joint, with a right of protest if the father
1 _ / 
alienated ancestral grandpaternal property. That Vijnanes­
vara also has in mind the elementary family besides the 
patrilineal joint family in his comment on Yajn. 2,121 may 
be concluded from the fact that he speaks of the possibility 
of partition of ancestral property at the will of the son,
r_
even if the sastric reasons of partition are not existing; 
also from the fact that he speaks of an undivided father a
^See also the interpretation of si,.2,118 pitp-dravya• . . , 
which acc. to Vijn. should be understood as matr-pitror- 
dravya... and is meant to declare as impartible * property 
which is earned 1without detriment to the property of the 
father and mother1 which 'makes sense if the father's and 
mother's property formed a joint mass, indistinguishable 
until death or divorce*. Derrett, ZVH, 64 (1962), 15 at 
62 fn.189.
phrase implying that a divided father is normal in the con­
templation of this set of rules.1- It seems preferable not 
to assume an inconsistency between (i) the rules allowing a 
right to interdict the alienation of the self-acquired 
immoveable property of the father and (ii) the right to 
interdict merely the alienation of ancestral property. Once 
Vijnanesvara had established the anratibandha davada-ship 
of the son checking thereby the rights of other davadas like 
the widow, daughter etc. and had on the other hand modified 
the law of the patriarchal family to suit the notion of 
joint ownership between father and son, both kinds of 
families merged and incidents of both might have become 
applicable in common.
Ill The Rights of Women.
(l) StrTdhana: Female’s Property.
We have noted in chapter III that the text of Yajnavalkya 
2
on stridhana was differently read by medieval authors and 
that southern authors add to the categories of stridhana the 
particle ’etc.* (-advam ca). Vijnanesvara takes the posi-c
tion that all property acquired by a female in the manner
1 »I ,iv ,8-9 »227: tatha sarajaskayam matari sasprhe ca pitari
vibhagam-annichasy-api putrecchaya paitamaha-dravya-vibhago
bhavati/ tatha1vibhaktena pitra paitamahe dravye diyamane
vikriyamane va pautrasya nisedhe1py-adhikarah, pitrarjite
na tu nisedhadhikarah, tat-paratantratvat/ anumatis tu
kartavya/
2 2,143-4 (250f.; II,SL,i-35, See above, 114
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prescribed e.g. in Gautamafs text such as inheritance,
partition, purchase etc. is stridhana and that in fact the
term s trTdhana conforms with its etymological connotation
1 /and has no technical meaning. Vijnanesvara does not refer 
to the texts of Katyayana which says that strTdhana is 
separate from the property of the husband and only avail­
able to him in an emergency (Katy. 911-4); this indicates 
that in fact he leaves the question open because community 
of ownership between husband and wife was still a familiar
phenomenon, stridhana being the wife’s interest in the joint 
2 ~property. Other authors contemporaneous or posterior to
Vijnanesvara explicitly refer to the texts of Katyayana
establishing that stridhanam is not only separate from the
claims of agnates of the husband but also available to the
3husband only in an emergency.
Another question is whether a woman has full power of 
disposition over her strTdhana. Modern writers hold that 
the acquisition of stridhana in the Mitaksara does also convey 
absolute power of disposal to the woman. This has been 
recently disputed at length by V.V. Deshpande. But the
<4
On Yajn. 2,143-4(250; tr.H, x i , 1-4).
2
Cp. also above his view on self-acquisitions,i^f •
^Katy.911-4; Da.bha. . 78: Sm.ca,656; Vva.ma. 286 etc. See 
Kane’s fns. at text of Katy.
4~’"Stridhana”, According to Mitakshara, Re-examined’. In: 
Studies of Law. Patna Law College Golden Jubilee Comm.Vol., 
1961, 330-374.
' /j 
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discussion is based on the argument that Vijnanesvara is 
rfthe foremost champion of the patrilineal family as the 
basic unit of Hindu social and domestic life” (p*337)«
This is4;rue to a large extent, yet it represents an (orthodox- 
sastric) interpretation of the Mitaksara viewed from the
f
atmosphere of a patriarchal joint family. Vijnanesvara 
allows, as we have tried to indicate, the existence of the 
customary elementary family where relations by marriage were 
valued highly and he allows the customs of communities, where 
women have far greater rights in property than in the patri­
lineal joint family in which a limited number of categories 
of strTdhana. a tendency to exclude women from inheriting 
the property of males,and mere maintenance, were prevalent, 
to conform to the sastric law. At one place, while discuss­
ing ithe sonless widow’s right to succeed to her husband's 
estate, Vijnanesvara takes up the Smrti-texts which speak 
of the paratantrva of the woman, i.e. her dependence in 
respect of disposition of property and he exclaims: ”let
there be dependence, but where is the objection of accepting
1 /the right in property". The true opinion of Vijnanesvara
seems to be therefore that paratantrva of women is accept­
able, but the solution of the question in which situation, 
in respect of which property, and amongst which communities
dependence would apply is left to custom.
1 ^On Yajn.2 ,135-6 -241; IX,i ,25 *•••tad-astu paratantryam, 
dhana-svlkare tu ko virodhah//
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(2) The Interest of Women in Dava as the Undivided Family
Property.
According to the definition of dava. the wife is a davada 
in respect of her husband’s property; this, implied, admis­
sion of the wife as a davada in respect of her husband’s 
property was not undisputed. We have seen that most authors 
had in spite of texts like that of Yajnavalkya (1,135) only 
admitted the sonless widow to inherit her husband’s property 
under certain circumstances as Visvarupa, Dharesvara, etc.
n -  —  —  1or subject to a limited estate as Jirautavahana. The con­
cept of the woman as a davada of her husband’s property is 
reflected in customary law, but Vijnanesvara neutralized to 
some extent the implication of his acceptance of the wife 
being a dayada with his theory that the son is anratibandha 
davada of all the father’s property. Even in customary law 
the widowed mother whose sons had been advanced might be 
left in possession of the father’s self-acquired property 
(or rather their joint acquisitions) and other property in 
the possession of the father at his death, the extent of 
the claim of the mother varying considerably and depending 
on the custom of the area or caste. In the strict patri­
lineal family according to the sastric texts the mother had 
merely a claim to maintenance and a moral claim that the 
partition of the property should be postponed until after 
her death. VijnanesVara settles the wife’s interest in the
1See
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family property at partition between father and sons or sons 
separating after the death of the father by allowing her a 
share equal to that of a son subject, however, to the amount 
of stridhana she had received* This seems to be an equitable 
solution, because if she has received already stridhana from
the property of the family she would ultimately receive more
1 / 
property that the son* On the other hand Vijnanesvara
defends the right of the mother to a share against authors
who would hold that she should receive only as much wealth
2 /as is sufficient for her maintenance* Vijnanesvara does 
not believe in interpreting Yajnavalkya to the effect that 
if the property is large the mother takes sufficient property 
for maintenance, but not a share equal to that of a son and 
that an equal share is only to be assigned if the property 
is small as £>rTkara and other predecessors of Vijnanesvara
3
interpreted the texts referring to the mother’s share*
(3) The Sonless Widow's Right.
Though the wife is a davada of her husband's estate
  /
according to Vijnanesvara's opinion, jointless between father 
and sons and the agnatic collaterals of the father would
10n Yajn.2,123b (229; I|Vii, 1,2).
^On Yajn. 2 ,135-6 (241;II,x ,31-2); atha 'patnya^ karyalj 
samamsika* (Yajn. 2,115) ity-atra 'matapy-amsam haret’ _
(Yajff.2 ,123) ity_ atra ca jlvananopayuktam eva dhanarj stri 
haratxti matam (y*l»: strTdhanam iti matanQ , - tad-asat;
'aiy^a' ^abdasya 'sama' ^abdasya canarthafty-aprasangat/
5Ibxd.
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1 _
postpone her right to succeed. The same result would be
2  r u  f
effected by reunion. Vijnanesvara in a similar but more 
coherent manner reconciles Smrti-texts which lay down prima
3
facie the sonless widow’s rijeht to inherit and Smrti-textsp
which prima facie excluded the widow from inheriting,
originating in the atmosphere of the patrilineal patriarchal 
4
family. He refutes medieval commentators who postulate
5
that the widow should submit to nivoga. He asserts that 
the woman is entitled in her own individual right and not
through the husband and son and refers in this connection to
— 6 
the different kinds of stridhana enumerated by Manu,
w k k I S
Maintenance is due to widows only during jointness sometimes 
effected by reunion; Smrti-texts allowing the widow only
7
maintenance have to be interpreted accordingly. The school 
which held that Property exists only for Vedic sacrifice and 
that the widow is consequently disentitled to take the whole
10n Yajn.2 ,135(238-2^3; XI,i,1-39).
2
II,i,30; H,ix,l: "The author next propounds an exception
to the maxim that the wife and certain other heirs succeed 
to the estate of one who dies leaving no male issue...
■^ 11, i, 6 ; Vyddha-auanu or Katy.921; Visnu 17 Katy. 926 
(above ) Bphaspati 25i87(210)
^11,i,7; Narada 13*2^-6 (above, ), Manu 9»133(above, ) 
and Katy. 928.
^ ; IX,i,8-14. See above , 22. H cwi {^-1.
£
Ibid.(240; II,i,l6 ): atha strinam pati-dvarako dhana- 
sambandhal> putra-dvarako va nanyatheti matam,- tad-apy-asat;
• ••(Manu 9 »19^) ityadi-virodhat/
7Ibid. (240; XI,i,19-20).
estate of a deceased husband, are refuted with the argument 
that if this theory were sound, then e.g. religious dona­
tions were not possible* Property serves purposes of artha
1and kama as well , and if the term yajna, actually meaning
Vedic sacrifice, is taken to connote religious duty in general
women succeed, since they are competent to perform works of
2
purta, like the excavation of tanks* Smrti-texts whichft
assign the heirless property (adavadakam), with the excep­
tion of the property of a Br'ahmana, to the king by escheat, 
after the deduction of subsistence for ’women1, apply to 
concubines (avaruddha-stri), because they use the word ’yosid*
7   ^
(females) and fstrif. But since Yajnavalkya uses the term 
'patni* which implies a woman who is married and is capable
4of joining her husband in the performance of sacrifices , 
these texts would not apply to a married and chaste wife.
The conclusion at which VijnanesVara in face of the widely 
conflicting Smrti-texts and of the welter of customs arrives, 
is, then, that a legally married wife, being chaste, takes 
the whole estate of a man, who, being separated and not
1Ibid. (240;II,i,22)
^Ibid. (241; II,i ,24):kimca yajna-sabdasya dharmopalaksana- 
paratve strinam-api purta-dharmadhikarad-dhana-grahanam 
yuk tat ar am/
^Ibid. (241; II, i, 27-8 ); Katy.931 (see fns *) , Narada 13*52. 
These texts supply the foundation of the Anglo-Hindu law and 
modern Hindu law on concubines. See also Kane, H D h , I H , 600, 
8l0ff. Jolly, Recht und Sitte. 64 f.
4
11,1,5,29* See Panini W,l,33 for the derivation. Kane,
RDh,III,707•
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1
subsequently reunited dies leaving no male issue*
IV. The Rights of the Daughter (Sister) and the Parents.
Aparaditya had acknowledged the daughter’s right in
the family property by reason of her birth. But he as well
as Vijnanesvara says that in the presence of brothers she
is precluded and her claim in the dava consists of marriage
expenses and dowry amounting to a fourth part of the share
2
which is allotted to a brother. Whereas in customary law 
the share of a daughter might amount to a larger share than 
that of a brother, or is in any case flexible in size or 
larger than one fourth of the share of a son, Vijnanesvara 
follows the Yg.inavalkva-smrti in settling the question. The 
brother’s duty to arrange for the marriage of the sister is 
in accord with Vijnanesvara1s concept of the son as 
aoratibandha davada which places the burden of family respon­
sibilities towards the whole family in the hands of father
3
and son. They have consequently joint ownership.
4
After the daughter’s son , the aaather and father are
in order davadas: the mother is probably selected as a
davada in preference of the father in view of polygamous
Ibid.[242f.; 11,1,393 : tasmad-aputrasya svaryatasya 
vibhaktasyasaiysrstino dhanam parinita stri samyata sakalam 
eva grhnatTti sthitam/
20n Yajn.2,124 bC239f.: I ,vii,5-141 .
Ibid.£229;I ,v ii,61: asyarthah-bh^ginyascasamskrtah- 
saigskartavya bhratribhih/
^On Yajn.2,135-6, (2^3;H ,ii,6)•
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families where the wives may be from sufficiently important 
families to entitle the mother in preference of the father 
or as Vijnanesvara says, because ffthe father is a common 
parent to other sons; and since her propinquity is conse­
quently the greatest, it is fit, that she should take the
1
estate in the first instance...n The authors from Bengal
like Jimutavahana and Raghunandana as well as most of the
predecessors and followers of VijnanesVara held the father
to be entitled in preference to the mother thus conforming
more closely to the concept of the patrilineal and patriarchal 
2
family; some early authors held that the parents take 
together, so for instance ^rikara.^ The latter solution 
would be more in conformity with the institution of community 
of acquisition between husband and wife as it is reflected
4m  the next dampatyor dhanam madhy again»
V. Partition, Exemption of Self-acquisitions, and Reunion*
(1) Exemption of Self-acquisitions.
1J-he interesting passage in which Vijnanesvara inter­
prets Yajnavalkya1s text (2,118; see above ^ 70) on the exemp­
tion of self-acquisitions as presupposing that the property
Ibid. (2 4 3 T * i i i i i 1-5)s••• kimca pita putrantaresv-api 
sadhiraija^; matE tu na sadharanfti pratyasatty-atilayat 
’ anantaral^ sapiijdad-yas-tasya tasya dhanam bhavet1 (Manu 8 , 
187) iti vacanan-matur eva prathamarn. dhana-grahanarn yuktam/
♦  ^ t
2See texts cit. in transl.at Jha, HLS.II. 494-9*
3
See fn. to tr.H,iii,5*
^See above, 4£{«(- •
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which is exemptible has not been acquired 'with detriment 
to the father's and mother's estate' is explicable in terms 
of customary law where father's and mother's property
1
formed an undifferentiated mass until death or divorce.
If the sons remained joint and property was divided only 
after the father's death (or parents' death) or during the 
lifetime of the mother, though with consideration of her 
rights in the joint estate, self-acquisitions could be 
exempted. But another feature of this type of family, at 
that time prevalent mainly in the South, is that only 
limited categories of property could be exempted by the 
brothers so that even gifts (pratigraha) were partible 
amongst the davadas. In the following Vijnanesvara speaks 
of 'self-acquisitions' not acquired to the detriment of the 
father's estate which is again in conformity with the patri­
lineal joint family where the wife's property would be 
separate from the estate of the agnates. But we may also
^Derrett, ZVR. 64(1962) 15 at 62 fn.l89* Yajn.2,118(224; I,iv, 
2 ): mata-pitror-dravyavinasena yat-svayam-arjitam, maitram 
initra-sakasad-yal-labdham, audhvahikam vivaha-labdham- 
dayadanam bhratrnaifi tan na bhavet/- "That, which had been 
acquired by the coparcener himself without any detriment to 
the goods of his father or mother (or: and mother): or which 
has been received by him from a friend, or obtained by 
marriage, shall not appertain to the coheirs o Xrbrethren"•
2
Ibi a. (224; tr•X ,iv,6-9)♦ By accepting a gift the acceptor 
would not only place his own person under an obligation but 
also the other davadas and the common estate. See e.g.
M.N. Srinivas, Religion and Society amongst the Coorgs. 94.
See in this connection also J.C. iieesterman, "Reflections on 
the Significance of the Daksina", Indo-Xranian Journal.
3(1959) 240-58.
understand the phrase 'father's property* as typifying the
<v/____  /
.joint property. Whenever Vijnanesvara calls the common
estate samudava he probably implies that the wife's interest
has become part of the common estate whereas the term
sadharanani which he also uses is more representative of the *
joint interests of father and son as understood by northern 
authors. On the other^he also allows the impression that 
samudava. interpreted in the light of the patrilineal family, 
does not include the wife's stridhana. this constituting a 
separate estate, so that the terms samudava and sadharanam 
coalesced in so far as a common fund could exist only 
between father and son, or between agnatic relations."*'
(2) Partition.
An eldest living ancestor may stay jointly with his 
sons and grandsons all having a joint interest in the aggre­
gate of property. If he dies or one of the descendants dies 
there is strictly speaking no change in the ownership of the 
undivided members except that one of the ownerships has 
ceased. If a brother dies with male issue even his con­
current interest continued to exist as there is an identity
of ownership between father, and sons of predeceased fathers
2
take 'per stirpes' at partition. The aggregate of property
1 z
The term dravva-samudava occurs e.g. in the proemium to 
Yajn.2 ,Ilk 216; I,i,4 and on Yajn.2,126 where it is used 
synonymously with sadharanam dravvam. See Derrett, Jour. Ind. 
Kist., 30(1952) 35 ff. at * 46f•
2
Yaj n.2,120 b(226f.; I,v,l-2): aneka-pitrkanam tu pitrto 
bhaga-kalpana//
is tlius subject to deminutions and enlargements because of
alienation by the father or eldest brother and acquisitions
by family members, but the prospective portion of the
property is also subject to the death and births of davadas.
i.e. the creation and ceasing of ownerships. Partition or
vibhaga is, therefore, an arrangement of these ownerships.
Colebrooke translates: "Partition is the adjustment of diverse
rights (svamvani) regarding the whole, by distributing them
1
on particular portions of the aggregate11. Whereas for 
father and sons or brothers living jointly the term vibhaga 
implies division of the property amongst davadas whose 
ownerships are actually effective, the widow and daughter or 
other davadas have, according to the order prescribed by 
Yajn.2,135-6, ownerships which are under obstruction. In 
the case of the widow and other heirs not belonging to the 
inner circle of aoratibandha davadas or avibhakta davadas 
the term vibhaga is likewise applicable, though here it 
consists of the arrangement of property being the object of 
many ownerships, giving preference to some only of the many 
ownerships. Whose ownership is to be preferred and whose 
ownership is to remain under obstruction is to be decided 
according to propinquity.^
Proemium to Yajn.2,114 (216; I,i,4).
See 1.3. Pawate, op.cit., ch.VII.
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(3) Reunion*
We may summarize here some of* the objects of reunion
as evident from the treatment in early commentaries and the
Mitaksara* Visvarupa had related Yajnavalkya*s text regard- 
1
ing reunion expressly to a previous partition according to
mothers and held that uterine brothers whether divided or
undivided succeed in preference to uterine half-brothers
which shows that the property should remain in the hands of
2
the immediate descendants of the mothers* Medhatithi had
explained the exclusion of the non-uterine half-brothers in
preference of uterine brothers thus: "It may be seen that
the characteristic feature of divided uterine brothers, even
though they are far away from those who live jointly, is
nearness which arises from their identity even though they
are separate." Aparaditya had introduced a commercial
aspect in so far as the proportions of the joint family
property or other property lumped together at reunion are 
1   ^
Yajn*2,139» see above, •
20n Yajn. 2 ,138-9(=2 ,142-3) C i Dh.IC. 1546a, 1547a!: 
sodarasya ca sodara ity-etat tu matrto vibh'aga-pak^e drastav 
yam, nirdhane ca pitari vibhaktaja-visayam/
On Manu 9*211-2 (Dh*K• 1 5 ^ b ) : sodarya-vijbhaktanain saha 
vasatairi mahanika£am avasaty-api sannidhyam vi^esa-karya 
samanyot^tha-vibhaktanam api vijnayata*../ Cp.Jha's tr*
V, 176.
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taken into account at a new partition* But he, too, considers
reunion as a qualification to the rule that sonless widow
1
succeeds to the property of her husband* The commercial
incident does not recur in Vijnanesvarars treatment of
reunion and the exclusion of the sonless widow is one of
2
the main objects. Whereas a son born after partition would
exclude a divided son from inheriting his fatherfs property
including the latter's self-acquisitions earned subsequently 
3
to partition , it is doubtful whether a divided son would 
take the estate of the father in preference to a reunited 
brother of the deceased. A separated son would have to 
reunite with his father to postpone the right of his widow 
and daughter, similarly a divided brother would have to 
reunite with his brother to achieve the same effect. 17e 
have a clear solution to the effect that separated brothers 
do not exclude the sonless widow*
The relations who could reunite are deduced from 
Brhaspati’s text which is taken as exhaustive and not illus­
trative so that only brothers sons and their father, or
k
uncles and nephews could reunite* This corresponds also 
See above,1^ .
Q  ^ _______________ _
On Yajn. 2,138 (2^7i H,ix,l): idanlm svaryatasya putrasya 
patny-adayo dhana-bhaja ity-uktasyapavadamaha/- "The author 
next propounds an exception to the maxim that the wife and 
certain other heirs succeed to the estate of one who dies 
leaving no male issue".
^Yajn. 2,122a•
^On Yajn. 2, 138a and Brhaspati 26,113 (see above lol ) (2 48; 
H , i x , 3 )s samsrstatvam ca na yena kenapi, kintu pitra 
bhratra pitravyena v5"; . . .
2'§2
to the persons which; may normally hold the property as 
avibhakta davadas > and we are left to suppose that all 
relations who had not participated in the previous partition 
but had a residual interest, though it had been under an 
obstruction at the time of partition, could not have a 
right to reunite*
(4) Conclusions.
Vi jnanesVara 1 s discussions reflect the desire to ascer­
tain and to distinguish the various converging interests in 
the property of a person and to arrange them in order of 
priortiy by means of partition and reunion. The limited 
categories of property which could be exempted at partition 
and the strict interpretation of Brhasapti's text on reunion 
indicate to our mind that at the time of Vijnanesvara the 
claims of family members constituted a strong pressure on 
the property acquired by a person. In this context we 
remember the son's claim to the father's self-acquired 
immoveable property which often would be the land received 
as a subsidy for learning and reward for loyalty and was 
most valuable for new brahmanical immigrants from the North. 
The other feature of Vijnanesvara1s discussion in general 
and in respect of his treatment of partition and reunion is 
the tendency to prefer jointness of males, females being a 
sort of beneficiaries of this jointness with no corresponding 
responsibility.
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Chapter VIII
^  /
Trends in Medieval Ivorks after Vijnanesvara 
I. Varadaraja's Vvavahara-nirnava
This author, who composed the Vvavahara-nirnava accord- 
ing to K.V.R. Aiyangar about 1225 A.D. but wrote in any 
case much earlier than Devanabhatta, also adheres to the 
view that through relation to father and mother etc. one is 
an owner of their assets; therefore, what is already one’s 
own is partitioned and Property does not arise from partition.' 
On the text of Harita: jivati pitari... na svatantryam iti/ , 
he commented: "Moreover if we take the view that Property
arises prior to partition the term found in all Smrtis, ’let 
him divide1, fits; otherwise what ought to be said is,
'let him give to his sons', for there would be no Property 
(on the son's part) prior to partition. Similarly taking 
the view that Property arises on partition, an only son 
could not have Property because there will be no partition 
after the death of the parents". And he concludes: "There­
fore merely by entering the kula there is indeed ownership
on the part of the son in the property of the father and
1
Adyar Lib.ed., introd., liii-liv.
2P.413 (Dh.K. Il80b) : evaip pitr-matr-sambandha-prabhpti tad- 
dhane§u te§am tatha svamitvam-astiti/ svasya sato vibhagah/ 
na vibhagat svatvam iti/
^See above, •
! ' ■
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grandfather?f • Recognition of svamva (ownership) and svatva
(Property) does, however, not necessarily diminish the
patriarchal authority. In respect of self-acquired property
of the father the partition takes place at the desire of
the father, whereas ancestral property is to be divided by
2
the will of the father and the son. Though we are left to
guess whether ancestral property may be divided at the sole
will of the son or after father and son have come to an
agreement, the times of partition which follow the tradi-
3
tional pattern tend to confirm that Varadaraja does not 
deem it feasible that the son should act unilaterally.
In Varadaraja*s work rather the patrilineal joint 
family than the nuclear family is emphasized. Sanindas are 
those agnates who live jointly and may comprise four genera­
tions • The relation who is removed five degrees from a 
particular saoinda would be excluded at a partition by those* f
joint or reunited. This conception is based on the texts
5 6of Baudhayana and Devala which hardly allow any rights of
412: kirn ca purvarn eva svatvam-utpannam ity-asmin pak^e
sarva-smftisu vibhajed iti yujyate/ anyatha vibhagat-purvam
svatvabhave putrebhyo dadyad iti vaktavyam/ tathS vibhagat
svatva-pak^e eka-putrasya mSTta-pitror-urdhvani vibhagabhavat
svatvagi na syat/ tena kula-pravesad eva pitr-paitamahe dravye*
pi putrasya svarayam asty-eva//
2 —    . J ,
413: tena svayam-arjite pitur-icchaya vibhagah arjakasya
pradKanyat/ krameigate tu pitur-icchaya" putrecchaya ca vibhagah/
3408, 410, 4l2f.
4
425, 454.
See above, 62.f. .
^See above,
' '■> ^ 
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relations by marriage, and though the sonless widow is
recognized as an heir she would inherit only if her husband
died separate from his agnates within four degrees in ascent 
1
and descent* To this we have apparently an alternative in 
so far as it is stated that the widow may utilize the gifts 
from her husband *up to 2JOOOf at her pleasure, whereas if 
she has received no gifts she may take from the estate only
3000.2
IT. The Smrti-candrika of Devanabhatta. 1-------------  o » «
(l) Definition of Dava Rights of Wife-Widow-Mother•
Rights of Daughter.
Devanabhatta, the author of the Smrti-candrika, who has0 e u 1-----------------------------------------------  c     — -------- 1
written before 1225 A.D* and refers to VijnanesVara and 
— 3Aparaditya, is strongly against women having more rights in 
property than they would have in the traditional patrilineal 
joint family. He combats the definition of dava given by 
Vijnanesvara as the same would imply that the wife partici­
pates in the property of the males as a davada. which, he 
says, is against the sruti dictum that women do not partici-
4pate in dava. Devana sets out to disprove that the woman 
in her capacity as mother or wife is entitled to a share at 
partition as a davada: in his opinion she has only a right
*425, 450.
2450.
3Kane, HDh.I.545f.
See above , J0f)[ •
'o c, 
2 96
/ — rw
to maintenance. The term amsa in the text of the Ya.inavalkva- 
1
smrti is not consistent with the proposition that womene
  f
should get dava. as amsa merely implies a 'share * and not
dava. the same way as members of a trading corporation may
—  2receive ’shares1 which are not dava. In other words Devana 
does not admit the concept of dava where a widow inherits.
The wife does not acquire a right in her husband's property 
by marriage which would entitle her to a full share as a 
davada at a partition between father and sons or between 
sons after the father's death. What she acquires is merely 
a right to maintenance and in this light we have to under­
stand Devana's reference elsewhere to property belonging in
common to husband and wife and property belonging exclusively
3
to women.
Devana makes it clear that according to his view the 
mother does not take a share, if she possesses stridhana 
which is sufficient for her maintenance and for religious 
performances to be observed by her. If she does not possess 
stridhana she receives a share up to the amount necessary for 
her needs. Even if the property is very large, a mother or
*2 ,135; see above, U9{ •
M ys. ed., 623f•* badham yujyate, dayanarha^am tu dayaharit- 
voktir virudhyate, na punar-amsa-haritvoktih amsa-sabdo hi 
bhaga-vacano na daya-vacanah, gana-dravyadav-apy-amso deya 
iti prayoga-darsanat/
7 _
On Manu 9»i99 C65^1 '• s va t an tr ananu j nay a paratantrah striyah 
strl-pumsa-sadHarana-vi11ad atmTya-vittacl va tyaga- 
bhog'adikam na kuryur ity-arthah/
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mothers receive only such share as is necessary to meet
1 - ** their needs. The mention of an ‘equal* share in Yajnavalkya*
text serves only to debar the mother from claiming a larger
share than that of a son, though she may be actually in
need ox it, when the estate to be divided is small. (624f.
Gharpure *s tr. 572.)
f
Vijnanesvara*s definition of dava is disapproved by 
Devana as it would imply that the wife's property is dava 
and thus partible. This would go against the notion that 
there can be no partition between husband and wife. Thus 
also the property which the wife receives solely on account 
of her relationship to her husband from the husband in the 
form of a share at partition would be dava. This would be 
against the sruti.^
Devana perpetuates, as we shall see, the concept of 
common ownership between father and son in respect of all 
property. Property was held in the male line and women are 
confined to their strTdhana having beyond it only a right to 
maintenance. Their stridhana is separate and not partible 
by the agnates, and as dava implies partibility Devana 
accordingly formulates his definition of dava; "According 
to our opinion, however, property which is capable of parti­
tion and which becomes the property of another solely by
2623f
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reason of relationship to another is the meaning of the 
word dava: wife's property which is not capable of parti­
tion is not dava.^
The refusal to accept the wife's or mother's having a 
right beyond the necessary amount of maintenance does not 
prevent Devana from admitting the widow to take the whole
estate of her husband who died separated, unreunited, and 
2
sonless. By marriage ownership of a dependent character
is created for the wife in respect of the whole of her
husband's estate; with the death of the husband the owner-
3
shxp becomes independent in character. If these conditions 
are present, the fsruti-text ' tasraat striyo nirindriya 
adayadih' does not apply to the case of the patnST. i.e. a
wife who is not purchased and is married in the approved
4 —
form of marriage. This would be in the case of the brahma-
marriage, but as most marriages in the South were performed
in the unapproved forms of marriages, the right of the widow
to succeed must have applied only to a limited number of
communities •
*624: asman mate tu vibhagarham sva-svami-sambandhad eva 
nimittad anyasya svam jatam daya-^abdartha iti vibhSTganarham 
patnT-svaip na daya£/ In the beginning of his treatment of 
davabhaea Devana had already defined dava with these words: 
vibhagarha-pitradi-dvaragate dravye v^ddha daya-^abdam ahur 
ity-arthah/- nThe meaning the seniors declare by the word 
dava is this: it is the wealth which came from the father 
and the like, and which admits of partition". Mys.ed.,597*
2
672ff.,ch.on the succession of the sonless widow. Tr. I, 
274-83 (XI,i ,I-58.
3 — —__________________________________675! yady-api vivahad eva pati-dhane krtsne patnya api
svamyam a jivanat paratantratayS" siddham, tatha'pi svatan-
trataya svSmitvSntaram labhyata ity...
^68l; Gharpure's tr., 641.
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The rights of the widow are further qualified by the
1
requirements of chastity and piety , and where these require­
ments were not met, she would receive only maintenance from 
the agnates of her husband, even though the latter had died 
separate•^
A sonless widow is entitled to immoveable property 
only if she has a daughter and her husband was separate from 
his agnates, because immoveable property is said to consti­
tute the means of subsistence for descendants (santanatvrtti)• 
A widow (patni) of a davada who dies unseparated could 
be left in the possession of the self-acquired assets of her 
husband in consequence of her father-in-law, etc., not being 
able to maintain her or being engaged in other concerns.
But she was entitled to maintenance from her father and other 
agnates of her husband provided they take the property of 
the deceased. It is expressly mentioned that the taking 
the wealth of the deceased (i.e. his self-acquisitions 
which he had not exempted at a partition) is the reason for 
maintaining the widow, in other words one should not accept 
the wealth of the deceased and omit the maintenance of the 
widow
1675; tr. 1 ,276(XI,i.,15-18).
^680; tr. 1,282 (XI,i,50).
3676j I,278f. (XI,1,25-7).
Ll  f __  _  •
On Katy.921 (see above, • 677f*)s tat avibhakta-dasayam 
raksana-bharanasamarthesu karyantara-vyagresu va sva^uradisu 
patnya svayam eva jivanartham upattavibhakta-dravya-visayam/•• 
raksanadi-samarthesu svasuradisv-avibhakta-mrta-dhanaV —
• « * w • f
grahisu satsu tair eva grhita-dhanair-bharanam karyam|.tJ 
grahineti sarvatra jyesthadau ^eso drastavyah/ dhana-graha^a- 
nimittitvat bharanasya/*
300
This means that the widow may be allowed to maintain
herself from the acquisitions of her husband, though, of
course, jfche could not be entitled as a davada and her power
was
of disposition^limited• This differs from the Davabhaga 
provisions where a widow receives-subject to a limited 
estate - her whole husband's share in the undivided property 
held by the brothers in quasi-severalty•^ In the Smrti- 
candrikiT the father might still be joint with sons; the 
sons have ownership on account of their birth, and unlike 
the Davabhaga situation their ownerships extends over the 
whole property, until partition makes them exclusive owners 
of their respective shares.
(2 ) The Right of the Daughter and Parents as Heirs.
Community of Ownership between Husband and Wife.
The daughter, though acknowledged to have a proprietary
interest by birth, does not receive a share as dava from her
brothers, but only a share amounting to one fourth of that
2
of a son in order to meet their marriage expenses. The 
daughter as an heir of a person separated from his father 
and brothers might even inherit in the presence of the widow
who does not possess the qualification of 'chastity1
— 3(vvabhicaritva)•
1
See above , ,
2 _
6252 janmana labdha-svamyasya... Gharpure's text reads
janmana svatvanvitasya•••(268)•
■^ 686 (1 ,287; XT,ii*21-7 )i vvabhicaritva. lit. 'going astray'.
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In deviation from the Mitaksara Devana holds that the » •
1
father precedes the mother as an heir to the son. The
answer given by Devana to the question why an order of
precedence has to be stated is significant. Devana quotes
the unidentified author Sambhu who had denied the necessity
to establish an order of precedence, referring to the
community of property between husband and wife; S^ambheEa.
had said that whichever of the spouses would accept anything
would take it for the benefit of both. But Devana says that
whatever is taken by the mother is taken for her own benefit
as in the case of strTdhana and not for the joint benefit
2
of both herself and her husband. In other words we find 
here an instance of weakening of the elementary family where 
community of ownership between husband and wife would often 
in fact occur, a community which Devana will not allow to 
interfere with his patrilineal set-up.
The text of Apastamba which suggested that there can 
be no partition between husband and wife is disposed of by 
Devana with the text of Yajnavalkya which speaks of wives
1687-9-
2 —  /689 5 yat-tuktam sambhuna - ‘madhyaka-dhanatvat dampatyor
yena kenacit g^hyamanam ubhaySrtham iti na viseso vaktavya^'
iti, tad-ayuktam/ matra grhyamanam raatrarthaq? evadhyagnyadi-
stridhana-van nobhayartham iti viieso vaktavya eva/
See Setlur's tr., 1,290.
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receiving a share at partition. On Yajnavalkya 2,52 which 
nre-tli&itaksara had utilized to point to the institution of 
community of ownership between husband and wife and to 
stress that there can be no partition between husband and 
wife, he confines his comment to saying that the person
advancing a loan must have been separated from the person
. . 2  receiving it.
(3) The Rights of the Son, Grandson and Great-grandson.
The preference of the father over the mother is in
consonance with the Davabhaga in common with which Devana
also has references to the spiritual benefit in matters of
succession, thus e.g. when he expressly mentions the great-
grandson as an heir because he is entitled to offer pinda
3
to the great-grandfather. The opponent had objected that
only the son and grandson were entitled by birth to the
4
father’s and grandfather’s estate. Devana refers to the
text of Devala which had enjoined that within four degrees
the sakulvas are sapindas and comments: "Among the undivi-• #
ded sakulvas. i.e. who are undivided in estate, and who are
^Yajn • 2 ,115 C6 13^ • See above, •
^On Yajn. 2,52 • See above, •
3648; tr.I,254 (VIXX.ii).
Ibid; tr.ibid. (VIII, 10) . See also 683f". where the daughter
is said to confer benefits by means of her son who performs 
^raddha.
^See a b o v e , •
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kulvas of the original owner, but born in different lines,
who lived together, i.e. who have resided together for a long
time, partition extends to the fourth, i.e. from the original
1
owner to the great-grandson. Me notice that patrilineal 
joint families comprising four generations are treated as a 
potentiality. The father could also separate some of the 
sons by giving them a share of the estate. These were then 
precluded from succession by the undivided sons. Post­
partition debts incurred by the father are to be paid on
the death of the father by the undivided sons who are alone
2entitled to the property of the father.
Devana accepts that the son (etc.) acquires the property 
of his father by birth, although he is asvatantra during the 
life-time of the father except when the usual causes cited 
in the Smrtis justify a partition: (a) the father is * decayed1
(b) remotely absent, (c) afflicted with a lasting disease,
(d) extremely old, (e) disturbed in intellect, (f) influenced 
by lasting wrath, (g) prodigal, (h) addicted to courses not 
warranted by law.
*648: avibhakta-vibhakVtanam avibhakta-dhananam vibhinna-
santati-jatanam kutastha-kulyanam bhuya^-ciram sahavasatam
a caturthat kutastha-prapautra-paryantam/..•
2 b395s***yatra punah pitra saha vibhakta avibhaktasca putras-
santi, tatra yesam vibhagad-urdhvam pitra! yad-rnam krtam
tat-tair-na deyam avibhakte^u sutesu satsu vibhaktanatfi
vibKagatah pitr-dravyarhatvasyapagatetvena mrte pitari
punah pitr-dravyagrahanat/
I '
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These reasons justify a partition against the will of
the father, but the son may also partition the property if
the mother is past childbearing, the sisters are all
married, and the temporal affections of the father have
1
become extinct, and the father consents*
In respect of ancestral property Devana refers approv­
ingly to a custom which disallows a father or other member 
of a kula to initiate a partition in respect of ancestral
immoveable and other property or to sell or give it away
— 2without the consent of the davadas *
The texts of Yajnavalkya and others on equal ownership 
between father and son amount to this, that each takes an 
equal share if partition takes place* Devana, however, also 
accepts an interpretation of Yajnavalkya1s text which would 
correlate, as we may suggest, the father’d power to alienate 
grandfather’s property with the right of the son to ask for 
partition; that is if the father would alienate ancestral 
property against the wish of the son and without a family 
purpose or other justifying reasons, the son would be entitled
1598 ff.
^On Katy* 853^646; tr • 1 , : • • . loke kula-kramayate
sthavaradau na kas'cit pitradir api riktha-vibhage, api- 4
sabdat vikrayadav-api na prabhutam iyat/ tena tatra 
dayadanumatim-antarejja na vibhiTga-vikraya-danani kuryad iti 
tasyarthah/ See also 645: ksetram tu akhila-dayadanumatya 
vibhajanTyam*.. "Land, however, is to be divided with the 
permission of all the dayadas”*
3 0 5
to ask for partition to safeguard his portion of the 
ancestral property. Like Vijnane^vara, Devana holds that 
the son owns the grandpaternal as well as paternal property, 
i.e. the self-acquired property. In respect of the grand­
father's property there is an identity of svamva and 
svatantrva whereas as regards the father's property the 
father was - none of the causes of extinction of right 
listed above existing - wholly independent. Thus he refuses 
to accept Vijnane/vara's view when he says that self-acquired
property even if immoveable, may be alienated without the
2
consent of the undivided members. This may have motivated 
Devana to omit the division of dava into aoratibandha and 
sapratibandha. because it had little meaning to say the son 
has ownership in ancestral as well as paternal property 
unaccompanied with obstruction, if he had no effective 
rights of interdiction in the paternal property as long as 
the father's powers subsist. Moreover once it was estab­
lished by Devana that the widow or mother was adavada so as
l — / — / M
6^9 : kecit - yathasrutarthatam eva casya vacanasyangi-
kurvanti/ tathaca pautramatrecchaya'pi pitamahadhana-vibhago 
bhavati/ pitur-iccha-matrena ca kramayata-dhana-danadikaip na 
bhavati, tatra putrasyapi svamyabhidhanad ity-ahuh/ tad atrapi 
grahyam, anjasatvat/- "Some however accept a literal signi­
ficance of this CYajnavalkya' si text and say that even at 
the desire of the grandson alone a partition may take place, 
and that at the mere wish of the father a gift etc. of the 
hereditarily descended property cannot take place; since an 
equal right of ownership of the grandson in such property 
has been stated - that may be accepted here also, as being 
reasonable". Gharpure's tr., 602.
^447 * evarp ca svarjitam sthavaram api saptadhikam jnaty- 
ananujnatam deyam/
306
not to be entitled to an actual share at partition, there 
was no need to refer to the concept of anratibandha davada- 
ship of the son. Anglo-Hindu law followed Devana in regard 
to females' shares; it ignored him with regard to inter-
1
diction until the case of Rao Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori
when a de facto agreement was achieved.
It is in consonance with Devana1s approach that the
interpretation of Gautama's text on the sources of acquisi-
—  2tion of property differs from that in the Mitaksara. 
Riktha^is ownership which originated in respect of the 
father's and others' wealth on account of birth. Vibhaga 
does not intend that the ownerships of any relations in the 
aggregate is arranged under the head of individuals whether 
these relations are aoratibandha davadas or sanratibandha 
davadas; vibhaga simply produces exclusive ownership of the 
sons and other male descendants in respect of the father's
•z
(etc.) property.
1(i898) 25 I.A. 54.
^See above, •
7 ^ .   _
603s rikthaip riktarjanam pitradi-dhane svamitvapadakanj 
putradi-janraeti yavat/ tathaca paitrka-dhana-labha- 
hetutvenoktaip gautamenaiva 'uttpatyaivartha-svamitvam 
labhety-acarySh' iti/ uttpattyaiva m^ltur-garbhe t
^arTrotpattyaivety-arthah/ samvibhagaljL pitradi-dhane visesa- 
nis tha-svamitva sampadako vibhaga]^/- T r . 1,217*
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(4) Sapindaship and Marriage, Effects on the Rights of 
the Sonless Widow.
The emphasis which Devana lays on the *orthodox-sastrie * 
criteria for the right of the widow to succeed to the estate 
of her husband, reminds us that in many South Indian 
communities women enjoyed greater independence and that
1
divorce and remarriage of widows were widely practised.
It might have been one of the aims of the author of the
Smrti-candrika to preserve the identity and to emphasize
certain aspects of the 1orthodox-sastrie1 traditions in the
face of widely varying customs which at the same time had
to be fitted satisfactorily into the sastrie system. Such
an aspect would be the patrilineal joint family where women
are svatantra having merely a right of maintenance rather than
a full share and having a qualified right to succeed to the
sonless husband's estate, if he dies separate and unreunited.
Another aspect is the insistence on the approved forms of
marriage which would entitle her to succeed.
Devana admits that the marriage with the maternal uncle's
daughter is permissible, but only if the marriage takes
place in the approved forms, i.e. especially in the brahma-
form. Only in the case of the brahma-marriage does the
sapinda-ship arise for the bride in her husband's family.# *
In the eandharva. and asura-marriage. the latter especially
See e.g. the provisions in the Tesavalamai where remarriage 
is visualxzed as common.
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common in South India, there is no gift of the bride and her 
sapinda-ship in her parental family would continue* Here 
the smrti-texts prohibiting cross-cousin marriages would
1
apply, if her son married his maternal uncle's daughter*
Such customary marriages moreover must have had effects in 
the property sphere, that is a maternal uncle might act to 
the prejudice of his own son's proprietary interest - who 
was the true representative and heir in the /astric system -
in favour of his sister's son, who was f&lt to be a close
2 —
sapinda* The purpose of the brahma-marriage was thus to
sever the sapinda-relationship and make the wife irrevocably6 *
a member of her husband's patrilineal kula* Devana notes——  e
the objection of 'some* to the widow's right to succeed to 
her husband's estate because the estate is to be enjoyed by 
relations of the husband, which seems prejudiced if the 
widow inherits. Devana obviates this objection but at the 
same time makes sure that the property should be spent for 
purposes beneficial to the husband under the guidance of the
3
priest and guru of the husband's family.
1 Z
Cit. in Krtva-kal♦. introd.to Grhastha-kanda. 23 f.,fn.l. 
Devana shares this opinion with Jladhavacarya.
^Cp• above,32 •
3 r —675! etad-uktaip bhavati - sthavarenapi sahitam kjrtsnam
aijisaip adaya dhana-sadhyaiji stry-adhikara-sraddah-purtadikam
danadikai£ ca patyur-atmanaica sreyas-ifadhanam karma-jatam
pati-paksiya-rtvig-acaryadi-puras-saraijj patnya gfahita-
dhananusarena karyara iti/ etaSca yat-kai^eid uktam - patni-
g^ phitaiji dhanaip yogya-pati-pak^a-bhogyajp dhanikanupakarakaip
vj*tha yasyatiti na patnT pati-dhana-bhfaginTti, tat asiddha-
hetukatvad$-deyam/
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III. The Parasara-madhavTva of Madhavacarya
Madhavacarya who composed the Parasara-rnadhaviva
1 ^ f
between 1330-1385 A.D. adopts Vijnanesvara's definition
of dava and his division of dava into aoratibandha and
2
sapratibandha. The son acquires ownership in his father's 
property by birth. Yet while the father is living the sons 
should not divide the wealth, as they are, on account of 
their dependence in respect of wealth and religious acts, 
incompetent to make a partition. Independence in wealth
3
means independence in giving or receiving property.
Though the son has no right to ask for partition except in 
the usual cases where the father's rights cease, the father 
is nevertheless dependent on the consent of the son when he 
deals with the immoveable property, whether ancestral or 
self-acquired by the father. The consent may be dispensed 
with in times of distress, for purposes of the family and
JKane, HDh. 1,330.
2478.
479 f •s yady-api janmanantaram eva putrah pitr-dhane 
svamitvam pratipannah tathapi pitari jTvati tad-dhanaip na 
vibhajeran/ yato dharmarthayor-asvatantryad-vibhaga-karane' 
narhal^/ arthasvatantryam tad adana-pradanayor asvatantryam 
- iti/- See the text of HarTta 'jTvati pitari...', cit. 
above, • arthadana is explained as upabhoga« 'consumption 
of wealth', visarea as vvava. 'expenditure', and aksepa as 
bhrtyadelj sik§artham adhiksepadih, 'reprimanding etc. of 
servants etc. for the purpose of instruction.1
Zj.________ _ _ _ _
485s sthavaradau tu svarjite'pi putradi-paratantryam eva... 
Madhava, a Southerner, does not hesitate to call the father 
paratantra. a frankness which had no express sanction in the 
Smrtis•
O n
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1
for religious purposes. Thus property is common between 
father and son and the term pitr-dravvam in Manu1s text on
exemption of self-acquisitions typifies the undivided
. 2 property.
IV. Madana-ratna-pradipa (Vyavahara-vivekoddvota)
This work which was compiled under the patronage of
king Madana-simha between 1375-1450 A.I). is an attempt to
synthesize the views of the orthodox-sastrie school with tie
views proposed in the Mitaksara. The definition of dava
suggested by Vijnanesvara the subdivision of dava into
apratibandha and sapratibandha is retained. Devala’s dictum
which expressly said that there is asvamva in the case of
the son as long as the father is nirdose - without fault -
is looked upon as merely expressing 'dependence* (paratantrva)
an explanation of the dictum which is maintained by most
authors of the Mitaksara school. Once more it is mgde clear
that ownership exists in the father's as well as in grand-
3
paternal wealth. But the question whether the son's right 
is based upon sastric authority or on the secularity of 
property is resolved with a compromise which shows that the 
Mitaksara view that property can be acquired by popularly/
1Ibid.
2 —558: pitr-grahanam-avibhaktopalaksanartham/
3 — * -3232 tatrasvamyam-asvatantryam ity-artha'vaseyah saty api
nirdose pitari-putrapautranam janmana arabhyaiva pitr-
pitamahadhane svamitvasya loka-siddhatvat/
recognized means was not completely victorious: though.
ownership is a secular institution, the cognizability of
the relationship between property and owner can be deduced
from the sastra.^ Riktha is described as apratibandha
dava and samvibhaga as sauratibandha dava* This is in
accordance with the Mitaksara. but it is significantly*
added: MIt is to be understood that the cause of property
is birth in the case of apratibandha dava, whereas in the 
case of sapratibandha dava it is essentially the disappear-
I   /
ance of the obstruction. Vijnanesvara had implied that the 
right of the sapratibandha davadas are ineffectual and 
dormant, but the author of the Madana-ratria-pradlpa makes 
it clear that before the removal of the barrier by parti­
tion or death, the rights of the sapratibandha davadas are 
non-existent for practical purposes.
(2) The Rights of the Apratibandha Davadas.
The times of partition are in accord with the sastric 
precedents and there is no indication that the son may 
divide against the father1s will unless one of the reasons 
entitling a son to ask for partition is present* One may 
ask to what the rights of the sons amount. The authors of 
this work consider this not as a matter to be discussed in 
the chapter which deals primarily with partition of dava *
A right of the son not being given we find that the rights
to prevent alienations by the father are discussed in the 
chapter on dattapradanikam. This is following the example
^   r
of the Smrtis, whereas Vijnanesvara, as we have seen, 
brings the discussion in the chapter on dlvabhaga. The 
text 1 divided or undivided, sapindas are equal in regard to» o
immoveable property. No individual among them has the 
power to give away, or mortgage or sell it* refers in the 
opinion of the author to ancestral immoveables, presupposes 
only prima facie the necessity of consent, and serves in 
fact as an argument a fortiori: "Divided coparcerners even
are equal, how much more undivided coparcerners? The 
employment of the word 'divided* is for the sake of the 
rule *how much more?', but does not purport to confer owner­
ship to the divided. The uselessness of partition would 
be the result"*
As regards self-acquired immoveables and slaves etc.
we find again the rule of the Mitaksara. i.e. they can only
*
2be alienated with consent of the adult sons.
__ 3
In the text attributed to Vyasa is explained with the 
a fortiori rule; the first sloka is corroborated by the
1 ^ ^  _
210: 'vibhakta avibhakta va sapiij^ah sthavare samah/ eko
hy-anTsah sarvatra danadhamana-vikraye//* vibkakta 'pi 
sthavare samah kimutavibhakta iti kaimutika-nyaya- 
pradar^anartham vibhakta-grahaparp na tu vibhaktanam tatra 
svamitvam astiti pratipadanartham/ vibhagasya vaiyarthyapattelY
2  _ _  ^  ^ ^
svarjitam api sthavarara dasadikaip ca putresu prapta-
vyavaharesu tad anumatyaiva datavyam/
3
^"Immoveable property, and bipeds, even though self-acquired 
shall not be given nor sold without the consent of the sons.
- Those who are born, those that are unborn, those that are 
in the womb - all these require livelihood and there shall 
be no gift nor sale”. See above,
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second. The exceptional powers of the father to alienate 
immoveable property are clearly defined: "In emergency con­
ditions for the nourishment of the family, for the necessary 
sraddha ceremonies of the deceased forefather, for the 
proper performance of the marriage of the unmarried girls, 
and for religious purposes, a gift etc, of the ancestral 
immoveables may be made even without the consent of sons 
and brothers etc."^
V*. . The Sarasvat I-vilas a of Prataparudradeva
(l) Definition of Dava. Partition, The Right of the Widow.
The Sarasvati-vilasa was composed in the first quarter
3 —of the l6th century according to MM P,V. Kane Dava is
defined as 'a thing common to father and son1 and 'a thing
k
belonging to the father which is fit for partition1: The
author quotes a text by Brhaspati which is only found in 
his work and according to which dava is derived from the
1Ibid.
2 —. — —   /
Ibid.: apat-kale kutumba-posanartham avasyaka-pitr-
sraddhadharya- (or -pathya-, another var• lect.:
-^raddharyarthaya-) kanya-vivahadi-dharma-karyarthai£i putra-
bhratrady-anumatir-ahito'pi kramagata-sthavara-danadikam
kuryat/
322&.i.4i3.
4 - - —  —Paras. 5 *8 : dayo nama pita p u t r a - s aaiuday a - dr avy am/
vibhaktavyaqi pitjr-dravyaig dayam-ahur-manTsjlna iti smrteh//
vibhaktavyam vibhagarhaiji// • . . vibhSgarham pitr-dravyam
dayam-iti//
Prataparudradeva thinks of daya as covering both reli­
gious as well as secular inheritance, i.e. with the division 
of dava = ’property*, the separate performance of religious 
acts, e.g. the maintenance of a separate housefire and the 
separate performance of religious acts like the performance 
of the five great sacrifices of a householder (nanca-
— /W> \ t —mahava.inas) , and the sraddha-ceremonies are effected. In 
the case of persons who are very poor a separation of reli­
gious duties or acts takes place, and the separation is 
effected by mere declaration of intention. In the case of
people with wealth the division of religious duties follows
2 **- —.the division of wealth. The author of the Sarasvati -vilasft
frequently refers to Bharuci, a pre-Vijnane^vara writer who 
had already examined a definition of dava similar to that 
which was later adopted by VijnanesVara - in spite or because 
of its implications. Bharuci declined to accept the impli­
cations .which made it appear as if women could be davadas«
1 —  -r- ~Para.6 . B^h•26,1(195)• dadati diyate pitra putrebhyas- 
svasya yad-dhanam/ tad dayam iti// "He gives; that property 
of his own which is given by a father to his son is daya11.
He explains! "The nominative case of the word 'father* is 
to be understood, - That property which a father gives to 
his son." Thus the word Dava has an objective derivation; 
and by this, its general definition is, that Dava is that 
kind of property which is common to father and son."
2Paras. 8ff., l8,22ff.
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which was against sruti.* Prataparudradeva discussed the
question whether the term dava can be formally applied to
the term stridhana and he confirms the attitude of the
author of the Smrti-samgraha; 11 ...that wealth which is
obtained through the father and the wealth which is obtained
■* 2through the mother, may be both spoken of by the term dava11.
According to the northern school, represented e.g. by 
~» / 3
Dharesvara , a widow of a man who died separated and sonless 
could inherit the property of her husband only if she sub­
mitted to nivoga. otherwise she was to get maintenance. But 
the Sarasvatx-vilasa does not go so far and allows in such 
a case the widow who is a dharma-patni. i.e. married accord­
ing to the brahma form of marriage, as an heir on account
k
of her nearer propinquity with the husband.
This is in accord with the provisions in the Smrti-
candrika which the Sarasvati-vilasa generally follows closely
in the matter of rights of women. Thus the share of women
at partition is not characterised by enjoyerness of dava
(na dava-bhaktvam) but is merely meant for their maintenance
5
and necessary religious performances.
^Paras. 19-21.
^Paras. 21, 33TT•, 37*
7
See above , ISlM ; cit.in Vlramitrodava. 633*k
Paras. 399i 478-539.
^Paras. 114-6.
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(2) The Rights of the Sons*
The right of the sons to ask for partition of the
ancestral property even against the will of the father is 
1
admitted , though again the impression arises that through
the intensive discussion of the traditional reasons of
partition earlier, the right of the son is not absolute and
that the orthodox reasons are accepted as the normal and
ideal causes of partition* If the father proceeds to dispose
2
of his self-acquired property the son cannot interdict*
In respect of the paternal grandfather’s property the son
has a right to interdict the alienation, and the right to
ask for partition merely lends, in our view, emphasis to 
3
this right.
VI. . Mitra Misra's Viramitrodava-vvavaharaprakasa *
(l) Definition of Dava *
Mitra Miira's literary activity has been placed by
l±
MM P.V* Kane between 1610 and 1640 A*D* In the davabhaga
section of the Vvavahara-nrakasa he summarizes the views of
preceding authors on the meaning of dava« svatva, and
svamitva, and defends the position of the Mitaksara school
against the doctrine of the followers of the Davabhaga *
In the course of his discussions he modifies the Mitaksara
system.
1
Para* 220*
2 —cParas.221 f .: pitrarjite tu na nisedhadhikarah/ tat- 
paratantratvat// anumatis-tu kartavya)
3 — —. /
Para.222: ••.paitamahe tu dvayos-svamyam-avisistam iti
nif edhadhikaro ’py-astiti vis§.sah//
^HDh. 1,446.
° i
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We have referred to Mitra Mis/ra*s objections to
_ r___ __ _  — 1
Jimutavahana’s etymological derivation of dava# Mitra
/ _  —  2 Misra’s definition follows its precedent in the Mitaksara#
The definition is extended with reference to the dictum of
the Njghantu which says: "The property of the father which
*5 /is to be divided, the sages call heritage”. Mitra Misra
tells us that the word •father* refers to anv relation. 
Vibhaktavvam (to be divided) is explained as vibhagarham = 
•capable of partition*, i.e. it is not necessarily to be
4divided thus covering the case of an only son. Dava is of
5
two types: apratibandha and sapratibandha. In another work
of his, Mitra Mi^ra had defined dava as dhanam svami-%
sambandhavasal-labdha-dhanam: "dava is the property which is
acquired by way of relationship to the owner
(2 ) The Relationship between Father and Son. Putratva.
The Effect of Partition.
The author refutes the objections of predecessors who 
were against the notion of common right between father and
*See above,133 •
2 / /411: daya-sabdascayam svami-sambandha-matrady-atra dravye
svatvaiji tad-rucjhya vadati/- "The term "heritage** again, is
said to be applied to the property to which (one*s) right
accrues solely by reason of (his) relation to the owner."
Setlur's tr. II, 275 (Ch.I.,2.).
2     _
Ibid•: vibhaktavyam pitr-dravyam dayam ahur-manisinah/
Ibid.: tr.X,275f .(1 ,3).
5412; tr.11,276 (l,5 ).
^Commentary called Viramitrodava, on Yajn.2,114, p*568.
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son and who pleaded for the right of the son as accruing
on the extinction of the rights of the father so that dava
is obstructed - the existence of the father forming an 
1
obstruction. We have already referred to one of the 
arguments directed against the notion of common ownership, 
namely that the sruti prescribes the establishment of a 
sacred fire with one’s own wealth as soon as a son is born* 
Another argument is the rule of the impartibility of gifts 
to a son by a father which would be unreasonable as a gift 
requires the consent of all sons. The prohibition therefore 
would be superfluous, as what has been given by the father
h  2with consent of the sons has been given to all.
Mitra Misra answers these objections in the following 
way: if only on the extinction of the right of the father
the right accrues to the son, the sons would be incompetent 
to perform the ceremonies enjoined by the Vedas which can 
be performed only with one’s own wealth, and the same 
conflict with the passage of the sruti would arise, the 
injunction of the sruti being applicable even if the father 
is alive. Permission to sacrifice, given by the father to 
the son or vice versa by the son to the father, does not 
generate property. The competence arises out of the fact 
that both have ownership, in the case of the sons permission
1T r. II, 277 (1,6 ). 
2I,277 (1,7).
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being required, whereas, in the case of the father, on
account of his independence no such permission is required.*
The second objection is refuted with the reference
that one can assume the son's permission and these texts
only establish the invalidity of the affectionate gift of
immoveable property. Or one can say gifts other than
immoveables may be given by the father without the permission
2of the son by reason of his independence.
On a text of i/ankha-Likhita another dispute had arisen.
The text runs: "The sons shall not divide the riktha while
the father is alive; although ownership is subsequently
acquired by them, the sons are certainly incompetent by
3
reason of the absence of independence". Various interpre­
tations had been offered by predecessors of Mitra Mi^ra. 
Devana had explained it thus: the sons - though acquiring 
the property of the father (pitr-dhanam) immediately after
4>
their birth - shall not divide the paternal estate except 
at his desire. As they have no independent wealth and 
religious duties , the sons are incompetent to make a 
partition
14l8; II, 284f. (ch.I, 23f.).
24l8; tr.I, 286 (ch.I, 28f.).
^Tr.H, 279 (ch.I,ll.). 414: na jlvati pitari putra rikthaip 
bhajeran/ yady-api svamyaip pascad-adhigatam tair anarha eva 
putra artha-dharmayor-asvatantryad iti/
4
Ibid •
3^0
A different interpretation was ascribed to the Kalnataru; 
"Although ownership is subsequently acquired in the wealth 
gained by the sons through learning etc. without making use 
of the paternal property, still by reason of the indepen­
dence during the lifetim^of the father in respect of property 
and religious duties, there is no absolute ownership even 
in the property acquired, - then what ownership can there 
be in the father*s estate"?
Mitra Misra prefers the interpretation submitted by 
Devana* His argument for his choice does not seem very 
strong, but is understandable, if it is understood that 
1 cumbersomeness * in sastric interpretations tends to destroy 
the value of an argument. The interpretation given in the 
text ascribed in the Kalpataru makes it in his opinion
necessary to infer many terms (bhuvah-padadhvaharah) like% *
"acquired by learning etc.11 whereas according to the inter­
pretation of the Smrti-candrika which imports the term 
"birth" only, one has to infer less terms (alpadhvahiarah) .
2
Moreover "birth" is suggested by its connection with sons.
Nevertheless the fact that Mitra Misra has to tackle 
such arguments shows how far the views of the Dayabhaga 
school had gained influence according to whom the father 
may even retain two shares of the self-acquisitions of the
1Tr. II, 279; ch.I,11.
2(tl8 ; tr.H, 285 (ch.1 ,26.).
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son.^ Mitra Mi^ra holds that because the father acquires
the son and the property there is no obstacle of taking two
2shares of his own acquisitions.
Mitra Mi^ra defends the concept of common ownership 
between father and son and does not seem to reject that the 
son does not 1 own1 the self-acquired property of the father,
as MM P.V. Kane suggests in his notes on the edition of the
— 3 /Vvavahara-mavukha. On the other hand Mitra Misra tries to
mitigate the direct import of the text which prohibits the
alienation of self-acquired property by the father and
merely uses it as an a fortiori argument for the necessity
of consent by the sons when the father alienates immoveable
ancestral property.4
Nor does Mitra Misra accept JXmutavahana's theory of
* factum valet1 for validating the alienation of immoveable
property by one undivided brother (or by the father) without
the consent of the davadas except in the cases specified by
texts: it would be a mistake to see a spiritual object in
a rule of positive law, if the rule is directed to 'seen*
(^drsta, secular or rational) and not to 'unseen' (adrsta^,« e # —  7 —  . • •— T  7
spiritual) objects. If the rule were only to entail the
Colebrooke's tr. 11,65-6. 71-2f H , 4 6  (read: competent to
sell, give, or abandon the 'son' not 'property1,}.
2444, 447; tr. IX, 321f ., 325f.
5At p.23.
458! yady-api svayam-arjitam ity-anena paitamahe kaimutika-
nyayena putranumatyavasyakata pradarsita/
moral offence of distressing the family, as Jimutavahana
maintains, then even in the case where all davadas consent,
1
the objection of distressing the family could arise.
The Viramitrodaya covers much space to work out the relation­
ship between father and sons and further male descendants.
The ancient notion of putratva which implies that the son 
inherits or is charged with the duties and obligations of 
the father is combined with incidents of the rights of the 
sons as laid down in the Mitaksara. The cause of ownershipj
in respect of father's and grandfather's property is
putratva rather than mere birth. This would affect the
concept of partition and make partition between father and
sons sui generis * Thus Mitra Mi^ra refers to the text of
HarTta which suggested to our mind that even after partition
- or rather advancement - the mutual rights of father and
2
son subsisted. A son may be disqualified because of 
excommunication or physical and psychical causes, but his 
ownership is not affected by partition or reunion. The 
reason is, we may say, that the sons are primarily and in 
preference to all other family members, especially the 
widow, qualified to be entrusted with ownership of the 
father's property with all rights and duties flowing therefrom
1460; tr.XI, 3k 1 (ch.II,22).
2 __ _
See above ,139,15^. 540: . ♦ .Haritena ca vibhagottaram api pitra-
putrayoh paraspara-dhanadhikara-pratipadanac-ca/
3 _ __ _
Ibid.: kinca pitradi-dravye-svamye putratvadikam f
evapatitatvalli-visistam prayojakam na tu samsrstatva visistam
api gauravat/ T r . II, k31 (IV,12j.
323
Thus even if all the sons are separated and not reunited
the wife would not succeed. If only some of the sons are
separate and others remained joint all would succeed jointly.
This is only qualified by the rule of Brhaspati relating to
the son born after partition who would then, together with
the sons who remained joint, debar the separated sons from 
2
succeeding. This differs from the position in the Smrti-
0
candrika, where partition extinguished the right of the
3
separated son in the presence of unseparated sons. Because
of the overriding effect of putratva a separated son had to
pay the post-partition debts of the father even out of his
4own property in the absence of paternal property.
(3) Rights of the Undivided Davadas. Effects of a Partition
between Collaterals.
/
Mitra Misra defends the conception of common rights of
undivided brothers over the estate which was disputed by
most of the followers of Jimutavahana who maintained that
undivided brothers held separate rights over the estate.
^Ibid.: tacca sarvesam samsrstanam-asamsrstariam ca tulyam
iti sarvesam eva putradinam visesena tad-dhana-grahanam- 
ucitam/ na ca vibhagena pitradi-dravyarhatvapagamah sarvesu 
putresu vibhaktasamsrstesu-putravad-bharyyadlnam eva tatra 
dhana'dhikarapatteh/
2Ibid.
See above, (S&fn.l.. The consequence was that the separated son 
would be free from paying the post-partition debts of the 
father.
^Katy. 559C266]: vibhaktalj putro vibhagahantaram pitr-krte 
rne tisthati tasmin-mrte tad-dhanara na grhnTyat kim tu.« . t — / * 0 / • *» **
dhanikSya dadyat/ yadi kincit tato1visistam bhavati tarhi 
grhnTyat/ pitr-dhanabHave riktha-grahanarlahitye 1 pi sva- 
dhanam dadyad ity-arthah/
Mitra Mi/ra does not follow the view that 'ownership' (svamva) 
inheres in the owners jointly nor that 'property' (svatva) 
inheres in the whole estate and is determined by the owners* 
His proposition is that rights (properties and ownerships) 
exist separately in each davada by reason of the sameness 
of relation: "When partition takes place amongst davadas.
the right of each ceases to the extent of that which is
allotted to the co-owners, the same way as in the case of
1 / death, retirement etc." According to Mitra Misra this is
the meaning of 1vyavasthapanam' = 'adjustment' in the 
—  —  2Mitaksara. If this were not the case one would speak of 
the production of right to a specific portion, but it is 
not the production of a different right which is to be 
assumed•
According to Jimutavahana the svatva of a co-owner is 
not ascertained before partition; thus there is actually 
no possibility of making use of the property, because one 
does not know which property is one's own. Mitra Misra does 
not accept the concept of fractional ownership before par­
tition which would justify the co-owner to alienate his undi­
vided share as such without the consent of the other 
cotowners. He follows Raghunandana in maintaining that the
property of each co-owner accrues to the whole estate, but
1 — ~ — — — —
431! praty-eka-vrttini sambandhavisesat svatvani svamyani
ca.../ Tr*l, 305; ch.I,57* See Raghunandana, above, »
^See above , ^ *69 •
3 2 5:r
does not follow him, as we have seen, in saying that Property
is replaced by a set of different properties at partition.
Neither does he accept the solution offered by the author
of the Svatva-vic^ra who said that pre-existing property was
1
replaced by different properties with retrospective effect.
Mitra Misra's conception of partition differs from 
Vijnanesvara's in so far as the latter makes it appear that 
in the share allotted to a co-owner at a partition, svamva 
of the other co-heirs continues to exist, though it becomes
ineffectual ownership 'accompanied with an obstruction',
/ 2whereas according to Mitra Misra ownership as such ceases.
(4) Mothers' Shares at Partition.
During the lifetime of the father no distinction between 
his wives with sons and wives without sons is to be made in 
matters of partition. But after the father's death the 
.ianani - the mother with child - is alone entitled, while 
stepmothers without child receive only maintenance, i.e. 
food and clothing, Mitra Misra infers from the use of the 
term 'wives' in Vyasa's and Yajnavalkya's text (2,115) that 
only at a partition during the lifetime of the father his 
sonless wives are entitled to shares equal to that of sons.
1This, however, made the consent of the other non-alienating
co-owners also necessary. See J.D.M. Derrett, 28 (1956)
BSOAS, 488 8c fn.ll; 489 & fn3.
2 . _ —   / /431! svatvani svamyani nasyanti.../
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At a partition between sons after the death of the father
the use of the term ‘mother1 in Yajnavalkya*s text points
1 /to the exclusion of sonless step-mothers. Here Mitra Misra
follows the view of Jimutavahana who also held that a son-
2
less step-mother is only entitled to maintenance.
Thus we get three views amongst the sastric medieval 
authors on the rights of wives and mothers etc. as regards 
shares at partition between sons: (a) the mother etc. is
entitled to a regular share equal to that of a son. This 
is the view represented by Visvarupa, Vijnanesvara, 
Aparaditya, Varadafaja, Madhavet, Madana, S^ulapani and 
Balambhatta. The term ‘mother* in Vyasa's text is used as 
standing for father's wives generally. Thus mothers, step­
mothers, grandmothers and step-grandmothers are entitled to 
a share•
(b) Mothers etc. are entitled to maintenance only, that is
they take only as much property as is necessary for their
maintenance; they may take an equal share when the ancestral
property is small, while they take only as much as would be
necessary for their maintenance when the property is large.
This is the view e.g. of the Smrti-candrika « and the 
^  _  4Sarasvati-vilasa • The tendency to exclude women from a
1453 f.; tr.H,333f. (ch.XI ,i , 19.) •
2 —Colebrookt* s tr. 1X1,29-30. See also Jagannatha,
Vivada-bhangarnava. vol.2, 244.
3
See above , <2.34 •
4See above , 315
3 2?
share is also supported by Haradatta , and is recommended
_ _  —  2 
in the Vvavahara^sS’ra and Vivada-candra •
(c) Mothers are entitled to a share, but not the wives of 
the father who are sonless. This is also the view of the 
Davabhaga. It became obliterated in the British administra­
tion of Mitaksara law, though it was retained in administra-*
tion of Davabhaga law.
(5) Reunion•
Contrary to the strict attitude in the Mitaksara and 
Smrti-candrika in respect of the persons who might reunite,A
the VTramitrodava takes, it seems, a broader view of the
3
possibility of reunion. The text of Brhaspati does not
exhaustively enumerate the persons who might reunite. The
conditions for reunion are that jointness and partition have
4preceded the particular agreement to reunite. For instance 
Mitra Mi^ra refers to the possibility of the reunion with
the daughterfs son which, he says, is universally established
5
in practice. Thus he also considers a reunion possible
*See above , 2.Z-9 .
2
See Kane, HDh,III, 605i where the texts are cited.
3
See above , ]
4 „ _
512: tasmad yesam paraspara-vibhagas-tesam eva tat-purvakah 
paraspara-sarjisargo ,py-abhisandhi-visesa-purvako na paraspara- 
dravya-mi/rikarana-matrena vanigadinara ivety- ... Tr.H,401 
(ch.HI, i , 13) •
5 _  __
Ibid.: yatas-tatha sati sakala-loka-vyavahara-siddo
dauhitradi- samsargo fpy-anyayyah syaTt/
328
between mother and son. He supports this with the argument 
that though the mother did not participate directly in the 
partition she nevertheless may get a share at the choice of 
the father at a partition during his lifetime and since she
1
receives a share at partition after the death of the father.
The reason which may have induced Mitra Misra not to 
interpret the text of Brhaspari dtrictly may be found in the 
fact that unlike Vijnanesvara and Deva^ta he was not con­
fronted to the same extent with agnates tending to separate 
as soon as possible and relations by marriage. In the South 
even among Brahmanas there was in practice a close nexus of 
marriage and property ties between a person and his mother's 
brother's families and his father1s sifter's families. In 
the North on the whole the agnatic system of inheritance 
and exogamy was more widely practised. During the time of 
Mitra Misra families stayed together longer so that reunion 
between separating cousins, etc. would be practical. As 
long as the property remained in the hands of joint agnates 
there was no harm to widen the circle of agnates who could 
reunite provided they had participated in a preceding parti­
tion. Mere mixing of property as in the case of traders
^Ibid.: vastutas-tu saksan-matra vibhagabhave’pi jTvad-vibhage 
pitricchaya tasya api bhaga-sadbhavad-ajTvad-viblxage tu 
sak§ad eva vibhfagoktelji prTtyafbhisandhi-viiesa-purvakam 
putraih saha samsarga-sambhavat/ ••• atra brhaspati-vacanat- 
paryyam na matradi-nivrttau/
would not do. Mitra Mi^ra does not tell us how a partition 
between a man and his daughter’s son can be contemplated.
We may visualize a case where a person having no male issue 
separated his daughter's son in expectation of male issue.
If this did not materialize the grandfather might resort to 
reunion with his daughter's son. The admission of the 
daughter's son does not necessarily imply the strengthening 
of claims of relations by marriage, because the son-in-law 
would either be a kind of ghar-.iamai having little or no 
connections with his relations by birth or would live in 
another village allowing one of his sons to substitute for 
male issue of his father-in-law.
The possibility of a mother's reuniting with her son 
is in accord with the tendency of Mitra Misra to place all 
property deriving from agnates in the charge of agnates; in 
other words Mitra Misra encourages the practice of mothers 
living under the protection of one of their sons.
VII. . Nilakantha's Vyavahara-mayukha.
(l) Dava and Reunion.
Mitra Misra's contemporary defined dava as property
which is not reunited and is partible: asamsrstam vibhajanTyam
dhanam dayah/ Dava is not wealth which is brought together
1
Ibid. The necessity of a previous partition was discarded 
by the 'moderns' (navyah) as recorded in the VivITda-cintamani 
in connection with Brh.*s text. Dh.K.1556b, 1557a* See 
Jha's tr., 288f. We may assume that such 'reunions' were 
conceivable only in an agnatic pattern of kinship.
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into a common fund for the sake of profit etc. Similarly
dava is not the wealth which is thrown together by reuniting
members of the family. According to the opinion of some
authors referred to by Nxlakantha, property is divided
unequally at the time of a fresh partition after reunion, a
view based on the fact of the possible .inequality of shares
1
thrown together at reunion. This is like in the case of 
a partnership between merchants who may have contributed 
unequal shares and participate in the profit accordingly.
Other authors referred to by Nilakantha, would assign equal 
shares at a fresh partition notwithstanding unequal contri­
bution at reunion.
The word pitr in the dictum of the Nighantu refers to 
» » •
2  V  - /
any relative. Nxlakantha follows here Vijnanesvara and also
takes up his classification of dava in apratibandha and
sapratibandha d~ava.
Nxlakantha holds that only persons who were parties to
the original partition could reunite. As illustration for
persons with whom it was possible to reunite he mentions 
3
one 1s wife , paternal grandfather, brotherfs grandson,
4
paternal uncle* s son "and the like11 •
*See 147; tr.l69*
93 s Vibhaktavyam pitr-dravyam dayam-ahur-ma^Lsinah iti/ pitr- 
padam sambandho-matropalaksanam//
• % c
She could receive a share from her husband when he divided 
the property between his sons. Apastamba's doctrine that 
there could be no partition between husband and wife was
evaded with reference to the text of Yajn. which had declared 
'wives should be made equal sharers' (Yajn.2,115 and Yajn.2 ,52) 
4
146; tr.l69*
I J
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If we take these illustrations as a reflection of the 
constitution of the family at the time of partition, we 
find that families are within contemplation which comprise 
three or four generations of male agnates.
(2) Sonfs Right to ask for Partition.
The son's right to ask for partition seems to be quali­
fied by smrti-provisions which allow a father to be deposed 
on grounds of vice or senility. In his comment on the text 
of £>ankha-Likhita - which enjoins that the eldest son should 
take over the management of the affairs of the family if the 
father is incapable to carry them out, or a younger son with 
consent of the brother - Nilakantha holds that partition
should take place with the consent of him who is able to
applies
maintain; but tfrhere all are able, no restriction to partitionj. 
But this obviously refers to a situation where the father 
is disqualified for certain reasons and deals with the possi­
bility of partition between brothers.
On the other hand Nilakantha goes beyond the Mitaksara 
in holding that the father is not independent even in respect
of ancestral moveables and thus may not alienate them, but
2
may . only regulate their use.
As regards partition between brothers Nxlakantha intro­
duces the concept of notional partition which is effected
*96; tr.89* 
290f.; tr.80f.
rJ2
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by a mere declaration like: "X am separated from youiM
Severance, he says, is merely a particular state of the 
mind and this declaration only manifests that state of mind* 
The question what constitutes an unequivocal declaration of 
intention to separate and the presumption of the status of 
the other members when one separates, has been the topic 
of many cases in Anglo-Hindu law.
1 86; -Lr. 86
333
0NCLUSI0N5
We witness in the post-Mitaksara texts a persistent
emphasis on the incidents of the patrilineal and patriarchal
joint family. The institution of community of acquisition
and common ownership between husband and wife recedes for
practical purposes. Jointness of spouses in the property
sphere is confined to the requirements for the joint perfor-
1
mance of religious acts. This is the effect of patrilineal 
jointness and the emphasis on the father-son relationship 
in the property sphere. Rights of women tended to be 
restricted and the shares at partition do not amount, accord­
ing to some authors, to shares equal to that of sons, but 
to provisions of maintenance. The concept of common owner­
ship between father and son in respect of all the father's 
property and the son's self-acquisitions, which are also
part of the common estate and could be exempted at partition,
2
-was retained. Perhaps we may say that there was no need
1 —
The Viramitrodava clearly says that the wife's right in
respect to the husband's estate is technical (aupapattika)
that i& it fits the purposes of religious acts which have
to be performed jointly by the spouses. The right is not
real and mutual as in the case of brothers and at the death
of the husband the technical ownership of the wife lapses.
P.510; tr.399(ch.Ill,i ,13)» Kane, HDh,III„ 603jfn.ll40. We
notice that Mitra Mi^ra does not cite as an example the
mutual right of father and son; the son is uaratantra and
his rights tend to be subordinate rather than co-ordinate
unlike in the case of brothers.
2 _
Cp. the comment by Sayana on the Taittiriva-samhita and
Aitareya-aranvaka. above. Cp. also V^caspati Mi^ra,
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2 (Contd•)
Vvavahara-cintamani, para. 92, 9-10 (tr.53); para.l44,
7 (tr.63)« The status of the family members was decisive 
for the nature of the property; if it was stated in a 
plaint that the property was acquired by the defendant 
while he was joint with the plaintiff, the defendant can 
reply that the property was acquired after partition.
anymore to over-emphasize the concept of the son's 
apratibandha dgyadashin. because - under the influence of 
northern sastric orthodox predecessors - authors were 
inclined to interpret the Mitaksara in the light of the 
patriarchal, patrilineal joint family. The main function 
of the son's being an apratibandha davada in the Mitaksara 
seems to reflect the attempt to establish the patrilineal 
joint family as such. Later texts indicate that the 
patrilineal family was established and we notice a shift 
towards assigning more rights over property to the father.
Most of the authors do not seem to be in favour of the son's 
absolute right to demand partition. If the father acted 
without consent and alienates ancestral immoveable property 
contrary to purposes recognized by law, which includes 
alienations for religious purposes without thereby prejudicing 
maintenance claims, the son may separate and safeguard his 
share in the sadliaranam. That the son was normally prevented 
from separating against the father's will is also evidenced 
in customary law.'*’
We have taken the rules on reunion as a probable reflec-
2
tion of the existence of larger joint families.
Rattigan, A Digest... (13th ed.),237* See also Foral de 
usos e costumes dos Gancares e Lavradores desta Ilha de 
G6a ...(1526), in: Collection of material on Hindu Law in 
Port.India (SOAS), 135ff•1172:•.• and if somebody has four 
sons or more or less, they should not divide during his 
lifetime, except with his consent...
2
Published family histories from Maharashtra (up to the l8th 
c.) show that families remained undivided for a period of 
two or three generations. Se£ V.T.Gune, lfThe Social Develop­
ment of Maharashtra", in: P.II. Gpde Comm. Vol.. Poona , 1960 , e t 147-
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Chapter IX
The Establishment of the British Administration of Hindu Law 
___________ and the Concept of the Hindu Joint Family*_________
I* The "Gentoo Code11*
In 1765 The East India Company acquired the diwani of 
Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa* According to Warren Hastings1 
"Plan11 of 1772 the administration of law relating to inheri­
tance, which automatically involved cognate topics like joint 
family, adoption, maintenance and legitimacy, was to be based 
on the dharma^astra» The passage of the plan relevant in 
our context which was made into binding law in s *27 of the 
Regulation II of 1772 may be recalled here: "In all suits
regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious 
usages of institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to 
Mohamedans and those of the Shaster with respect to the 
Gentoos shall be invariably adhered to". Th«- ascertainment
e_
of the dharmasastra relating to the topics listed in the 
section was to be secured with help of sastris or pandits 
including court pandits. The function and mode of applica­
tion of the dharmasastra in the traditional system differed, 
however, from the convictions of English judges on the topic*
X
Plan for the Administration of Justice Extracted from the 
Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit (Cossimbazar)
15 Aug.1772, being pp.13-25 of Extract of a Letter from the 
Governor and Council at Fort William to the Court of 
Directors, 3 Nov. 1772. See J.D.M. Derrett, "The Administra­
tion of Hindu Law by the British", Comp.Studies in Society 
and History, 4(l96l) 11-52, at 24ff.
>d L
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The traditional dharmasastra system purported to be in prac­
tice the juridical framework for Brahmanas and castes under 
the influence of the dharmasastra. subject to local customs 
and ad hoc decisions which would consider social factors 
beyond the bare facts of a case and aimed at mutual unanimity 
between litigants and affected communities* The result was 
that issues might be decided differently from case to case* 
The dharmasastra itself as interpreted by medieval authors 
fluctuated, as we have seen, greatly; the practical influence 
of a particular author was established if by his interpreta­
tion he could accommodate the needs of various communities 
within his contemplation. The consequence of this approach 
was the apparent vagueness of sastric law* An attempt to 
continue the traditional method of settling disputes within 
the framework of the dharmasas tra was to a certain extent a 
success in French India* Here decisions were arrived at by 
native authorities after consultation of caste leaders and, 
if desirable, of sastric texts * * The British administration 
was faced with problems which eventually led to the adoption
of characteristic English methods of the application of the
2 /_ /_
law. The tendency of the sastris to interpret sastric rules
to fit a decision ad hoc rather than to rely on fabstract1
Derrett, ubi cit., 20f., Leon Sorg, Avis du Comite 
Consultatif de Jurisprudence Indienne« Pondicherry, l8£57 •
2See in this connection Derrett, op .cit., 22*
338
law and precedent was so far in consonance with the tradi­
tional outlook• But probably the absence of the functioning 
of the traditional social system in front of the modern 
courts, i.e. the non-applicability of the traditional desire 
to arrive at a compromise between the disputing parties or 
between interdependent communities rather than the insistence 
on "abstract" law, made the interpretations of the sastra by 
the pandits susceptible to influences which would strike 
British administrators as corruption. The need for certainty 
of the law was thus felt and the first attempt to arrive at 
a consolidation of the floating mass of sastric law was the
compilation of the "Gentoo Code" by a committee of eleven 
1
pandits. In the context of our subject the work restates
typical DSvabhaga rules and adds the views of pandits from
Mithila where these differ. T.7e may mention here some of the
important provisions.
/ \ a(a)__ The M^Lthila rule that a widow inherits if her husband 
dies separated and without son, grandson and great-grandson, 
and the view of Jlmutavahana and his followers that the 
property goes to the widow (or widows) whether he died separa­
ted or unseparated from his collaterals are stated side by side. 
 ^ _
¥ivadarnava-setu ("bridge across the ocean of litigation") or 
Vivadarnava-bhan.jana ("breakwater to the ocean of litigation") 
Tr. N.B. Halhed, A Code of Gentoo Laws o r . Ordination of the 
Pundits. London, 1777* Tr.into German by R.L* Raspe, Gesetzbuch 
der Gentoo Ts, oder Sammlun.cz; der Gesetze der Pundits, nachjbiner 
persianischen dbersetzung des in der Schanscrit-Sprache 
greschriebenen Originales. Aus dam Engl.. Hamburg, 1778.
Derrett, "Sanskrit Legal Treaties Compiled at the Instance of 
the British", ZVR. 6 3 (1961), 72-117, at 85ff.
2C h . H ,  i,25f.
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(b) The work elaborates on the provisions of acquisitions by
^  _ 1
sons during the lifetime of the father given by Jimutavahana.
A son who has employed property of the father and grandfather 
and acquires fresh property, has to give half of his gains 
to his father. If he has no brothers, he shall take the 
other half himself. If he has brothers he shall take a 
double share of the remaining half and shall give each brother 
a share of his acquisition.
If he has not been advanced with any property and he 
makes gains, he shall give half to his father, whereas his 
collaterals would not receive a share. A person employing 
his brother’s property and acquiring any profit should give 
half to his father whereas his collaterals would not receive 
a share•
A person employing his brother’s property and acquiring
any profit should give half of it to his father, if the
father is learned, he himself should take a double share, the
person whose property was employed should receive a single
share, and those whose property was not employed shall not
receive anything. If the father is not a man of learning,
he shall receive a double share, and he who made the profit
should also receive a share; the person whose property was
2
employed shall receive a single share.
See above ,14( j • .
2C h . H ,  ix, 67f.
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(c) A father is said to have no power to sell, or give away, 
ancestral property without the consent of the sons* This is 
modified in the next paragraph by the statement that a father 
should not give or sell the property whether self-acquired
or ancestral to the prejudice of the maintenance claims of 
his dependents.^
(d) Partition between sons is not ’right and decent' during
the lifetime of the mother unless she gives them instructions
accordingly* She may receive at her wish a share equal to
that of a son, subject to her having received strTdhana from
her husband in which case she would get only half of the
share of a son; similarly in the case of grandmothers. The
sonless widow of the father does not receive a share but only
food and clothing. The view of the pandits of Mithila is
stated which shows that the strict Mitaksara view had pre-
vailed there rather than the views of Mitra Mis'ra: a father's
2
sonless widow is to receive a share equal to that of a son*
(e) A brother joint with collaterals shall not alienate joint 
property without the consent of his brothers• An alienation 
of part of the property may be validated at the computation
of his share at partition. But if he alienates to a man "of 
fraudulent principles, so that loss and vexation should 
accrue thereby to the partners, the man who thus gives away,
1Ch.II, xi, 72.
2C h . H ,  xii, 75-8.
'-V
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sells, or mortgages such property, is to be accounted criminal11,
3L
The Mithila view is that an alienation without the consent of
part of joint property, becomes valid at the computation of
1
one’s share at partition*
The first attempt to sift the mass of sastric rules and
compile a "code” was from the practical point of view
(generally speaking) a failure, mainly because it omitted to
2
treat of many aspects of practical importance.
II. The Vivada-bhangarnava or 1Colebrooke *s Digest1.
«
(l) Partition by Father.
Another work which was subsequently composed to assist
— _ — 3European judges was the Vivada-bhangarnava by Jagannatha.
In respect of the subject under discussion it represented an
elaboration of the rules of the Dayabhaga school and many
rules of the ’Gentoo Code* were discussed while referring to
all possible points of the then available sastric learning.
Often no definite and settled conclusions are given, of which
in fact the judges were in demand. At times Jagannatha shows
signs that the sastra was adaptable to new requirements under
the influence of the administration of law. Thus e.g. if the
father divided his property amongst his sons, he may resort
^Ch.II, xiv, 80f.
2
See Derrett, op.cit., 86-8 .
3
References are to the Madras ed. of Colebrooke’s tr., 2 vols. 
1864-5 •
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to unequal distribution when filial piety, the maintenance
of a larger family, inability to earn a livelihood etc. fall
to be taken into account. Here the father*s discretion is
completely unqualified. But can he exclude the son completely
from a share? He can do so only after proving that the son
is inimical towards him * in the presence of the king, or
1
before a public assembly*. It is possible that this contem­
plates a testament similar to the testamentum calatis comitiis. 
The history of the testament may well have been explained to 
Jagannatha. This allusion is inserted rather abruptly between 
the statement that the father may divide his self-acquired 
property at his discretion and the statement that the father 
commits only a "moral offence** and does not incur a **civil 
penalty** if in fact he does not give a share to any of the
sons though the son is not guilty of an offence, and gives a
share to one guilty of an offence. Thus the exclusion of an
inimical son mentioned above which cannot be validated by
simple assertion on the part of the father, can only refer to 
effects intended to take place after his death. This conclu­
sion also derives support by the latter statement that in
respect of immoveable property an unequal distribution is
2
only * morally considered' unlawful.
The immoveable ancestral property inherited from the 
grandfather may be alienated by gift which is not a moral
1II, 237f. 
2II, 260.
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offence, though this is the case with an alienation of'the
1
whole immoveable ancestral property. It is significant that 
Jagannatha declares at one place that sons oppressed by the 
stepmother 1 or the liker may appeal to the king and obtain
2
partition from their father in respect of ancestral property. 
Here we may detect that guardianship proceedings as known to 
Anglo-Hindu law had entered the sastra.
(2) Validity of Gifts in Contravention of Rules in the Smrtis.
The distress of the family caused by gift or alienation
of the whole immoveable property is only the cause of moral
guilt. The gift or alienation is not annulled, as the gift
is done by an 1 owner1; the alienation is only void, if the
3
owner is either insane or similarly incapacitated. The 
absence of consent by the sons at an alienation of ancestral 
immoveable property entails merely a moral offence.
Thus according to Jagannatha a gift is valid provided 
the object gifted was the property of the owner, and 1 even
5
100 texts cannot bar the validity of the gift1. In fact only 
that gift is invalid which is considered as 1 ungiven1 in the 
Smrtis^ like gifts given under influence of fear, anger, or 
grief, while suffering from disease etc. Gifts which are
1XI, 361.
2II, 266.
■*11, 259, 261.
4n ,  240. 
5I, 411.
fAdatta!; see Narada 5i 2 and 11 = Dh.K., 793,a and 800,a.
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termed as adeva (ungiveable) in the Smrtis do not prevent
1
the validity of the gift.
_ 2 
Jagannatha tells us that in the Mithila school the gift
of the whole estate without the assent of the sons is invalid.
He refers this to the case of gifts for civil causes• Gifts
3for religious purposes are valid m  any case.
The text of Yajnavalkya 1 manimuktapravaleXnam? and similar 
texts indicate according to Jagannatha once more only a moral 
rule and do not invalidate alienations.
(3) Maintenance.
The text of Daksa which prohibited gifts of one1s own
whole assets, when male issue was living, apparently intended
to safeguard the maintenance of the sons, but as we have seen,
in the opinion of the author, the gift of the whole property
is valid in case of religious donations. Elsewhere he tells
us that gifts for civil causes are not valid if the subsistence
of the family is thereby affected. Only the remainder, after
sufficient property has been set apart for the maintenance,
k
may be gifted.
We have to remember that Jagannatha, in working out the 
absolute ownership of the father over all property, proceeds
on the assumption that, as long as the ownership of the
1 —See texts cited in the Dh.K., 793Tf. On Jagannatha's rule see
J.D.H. Derrett BSQAS. 20(1957) 214; Priyanath Sen, General
Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, T.L.L., pp.83» 85-86.
See Mitra Miira, infra, p.
3H ,  410, 422 f.
I, 4io.
345
father over all property, proceeds on the assumption that, as 
long as the ownership of the father exists, the son's claims 
are based on maintenance, i.e. the personal obligation of the 
father towards the son and other members of the family. There 
was no need in Jagannatha*s time to secure the son’s mainten­
ance by giving him rights from the point of view of ownership. 
The alienor has full ownership and therefore an alienation 
may be void because of the non-observance of the prohibition 
to maintain the family. Therefore one may alienate the 
remainder of the property after setting aside sufficient
property with a view of the probable life-span of the family
1
members to be maintained. Sufficient moveable property may
be set aside for necessary consumption and may be alienated
2
as soon as other moveable property has been acquired.
Jagannatha notices an opinion which he calls in consonance 
with settled usage: a man may give away the immoveable property 
after setting aside a sufficient amount necessary for main­
taining the members of the family and their families 'for a 
long time 1• The amount of property is to be determined by 
’five prudent persons’, i.e. probably by a caste council or 
seniors of the family group. Likewise the amount of moveable
property is to be determined before the remainder may be 
3 —given away. Jagannatha declares, as we have seen, that only
1i, 4io. 
2I, 4ll. 
3I, 4ll.
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civil gifts in neglect of maintenance are void, but it seems 
that he mitigates his proposition when he cites the opinion 
of authors without refuting them who hold that civil and 
religious gifts in neglect of maintenance duties are void. 
Jagannatha merely adds his observation that people who are 
able to acquire wealth speedily, do perform e.g. the visva.jit 
sacrifice in which the sacrificer is to spend his whole wealth. 
Jagannathafs whole discussion suggests that a gift for reli­
gious purposes (dharmartham) in neglect of the requirements 
of the family could certainly not be styled ’religious*.
(4) Alienation of the Undivided Share.
— 2The text of Vyasa which prohibits a co-heir from aliena-
3
ting joint immoveable property, but also the text of Brhaspati 
which prohibits the alienation of common property and the
_  4text of iMarada form the basis of the proposition that a 
coparcener may alienate his share in the undivided property.
As it is not yet ascertained until partition what parti­
cular item a co-heir will obtain, even if he enjoys the 
possession of a particular item (see below, p. ) the
consideration of an item being sold becomes common property
3
of the co-heirs•
The lack of consent of the co-heirs entails a moral
offence merely. aowever, punishment is involved as one cannot
1I,440; See Manu 11, 7^5 tr. G.Jha, vol.3» P*39S 
2I,303.
3i,4oi f.
4
I,401.
5t1 . )U.. .
> '
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ascertain before partition whose property has been sold and
1whether the alienor was the owner or not.
The consent is necessary to alienate the whole of the 
joint property, otherwise the sale is invalid up to the 
extent of the seller^ share.
The lack of consent is thus not an essential requisite
for conferring validly one1s own right and thus a co-heir*s
2
gift of his own share is valid.
Jagannatha tells us that it is not a custom * in some
countries* to make gifts or sales of undivided land or other 
property, because the alienor cannot see what is really his. 
Though Jagannatha cautiously admits the possibility to alien­
ate one * s share, he points out that in practice this has 
arisen only due to the possibility that the king does not 
intervene in trifling occasions to fine the alienor or can be 
ascribed to the indifference of co-heirs who have omitted to 
aPply 1° the king for intervention. He suggests that if a 
co-heir wishes to sell his share before partition for the 
maintenance of his family which he can not otherwise provide 
for and the other co-heirs do not assent to the alienation or 
refuse to partition the property, the co-heir may apply to 
the king for intervention. This points already to the influ­
ence of Anglo-Indian administration of law where partition 
could be effected by a decree. We can see, however, how much 
the theoretical possibility to make use of one *s share for 
individual purposes was still limited in practice.
*1, 303. 
2I, 403.
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Details of the Alienation of Specific Property or of
an Unascertained Share before Partition.^
The co-heirs may choose to share the value of the effects 
at a partition or they may recover their shares of the effects, 
because the co-heir cannot annul the ownership of the others 
and the alienee, 1 being in the shoes of the alienor1, may 
have to wait for partition at which the item may be included 
in his share.
The question is discussed whether sale of a particular 
item determines the property of a coparcener therein, the 
same way as distribution by lot determines property. Other­
wise it may appear that by the consumption of the produce of 
the sale embezzlement of the property of another co-heir may 
happen. Jagannatha decides that by the sale no interest 
dissimilar to that of the other coparceners is created, but 
a right proportionate to the share of the alienor.
Similarly, occupancy of property, as we have already 
indicated above, which comes to be alienated by one of the 
co-heirs does not manifest property. It is only at partition 
by lot or otherwise that property is ascertained.
Property may be alienated without penance or punishment 
for necessary consumption. Undue consumption of the produce 
of a sale involves punishment.
Alienation of a specific item, requires specific authori­
zation by the co-heirs, which supposes a common right vested
1I, 404 f.
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in all the co-heirs in each particular item. Due to this 
notion, a co-heir may give or sell his own share without 
specification of a particular item. The alienee may then be 
admitted to the distribution by lot at a partition.
An alienee thus has no opportunity to realise the share 
sold or donated to him by one of the co-heirs without the 
consent of the rest and has to await partition where the share 
may be allotted to him. In respect to specific items, probably 
when they have not been actually handed over to the alienee, 
partition has to be similarly awaited at which the items may 
be allotted to the alienee if the co-heirs assent to the 
inclusion in the share of the alienor.
Jagannatha comes to the conclusion that a co-heir may 
cancel his right in the estate and can validly alienate his 
share, but has to perform penance if there is no consent by 
the rest of the co-heirs. The alienee's rights, we may add, 
are not protected and until partition his share may be sub­
jected to diminutions, though the size of the fraction was
predicable unlike in the law of the Mitaksara school.%
Jagannatha cleared the way for the eventual recognition of 
an alienee's right to partition which was recognized in 
Anglo-Hindu law.
/ "  /  
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(5) The Fate of* Jagannatha fs V/ork.
Jagannatha's digest had not removed the difficulties for 
the judges had no means of personal access to sastric litera­
ture and modes of interpretation. Sir F .W. Macnaghten in his
Considerations on the Hindoo Law as Current in Bengal which
1
had mainly as purpose to render the law certain commented
on the Vivada-bhangarnava: !,Of Jagannathars digest, it is
enough, in this place, to say that the labourer might have
2
given a more appropriate appellation to his work". Yet he
refers to Jagannatha in his work and H.H. Wilson in his Review
3on Considerations of the Hindu Law calls it "an exceedingly 
useful work although it does not profess to save those who 
consult it the trouble of judging for themselves". In fact 
Sir Thomas Strange in his Hindu Law makes constant use of the 
Vivada-bhan.garnava and it certainly contributed, together 
with other works emanating from Bengal, to the diffusion of 
aspects such as the spiritual benefit theory, the patrilineal, 
patriarchal joint family, the introduction of wills, and the 
power of a davada to alienate his undivided share.
III. Selection and Abrogation of Rules of the Sastra. The 
Attitude towards Customary Law.
Details of family custom were fluctuating, thus e.g.
whether self-acquired property could be alienated by the father
1 ~
Preface, xi f.
^Preface, xvi.
Works of the late Horace Hayman Wilson, vol.5» l865? at k j •
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without consent of the sons, whether the eldest son would
receive a preferential share, or whether partition should be
per stirpes or by mothers# In Punjab customary law e.g. we
1
have a situation which might differ from family to family#
2
In Bhagvandas v> Ra.imal , Westropp, C.J., expresses the general
policy towards customary law in the administration of Anglo-
Hindu law: ,fIn this country it is no uncommon experience to
find the custom alleged to be that which for the 
moment it is convenient to those who assert its exis­
tence that it should then be# I have known the most 
conflicting customs to be from time to time asserted 
to exist in one and the same sect. V7e find it 
necessary to scrutinise evidence of usage closely, 
and especially to demand specified instances of the 
custom”•
The superior influence of works like the Davabha.ga and
Mitaksara not only amongst pandits but also amongst judges,
because they were accessible in translation, enabled certain
sastric rules to be abrogated while others were selected,
emphasized and perpetuated. Thus e.g. the patnl-bhaga rule
was held to be a kulacara and to prove the family custom clear
and positive proof that the usage was ancient and had been
3
invariable became necessary^ or it was held to be applicable
to ^udras.^ In fact the rule would be inconvenient in a
strict patrilineal exogamous set-up of the family system
Rattigan, A Digest of Customary Law...(15th ed#), see 
chundavand. pa.gvund, self-acquired property, share of the 
eldest son.
210 Bom.H.C.R. 261.
3 r
-'U.ii. Macnaghten, Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law, 
vol. I, 16 fn.l.
4
Strange, op.cit#, I, 205f•» where he says that the law of 
the £>astras is superseded by the patnl-bhaga rule. oee 
cases cited at II, 351-7*
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where no connections to relations by marriage existed in the 
property sphere* Where however families were particular of 
having alliances through marriage connections,the mothers* 
families by birth might contribute to the support of the 
descendants of their married daughters* Here a partition by 
mothers of the property descending in the male line would be 
just* But if connections with families by marriage were 
formal and the descendants of each mother were more or less 
exclusively dependent on the property deriving from the father 
and his paternal ancestors, a partition by mothers may be 
greatly unjust. A partition per stirpes by giving each son 
an equal share would be the solution* We noticed in the pre­
ceding chapter a gradual move away from the influence of 
the mother’s relations by birth, accompanied by a tendency
to rely exclusively on the ancestral property deriving from
1
paternal ancestors. Here if the wives were of equal caste
an assignment of a share equal to that of a son to each wife
2
or mother and a partition per stirpes was appropriate.
It seems that the administration of Hindu law by the British
started at a period when the sastra had begun to neglect
matr-bhaga and in fact accelerated the process of eliminating 
1
See the Sar*v il. which says that the partition by mothers 
occurs among Vaisyas (cp. the custom of the Chetties referred 
to above ,(£>!{*.1) and ^udras , para. 79*
2
Or shares were assigned to sons according to the status of
the mothers. See above, •
353
a custom which was nevertheless still widely prevalent in
1 2 the South , though declared as not recognized there,
IV. The Rights of the Father in Bengal.
(1) Partition and Alienation of Ancestral Property.
The Factum Valet Doctrine.
The British administration was faced with the problem 
of assessing the powers of the father at Dayabhaga law.
The rules of partition of property by a father served in the 
traditional atmosphere as a guide to the father as well as to 
his relatives and the social group to which he belonged.
The father as the sole owner of all property had the respon­
sibility of seeing that the property was divided according 
to these accepted conventions. Unequal partition, or even 
e.g. the assigning of the whole property to one son may be 
fully justified, though morally the property belonged to his 
descendants as well. In respect of ancestral immoveable 
property his sense of responsibility was especially called 
for. There were various means and ways to prevent or to 
rectify the actions of a father and to cause him to abide by 
his social and religious obligations.
1
See Strange, op.cit., I,205* See note by Colebrooke at 
Strange, II, 351, and Ellis1 note at 357*
2 ,
Mutuvejgngudachellasawmv Manigar v. Tumbagasawmv Maniagar.
(1849) Mad. S.U. 27 Cp.Mayne's Tre atise on Hindu Law and 
Usage. 506 fn.e.
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Whatever the father did with respect of partition or 
alienation of his property, he could not defeat the maintenance 
claims of his dependents and these claims attached to his 
property. VThen the question of alienation of ancestral pro­
perty was raised before the courts there was an alternative 
to interpret the father’s powers as absolute or to invent 
devices which would transmute some of the traditional and 
moral checks into binding law. Very early in 1792 it was 
h£ld after consultation of the court pandits that a gift of 
the whole immoveable property to an eldest son subject to 
pecuniary provisions for the youngest son was valid. The 
decision was based chiefly on the doctrine that the gift was 
sinful, but valid. * In the case of Bhowannvchurn Bunhooiea 
v. The heirg of Ramkaunt Bunhoo.iea a father had allotted in 
a deed of partition unequal portions of his property including 
immoveable ancestral property and - his deposition not having
been carried into effect during his lifetime - was held as
2not binding after his death.
Sir F •b • Hacnaghten discussing the issue at length iden­
tified the Bengal theory that acts may be sinful but valid
with the doctrine quod fieri non debuit. factum valet and 
__ “
Eshanchund Rai v.Eghorchund Rai« 1 S.D.A. Rep.2. See also
Ramkoomar Neaee Bachesputtee v. Kishenkunker Turk Bhoosun.
2 S.D.A. Rep.42. Sir F • • liacnaghten, op.cit., 271-4.
^2 S.D.A. Rep.202: 6 I.D.(0.S.) 556; W.H. Macnaghten, 
o p .cit•, 1 ,10.4 .
applied it to the case of unequal gifts or partition of
1ancestral immoveable property by the father. W.H. Iiacnaghten
in his Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law arrived at an
opposite opinion* He relied on Bhowannvchurn Bunhoo iea 1s 
2
case apprehending that if the doctrine of factum valet as
deduced from Vyasa’s text in the Davabhaga would be applied
in all contexts, it would have "the effect of superseding all
law". lie pointed out that the text of Vyasa was cited "in
the chapter of the Davabhaga which treats of self-acquisitions,
3
and has no reference to ancestral property11 • He then relies
4
on Mitaksara provisions which seems inappropriate. V7e see
that opinions on the issue conflicted. In 1830 Ram Mohan Roy
published a defence of the view that a father should have the
power to alienate at his free will.'* Ram Mohun Roy calls the
son’s right of interdiction or partition against the will of
the father as abhorred by common sense; the birth of a son
^Op.cit., 331247,301. See Derrett, "Factum Valet: The
Adventures of a Maxim”, Int.Como.Law Qlv. 7(1958) 280ff., at 
29^ff. See also Sir Thomas Strange, Hindu L aw. 1,87- Sir F.W. 
Mannaghten's view was criticized by H.H.Wilson, op.cit.,
65ff.76, who wanted the court to have the power to determine 
whether an unequal distribution had been with ’caprice or 
injustice*. Ibid.,7^*
^2 S •D •A.Rep.200: 6 I.D.(0.S.) 358.
5P.46.
^Ibid.
Rajah Rammohun Roy, Essav on the Right of the Hindoos over 
Ancestral Property, according to the Law of Bengal. Calcutta, 
I83O. Roy also criticises ii«H.Wilson's 'Review*; see at 37ff*
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1
would be considered a curse rather than a blessing. This
probably reflects correctly the psychological background to
Jimutavahana1s approach which led him to negative any legal
rights of the son apart from maintenance before the ceasing
2of the father's rights. Ram Mohun Roy further believed that 
recognition of the unhampered powers of the father was a 
progressive step and in the interest of commerce which the 
introduction of the Mitaksara rule would stifle. He mentions 
that to procure loans on the credit of one's property whether
3
ancestral or self-acquired has long been in use. However
the regard for ancestral immoveable property was even high
in Bengal and the absolute power in respect of such property
4was not unanimously accepted by the public. The general 
trend of the decisions was already in support of the absolute 
power of the father in respect of alienation and thus in
support of an unequal partition of ancestral immoveable
5
property. In Kumla Kaunt Chuckerbuttv v. Gooroo Govind
 ^      _ _
Chowdree it was held that^ by the law as current in
I
Bengal, a son has no right in the ancestral property
*Ubi cit., 72.
^See above ,231 {1X3^f [
3i6 .
4See the long discussion between Ram Mohun Roy and an 
''Anonymous Hindoo" printed in the appendix to the essay 
referred to. Also d.C. Sarkar Shastri, A Treatise on Hindu 
Law. 3rd ed., Cal.,1907, 274-6.
5~oee Colebrooke's note on Eshanchund Rai v. Sshorchund Rai. 
(1792) 1 S.D.A. Rep.2. Morlev's Digest. 1,33(1).
^(1829) 4 S.D.A.322.
357
inherited by his father during the father*s life and in
Juggomohan Hoy 7 . Neemoo Dossee^" it was held that a Hindu
who has sons alive, can without their consent, sell, give, 
or pledge, immoveable property and can without their consent,
by will, devise, prevent, alter or affect their succession
to such property.
^■(1831) Morton's Decisions (Sup.Court Calcutta) 90.
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(2) The Introduction of Wills
There are references in the sastra which show that a person
could direct his sons or other near heirs to fulfil religious
gifts, promised by him, after his death.^ It was especially
said to be of imperishable religious merit to make donations
2
of cows, land, sesamum, and gold at the time of death.
Secua^Lr gifts or ‘bequests1 were probably binding on the 
estate in practice which we may conclude from the very 
fact that a Smrti-passage negatives such a custom.^ In any 
aa e case such an elaborate arrangement which is recorded in 
a document surviving from the Ivlaratha period
(ctd. on next page)
Katy.566. See Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage, 873f* Sahara 
in his Bhagya on the MImamsasutra(X,2,38; says that if 
a sacrifice is instituted by a yatjamana(sacrificer) and 
if he dies during the performance, he nevertheless receives
apurvam(spiritual merit) of the sacrifice when the same 
is completed according to his instructions. See herrett, 
Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, para.7oo.
 ^ Varaha-purana, cit. by Raghunandana, &iddhi-1attva, 271; 
pu£Lya-kalas-tada sarwe yada mptyur-upasthitah// go-bhu- 
tila-hihapyadi dattam akgayam iyat //
 ^ Brhaspati^ 14,14 139 » cit. in Vyavahara-nirnaya,298-9; 
mad-urdhvam iti yad-dattam na tat-svatva-vahaiji bhavet/ 
tehedanim adattvan mrte rikthinam apatet// - “ A gift 
promised with the words ‘after my death* shall not produce 
propeFty, as what is not given by the promisor fall to the 
heir on his death11. See Derrett, ubi cit.
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and which was to take effect post mortem, must have been
1
expected to be followed in practice. From donations inter 
vivos and death bed partitions of property or what Ram Mohun 
Roy had called "predetermination of allotments” which the 
sastra allowed and which had to be carried out even sifter the 
death of the donor or allotter of property, it was a small 
step to identify and recognize juridically testamentary power. 
As a matter of a fact testamentary power was undisputed in 
the courts with the exception of the case of Bhowannvchurn
3
Bunhoo.iea v « The heirs of Ramkaunt Bunhoo.iea which was con­
sidered to have been superseded by Joggomohun Roy v . Neemo 
4
Dossee. The decision in the case of Ramtoonoo Mullick v . 
Ram.gonaul Mullick that a Hindu "might and could dispose by 
will of all his property moveable and immoveable, and as well 
ancestral as otherwise11, was confirmed on appeal by the Judi­
cial Committee of the Privy Council in 1829*^ From Bengal
the juridicial recognition of testamentary power spread to
7
Madras and Bombay eventually.
^See Kane, HDh.Ill«8 16.
2 —   —
Op . cit. , 62f • , referring to Srikrsna on Davabhiaga 1 , 3& • On
the development of testamentary disposition see also Tagore
v . Tagore. (1872) I*A. 3upl.Vol.,47 and Gadadhur Mullick v.
Off.Trustee of Bengal. (19^0) 67 I«A.129.
^See above .
1±
(I83I) Morton 1s Decisions (Sup.Ct.Cal.) 90.
^Sir F. Macnaghten, op.cit.,336, 356, 357.
C
1 Knapp, 2k5*
7
See Mayne, op.cit., 87^* paras. 7^0-1.
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V. The Concept of the Undivided or Joint Family.
(1) The Undivided Family in Early Textbooks 
(Strange1s Hindu Law).
The influence of the patriarchal joint family as
especially reflected in DSyabh&ga law is also discernible
in the notions which guided textbook writers like Sir
Thomas Strange and W*H.Macnaghten in their description of
Misjtksara law. At that early stage the subject was viewed
rather as an aspect of inheritance - the son inheriting from
the father - and of partition - taking place after the death
of the eldest common ancestor between collaterals. In one
pla-ee Sir Thomas Strange calls partition which takes place
during the lifetime of the father "an anticipated descent
of property".^* In hi^chapter on inheritance Strange says
that the "Hindus are a patriarchal people, many families
living together as one; connected in blood, and united
2
in interest..." Introducing his chapter on Partition 
he sa$ys that "as partition, in the life of the parent, is, 
in modern times, of but rare occurrence, it has been 
thought by some, that any account of the law of it here 
might be reasonably dispensed w i t h . W h e n  property had
Hindu Lawji I, 191. 
 ^ Op.cit., I, 12o.
 ^ Op.cit. , I, 176.
descended to sons, they were called coparceners; if the father 
was joint with his brothers and their wives etc. leaving
widows,daughters and other dependents it was called an
1 — 
undivided family. In other words following Davabhaga law a
coparcenary could only be contemplated between collaterals
after a common ancestor had died and the property had
2
1 descended* to the male issue. The son as anratibandha 
davada was contemplated rather as having an inchoate right 
or coordinate concern in respect of the ancestral property
3
which is called family property. The main difference 
Bengal and the other provinces was seen merely in the son 
having no right in ancestral immoveables according to Bengal 
law whereas in non-Bengal law such right was recognised.
Father and son were not contemplated so much as joint in 
status in spite of the son's having an interest in the ances­
tral property of the grandfather. The son would have a right 
to realize his claim during the father's life only in particular 
exceptional circumstances, equivalent to the traditional 
orthodox-sastrie causes on which the father1s rights cease. 
However if the father chose to divide the ancestral property,
he had to make equal shares and if he wanted to alienate it,
4
he had to seek the consent of his sons. Thus the anratibandha 
davada is compared with an heir apparent at English law.
1I,19Sf.
2
See Strange, 1,120.
^Strange, 1,177* 17f*
^Strange, I, 17f*
Strange, I, 131*
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It is in accord with this notion of the son only being an
heir apparent that Sir Thomas Strange does not recognize the
absolute right of the son to ask for partition* He says:
nIn the provinces dependant on the government of Madras, and
elsewhere in the peninsula, the right of the son to exact
partition of the ancestral property, independent of the will
of the father, appears authorized, but not without the exis-
1
tence of circumstances to warrant the measure*.. Contemporary
sastric learning was similarly against an absolute right of
2
the son to ask for partition.
(3) Constitution of the Joint Mitaksara Family at Anglo-
Hindu Law. The Concept of Survivorship and Coparcenary* 
Maintenance•
The concept of the Hindu joint family at Anglo-Hindu law 
originated in this atmosphere of patriarchal and patrilineal 
jointness. The large patriarchal household where several 
generations might reside jointly in subordination to the 
eldest common ancestor was taken as a normaJ/fceature of Indian 
life* We have seen in the previous chapter that the post- 
Mitaksara sastra itself probably reflects a movement towards 
patrilineal jointness and the decrease of the powers of the 
male issue, though this applied probably only the large and 
influential landholding families. The Privy Council recorded 
this trend as far as jointness is concerned by declaring
1I, 184.
^Daya-da^^-j^lokiT, ed. and tr. (without -vvakhva) by A.C. 
Burnell, Mangalore, 1875* See si * 1♦
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that the joint and undivided family is the normal condition
of Hindu society and that an undivided Hindu family is ordin-
1
arily joint not only in estate but in food and worship.
Probably from that time derives the habit to speak of the
joint Hindu family for which probably the closest equivalent
2in Sanskrit is the term kutumba.
#
Gradually the rights of the members of the family as
individuals and as a whole were ascertained, articulated and
mobilized - reflecting a movement away from the preoccupation
of the ^astra with the rights of the father* In Katama
3
Natchiar * s case the Privy Council while dealing with the 
rights of a widow in respect of self-acquisitions of her 
husband introduced the principle of 'survivorship* for des­
cribing the process of not leaving the interest in ancestral 
property by succession. The undivided owner (svami) was 
styled coparcener. V7e may recall the often-quoted dicta: 
"According to the principles of Hindu law, there is copar- 
cenaryship between the different members of a united family, 
and survivorship following upon it. There is community of 
interest and unity of possession between all the members of 
the family, and upon the death of any one of them the others 
may well take by survivorship that in which they had during 
the deceased's lifetime a common interest and a common
■4
Raghunadha v. Brozo Kishore, (1876) 3 I * A . Neelkisto 
Deb v. Beochunder, (1869) 12 M 00.I-A.323*
See above ,M^ (. •
3 (1863) 9 Moo.I.A.539, 6l4.
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possession. Here we notice that the notion of the sons 
* inheriting* the ancestral property was abandoned by impli­
cation. The sons* rights became rather coordinate with those 
of the father than subordinate. Golds tllcker, in his essay
entitled "On the Deficiencies in the Present Administration
2of Hindu Law11 deplored the introduction of the notion of
'survivorship*. The Privy Council had held that "there are
two principles on which the rule of succession according to
the Hindu law appears to depend; the first is that which
determines the right to offer the funeral oblation, and the
degree in which the person making the offering is supposed
io minister to the spiritual benefit of the deceased; the
3
other is an assumed right of survivorship". Goldstiicker 
argued that there is only the principle of spiritual benefit 
determining the right. According to the Davabhaga school, 
he said, "the widow would confer the greatest spiritual bene­
fits on the soul of a deceased husband, provided he leaves no 
male issue", so that "she is always entitled to succeed to 
the property of the husband, whether the latter be divided 
or not. The Mitakshara school, on the contrary, not admitting 
this superior spiritual power of a widow in an undivided 
family, excludes her from the position she holds in the 
Dayabhaga school". In answer to Goldstdcker's criticism we
*At p.6 l3 .
2
Journal of the East India Association. N o .1, vol.3» Iff.at 
Ipff.
•^Katama Natchiar. (1363) 9 Moo. I* A. 339 j 6l4*
365
may suggest that the Mitaksara contemplated mere jointness
of collaterals as excluding the widow's right in her husband's
estate the spiritual benefit did not play a role at all* The
spiritual benefit was used in support of a certain proposition
rather than determining the right a priori* Post"Mitaksara%
authors used e*g. the concept of the right to perform
sraddha for establishing firmly the rights of the great-
1
grandson to the property of the great-grandfather* The 
introduction of English legal terms was deplored at times, 
but in practice their meaning was either distinguished or 
modified and adjusted to Indian needs in usage and judicial 
decisions* "Survivorship" was borrowed from English legal 
usage where it is associated with joint ownership in a joint 
tenancy. It became eventually well established that the 
incidents associated with joint ownership under Mitaksara law 
were not identical with those known to the English law of
3joint —tenancy• In re The Hindu V/omen's Rights to Property Act
“1 —
See e.g. Viramitrodava, Setlur's tr.,H, 34lf.
2For coparcenary not being identical with coparcenary m  
English law see Lord Dunedin's remarks in Ba.inath Prasad v *
Te.i Bali Prasad, (1941) 48 T.A., 195i211. See also e.g* 
Karsondas v* Gangabai on the difference between joint property, 
joint family property, and joint ancestral family property. 
(1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom.479* For the difference betvfeen _
Mitaksara coparcenary and English coparcenary, and Mitaksara 
coparcenary and English joint tenancy, see k.R. Raghavachariar, 
Hindu Law, 4th ed., 243f*
5 194l Fed.Ct.Hep. 15 at 32.
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it was stated: ’’There is however this degree of resemblance
between the jus accrescendi and the effect of the death of 
one of the owners of joint family property under the Mitakshara 
law, that in a sense there is only an extinction of the 
deceased person*s interest, and the shares of the survivors 
- whose pre-existing interest extended over the whole 
property, - are increased only because of the diminution in 
the number of sharers”. In other words the term 1 survivorship1 
was used differently in Anglo-Hindu law and became adopted 
in default of a better expression.
The membership of the coparcenary was based on texts
  1
like Devala’s * avibhakta vibhaktanam...1 These texts were
handed down by *orthodox-sastrie * authors and authors of the
Davabhaga school, e.g. Jagannatha in his Yivada-bhangTirnava.
In Moro Vishvanath’s case the right of the male issue to
offer pindas - which was taken in *orthodox-sastrie1 texts • »
as entitling a great-grandson to inherit from his great­
grandfather or to take a share at iDartition _ was taken as 
co-extensive with the right by birth and as entitling to a
-jL
See above, • Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vithal. (1873)
10 Bom.H .C .11.444 . For BaudhSyana ' s text 1,5,11,9-1^
(58; Dh.IC. l467bf • ) see Mayne Hindu Law and Usage. 377* Since 
the Viramitrodaya (Setlur's tr.II,391-2) sapinda in the text 
of Baudhayana was understood to mean 'partaker of an undivided 
oblation’. This follows the Davabhaga.
/ ' - 
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right to demand partition. In Dasharatharao v. Ramchandrarao. 
Gajendragadkar,J ., as he then v^ as , stated the rule thus: 
"•••Whether a member of an undivided family is a coparcener 
or not would depend upon whether he is entitled to demand 
partition, and that naturally would in its turn depend upon 
tne question, whether he has a right in the property of the 
coparcenary *>y his birth. Broadly stated all members of a 
joint Hindu family who are not removed more than four degrees 
from the last holder are coparceners, however much remote they 
may be from the original holder or acquirer of the property.
If a person is removed by more than four degrees from the 
last holder, he does not acquire any interest in the property 
of the family by birth, and as such he is not entitled to 
demand a partition.,
The rights of the male members in the corpus and its 
income are ascertained on partition, for: "no individual
See Colebrooke's Digest 11,242 (cit.at p.466f. of the decision) 
479 (Manu’s £1.9il87)» 512,515 (cit at p.454 and p.465 of the 
decision). On p.465 Nanabhai Harida$ J., says: "The rule, 
then, which I deduce from the authorities on this subject is 
not that a partition cannot be demanded by one or more than 
four degrees removed from the acquirer or original owner of 
the property sought to be divided, but that it cannot be 
demanded by one more than four degrees removed from the 
original owner thereof”. On the rights of the great-grandson 
see also Mayne, op.cit.,528,fn.0 . The right of the sons to 
partition during the lifetime of the father in the Viramitrodaya 
has to be read with the earlier statement that partition 
during the lifetime of the father on the desire of the sons 
is only possible when certain reasons disqualify the father.
See 11,341, 305 ff* of Setlurfs tr.
2 _
p3 Bom ,B*Ro 75*
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member of the family, whilst it remains undivided, can pre­
dicate of the joint undivided property that he has any 
definite share”. * Before partition the interest of a copar­
cener was said to be fluctuating and liable to be diminished
2
by births or increase by deaths in the family*
(4) Maintenance.
The joint Hindu family as a legal institution does not 
only consist of the management and enjoyment by and for the 
coparceners. Their interests are also subject to the 
'maintenance1 claims of those family members who are not 
coparceners (or who are disqualified coparceners). Their 
traditional entitlement to 'food and clothing1 amounting in 
effect to bare subsistence was legally ascertained as includ­
ing residence, food, clothing, medical attention, education, 
and marriage and dowry expenses (subject to the Dowry 
Prohibition Act. No. 2o of 1961). Various expedients and 
remedies were developed in decisions for which there was no 
need in the traditional system. From Chunilal v. Bai
4Saraswati we may cite a useful summary on the rights of 
maintenance: "The liability to maintain others arises in some
cases from the mere relationship between the parties, inde­
pendently of the possession of any property, and in other 
Annovier v. Ramasubba Aivan (1366) 11 Moo•I •A •75,8 3 •
2
Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu. (1902-25) Mad.l43*156* 
Mayne, op.cit.,326f .
3
Derrett, Introd. to Modern Hindu Law, paras. 397-9*
4
A.I.R. 1943 Bom.393*394.
cases it depends on the possession of property. The first
kind liability is placed only on the father, the husband and
the sons, and the latter kind devolves on the manager of a
joint Ilitakshara family, and also on the heir to whom the late
proprietor was legally or morally bound to maintain, the
reason being that the estate is inherited subject to the
obligation to provide for such maintenance". Thus the joint
family property remains subject to maintenance even in the
hands of a 'sole surviving coparcener', and that even if he
sells the coparcenary property and spends the proceeds unless
he spends such property for family purposes which have
priority over the widow's maintenance claims. The obligation
is on the coparcener to prove the application of joint family
property for family purposes and if he fails to do so his
liability to pay maintenance remains to the extent to the
1
property to which he succeeded. This ruling provides a 
good example of the development of the traditional right of 
maintenance at Anglo-Hindu law. The rule prevents the possi­
bility of action of coparceners motivated by fraud and
2hostility against the non-coparceners.
In the above quotation from Chunilal v. Bai Saraswati
we notice the distinction made in Anglo-Hindu law between
'legal' and 'moral' rights to maintenance which seems not
1See Chunilal v. Bai Saraswati, A.I.H. 19^3 Bom.393*
2
See Derrett, Introd. to Modern Hindu Law, para.402; id.(ed.), 
Studies in the Laws of Succession in Nigeria, preface, 8f,
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warranted by the sastra. Wo doubt the ^astra was silent -
to select one instance - about the married daughter1s right
who was thought to have become a member of her husband’s
patrilineal gotra> But it could not have been contemplated
that - if she was destitute and has become permanently
attached to her father’s household - she was not entitled to
maintenance from the joint family property which was owned
by her father and others. Anglo-Hindu law made it only a
legal obligation of the heirs of the father to maintain her
1
out of his separate estate. Here modern Hindu law with the 
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (78 of 1956) brought no 
improvement and it seems that a married daughter would still 
have to wait until the death of the father when she would be 
entitled to a share in his coparcenary interest according to 
Section 6 (and Schedule) of the Hindu Succession Act (30 of 
1956) and would succeed to his separate property, if any, 
according to Section 8 (and Schedule) of the Hindu Succession 
Act. At Anglo-Hindu law the widowed daughter-in-law - to cite 
another instance - had a right of maintenance to the deceased 
father-in-law’s separate as well as to the coparcenary
property. But according to Section 19(1) and (2) of the
1 - — Ambu Bai Ammal v. Soni Bai Animal. I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 13! A.l.R.
1940 Mad.8o4(F •B .); App'avu (N.) Udavan v. Nallammal. (1948)
1 M.L.J.iiO: A.l.R.1949 Mad.24: for the right of the daughter- 
in-law. See Derrett, op.cit., para.689*
2Ambu Bai Ammal v. Soni Bai Ammal. I.L.R. 1941, Mad.13! A.l.R. 
1940 Mad.8o4 (F *B.). See cases cited by Derrett, op.cit., 
at para. 271 fn.4.
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (78 of 1956) a widowed 
daughter-in-law is entitled to maintenance by her father-in- 
law provided she is unable to obtain maintenance from the 
estate of her husband or her father, or her mother or from 
her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate. Further 
she is only entitled to maintenance from her father-in-law 
if he is in possession of coparcenary property and provided 
she has not received a share.
Vi. The Son’s Right to Partition.
With the establishment of the High Courts in l86l and 
dismission of the court pandits the text of the Mitaksara 
came more clearly into focus and in some respects superseded 
post-Mitaksara developments which had tended to limit the
1 9 ■
son’s rights. The Mitaksara (besides the VyavaHara-mavukha)
was then the main source on which the courts administering
Mitaksara law relied, as translations of the main works of  #   7
_  1 
post-Mitaksara authors were yet to appear. Perhaps this
supported to a certain extent a shift towards a modification
of the patriarchal notions, which had influenced case law
before lb6l and textbook authors, in favour of the family
members whose rights were defined and mobilized. In l36l
the Madras High Court made the right of the male issue to
ask for partition from his father absolute, contrary to Sir
See Derrett, Coiim. Studies in Sociology and History. 4(1961) 
10, at 34 ft.
Strange’s view* It was decided that a grandson may irres­
pective of a circumstance maintain a suit against his grand­
father for compulsory division of ancestral family property* 
Scotland, C.J., and Bittlestone, J*, were of the opinion that 
the passage in ch*I,ii,7 of the Mitaksara was applicable to 
the law governing the division of property generally and 
ch*I,v, 8 and 11 was applicable to the division of ancestral 
property. This division would coordinate the rights of the
male issue with those of the father. Widespread practice,
2
as we have seen, would not visualize such a right* When the
question of the son’s right to demand partition came up
before the Bombay High Court, it was held that a son is not
entitled to ash for partition in the lifetime of his father
without his consent in a situation where the father is not
3 ™separated from his father or brothers and nephews* The 
majority of the judges refused to recognize the son's unquali­
fied right to ask for partition. The judges took the right 
of the son only as relating to a situation where he was 
merely joint with his father; in other words equal right of 
ownership of father and son in property acquired from the 
grandfather "does not necessarily imply a separate and inde­
pendent right by one of the co-owners to have that property
1Nagalinea Mudali v* Subramaniva Mudali*(1862) 1 Mad*H*C,Rep•77
2
See also Nelson's criticism of the decision in Indian Usage 
and Judge-made Law in Madras. London, 1887» 210-3? 370-1*
^Ana.ii v. Ramchandra* (1892) I*L,R, 16 Bom*29 (F.B.).
1 /
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separated from the joint family estate in the hands of several
1lines of coparceners...” In accord with an interpretation
_  a.
of the Mitaksara adjusted to patrilineal and patriarchal
conception of the joint family, Candy, J., reasoned that the 
general rule of the Mitaksara is that a person can get his 
share of the joint estate only through his father. This 
presupposes in his opinion that the father must be dead before 
the son can obtain his share. To this general rule 
Vij nane^vara introduces an exception on account of Yajnavalkya1s 
text "the ownership of both father and son is equal in the 
ancestral estate11 in so far a person may compel his father to 
partition the ancestral property. But it is not a general 
rule that partition may be enforced by any co-sharer whatever 
his position in the family may be. nThe vested interest 
which every member of the family acquires by birth is in the 
whole property. The equality of ownership, which is the 
principal foundation of the right of a man to demand parti­
tion, is that of father and son... It is a mistake to 
suppose that, because the equal ownership of father and son 
in ancestral property gives the son a right to demand parti­
tion from his father, and requires the shares to be equal,
therefore all the rights and liabilities of each must be
2
equal or identical". A further reason which influenced
the majority opinion of the judges was the absence of any
Sargent, C.J., at 35*
2At p.75.
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jjrevious case in the Bombay Presidency in which the principle
of partition at will being a right of every member had been 
1
advocated. Candy, J., was evidently apprehensive of turning
the patriarchal joint Hindu family in the light of which he
— 2 
understood the Mitaksara. into a "voluntary partnership11.
Telang, J., in his dissentient judgment took the view
that the son’s right was based on his right by birth and
right of ownership and that the general principle in the
Mitaksara was that where there is joint ownership there is
3
also the right to partition. The son’s right was based on 
his apratibandha davadaship and was independent and entirely 
unaffected by the father or any other person being alive or 
dead and hence classes as *ufaobstructed’ in contradistinction
of those which are dealt with under the head of "obstructed
4
heritage". The mere absence of such claims as made in the
5
case of Apaji v. Ramchandra did not impress Telang, J. ; nor
did he appreciate the consideration of the "general prevalence,
of the institution of undivided families in Hindu society".
1Candy,J., at 79? see also Sargent, C.J., at 35*
2
The influence of Sir Kenry Maine and his overstatement of the 
influence of patriarchy in India is noticeable when the learned 
judge refers to a passage of Maine’s Dissertations on Early 
Law and Custom (London, 1883) where the author says (263)1 
"I have frequently observed the unintended disintegration of 
the Indian joint families by the operation of Anglo-Hindu law".
3At 36.
At 40.
5 At 55.
6
At 36 •
' : I
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The judgment of Telang, J#, represents the general trend
away from rigid patriarchal notions. The interest by birth
became coincident with a right to demand partition. Outside
Bombay the right to demand partition against the managing
1
member or other coparceners became well-established. We
suggest that the development was in accord with the joint
Hindu family as a modern institution. The threat of a son
demanding partition from his father and other coparceners
provides a check on arbitrary alienations of joint family
property by the manager. The inference that the joint family
would disintegrate is not necessarily true.
Ao^aii v. Ramchandra which is still an authority in
Maharashtra and Gujerat has been recently resented in
2
Jaswantlal v. Nicchabhai. but could be distinguished on the 
particular facts of the case. The case concerned a suit for 
partition of joint family property by metes and bounds.
Mody, J., was not ready to extend the principle of Ap^aii1 s 
case which concerned primarily a severance of status. It is 
to be hoped that the Supreme Court will eventually overrule 
Avi&.ii 1 s case.
VII. Self-acquisitions.
(l) Self-acquisitions of the Father.
We have noted previously that the Smrti-candrika had
negatived the son's right to control the father^ alienation
1See cases cit. at Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage. 520 fn.4.
2A.I.R. 1964 Guj. 283 at 285(b).
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of'property. This was contrary to the text of Vyasa and its
* *  / 2reception by Vijnanesvara. Elsewhere Vijnane^vara had 
provided an alternative by saying that the son had to acquiesce
rt
in the father’s disposal of immoveable self-acquired property*
The father’s right to alienate self-acquired immoveable
k
property freely was doubted by the Madras High Court, and
negatived by the High Court of the North -Western Provinces
(Allahabad)'*, But eventually all the High Courts decided in
favour of the father’s power.^ The Privy Council in Rao
7
Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori settled the question finally 
and held that the father has full power of disposition over 
his self-acquired immoveable property. The Judges followed 
W.H. Macnaghten’s distinction between moral and legal rules 
which was in turn derived from the theory peculiar to Bengal 
authors. The reason added to the precept of Vyasa cited in 
the Mitaksara (I,i.27) was taken as an indication that the
*See above ,3OS .
^Mit.I,i,27* See above, .
3I,v,10.
Tarachand v. Reeb Ram. (1866) 3 Mad.H.C.Rep. 50,55- " n  is 
by no means clear upon the authorities that he (the acquirer) 
can even by gift inter vivos deprive them (the male issue) of 
their right to share even in his self-acquired real property 
and we apprehend that it is perfectly clear that such male 
issue would be absolutely entitled to it at death”.
%!ahasookh v. Budree, (1869) 1 N.W.P., 153*
Cases cited at Mayne, op.cit., 430.
7 (l898) 25 I.A. 54: I.L.R.20 All.267.
Q
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Vyasa*s text could not be a positive rule of law* Their
Lordships stated: "All these old text-books and commentaries
are apt to mingle religious and moral consideration11* This
solution brought the law in de-facto consonance with the
_  3
view adopted in the Smrti-candrika* Besides it provides 
an illustration of how Anglo-Kindu law consolidated the law 
which in the traditional system was differently settled in 
legal texts and which as customary law varied from caste to 
cas te •
(2) Self-acquisitions as a Separate Entity.
In the traditional sastric system self-acquisitions of 
the undivided agnates of the family were part of the common 
estate until exempted at partition. This was not clearly 
stated by early textbook writers on Anglo-Hindu law who
k
styled the father*s self-acquisitions as separate property.
Vyasa: "They, who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten
and they who are still in the womb, require the means of 
support, no gift should therefore, be made'1. This passage 
lends merely - in traditional outlook - convincing emphasis 
on the preceding rule by Vyasa not to alienate one's self­
acquired property.
^Rao Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori. (1893) 23 I»A.fj4, 69*
^See above,^06 .
See e.g. Strange, Hindu Law> 1,17* See also the interpreta­
tion of Manu * s text 9*209 at Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage. at 
313 fn.u. Manu's view indicates in our view clearly that the 
father is at liberty to divide or to exempt at partition the 
ancestral property recovered by him. Mayne believed that the 
text "contemplates the continuance of the coparcenary, not 
its dissolution, and points out what property falls into the 
common stock and what does not". The possibility of self­
acquisitions not being part of the ’common property* could 
only arise in the Davabhaga.. See Dh.K. 1213b, 12l4a.
■'/ / / 
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The attitude to consider self-acquisitions as a separate 
entity before partition was probably strengthened by the 
growth of testamentary power, i/hen a person dies intestate 
his self-acquired property would remain part of the common 
property belonging to his undivided sons# Similarly when 
X w*ho is sonless and joint with collaterals died, his self­
acquisitions would remain part of the property of his 
collaterals# There was no question of the self-acquisitions 
* devolving*1 by 'succession1 to X's widow and the ancestral 
property being taken by the brother by 'survivorship'. But 
gradually the notion was accepted that 1 selfacquisitions *
were inso facto separate. When the point was examined by the
1
Privy Council in Katama Natchiar's case it was overlooked that 
in the Mitaksara the devolution of property did not depend 
on the nature of property, but on the status of the deceased#
It was decided that where a man dies without male issue, but 
undivided from his brother and nephew, and had left self­
acquired property such property passes by descent to his widow 
to the exclusion of the son of the predeceased brother# We 
should note that when the case had been referred to the
pandits in 1833 they had taken the view that the brother's
2son was entitled to the property# This still reflects the
1(1863) 9 Moo.I.A. 539, 6l0ff. 
2550 ff.
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traditional position. In their Lordships* view the Mitaksara
dealt only with the case where the property nhas been either
wholly the common property of* a united family, or wholly the
2
separate property of the deceased husband"* We know now 
why the Mitaksara had not visualized the third position*
Their Lordships placed the burden of proof upon the respon­
dent to show that "separately acquired property", though the 
owner was joint in status, did not descend as separate 
property, i.e. by succession. The respondent argued that 
separate proxoerty did not descend as separate property, 
because there was '*a general state of coparcenaryship as to 
the family property*1. The respondent thus thought that the 
status of the person is decisive for his claim to the self­
acquired proj>erty, though even he admits that the coparcenary 
does not extend to self-acquired property. In the words of 
their Lordships: "Again it is not pretended that on the death
of the acquirer of separate property, the separately acquired 
property falls into the common stock, and passes like 
ancestral property. On the contrary, it is admitted that if
See also Leon Sorg: Avis du Comite consultatif de jurispru­
dence indienne, p.l60 (avis nt. 57-l^HiMay 1337) • X dies joint 
with Y leaving a widow W. X leaves self-acquired property.
W is entitled only to maintenance. According to Sorg (writing 
in 1893) the rule was abandoned. Sorg's remark at p.21 shows 
that the distinction between joint and separate property was 
relatively recent and that the failure to distinguish per­
sisted even at that time among certain families, particularly 
in the country districts. See also West, A Digest of the 
Hindu L aw. 4th ed., 699 fn.t.
2 At 610.
3See above,168 . J.D.M. Derr^tt, "The Right of the Separated
Son", Supreme Court Journal* 19 (1956) 103*
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the acquirer leaves male issue it will descend as separate 
property to that issue down to the third generation". These 
dicta reveal a misunderstanding by the Privy Council. How­
ever they show that even the respondent himself thought that 
the self-acquired property forms a distinct entity for 
purposes of succession. His argument that jointness as to 
the family property should prevent self-acquired property 
from "taking the general course of law" i.e. from descending 
by succession, seems inconsistent.
In what follows in the decision a share received at
partition is referred to and described as descending as
separate property and it is a fortiori concluded that the
same rule applies "to property which from its first acquisition
has always been separate". From this the important principle
is derived that the "law of succession follows the nature of
1
the property and of the interest in it".
(3) The Right of the Separated Son in Self-acquisitions of
the Father.
The rule laid down in Katama Natc h i a ^ s case which says 
in effect that self-acquisitions were a separate entity and 
pass by succession was generally not applied or ignored in 
connection with the rights and relationship between a father 
and a separated son. Some High Courts held that the right 
of the undivided son to take his father!s self-acquisitions
381
in preference of the separate son is based on the right of
1
survivorship. In Oudh on the other hand the logical impli-
2
cations of Katama Natchiar's case were followed. Stuart,
C.J., and Srivastava, J., ruled that sons who have remained
united with the father cannot claim any preference as against
the son who has previously separated, as regards succession
to the self-acquired property of the father. They follow
the implications of the rationes of Katama Natchiarfs case
and point to the consequences of the case of Rao Balwant
3
Sin.cch v. Rani Kishori. These cases make it impossible in
the opinion of the judges to apply the rule of survivorship
to the self-acquired property of the father. In Ganesh
4
Frasad v. Hazari Lai Collister, J., ruled that "succession 
to ancestral property and inheritance of self-acquired 
property are on entirely different footing. In respect to 
ancestral property, there is community of interest, unity of 
ownership and unity of possession among the undivided copar­
ceners, and succession is by survivorship among coparceners". 
But then he bases the preference of the unseparated over the 
separated son again on the original Mitaksara position accord-
ing to which the status of the claimants in respect of the 
1Fakirappa v. Yellappa. (1898) I.L.R. 22 Bom.101; Nana Tawker 
v. Ramachandra, (1909) T*L.R. 32 Mad.377*
2Badri Nath v. Hardeo. Altf. 1930 Oudh 77.
25 I.A.54.
i±
A.I.R. 1942 All.201 (F.B.)
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father was decisive* The sons were said to have fta certain
right or interest by birth" in the self-acquired property of
the father, though it was considered to be very different
from the right which they have in ancestral property, and
consists in a moral and spiritual injunction upon the father
1
not to squander the property to their detriment. Bajpai, J*,
held that there is still a coparcenary in the wider sense of
the term and the divided son not being a member of the copar-
2
cenary can take no share in the self-acquired of the father. 
Hamilton, J., in a dissentient judgment held to the contrary.
The reasons why the majority of courts did not follow 
the implications of Katama Natchiar's case - which amounted 
in our opinion to the abrogation of the birthright in respect 
of self-acquisitions of the father, especially also in view 
of Rao Balwant Sincrh' s case and the introduction of testa­
mentary power over self-acquisitions - may be seen in the 
fact that the Privy Council did not deal with the apratibandha 
davadaship. This as we know implied the son's vested rights 
in all the deceased father's property including self­
acquisitions. Katama Natchiar's case dealt specifically with 
the right of the widow of a sonless propositus who was joint 
with collaterals• When the case of the separated son came 
before the courts the Mitaksara was re-examined because the 
matter was thought res inte.era and the principles in Katama
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1
Natchiar1s case were lost sight of. The underlying reasons
which guided some of the decisions were based on the view
that a superior right or virtue attached to uninterrupted
unity with the father in consequence of which the divided
sons are postponed to the undivided sons. This was believed
to be in accordance with "Hindu sentiments and the spirit of 
2
Hindu law". But the possibility that psychologically and 
economically Hindus were not prepared to the full implications 
of the rationes in Katama Natchiarfs case did not - one 
should have thought - abolish the law as laid down by the 
highest judicial authority.
Moreover the situation was obviously unjust where the 
father separated the son himself and the separated son was 
prevented from taking a share in the deceased father’s self­
acquired estate. The anomalous position was removed by
*1
Ranade, J., in Fakirapoa v. Yellappa. (1898) I.L.R.22 Bom.101, 
held that Katama Natchiar’s case did not apply to the facts 
of Fakirappa’s case. Here a grandson had sued his grandfather
and uncles for partition. He obtained a decree as to all
joint family property, but failed as to a share in the 
separate property of the grandfather. On the death of the 
grandfather he brought a fresh suit for a share of this 
separate property. It was decided that "as between united 
sons and separated grandson, the succession on the grand­
father’s death to the property, both ancestral and self­
acquired, left by him goes in preference...to the united son".
n
Collister, J., in Ganesh Prasad v. Hazari Lai. A.I.R. 19A2 
All. 201 at 208. See also Ranade, J., in Fakirappa’s case,
(1908) I.L.R. 22 Bom.101 at 10k : "The nature of the self­
acquired property can make no difference in this connection 
more especially where the grandson enforces his partition 
against his grandfather’s and uncle’s will".
Section 6, expl.2, of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956: a
person separating himself from the coparcenary before the 
death of the deceased or any of the heirs cannot claim on 
intestacy a share in the interest of the deceased. This 
would not apply in a case where the father had separated a 
son and subsequently makes self-acquisitions• Here the 
separated son would be entitled to a claim in the self­
acquired estate of the deceased.
VIII.Apratibandha Dava and Sapratibandha bava at Anglo-Hindu
Law.
In whatever manner the mode of devolution of self­
acquisitions of a father was conceived in decisions, i.e. 
whether self-acquisitions devolved by "survivorship" or 
"succession", there was no dispute that sons joint with their 
father take the self-acquisitions of their father as joint 
family property subject to all incidents of coparcenary^as 
between them and their descendants.  ^ Further it was estab­
lished that the right to take by survivorship could only 
occur in a coparcenary. The question was however which mode 
of devolution applied to property deriving from non-
^M t . Ram Dei v. Mt.Gvarsi. A.I.R. 1949 All • 5^5 • B • ) ; on the
mode of devolution of the self-acquisitions see Fakirappa v . 
Yellappa. (1898) I.L.R. 22 Bom.101, Nana Tawker v. Ramachandra.
(1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad.377! an undivided son takes his father’s 
self-acquired property by survivorship. Vairavan v . 
Srinivasachariar, (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 44 9(^ H  •)! by 
succession. But see Narasimhan v. Narasimhan. (1932) I*L.R.
53 Mad.856. Gupte, Hindu Law in British India. 107•
coparceners e.g. the maternal grandfather* Moreover the 
problem was whether such property became coparcenary property 
with all incidents attached to it or on what tenure such 
property was held by heirs related to the propositus in equal 
degree and being members of an undivided family. In the case 
of Godavari Lakshminarasamma v* G. Hama Brahman the question 
was answered thus: "(27).*. no property or interest in pro­
perty of one person is taken by another by survivorship 
unless the latter has already an interest in the property by 
reason of his relationship. This can only be in apratibandha 
daya, in which there is always a right by birth... (28)...in 
property inherited by two or more persons from their maternal 
grandfather there can be no right by survivorship in this 
sense, for the daughter’s sons, whether they be sons by the 
same daughter or by different daughters, did not possess 
from the time and by reason of their respective births any 
interest/in the property of their maternal grandfather while 
he was alive...,f The conclusion arrived at was that the 
widow of one of the two brothers, who inherited property from 
their maternal grandfather is entitled to his share in the 
absence of male issue, as the rule of survivorship does not 
apply and the brothers had taken the property as their 
separate property, i.e. as tenants-in-common•
1A.I.R. 1950 Mad.680
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This solution, of course, seems not in accord with
strict Mitaksara law. Separate property was then not known*
before partition. Moreover the daughterfs sons had an 
interest in their maternal grandfather’s property by the very 
definition of dava. though their ownership was under an obstruc­
tion. Certainly any accretion of property during jointness 
became part of the samudava until partition. I.S. Pawate
arrives at an opposite conclusion to that of the Madras High
1 2 Court. He refers to an early Privy Council case where it
was held: "The Calcutta decision appears to their Lorc&iips
to have been based upon a view of the Mitakshara law which
further investigation shows to be erroneous; namely, upon
the view that according to Mitakshara law, the doctrine of
survivorship is limited to unobstructed successions and to
the succession to the joint family property of reunited
coparceners •rf
Pawate points out that the Mitaksara does not contem-*
plate dava to descend in defined shares to heirs standing in 
the same relationship to the owner, contrary to the approach 
in the Davabha.ga law. The co-heirs acquire a right over the 
whole property and when one of them dies before there is any 
partition of the property inherited, the rule of survivorship 
comes into operation. Vibhaga includes both ’inheritance1 and
^Dava-vibha.ga. 184.
2Venkavvamma Garu v. Venkataramanavvamma Bahadur Garu. (1902) 
I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678, at 687.
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1 partition1• Vibhaga in the former case is the arrangement 
of ownership having for their ownership an aggregate of things 
by placing the property under the head of individuals. The 
property in our case is accordingly placed under the owner­
ship of the two daughters* sons. If they wish to enjoy the 
property with full independence they may make a vibhaga 
('partition*) by restricting their rights vested in the whole 
property to a particular part of the whole. If one of them 
dies before partition the property accrues to the other 
co-heir by survivorship to the exclusion of the widow of the 
deceased•
The solution offered by Pawate is logically implied in
the Mitaksara. yet it is questionable as far as the assumption *
of survivorship in the case of 'inheritance* or *sapratibandha 
dava' is concerned; some authors writing after Vijnanesvara 
tended to mitigate the implications of the Mitaksara defini­
tion of daya and ignored that there was any pre-existing 
right in respect of sapratibandha dava. They seem to imply 
in their approach that the sapratibandha davada would not be 
owner "solely" by birth or relationship but by the additional 
cause of demise of the owner.*
1 — _ _
See Madana-ratnapradipa. 323f*i Vvavahara-mavukha.93:
sapratibandha - the life of the owner is an obstacle to owner-
ahip; apratibandha- ownership accrues solely by relationship.
See Vijfiane^vara himself who turned strictly against the
view that e.g. separated davadas should continue to have any
mutual rights. I,i,30.
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We suggest that the introduction of the notion of 
'succession' was no radical departure from the Mitaksara#o
Moreovei/once separate property was recognized as an entity,
there was no reason why property inherited from others than
paternal ancestors should become joint family property* But
it was open to doubt whether e.g. the two daughters* sons
inheriting from their maternal grandfather should become
tenants-in-common and hot joint tenants with the right to
take from each other by survivorship. But the principle of
joint tenancy was said to be unknown to Hindu law except in
the case of joint property of an undivided family governed 
-  -  1by Mitaksara law. In Muhammad Husain Khan v. Babu Kishvao — 1 1
2
Nandan Sahi it was held that ' ancestral property1 is that
property which is derived from father, father's father, and
father's father's father. Property which is inherited from
any other person is not 'ancestral' i.e. it is separate
property without the incident of survivorship. The inevitable
consequence was to hold that the daughter's sons take as
tenants-in-common, and that the widow of one brother would
3
take as if her husband had been separate and not joint.
M^ t . Bahu Rani v. Ra.i endra Baksh Singh. A.I.R.1933 P«C«72.
264 I.A.205: (1937) II Mad.L.J.151 (P.C.).
3Godavari Lakshminarasamma v. Hama Brahman. A.I.R. 1930 
Mad.680.
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CHAPTER X
The Incidents of the Joint Family and their Development 
___________ according to Case Law and Legislation*________
I. ACQUISITION.
(1) Self-acquisitions » The Doctrine of "Merger”*
As a result of the new concept of self-acquisitions
being an entity distinct from joint family property,
coparceners could now also have transactions between each
other. In the sastra this could not have been contemplated
before partition had taken place. The early recognition of
self-acquisitions as a separate entity was in fact favourable
to the development of the joint Hindu family as legal
institution. It encouraged individual enterprise without
necessitating disruption of jointness. A further progress
in this context was the concept of merger, i.e. the blending,
or renouncing, or releasing of separate property by the
acquirer so that it would become coparcenary property.
"Merger” of self-acquisitions did not presuppose any nucleus
of coparcenary property. In their search for a sastric base
of this doctrine the courts were less successful, because
the question of merging self-acquisitions could not arise
during jointness. Only at partition one could renounce one's
self-acnuisitions by not claiming exemption from partition.
1
In Shiba Pars ad v. Rani Prava.g Kumar i Debi a passage from
k.L.R. 59 Ca. 1399: (1932) 59 I.A.33a.
39 i)
the Mitaksara as cited in Goorochurn Doss v. Goluckmonev 
1
Dossee was tawen as the basis of the doctrine. The passage
obviously relates to a partition and presupposes that
acquisitions become ipso facto part of the common stock;
there is no question of the acquirer having "merged” his
acquisitions with the common stock: "Among unseparated
brothers, if the common stock be improved or augmented by
any of them, through agriculture, commerce or similar means,
an equal distribution nevertheless takes place; and a double
2
share is not allotted to the acquirer11.
The P.C. however tool: the text to mean that property 
had been merged by the acquirer and their Lordships in the 
words of Sir Dinsha Mulla derived the following conclusion; 
"...a Hindu possessing self-acquired property may incor­
porate it with the joint family property in which case it
will pass on his death not to his hefjis , but to the
3
surviving members of the family".
Nevertheless the result, though perhaps technically
wrong, was an inevitable and necessary advance from pure
Mitaksara law.«..
It is noticeable from the facts of decisions that 
traditional attitudes continue to linger in so far as self-
1i653 Fulton, 165, 173-4.
2
Hit. I, iv,31*
•^Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Pravag Kumari Debi, (1932)
59 I-A.331, 349.
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acquisitions are usually felt to be or treated as part of
the common property for some purposes or that the property
is allowed to be used out of generosity or is utilised for
family purposes. On the other hand property might be
suddenly claimed as separate by the acquirer who had
previously treated it quite obviously and unambiguously as
part of the joint family property. In answer to such
situations the courts proceeded to strengthen the concept
of self-acquisitions as a separate entity by insisting on
the actual intentions of the acquirer being proved in the
1
light of all circumstances of the cases. The burden of
proof thereby is always on the party pleading conversion of
2
self-acquisitions into joint family property. Mere genero­
sity and allowing to use will not permit the inference that 
the separate right had been waived. Thus a member of the 
joint family who acquires property may allow other members 
of that joint family to manage it or to enjoy the income 
arising out of it, but this circumstance alone cannot mili­
tate against the presumption that such property acquired by
a member out of his own earnings constitutes his self- 
3
acquisition. We believe that these decisions had the
^Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lai. (1906) 34 I.A.63: I.L.R. 29 A1 • 
244; Sura.i Narain v. Ratan Lai. (1917) 44 I* A. 201: I.L.R.
40 All. 139.
2Narayanan Neelkuttv v. Krishnan Venki, A.I.R.I935 T .C •199.
•^Fratab Kishore v. Gvanendranath, A.I.A. 1931 Ori • 313*319* 
Mallesanna v. Mallanna. A.I.A. 1961 S.C. 1268.
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effect of preserving the institution of the joint family*
A presumption e.g. that all self-acquisitions are joint 
would force acquirers to manifest their intentions strongly 
and unambiguously* This would not necessarily contribute 
to the unity and harmony within a joint family. On acquiring 
property a family member may even see himself forced to 
separate from the family in order‘to treat his self­
acquisitions as separate beyond doubts*
( 2) V/hat constitutes self-acquisitions?
The Mitaksara followed a strict course as regards what
followed a strict course as regards what would be impartible
at a partition. Only that property which was acquired
fwithout any detriment to the goods of father or mother1
became impartible. Community of ownership between husband
and wife had lost its importance in the sastra and Anglo-
Hindu law inherited this position. Consequently the phrase
1 to the goods of the father or mother1 was ignored and the
subject was treated only with reference to property acquired
without detriment to the estate of the father, such property
typifying joint family property.
As regards gains of learning the position in the
Mitaksara had been that if they were earned at the expense
2 —  —  —of the family estate they were partible. Jimutavahana on 
1 —Mitaksara I. iv. 2.-----  *> ---  7 7
^Mi t . I , i v ,1,6.
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the other hand had held that gains were only partible if
they were as such acquired with the aid of joint family
funds and if the learning was acquired at the expense of
1
joint family funds* Perhaps the strict attitude of the
Mitaksara has to be understood in the historical context*■ — #
Gains of learning related mainly to brahmanical occupations
and predecessors of VijnanesVara from the North had taken a
2
liberal view of the right to exempt such acquisitions*
At the time when Vijnanesvara wrote, the new brahmanical 
families from the North were dependent on the acquisition 
of each member of the family* Moreover Vijnanesvara 
incorporates many local customs of other communities commer­
cial or agricultural amongst which was the attitude to
recognise only few categories of self-acquisitions as impar-
3
tible so that even gifts were deemed partible. The attitude 
to connect individual family members’ self-acquisitions with 
the whole family is widespread in customary law and 
Vijnanesvara took account of this 'established practice1•
The approach of the Mitaksara may have served the 
sociological and economical requirements of the traditional 
agricultural commercial and even the professional atmosphere, 
but in the face of modern differentiations of professions 
^D a * bha* V I ,i ,44-50.
Q
See Medhatithi on Manu 9 i204 and 206 (Jha’s tr• ,vol•5 * 169 f)*
3
Mit* I,iv,7i nrati.graha.
k -r ____
Mit.l,iv,9s acara-viruddham.
the application of the Mitaksara was felt as an impediment*
The fact that the Mitaksara was enforced as the standard
~ *  ~ '
authority which did not easily permit of the use of "lesser11
1
authorities inevitably led to unsatisfactory results*
The imposition of the Mitaksara has also suppressed customary 
attitudes which - difficult to prove as custom - might 
have become valuable incidents of joint family law* Thus 
e.g. the custom of managing one’s undivided share in the 
joint family property separately though survivorship would 
apply.2
The situations was that gains made after any type of
education without consideration of what had been received
from family funds in pursuing education would be held to be
3
joint family property. Some decisions tried to mitigate 
the strict Mitaksara rule* The attempt to improve the situ­
ation by legislation failed because of the cautiousness of
1 —  —The Vivadaratnak^ra which is an authority in the Mithila
school has detailed provisions on gains of learning which
are much more liberal than the Mitaksara rules and might
have been profitably used* See Vi.ra. on Nar. 1 3 » H  (text
no. l4l9» P*50 f*;) see also Krtva-kal*.675. The fact that
such texts were not made use of is ascribed to their not
being available in translation during the last century as
well as to their ’’regionalization” (l^errett. ) .
2
See on the custom Derrett, Contr* to Ind* Soc*, 6 (1963)
l6ff., at 45.
3
See cases cited at Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage. 35^f and 
fns •
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1
the administration# The same cautiousness guided the
2judgment of Lord Sumner in Gokal Chand v. Hukam Chand , a 
case which concerned the salary of an Indian Civil Service 
Officer who was an unseparated member of a joint Hindu 
family carrying on a joint ancestral business as money­
lenders# The appellantTs salary was held to be partible 
property since it resulted from a special educational train­
ing and the appellant had not discharged the onus of proving 
that that training was not at the expense of the joint 
family# Their Lordships regretted the incongruity "of 
applying to such an occupation as Mr. Gokul Chand1s an 
ancient rul e wnicn nn d its origin in a state of society 
possibly simpler than and certainly different from the state 
of society existing in the present day##."3 Their Lordships
4relied on the early case of Luximon Row m  which gains
were held to be joint family property although the causality
between the ancestral property and the actual earnings by
the acquirer as a Prime Minister was negligible# They also
5
relied on Ohalakonda Alasami v. Rhtnachalam where the
adoptive mother of a devadasi claimed the jewels and other
property acquired by the daughter. The acquisitions were
held to be the property of the family on the principle
1See Shepard, "Hindu Law and Anglo-Indian Legislation", Law 
Qlv. Review. 13 (1902) 172 ff#
2 (1921) 48 I.A. 162.
3At 174.
4
(1831) 2 Knapp 60: 3 ^*H#67 (IMC.)
3 (1364) 2 Mad.H.C.R.56.
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applicable in the Mitaksara families. There had been ab1 1
nucleus of property without which the daughter could not
have earned and acquired property* Their Lordships in
Gokul Chand1s case further concluded that there is no valid
distinction between a direct use of the joint family funds
and a use which qualifies the member to make the gains by
his own efforts* They thought it highly important that
"no variations and uncertainties are introduced into the
established Laws affecting family rights and duties ‘connected
with ancestral customs and religious convictions".
Meanwhile the efforts for legislation had gathered
momentum and in 1930 the Hindu Gains of Learning Act (30 of
C'in I )
1930) was passed without difficulty* The Act provided(that 
earnings which have been gained as a result of training or
education with the aid of joint funds by way of salary,
1
wages or any other income due to learning would be separate.
The consequence of the Act was that to a great extent
acquisitions fell outside the partible assets of a family*
But otherwise Gokul Chand1s case remained the basic authority
for the proposition that acquisition with the expenditure
of or with the detriment of any nucleus of joint family
property, however small, are available for partition. A
series of cases tended to move away from the strict rule in
1See Ramakrishna v* VTshnumoorthi* A.I.R. 1957 Mad.86*
Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, para.5^7*
v \ . i
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i
Gokul Chand*s case. The question what was detriment was
too liberally answered in some decisions and the rule that
whatever is earned by or as a result of the use of joint
family funds, whether directly or indirectly, falls into
the common stock, was at times neglected. The Supreme Court
has stopped this tendency. Thus where a manager of a joint
family floated a company with the intention to take over the
company as a going concern and was appointed managing
director, and finance was supplied at all stages out of
joint family funds, it was held that the managing director's
2
remuneration was the income of the joint family. In a
subsequent case the Supreme Court took a similar strict view:
a manager of joint Hindu family had taken out insurance
3
policies for his own family , and Hidayatullah, J., was
satisfied that there is no scope for inference either in
law or in fact, that the premia paid ceused to be the assets
of the joint family and became the share of the income of
the individual. It was held that there is no proposition
in law by which insurance policies must be regarded as the
separate property of the coparceners on whose lives the
insurance is effected by a coparcener and that proceeds of
kan insurance policy do not belong to the joint family.
1See cases discussed by J.b.li. Derrett in "The Supreme Court 
and acquisition of joint family property", 62(1960) Bom.L.R.
(Journ. ) 57-71*
^Comm. of Income Tax v. Kalu Babu Lai Chand.A .I.R.1Q59 S.C.1289* 
^Smt.Parbati Kuer Sarangdhar Sinha. A.I.K.I96O 3.C.403*
^At• p.4o4.
In M/s. Pivare Lai Adishwar Lai v . Commissioner of Income-
tax. Delhi , the Supreme Court took a more flexible line;
2
the judges in fact distinguished Ealu Babu Lai Chand1s case 
when confronted with a situation where a manager of a Hindu 
joint family had been appointed the treasurer of the Central 
Bank of India after he had furnished securities to the bank 
of certain properties of the undivided family. The question 
was again whether the salary and emoluments received by the 
manager as the treasurer of the bank were joint family 
property. Their Lordships took the view that they were 
not, because there was nothing to show that the manager 
had received any particular training at the expense of the 
joint family funds or his appointment was the result of any 
lay-out or expenditure or of detriment to the family property.
These few illustrations may suffice to demonstrate 
that as regards gains of learning necessary advancements 
from the strict Mitaksara rule were made which did not 
necessarily have the effect of the breaking up of the joint 
family. The acquirer retained the possibility of merging 
his self-acquisitions with the joint family property.
Perhaps these rules were well suited to the needs of modern 
joint family life. The satisfaction derived from the possi­
bility of letting one's relatives use the self-acquisitions
^A.I.R. i960 S.C.997. Set cJUc A>~. £. Sow
O CUtx^ asi CHC6JZI n.L-T. 65
A .I.h. 1959 B.C. 1289*
/
'• /  , 
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is a common feature of Indian joint family life and is 
supported by decisions rather than destroyed. On the other 
hand as far as acquisitions are concerned which are not the 
result of a special education or training the Supreme Court 
have interpreted old Mitaksara notions strictly but with 
consideration to the facts of modern life*
(3) Joint Acquisitions without Nucleus*
x
This expression was used by Sooeesdw to denote property 
acquired by the joint labour or joint exertions of copar­
ceners without the aid of joint family property consisting 
of ancestral property and accretions* The question arose 
under which circumstances property acquired in this manner 
could be considered joint family property*
It seems that the sastra knew the possibility that 
property would be acquired by some or all of the undivided 
brothers (davadas) without the aid of the paternal property* 
Such property could be claimed by the acquiring brothers at 
a general partition just as individuals could exempt their 
self-acquisitions. The acquisitions were held between the
acquirers and their issue, i.e. not on a joint tenancy as
1
in English law. In Anglo-Hindu law joint acquisitions
^Apararka on Yajn.2,120 (7^6 f.), on 2 ,135-6 (at 7^3 )icmd 
ibid. (at 7^(0 on S^ankha-Likhita-PaithTnasi. See above,
Yajn. 2,120b indicates that at the death of a brother his 
interest does not go by ’survivorship1 to the brothers as 
in a joint tenancy but that he is represented by his male 
issue who take his interest like in coparcenary.
^ P S aju • L  fto-cLiSvrt. ^ - £  V %
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without utilising any coparcenary nucleus were ab initio 
separate and unlike in the ^a*stra not coparcenary property.
The acquirers have to merge their acquisitions in order to 
impress them with the character of joint family property.
In Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimliulu ITaistrv. a father and 
his five sons constituted an undivided family. The father 
and three elder sons lived apart from the two youngest sons. 
The latter had acquired property jointly. The youngest 
brother sued his elder brother for an account and for 
partition of certain property which he alleged to be the 
property of a joint family consisting of his brother and 
himself. It was argued inter alia that acquisitions were 
partible as joint family property between the two brothers. 
Bhashyam Iyengar, d., had occasion to expound the conception 
of the joint family at Anglo-Hindu law while dealing with 
this question. Leaving out the discussion of the rights of 
the female members as not necessary for the solution for the 
particular question he said: a Hindu joint family is purely 
a creation of law and cannot be created by act of parties 
save in the case of adoption where a stranger may be 
affiliated as a member of the corporate family. The concep­
tion of a Hindu joint family is a common male ancestor with 
his lineal descendants in the male line. There may be one 
or more families all with one or common ancester within the
1 (1902) 25 I.L.R. 149.
4 01
larger joint family and each family with a separate common 
ancestor. The main family may own 'unobstructed heritage' 
with accretions and the branches of such a family each 
forming a corporate body within a larger corporate body may 
possess separate 'unobstructed heritage! which with its 
accretions may be exclusively owned by such branch.
Property acquired without the aid of joint family property - 
by one or more individuals members - whether they belong to 
different branches or to one and the same branch of the 
family - may by agreement be incorporated with joint property 
of the main family or one of its branches. If property has 
been acquired - even if the undivided family is not possessed 
of any ancestral nucleus of property - it can be impressed 
with the character and incidents of unobstructed heritage or 
joint property belonging to the main family or to any of 
its branches. But the question whether such property would
be held by the acquirers as co-owners and not as joint
1 „  ^
family property would depend on their intention. But if 
property was acquired by all the members of the undivided 
family, by their joint labour, it would in the absence of 
any indication to the contrary be owned by them as joint 
family property.^
At p. 155. 
At p.156.
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In Bha.awan v ♦ Reoti the nature of joint acquisitions 
of some members of the joint family was again the subject 
matter of discussion, Subba Rao, J., summarised the posi­
tion as follows:
'’Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law and cannot be 
created by agreement of parties except in the case of 
reunion. It is a corporate unit of a family unit.
The law also recognises a branch of the family as a 
subordinate corporate body... One or more members of 
that family can start a business or acquire property 
without the aid of the joint family property, but 
such business or acquisition would be his or their 
acquisition. The business so started or the property 
so acquired can be thrown in the common stock or 
blended with the joint family property in which case 
the said property becomes the estate of the joint 
family. But he or they need not do so, in which case 
the said property would be his or their self-acquisition, 
and succession to such property would not be governed 
by the law of the joint family but only of the law of 
inheritance. In such a case, if a property was 
acquired jointly by them, it would not be governed by 
the law of joint family; for Hindu law does not 
recognise some of the members of a joint family belong­
ing to different branches, or even to a single branch 
as a corporate unit. Therefore, the rights inter se 
between the members who have acquired the said property 
would be subject to the terms of the agreement there­
under it was acquired. The concept of joint tenancy 
known to English law with the right of survivorship is 
unknown to H.i. except in regard to cases specially 
recognised by it... 11
Some of the text books and decisions speak loosely of 
a •presumption' that joint acquisitions without the aid of 
a nucleus are joint family property. There is however no
presumption in law. Especially the case of Sitalprasad v .
2Rampersad creates the impression that property acquired by
1(1962) 1 S.C.J.348.
A.I.E. 1943 Nag. 321.
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a coparcener jointly with his brother without the aid of
any nucleus of joint family property would be presumed to
be joint family property. But this case seems to be based
1
on a misquotation of Ranrpershad v. Sheo Churn which is
based on the presentation of the case in Mulla's Principles 
2of Hindu Law • The actual words in Rampershad1s case are:
"There is nothing prima facie improbable in the hypothesis
that he (one of five brothers living together as a Hindu
joint family) brought his earlier gains voluntarily into
the common stock making them the capital on which he and
his brothers were to trade. All further gains made by their
joint exertions would be ... impartible...”
Thus there is no presumption in law, but there are
certain circumstances which prima facie admit the inference,
at times loosely called •presumption* in decisions that
joint acquisitions without the aid of any nucleus of joint
family property become joint family property. E.g. the
fact that the family lives jointly, is joint in food and
worship and has a common stock in which the acquisitions
3
are kept may allow such an inference of intention. A course 
of conduct in accordance with such fact over a prolonged 
period would justify the inference that the property was
1(l365) 10 Uoo.I.A.4 9 0.
2See 12th ed. ,
See e.g. Laldas v. Motibai. (1908) 10 Bom.L.R.175.
vi,t‘
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intended to be impressed with the character of joint family 
property. A presumption as contained in the dicta of the 
Nagpur case would be the against the nature of the joint 
Hindu family as a developing institution. The possibili ty 
that some meiabers may unite in earning property which is 
separate from the joint family property, without thereby 
breaking up the wider unit of the joint family facilitates 
the adaptability of the institution to modern modes of 
acquisition in trade and commerce and industry. It permits 
initiative of individuals with the framework of the joint 
family•
(4) v/ill s and Gifts by the Father in respect of his Self­
acquired Property.
Before we conclude our remarks on self-acquisitions
Vvre must make short reference to the case of Arunachala v .
1Iluruganatha • This case completed the development initiated
by Rao Dalwant Singh v. Rani Kisliori  ^ in recognising the
father’s complete control over his self-acquisitions. The
question which was settled by the Supreme Court arose in
connection with gifts (or testamentary bequests) made by a
father to a son in respect of his self-acquired property.
Did the male issue of the donee obtain an interest in such
property? The.Mitaksara would declare gifts received through
^A.I.R. 1953 B.C.495.
2 (1898) 25 I.A.54.
vff ...
4 Oh
favour of the father (nitr prasada labdha) exemptible at 
1partition , though the son's male issue would acquire an
interest by birth in such property. The Calcutta High Court
had held that such property becomes ancestral property in
the hands of the son's son as if he had inherited from his 
2
grandfather. The Madras High Court had held that it is 
undoubtedly open to the father to determine whether the 
property which he has bequeated shall be ancestral or self­
acquired but unless he expresses his intention that it shall
3oe self-acquired, it should be held to be ancestral. The 
Bombay High Court took the opposite view: there must be a 
clear expression of intention on the part of the donor to 
make it ancestral otherwise the gifted property would be
4held the self-acquisitions of the donee*
The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that as a 
father has complete powers of disposition over his self­
acquired property it must follow as a necessary consequence 
that a father is competent to provide expressly that the 
donee would take a gift exclusively for himself or that the 
gift would be for the benefit of his branch of the family. 
There is no presumption that the gift is ancestral or 
separate in the hands of the donee.
^1, i,19; I,iv,28.
2
Muddun V. Ram. (1863) 6 n.K.71.
^Na.galingam v . Ram Chandra (1901) l.L.R. 24 Mad. 429*
Jugmohun Das v. Mangal Das, (1886) I.L.R. 10 Bom.528.
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II • MAN AGEMENT AinD ALIENATION •
(1) The Alienation of the Undivided Interest •
The sastric position as regards the alienation of the
undivided interest in joint family property has been out­
lined in the preceding chapter* That is in the Maithila 
school - as.well as generally in the Mitaksara school - 
there was no possibility to alienate a share or specific 
property which was part of the sadharanam dhanam. When a 
part of the common property was alienated it was considered 
as MungivenM (adatta)• When a debt was incurred for indi­
vidual purposes the coparcener had to pay the debt out of
1
his own property or after partition from his share. The
Gentoo Code records as the opinion of the Maithila pandits
that the alienation of the undivided injterest was possible
after it had been ascertained at a partition. (See above,: .)
Even Jagannatha could not contemplate an absolute right to
2
alienate one’s share before partition. The view that the
interest was inalienable before partition was adhered to
3
in Northern India. and was followed by a consistent series 
of decisions in Northern India and Bengal (Mitaksara case^).
See Vivada-ratnakara (text no.4l0; p.199) on Katy.848; 
tr. Jha, HLG. II, 46.
2-oee aoove, •
^xla.i a* Bvdianund v. Jvdutt Jha. 4 3.D.A. 160. Sheo Surran 
Misser v. Sheo Sohai, (1526) 4.S.D.A.138 (l Morley’s Digest 
42(25); Nundram v. Kashee Fande. (1033) 3 £«D.A.232 (l Morley’s 
Digest, 42(24).
4See SadaDart Prasad v. Foolbash Koer, (I869) 3 Beng.B.N.
(F.L.) 31 and cases cited at Kayne, Hindu Law and Usage, 482.
4'0'7?
xhe fact that there were repeated attempts in Northern
India to introduce the alienability of one's interest which
wase. foiled in decisions, in itself indicates that the strict
Mitaksara rules were outgrown by the individual needs within
the framework of the undivided family. In most parts of
India it was finally achieved that a coparcener's interest
could be seized in execution of a decree during the
Coparcener's life-time the interest being ascertained and
1
realised by a partition.
Meanwhile in the South the law was developed further.
The origins of this development may be assigned to the 
famous correspondence between Colebrooke and Sir Thomas 
Strange which introduced the notion that after all only an
2alienation beyond the share of the alienor might be invalid.
Colebrooke's cautious remarks were based on the peculiar
theory prevalent in Bengal that though the alienation may
interfere with religious concepts the transaction as such
3
had an inherent legal validity. In Viraswami Gratnini v.
4
Avvaswami Gramini it was finally held that the member of
an undivided family may alienate the share of the family
property to which, if a partition took place, he would be
individually entitled. The decision followed earlier cases 
1Deen Dval v. Ju.udeep Narain Singh, (1877) ^ I*A.247»
I.L.R. 3 Cal. 198.
^See Strange, Hindu Law, I, 200f•; II, 3^3i 3^8.
3
On the history of the introduction of the right, see Derrett, 
Supreme Court Journ. (J.), 30(1957) 85» 93ff*
4
1 Med. H.C.R. 471.
4 0 8  -
1
of the same High Court , which were in favour of a bone, fide 
purchaser and e.g. upheld an alienation for value by a 
father and the oldest brother to the extent of their shares*
In Viraswami Gramani’s case a last attempt was made to 
support the alienability of the undivided interest with 
reference to the Mitaksara * It was explained that the widow's 
right to succession in preference to her husband's copar­
ceners in the Dayabhaga school rested on the unity of 
husband and wife and not upon the existence of a separate 
interest which the husband has during his lifetime according 
to Dayabhaga law. Similarly in both schools-it was pointed 
out - the interest descended to sons and the right was not 
absolute so that a separate estate, as a matter of inference
mi.ceht be deduced in the Mitaksara school from the descent■ *—--
of the father's undivided share to sons. Here we may once 
more recollect that according to the Mitaksara a single 
coparcener was incompetent to alienate. The widow succeeds 
only if the husband died separate and not because of the 
oneness of husband and wife ioso facto. The fact that a 
partition between brother and brother's sons the latter 
take per stirpes refers to partition and until then the 
property and its accretions were an undifferentiated fund 
and none of the coparceners could say that he owned a definite 
share. There was no question of "descent" of a share before 
partition•
^e.g. 3.A. 33 of 1833, Mad. 3.U. Decisions, 222.
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The real reason wnich allowed the introduction of the 
new rule of the alienability of the undivided share before 
X^artitbn was - as formulated in Sura.i Bunsi Koer v. Sheo 
Prasad - "founded on the equity, which a purchaser for 
value has, to be allowed to stand in his vendor's shoes, 
ana woric out his rights by means of partition". An individual 
coparcener ought to fulfil his obligations which he was 
able to by enforcing a partition and should not permit to 
hide behind his coparcenary status and claim his action 
has been ultra vires.
Sura.i Bunsi Koer's case acknowledged the development 
in Madras and Bombay by declaring it as settled law that 
one coparcener may dispose of ancestral undivided estate to 
the extent to his share and a fortiori that such share may 
be seized and sold in execution for his separate debt.
The same law was stated to apply in Bombay.^
Subsequent decisions in South India, though conflicting 
and meandering, eventually worked out and ascertained the 
limits of the rights of alienation and the equities of the 
alienee without effectively destroying the framework of the 
law of the joint Hindu family. Firstly, a right of gift of 
the undivided interest was not admitted, as the very 
foundation of the alienor's equity is the payment of
1(1879) 6 x.A.88.
2 (1878-9 ) 6 I.A.83, lOlf
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1
consideration. Further the undivided share cannot be
alienated by will because the right of survivorship was
held to take precedence to the exclusion to that by devise.
This was held in Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik
a decision which is an example for the restrictive attitude
observed by the Privy Council which here supported a
necessary development of the law without endangering the
framework of the law of the joint family. Though it had
3
been held in Madras that an alienation by gift inter vivos
would be valid against the non-assentient coparceners their
Lordships refused to follow the proposition that a share
should be alienable by will as a further consequence.
Their Lordships at the same time cast doubts on the
Madras view that the interest in joint family property
should be alienable by gift in view of the alienability
being based on the purchaser's equity and the reasons for
this cautiousness were laid down in the famous dicta: "The
question, therefore, is not so much whether an admitted
principle of Hindu law shall be carried out to its apparently
logical consequences, as what are the limits of an excep-
4
tional doctrine established by modern jurisprudence". In 
reaction to Lakshman Dada Naik1s case the Madras High Court
Peramanavakam Pillai v. Sivarainan. (1952) I M .L • J • 308 (F • B . ) #
2(l88o) 7 I.A.181.
Vitla Butten v. Yamenamma. 8 Mad. ii.C.R.6.
4
At p.195.
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reverted to the doctrine that the right to alienate the
undivided interest is based on the alienee's equity and
1
thus not alienab le by gift.
The alienee as a purchaser of the entirety of the
interest of a coparcener in the joint family property or
as a purchaser of the interest of a coparcener in an item
or even as a purchaser of the whole of a specific item is
merely given an equity against the entire joint family
estate and he may step into the shoes of his alienor in a
suit for general £>artition. But this right is subject to
the burden which the alienor as a member has to bear along
with the other coparceners and subject to an allotment of
the property purchased, if possible, without £:>rejudice to
2
the rights of the other members of the family. The alienee
3
does not become a tenant-in-common. An alienation by the
coparcener has not the effect of dividing the status of the
family nor does the insolvency of a coparcener bring about
a decision in the status of the family. These decisions
are eminently suited to a concept of the joint Hindu family
as a modern legal institution. There may be occasions where 
1
Bab a v. Tinirna, (1833) 7 Kad.337? see remarks .by
Turner, C.J., at 363*
2Peramanayakam Pillai v. Sivaranian. (1932) I Bac.t.J . 308
(F.B.), 329, 31b.
3Ibid.: see also jagdish Pandev v. Rameshwar Chaubev, A.i.it.
i960 Pat.54. 
kPeramanayakam Pillai v. Sivaraman, (1932) I Mad.B*J* 308 
(F.B.)t 329? 333 etc. See also Sheonandan v. Ugiah. 
i960 Pat.60, Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu L aw, 
para. 4o9*
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an individual coparcener requires a loan and wants to use 
his corjarcenary interest as a security without being forced 
to separate because his coparceners refuse to consent to 
the alienation. The consideration acquired by the coparcener 
becomes part of the common property and the alienor's act 
did not cause a total loss; moreover his appropriation by 
these means would be debited to him at a partition between 
the coparceners.^
Has then the introduction of the alienability of the 
undivided share seriously affected if not destroyed the 
legal basis of the joint Hindu family as is commonly alleged? 
we should remember that according to the Mitaksara school 
the coparceners were after all called owners (svamis),
With the means provided by the sastra an initiative co-owner 
who was otherwise attached to joint family life would have 
been invariably forced to separate if he wanted to alienate 
his interest and the other coparceners refused their sanction. 
In other words the sastra was not prepared for every modern 
eventuality and Courts furthered the adjustment of the joint 
Hindu family to modern needs without interfering necessarily 
the jointness of the coparceners,
We may ascribe the alienability of the share to an 
inherent right of the coparcener already countenanced in
^Derrett, Contribution to Ind, Soc, , 6(1952) 17 at 4l,
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the sastra and activated at Anglo-Hindu law. We may also 
accept the opinion of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., on the alien­
ability of the share, namely, that it is based on equity 
which though not recognised in the Mitaksara rests on 
equitable principles recognised by the ^astra in general.
The sSls tra recognises equity where a text of the sas tra
%would operate to bring about inequity*
(2 ) Management. The Power of Alienation and the Rights 
of the Alienee.
(a) Rights and Duties of the Manager (karta).
The adaptation of the sastric concept of the father or
eldest common ancestor or eldest brother being the family*s
natural representative and chief or predominant owner is
marked by detailed rules; these rules define the rights
and duties of the coparceners and family members as well
as the legal position of the manager in relation to the
coparceners and in relation to third parties• i/here the
sastra was content to concentrate on the question what a
father was allowed to alienate, Anglo-Hindu law eventually
treated the question from the point of the powers of the
manager, from the point of the rights of the family as a
whole, and from the point of the rights of individual
coparceners •
1Peramanavakaiii Pillai v. Sivaraman. (1932) I ^ad.L.J.
30o, 386.
V'"
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The core of the law relating to the management in 
Anglo-Hindu law was the text of Vyasa and the comment of
(V/ __ /   1
Vi.inanesvara in the Mitaksara. The condition that the
adult sons etc. had to consent to sustain an alienation by
the father of ancestral property was initially adhered to
2even if the sale was beneficial to the family. Ihe rule
continued to be in existence in Mysore and it was held
there in 1953 that a debt incurred for defraying expenses
at adoption of a son, and for the purchase of bullocks as
well as a subsequent mortgage of family property to raise
money for the discharge of that debt are debts contracted
for legal necessity. But there was nothing to show that
the plaintiff had consented expressly or impliedly to the
alienation and hence the alienation was not binding on him
3
and he could recover his share. But elsewhere, in British 
India, Courts took a different line. It might be very diffi­
cult to obtain the consent of all coparceners for an
1Kit. I, i ,28-9••••"while the sons and grandsons are minors 
and incppable of giving their consent to a gift and the 
like; or while brothers are son and continue unseparated, 
even one person who is capable, may conclude a gift, hypothe­
cation, or sale, of immoveable property, if a calamity 
affecting the vmole family require it or the support of the 
family render it necessary or indispensable duties, such as 
the obsequies of the father or the like, make it unavoidable”. 
For the text see above, •
2
Muthoora v. Bootun, (IS69) 13 h.h.30. See also Strange,
Hindu Law, I, 20.
^Nan.j unego wda v. Range gowda, A.I.R. 1953 Mys.l3o; Hanuma v . 
Kencha Mariya. A.I.R. 1951 Mys.119*
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alienation which was indispensable in the interest of the 
family. In the traditional system there were adequate means 
to persuade a recalcitrant coparcener apart from the 
unquestioning obedience towards the father or eldest 
brother. But the Courts were faced with possibility to 
recognise the consent of the sons as absolutely pre-requisite 
or to develop means to effect the speedy performance of 
transactions by the manager in the interest of the family 
as well as in the interest of bona fide alienees. ihe out­
come was a shift towards mor objective criteria for the 
justification of alienations by the manager. A few decisions 
took the line that the necessity of the alienation as such 
was sufficient to warrant the alienation by the manager.
The consent of the sons as postulated by VijnanesAvara was 
not taken as the pre-requisite, but as the evidence of a 
valid sale. The majortjiy of decisions established that 
the manager has an implied authority; if family necessity 
exists that necessity rests upon the family as a whole and
it is proper to imply a consent of all of them to the
2manager's action which necessity has demanded.
The powers of a manager of a joint family in respect
of alienations were considered by the Judicial Committee of 
1 .
Sir Colley Scotland, C.J., in Saravena Tewan v. Kuthaii 
Ammal. 6 Mad. K.C.R.371 referred to in Ponnappa Pillai v . 
Pappuvavvanvar« I.L.k. k Mad. l8 .
2
Sahu Ram v. Bhup Singh. (1917) 44 I.A., 126, 130: I.L#R.
39 All.437, 443.
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the Privy Council in Hunooman Prasad v . Mst. Babooee and 
though the case concerned the powers of a mother managing 
as guardian for an infant heir it formed the basis for the 
power of the snanager to alienate joint family property for 
the necessity or benefit of the estate* The concept of 
MI*egal necessity” and "benefit” was no doubt flexible and 
vague, but the consequence that these phrases were inter­
preted differently and that their import could change, was 
probably more suitable than the rigid requirement of the 
consent of all coparceners.
2
Hunooman Prasad’s case also provided protection for 
an alienee against non-alienating coparceners by introducing 
Sngiish equitable principles* The alienee was protected 
against the coparcener’s suit if the alienation was for 
necessity or benefit of the estate or if he has given value 
and had made sufficient inquiry as to the existence of a
3
cause justifying the alienation and had acted bona fide.
(b ) The Powers of the Father as Manager•
(i) Gifts of Affection. The Potentialities of the ^astra 
in Modern Hindu Law*
The father has additional powers as manager. He may
make "gifts of affection” to his daughters, sisters, and
even sons out of moveaole joint family property according
1(l856) 6 Moo. I.A. 393.
2(l8p6) 6 Moo. I.A. 393.
'Z '
Derrett, Introd* to Modern Hindu Law, paras. 441,93*
w 1
to the original Mitaksara position. On the other hand
certain sastrie texts provided that a woman may get for her
maintenance a slice of immoveable property in excess of
2
money or instead of money. There were frequent attempts
to introduce the possibility of making gifts of immoveable
property - an anathema to strict Mitaksara law because land
was reserved for the equal enjoyment of the male descendants
3
A strict attitude was taken in Jinnappa v, Chimmava when 
it was held that even a small portion of the immoveable 
property of the family cannot be gifted by a Hindu father 
to his daughter for her maintenance, who had looked after 
him in his old age and for whom he had great love and 
affection. N.M. T.V.Kane who appeared in this case as 
Council tried to show that the gift was for maintenance 
though the full sastiic background was not shown by him so 
that the Court simply relied on the text of the Mitaksara
of a ^ |'dc.4io^ cf’imfviOv'e.CLbie. fTOpa-Hy
which disallows^ In Madras on the other hand custom allowed
Nit. I,i,25* See Derrett, op.cit., para. 445*
^Katv. 902. Derrett. JitAS , 195&, 17-25 • See above , •
Bphaspati (26,28) 200 and Sara, m a , 548. Vyasa (see above, 109 
and S m . ca. ,655. This assignment of property is for main­
tenance purposes (see e.g. S m .ca., 553••••jlvanartham) thus 
gifts of affection as such, of immoveable property, are 
invalid unless they are for maintenance. Consequently the 
assignment of land by the father-manager to a daughter for 
maintenance may be subsumed under Mit.I,i,29 as an ’indis­
pensable duty’ and does not fall under Mit.I,i,25 where 
gifts of affection of immoveable property were disallowed.
^A.I.R. 1935 Bom.324.
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gifts of a reasonable amount of immoveable property to a
1
daughter even after marriage. Other High Courts circum-
2vented or ignored the Mitaksara rule. The Supreme Court 
in Guramnia v . Hallappa^ have now decided that a father has 
power to make a valid gift of immoveable property which is 
binding on his posthumous and adopted son in favour of a 
daughter sister) by way of reasonable provision for
her maintenance. The decision is supported with a passage 
of the Hadana-ratnanradioa as cited in the Vvavahara-mavukha 
which allows the gift of property up to 2pOQ(oanas) annually; 
if not given annually a larger sum may be given or even
4immoveable jjroperty, if the donor is able. The gift by 
the father or his representative of a reasonable amount of 
the joint family property even of immoveables for the 
maintenance of daughters is a moral obligation according 
to the Supreme Court which may extend over years even after 
marriage. The moral obligation is the result of a right 
to a daughter or sister to a share in the family property
at partition which was lost by the efflux of time. hut it
"l [ ~ ~ j
Hamala Devi v. Dachulal . A.i.A. 1957 Karuppa
Gounder v. Palinammal, A.I.A. 1963 Mad. 24p.
bee e.g. Tara Sahuani v. Raxhunath Gaku. A.I.R.I963 Ori.pO.
-'A.r.n. 190  ^ a.0 .510.
4bee Derrett, "Gifts of Affection: The Supreme Court Revises 
tne Mitakshara Law", A. I. A. 19^5 Journ. f f . Wavahar a-
mavukha. Ip4 : aneka-varsesvitodhikam api saktau stiiavaram 
api ca deyam ityapi sa [Kadana^l eva// hadana-ratnapradTpa, 326
419
seems that mere gift of affection out of immoveable property 
where the daughter’s maintenance is otherwise secured, would 
be still invalid.
The decision of the Supreme Court allows the inference 
that the Mitaksara and decisions expounding the Mitaksara 
may now foe revised by the Supreme Court or supplemented 
with the use of material of the sastra which has not yet 
been admitted by the Courts as authoritative. This compels 
us to believe that the study of the sas tra has still practical 
purposes in order that decisions supported by the sastric 
material may be technically correct.
(ii) The Pious Obligation.
Perhaps one of the most serious "inroads” in the law
of the joint family was seen in the recognition of the legal
liability of sons, sons1 sons, and sons' sons' sons to pay
to the extent of their interest in Mitaksara joint family
property, the private, untainted (not illegal or immoral)
pre-partition debts of their male ancestor. However the
sastric rules were considerably mitigated at Anglo-Hindu
law. For some time in Bombay the strict sas tra rules were
adhered to in so far as sons were held to be bound to pay
the debt of the father with interest independent of assets
inherited, whereas the grandson was held to be liable for
1
debts though without interest. But through legislation
Narasimharao v. Antaii. (l665) 2 Bom.H .C .H.6 1.
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the male issuers liability was limited to assets inherited.
In Madras a practice had developed that when no assets were
inherited the son’s obligation would be only moral and
2
rests on the notion that the debt is a sin. In fact it 
was tacitly assumed that the duty was not enforceable, and 
the coparcenary relation between father and son, with
I
respect to ancestral property, was regarded as identical
with the like relation between brothers with respect to
3
their common property.
The Privy Council however in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo
4
Lall - a case from Mithila - held that the father can
effect a sale of joint family property for his debt provided
they were not immoral; and in the case of Muddun Thakur v.
nantoo Lai it was decided that the joint estate can be
sold in execution of a money decree of the father. Both
cases establish that when a son sues to set aside the sale
by his father the pious obligation relates to back to the
time of the sale. The e=#fojct that the father is alive or
dead was held to be irrelevant. The effect of the decisions
was also to take away the powers to defraud purchasers which
would have allowed the father to retain the purchase money 
1Hindu Ileirs * Relief Act of lu66 , sec .4 .
2
See on the history of the pious obligation Muttusami Ayyar,J •, 
in Ponnaupa Pillai v. PaDPUvavvangar, lS8 l I.L.H. 4 Mad.l 
at 15ff.
•^Ponnanna Pillai1 s case, at 23*
4
(1574) 1 I.A.321.
5 (ld74) 1 I.A. 3 3 3 .
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while the son could make use of his power to interdict an 9
alienation without "need or benefit of the family1* based
011 the Mitaksara.
*
For Madras this development was accepted in a majority 
2
decision. Innes, J., in a dissentient judgment held that
purchaser of ancestral property under the decree takes at
the most only the share or the interest to which the father
was entitled at the date at which the charge was created.
He thought that the obligation would devolve with the
3
accruing share upon the surviving coparceners. Muthusami 
Ayyar concurred with Innes, J., and held that the father's 
share is all that passes by the sale during his life when 
it is neither justified by necessity or benefit of the 
family. The same way as an alienee could have been defrauded 
by a coparcener alienating his undivided share and conse­
quently an equity was created in favour of the alienee, the 
same way, he believed, the undivided share of the father 
should separate as a matter of inference. Moreover as the 
father's undivided share descends to his son and the right 
of survivorship is not absolute an equity would be created 
in favour of the alienee which would limit the son's power
4of interdiction to his own share. Turner, C.J., took the
1i,1 ,27-9 .
2Ponnappa Pillav v. Papnuvavvangar, l88l X.L.k . 4 M a d •1•
5At p.12.
4 . . . .
Ponnappa Pillai's case. I.L.ic. 4 Mad.l, at 3of • This sugges 
tion followed dicta of Sir Scotland, C.J., in Avvasami 
Gramini v. Virasami Gramini, 1 Mad.H.C.R.47I• See above,
422'
1
view that the obligation was not merely moral. There is
absence of any severalty of ownership and the right of
survivorship prevails over the claims of creditor and donees.
There is nothing to show in the texts that the liability
ceased to be commensurate with the whole estate ancestral
2
or self-acquired. The son's obligation is not purely
personal but an obligation incidental to his interest as is
clear from Girdharee's case. Being incidental to the
heritage it must subsist from the inception of the son's 
3
interest.
4In firi.i Narain v. Man.gla Prasad the principles were
3summarised and laid down in five rules. In this decision 
the concept of "antecedency" was clearly formulated; this 
concept emerged in previous decisions in consequence 4* of the 
acknowledgement of the liability of the male issue during 
the lifetime of the male ancestor for practically any 
private "untainted" debts and conflicts with the son's right 
to question alienations not for the benefit of the family
  •— (j
according to the pure Hit alts ara text.
The "pious obligation" as understood by the Supreme
Court is based on religious considerations: if a person's
■^ At p.44. ^At p.64.
2 4
At p.49. (1923) 2 I.A.129.
5
See e.g. Derrett, Introd. to Modern Hindu Law, para.477*
See on the problem Derrett, Hindu Lav/: Mitakshara: The
Pious’Obligation and the Doctrine of "Antecedency",
Supr. Ct. Journ., 18(1933) 139-50.
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debts are not paid and he dies in a state of indebtedness
his soul may have to face evil consequences, and it is the
duty of his sons to save him from such evil consequences.
The bcsls of the doctrine is spiritual and the object is to
confer spiritual benefit on the father. It is not intended
1
m  any sense for the benefit of the creditor. Nevertheless
the idIo u s obligation has developed in practice into a
special weapon to aid the transferee. In spite of the
dicta on the spiritual nature of the pious obligation, the
Supreme Court go further and support purchasers substantially
by deciding that the sons who challenge the alienation have
to prove not only that the antecedent debt was immoral but
also that the purchaser had notice that it were so tainted.
Ihis means that the basis of the pious obligation, namely
the payment of t.te untainted debt is disregarded. The
mischief which was to be avoided, namely possible collusions
between father and sons would be thus replaced by another
miscnlef namely that deception may be practised on the 
the
alienee and/son cannot prove the alienee’s notice of the 
taint•^
Nhether the institution has, however, vitally affected
the joint Hindu family as a legal and social institution
may still be doubted. he must remember that the sclstric
”
Per Ga j endragadkar , J., in Luhar v. Doshi . A.I.nh i960
c .s .964 , 966 •
^See Derrett, Luc iCwe w 4 f ero. L e. I t-wvq. s \ t
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provisions evidenced a very rigorous attitude in respect 
of the liability of male descendants which goes beyond that 
what has been achieved in Anglo-Hindu law save that sons * 
in Anglo-Hindu law were held liable even during the life­
time of the father. ias
'£&&& m&te32r -tt& s & 4aca*fc *kssj&*s
'^^nijsaeradry^T jt® .1' tiiaeraa i n  fn m s re n ?  jaee ts ra ra t ifts& esfts eo f
w^-
M >e^^S3airai3ar o f  ebsiri?© b^try=m it-ertrzi -bo-**® eo& Saxatsi^e in  pae*a**<£5>2^ t«hs»fo 
tzri&rretd . It seems unlikely that in the sastric time families 
were more protected against wasteful alienations for 
personal purposes and mismanagement by an imprudent father.
(4) The Position of the Manager in Modern Hindu Law•
The position of a manager at Mitaksara law as laid
down in juaicial decisions was that of a kind of trustee
tnough not all the duties of a trustee are imposed on him.
In fact his position is sui generis and only comprehensible
with reference to the whole law of the joint Hindu family
as a property-earning and -enjoying unit. Detailed technical
rules filled the gaps where the traditional law would only
/„
outline the rights and duties. During the sastric period 
simpler modes of acquisition and hereditary occupations 
made it easier to place merely full reliance on the sense
of responsibility of the managing eldest common male ancestor.
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His eldest son was to inherit his position eventually and 
continue his duties towards the whole family without there 
being necessarily an abrupt discontinuation of the manage­
ment by the death of the father. The fiduciary position 
of the manager is still retained in modern law though the 
types of duties have become much more variegated and 
complicated by e.g. requirements of Income-tax, Estate 
Duty, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , section 6, which 
assigns a separate interest to relatives in respect to the
undivided share of a deceased coparcener and of which the
1
manager has to keep accounts. There are many new burdens 
created by modern possibilities in trade, commerce and 
indus try•
(5) Uomen as Managers. Their Rights in Property.
The complexity of the powers, responsibilities and 
liabilities of a manager in Anglo-Hindu law and modern 
Hindu law is perhaps also one of the reasons for the hesi­
tancy to permit women as managers of joint Hindu families.
,/e have seen that in the sastra there was nothing which 
would basica iiy militate against women being "managers" in 
the absence of adult or capable males.^ The majority of
High Courts held that the right to become a manager depends
1See further on the responsibilities of the manager Derrett, 
Introduction.... paras. ^26-42C.
See above
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upon the fundamental fact that the person on whom the right 
devolves was a coparcener of the joint family. In this 
view the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, (10 of 1937)
- an enactment which was motivated by the intention to 
emancipate women by giving them better rights in property - 
has not conferred a corresponding right to represent the 
other members of the family as a karta, The Act had in 
effect restated pre-Hitaksara rules by assigning to a widow, 
or a widow of a predeceased son or of a son of a predeceased
son the interest that would have been taken by her husband
1 2 at a partition. In Nadha Ainmal v, Comml of income-tax it
was held that a partnership agreement entered with a stranger
by a Hindu widow representing her minor sons as a karta of
the family is not valid. The effect of the Hindu women1s
hig-hts to Property Act, 1937? was merely to confer ujDon the
widow an interest in the share of the husband and the estate
created in that interest is the interest of a Hindu widow.
She is also entitled to claim partition of the properties,
but all these rights either individually or cumulatively
do not have the effect of conferring upon the widow the
status of a coparcener in the family. Nor do they clothe
her with the right to become a karta. This case dissented
”1 i
Cp.Visvarupa on Yajn.2,119 £p.246^J; see sec. 3(l)-(3) of 
the Act. H
2 _ ~
A.x.ib. 1930 Mad. 33S.
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from Cor/ir.i. of Income Tax v . Laxmi where it was held that a 
female member of a joint Hindu family can become the manager 
of the joint family particularly if she is the only member 
sui juris left in the faraily. The main arguments were:
The status of a coparcener is not a sine cua non of compe­
tency to become the manager of the joint Hindu family of 
which she is a member. The archaic views that a woman did 
not deserve independence have been shaken by modern 
requirements and the status of a Hindu woman has been 
materially changed by the Hindu lVornen1 s Rights to Property 
Act (10 of 1937)* She gets a right by marriage in the joint 
family property.
It is possible that this view gains eventually further 
judicial recognition in so far as especially in the absence 
or because of the incapacity of adult coparceners a woman 
may become manager. There are no fundamental objections 
in the sastra.
Meanwhile the rights of women in coparcenary property 
before partition as laid down in the Hindu V/omen1 s Rights 
to Property Act (10 of 1937) have been altered by the 
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (30 of 1956). The 
interest in coparcenary property devolves on female rela­
tives and relatives claiming through such relatives specified
^A.I.R. 19^9 Nag. 128
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in class I of the Schedule to the Act. Amongst such rela­
tives are now the daughter, widow, mother etc. who share 
the interest together with sons etc. The interest is 
ascertained at a notional partition, i.e. as if a partition 
had taken place immediately before his death. The Hindu 
Succession Act also provided that the interest of the female 
in the coparcenary interest under sec. 6 would be absolute 
(sec. lk I •) so that her interest would be separate from 
the joint family property. Until partition she would have
a right to maintenance and at a partition *by metes and
2
bounds' a right to a share in appropriate cases.
V/e may finally ask ourselves whether the Hindu Succession 
Act in effect underminded the lii taksar a joint family by 
allowing; female relatives (and relatives claiming through 
such females) a share in the coparcenary interest of the 
deceased. At pure hitaksara law jointness, sometimes 
effected by reunion, was a way of disposing property and 
excluding female heirs. The Hindu 'Women's Rights to Property 
Act, 1937? had in fact stifled this possibility by providing
for a right of the widow etc. to the husband's interest in
3the coparcenary property as well as to his separate property.
i 17
^xpl. 1 to sec. 5 of the Hindu Succession Act, l$)oo.
^°ee Derrett, Introduction.... para. p26-32.
^Sec. 3(1) and (2).
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But under the Hindu Succession Act. 1956, a coparcener has
the possibility to dispose of his interest by will so that
he is able to exclude the wid<*w etc, from participating
a
with a share in the joint family property. The testator
on the other hand cannot utilise his powers over his
coparcenary interest indiscriminately. Even if he disposes
of his interest in favour of a stranger the share will
2remain subject to the rights of dependants.
IV. PARTITION.
Anglo-Hindu law introduced a clear distinction between 
the rights of undivided coparceners and the mutual rights 
of sharers after partition. The distinction between divi-
3sion of right and division of property is however no new
introduction and the Vvavahara-mavukha already had declared
that one could effect a severance by merely declaring one *s
4
intention to separate. The division of right does not 
amount to a division of the property by 'metes and bound *• 
Members of a joint family may, however, divide a portion of 
the property without affecting the status of the family and 
confining the unity of title only to the extent of property 
so divided. The severance of status may be brought about 
S.6 , proviso, and s.30•
2
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. 1956, s.31.
■z
Apppvier v. Rama Subba Aivvan (1866) 11 Moo. I-A. 75.
4
Kane's ed., 9^; tr• 86.
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by agreement or by unilateral declaration of a coparcener 
to hold the property in severalty.
Whereas there are no doubts that a coparcener can 
effect a severance by an unequivocal declaration of inten­
tion, one may not agree with the latest decision of the
Supreme Court according to which the intention must be made
1
known to all other members affected by the severance.
Subba Rao, J., remarked: ”...the knowledge of the members
of the family of one of them to separate from them is a 
necessary condition for bringing about the member's sever­
ance from the joint family. It is implied in the expression 
"declaration" that it should be to the knowledge of the 
persons affected. An uncommunicated declaration is no better 
than a mere formation of an intention to separate. It 
becomes effective as a declaration only after its communica­
tion to each person affected thereby".
Formerly it had been held that a mere posting of the 
notice was sufficient to validate a will executed by the
coparcener desirous of separating, the day after it was 
2
posted. But this view was overruled by the Supreme Court
in a decision which will cause considerable inconvenience
1Ra.ghavamnia v. Chenchamma. A.I.R. 1964, B.C.136.
2
Naravana Rao v. Purushotama Rao. I.L.k. (1938) Mad. 315« 
Indira v. Sivaprasada Rao. (1953) Madras 245; see also 
Katheesumma v. Beechu, (1950) Mad. 502. See Derrett, 
Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, para. 519*
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1
in practice. The reason why the notice to the manager 
who is after all the representative of the joint family, 
or communication to one of the coparceners who is in posi­
tion to inform the manager should not effect severance, are 
not equalised by the inconvenience created by coparceners 
who are e.g. absconding in order hot to receive news of a 
severance•
The rules of partition - of which we can bring no 
full greatment - reflect like in the sastra the intention 
to work out the rights of the sharers and prevent recurring 
claims of relatives who are separate. The notion of parti­
tion functions to put an end to the rights of collaterals 
and prevents relatives living jointly but separate in 
estate to ignore the effects of partition and so to attempt
to take by survivorship to what e.g. actually the vfidow
2would be entitled.
V. MALABAR CUSTOMS.
Malabar matrilineal joint families called tarwads in 
the marumakkathavam system and kutumba in the alivasantana 
system were originally characterised by the absence of 
partition by individual volition. That property was
Derrett, "Communication of Intention to Sever", 56 (1964) 
Bom. L.K., 137ff., at 143-5*
2Martand v. Radhabhai. A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 97*
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indivisible and that partition takes place when the family
became too numerous so that the land could not support them
and separation had to take place, is not contemplated in
the sastra from the Earliest times.
The property of the tarwad was held jointly though
property (self-acquisition) of a tavazhi (i.e. sub-tarwad)
which consists of descendants of a female through the
female line, could be held separately from another tavazhi.
If one tavazhi was extinguished due to death, the property
accrues to the common fund of the tarwad. The tarwad has
been described as a quasi-corporation acting through the 
1
manager. The property of the tarwad may also be managed 
by the eldest female, though usually the eldest male was 
the manager (karnavan. in South-Kanara, in Aliyasantana 
law called ve.iaman) •
No member of the tarwad could originally partition 
though a tavazhi could in effect separate from another 
tavazhi, But the right to partition arose eventually and
was recognised by statues. The mode of partition is usually
2   _
per capita unlike in the Hitaksara system. Similarly as
in Anglo-Hindu law the right to partition and the equity of
the alienee led to the alienability of the share before
1Gopala v. Kalyani, 1964 Ker. L. Times,
2See further Derrett, Introduction ••• para. •
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partition* But in Antherman v* Kannan the adoption of 
M itaksara law as practised in British-Indian Courts into 
tiJaruraakkathayam law was refused*
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS*
The introduction of the possibility to alienate one1s 
share in the undivided family property , the pious obliga­
tion's understood at Anglo-Hindu law, the rights of females 
in joint family property according to s*6 of the Hindu 
Succession Act* 195&, may in fact appear suited to support 
the extinction of the joint family as a legal and social 
institution, if we consider the effects, cumulatively.
On the other hand these devices have not affected the basic 
pattern between father and son and their responsibility for 
the family as a whole. The institution from the legal 
point of view is based today rather on continuation of 
jointness by agreement and has become rather a privilege 
than an institution founded on status as the traditional 
joint family. But this does not warrant the conclusion 
that the law has destroyed the social institution.
On the contrary judicial decisions - in spite of draw­
backs and inconvenience which may be eventually rectified 
by the Supreme Court - appear to have contributed to the
1A.I.K. 1961 Ker. 130 (F.B.)
2 0 See Derrett, ubi cit., para. 5o0.
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transition of the joint family from tradition to the modern 
demands so that it can still play a significant role in 
modern life.
The history of the joint Hindu family at Anglo-Hindu 
law and the experience gained by legislative measures may 
serve as an instructive precedent for other countries, for 
example Nigeria, where joint families are about to emerge 
from their traditional background.
See Derrett (ed.), Studies in the Laws of Succession in 
Nigeria. Introductory Chapter.
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